THE ORGANISED CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE QUEST FOR FAIRNESS AMIDST SELF-PRESERVATION MOVEMENTS: A PERMANENT STRUGGLE

Path-dependence, however, also applies to the premise that key junctures in history can produce a sequence of events that create synergies^[1038] toward democratic consolidation and strengthen the rule of law.

Despite the most recent events in the country eroding such principles,^[1046] Brazilians still show comparatively high levels of awareness of corruption and a willingness to fight it, as those international indicators above have shown. In the new democratic order, the participation of organised civil society reflected on the creation of participatory institutions and councils in numerous areas of social life, notably in health, environment and social welfare - a phenomenon that Leonardo Avritzer called a �moment of explosion of social participation in Brazil’.^[1047] There were some successful experiences, such as the participatory budgeting in Brazil’s southern city of Porto Alegre,^[1048] then expanded to over 200 cities, reaching nearly 25 per cent of Brazil’s population.^[1049] This achievement, and the national conferences,^[1050] were praised as examples of civil activism that had important impacts on defining the social agenda^[1051] and also combatting corruption and enhancing governance.^[1052] Even when extinguished, such policies could still foster citizenship and civil mobilisation.^[1053]

Brazil would experience in the 1990s and 2000s the �proliferation of partici­patory governance institutions’ as mechanisms to overcome Congress’ deficient policy-making.^[1054] The disconnection of the political system with the demands of society, on the one hand, and the growing civil engagement, on the other, led to the phenomenon of �funnelling demands emerging from organised communi­ties into the executive branch’.^[1055] It was the period of organising structures and processes aimed at enhancing the enforcement of individual and social rights that could prevail over embedded self-reinforcing practices^[1056] such as clientelism.^[1057] It was the symbiosis of �the right to have rights’, whose goal was to expand individuals’ political voice in public deliberations, and �participatory publics’, which targeted the fair distribution of goods and resources.^[1058] Though some studies have pointed out that these new practices have not effectively overcome clientelism - and, in some cases, even created new forms for it to operate through involvement of traditional political actors^[1059] - evidence has also shown that such modalities of participatory governance have indeed enhanced the capacity of coordination of collective actors, the quality of their deliberations and their influence on defining the public agenda inside state institutions.^[1060]

Yet, this civil engagement toward enhancing the culture of participatory governance has proven far more nuanced.

The broken vertical accountability has since clashed with two important vari­ables that would foment social and political backlash. First, the improved checks and balances and accountability institutions made explicit how entrenched and widespread corruption is in the country, a phenomenon well portrayed by those perceptions-based indicators above.

The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff arose as a direct consequence of such a social catharsis, which was the element needed for the consolidation of a movement of self-preservation by the political class. It was the paradox of a government that enhanced mechanisms of horizontal accountability but saw the rapid crumbling of its party-to-voter linkages.^[1068] The Worker’s Party (PT) and, particularly, its leader, former President Lula da Silva, were the main targets of such corruption scandals. However, it would be naive to disregard the fact that, beneath this reality, there was a growing oppositional Congress whose members were very much implicated in various corruption scandals and a very experi­enced Vice-President eager to take office as a more trustworthy defender of the preservationist interests of the political class.

The increasing lack of vertical accountability amidst the strengthening of horizontal accountability and social inclusion is indeed a paradox. However, it explains to a great extent why organised civil society, whose mobilisation was crucial for the transition to democracy, became disillusioned, and therefore was easily co-opted by a populist agenda. The bonds among individuals that make for a vibrant organised civil society were weakened while an anti-systemic rhet­oric framed as an anti-corruption campaign gained momentum.

What is more, Brazil has endured one of the most notable shifts in demo­graphics, with the rise of conservative and right-wing movements anchored in resurrecting and boosting traditionalist and religious values while embracing nationalistic feeling and even supporting an illiberal agenda. Particularly strong has been the growth of Evangelicals, especially those from Pentecostal and Neopentecostal churches. In 1991, Evangelicals were only 9 per cent of Brazilians. In the 2000 census, this number grew to 15.4 per cent, and, in the 2010 census, it was already 22.2 per cent, a growth of 61 per cent in 10 years - the biggest expansion of this group worldwide.^[1069] If the growth rate keeps follow­ing such a pattern, it is expected that, by 2022, the number of Catholics, who made up 91 per cent of Brazilians in the 1970s, will amount to less than half of the Brazilian population^[1070] and, by 2032, be surpassed by Evangelicals.^[1071] They have to an increasing extent occupied institutional spaces: currently, there are 82 Evangelicals elected among the 513 federal deputies (they numbered 67 in 2014, 65 in 2010, and 35 in 2006),^[1072] and whoever is running for an elective office increasingly depends on their support. Although there are some important progressive voices in the evangelical community,^[1073] very few elected Evangelicals have willingly supported progressive values,^[1074] thus the association with the right-wing caucus is well established. President Bolsonaro, a reported Catholic married to an Evangelical, aggressively defended this agenda, especially through an anti-abortion and anti-gender equality rhetoric.

In this context, an organised civil society willing to defend democratic and progressive principles has clashed more widely with fast-growing movements - religious, right-wing and extremist - that organise themselves around a popu­list agenda with little or no regard for core democratic values.^[1076] Polarisation is the immediate consequence while moderate conservatives and liberals have their voice stifled. President Bolsonaro consistently strove to silence progressive voices while constraining checks on his behaviour. He raised barriers to horizontal accountability, extinguished hundreds of forums, such as the national councils aimed at democratising deliberations over national policies,^[1077] and attacked nongovernmental institutions^[1078] and the media.^[1079]

It would be misleading to overlook that Brazilians have already proven in history their capacity to reverse their course.^[1080] Brazil is no autocracy, but a democracy enduring a serious moment of crisis.^[1081] Despite the last develop­ments and the worsening in democratic indicators,^[1082] Brazilians still keep enjoying some freedom and rights, freedom of press remains mostly in place, and there are core institutions working to defend democracy. Political pluralism and participation remain rather strong, and supportive and oppositional forces to the government have had their space for political activities fairly preserved.^[1083] Besides, nongovernmental organisations, unions and associations of all sorts have been essential players in distinct moments of Brazil’s history,^[1084] and have not only exerted significant pressure on presidents and Congress, but also on the judiciary.^[1085]

VI.