INEQUALITY AND BRAZIL’S DECLINING RULE OF LAW
Inequality matters for democracy and the rule of law, and its impacts on both are well-documented in the literature.[349] An unequal country fails to provide a more robust system of impartial and formal norms that apply equally to all regardless of their social, political and economic status, while, at the same time, hindering coordination of concurrent interests to challenge state abuses.
Inequality affects key choices of institutional design and functioning,[350] with long term effects. Unequal countries mutually reinforce inequality, mistrust and corruption, which are hard to eradicate given their intimate correlation with wealth distribution and society’s culture.[351] The negative impacts of inequality on democratic consolidation - despite some controversy over its effects on democratisation - have been empirically demonstrated,[352] thereby greatly impacting the rule of law.[353] Democratisation itself may not necessarily diminish inequality - it may even increase it in some circumstances[354] - but inequality is certainly not a good companion for the rule of law.Inequality, after all, hinders the development of formal and informal instiÂtutions aimed at effectively protecting constitutional rights and laws targeting those most in need,[355] while protecting elites from any radical change in their status quo, a phenomenon that also persists in democracies.[356] Democracies can be very unequal, as in Brazil, but their quality, measured according to distinct variables and methodologies, cannot be dissociated from inequality and its detrimental effect on the rule of law. Moreover, persistent inequality may also help explain some global movements toward democratic backsliding, rising polarisation and popular distrust in democratic institutions, which have gained expression with the populist narrative of a popular revolution against the elites.[357] Brazil illustrates this phenomenon with the rise of President Bolsonaro.
Empirical data from renowned international institutes have shown that the quality of democracy and the rule of law in Brazil, which seemed until recently to move upwards, has gradually worsened, at least since 2015. Although such a decline is normally associated with some key junctures in the political realm, such as the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the elecÂtion of President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 (and, in particular, his pernicious government),[358] inequality and, especially, the worsening of social welfare are major structural factors impacting those numbers. It is no wonder that the Latinobarometro Informe 2021, one of the most comprehensive surveys on the quality of democracy in Latin America, begins its report by pointing out that â€?Latin Americans do not tolerate anymore governments that defend the interests of a few, the concentration of wealth... The abuse of power, the privileges, the restriction of pluralism are at the heart of the demand for equality before the law, respect, and dignity.’[359] Inequality matters a great deal for democratic crises, and Brazil is one major case among many others in the world as it has consistÂently seen its achievements in democracy and the rule of law being reversed in the last few years.
Some international indexers, such as Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index, and The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EUI’s) Democracy Index and surveys, such as Latinobarometro, have clearly pointed out Brazil’s downfall. The impact has been particularly felt by V-Dem, which possibly offers the most concerning analysis in this regard. Its 2021 report places Brazil among the top 10 autocratising countries and fourth among those whose numbers declined the most from 2010 to 2020.[360] Its various democÂracy indexes rank Brazil among the worst countries in South America.[361] The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2021 also points out a worrying scenario for Brazil’s rule of law.
The country lost three positions in comparison with the previous year and is in 77th position among 139 countries examined and in 16th position in Latin America and Caribbean.[362] Such a decline was found in all its markers, with the exception of â€?order and security’, but it was notably concentrated on â€?constraints on government powers’ (76th among the 139 countries), â€?regulatory enforcement’ (75th) and â€?fundamental rights’ (95th). Brazil, according to such an index, also features one of world’s worst criminal justice systems (112th).[363] The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EUI’s) Democracy Index 2020, even though providing a less grim picture of Brazil’s â€?flawed democracy’, has graded Brazil below 7 (on a scale from 0 to 10) since 2015, coinciding with critical political events in the country. Brazil is ranked 49th after Uruguay (15th), Chile (17th), Costa Rica (18th) - the three Latin American full democracies - Panama (40th), Colombia (46th) and Argentina (48th). For The Economist, Brazil’s democracy has certainly worsened, but it is not yet moving towards autocratisation. Finally, Latinobarometro corroborates such concluÂsions and raises concerns about the â€?deterioration’ of Brazil’s democracy under Bolsonaro.[364] Its numbers are indeed alarming: only 40 per cent of Brazilians support democracy (below the average of 49 per cent in the region), though 59 per cent reject a military regime and only 11 per cent support an authoritarÂian government.[365] Its numbers, in various segments, normally place Brazil in one of the most troublesome positions in Latin America. Key for such findings is, as expected, inequality: only 14 per cent of Brazilians responded that wealth distribution is fair, and merely 20 per cent answered that they enjoy equal social and economic opportunities, both the lowest numbers in Latin America.[366]It is disturbing for any analysis of the health of Brazilian democracy and rule of law to see such numbers.
On the one hand, the country has seen important improvements in its institutional capacities[367] and mechanisms of democracy.[368] On the other, such improvements have undergone serious setbacks and backlashes in the last years, placing the country in a peculiar position in Latin America despite the generalised democratic backsliding in most of the region and the globe. It is quite symptomatic to evince that Brazil is ranked, according to some such indexers, below other countries whose histoÂries are marked by far more unstable political backgrounds, higher levels of poverty and economic underdevelopment and widespread disregard for the rule of law.It should be noted that this is, however, a difficult moment in which to provide definite conclusions and a clear picture of the reality. Even if the most accurate methodologies were adopted, those numbers should always be taken with a pinch of salt and be accompanied by other contextual discusÂsions. Latinobarometro is particularly compelling, because it shows the vivid sentiment of a country undergoing a severe and generalised distrust in its demoÂcratic institutions, while delivering a fairly sharp picture of the reasons that led to the rise of President Bolsonaro. The other indexers, though having contrastÂing conclusions, point out that the country’s democracy and the rule of law are in serious trouble. Brazil looked until a few years ago to be on the path to develÂopment, but it has systematically undervalued the perils of inequality and the authoritarian mindset that has strong ties with inequality. If this is the message the country’s last developments get across, it should not be forgotten that it has also proven to be able to advance an agenda of social and institutional progress, even if only partially and gradually.
Those indexers and surveys raise rich debates by pointing out where the main problem may lie, but they are just the tip of the iceberg of a much more nuanced discussion.
Large-N analyses, especially by comparing so many variÂables, are methodologically challenging and echo perceptions that may not be consensual at all. For instance, opinions on the subject range from largely pessimistic, such as Saad-Filho and Boffo’s of a â€?nation [that] is tearing itself apart’,[369] or Bianchi, Rangel and Chaloub’s Brazil’s â€?de-democratization’,[370] to very optimistic ones, such as Marcus Andre Melo’s emphasis on Brazil’s â€?enormous institutional improvements in governance’ and â€?the independence and overall effectiveness of the Brazilian web of accountability institutions... unparalleled in new democracies and probably even in a host of older democra- cies’.[371] Still, it is possibly Tom Gerald Daly who best interpreted the current scenario: â€?Brazil has moved from a context of democratic decay to a context of democratic survival’, but it does not follow that Brazil cannot be evidence of a case of â€?democratic resilience’. As he says, â€?many fundamentals of a healthy democracy remain in place: a significant swathe of the public remains committed to democratic rule, civil society is vibrant and robust, and the core constitutional institutions for defending democracy - independent (if highly imperfect) courts, rights protections, and a free media- remain in place’.[372]The next chapters will delve into such a complex reality and explore some of the nuances that those indexers and surveys may only partially reach. First, though, we should look into the persistent authoritarian mindset in Brazil, which, alongside inequality, is the major factor undermining the country’s rule of law.