Index

References are to paragraph numbers

ABUSE OF POWER

actual bias [7.65]

bad faith [5.51]

human rights protection, and [4.04]

improper purposes [4.04]

legitimate expectation [1.07], [6.29] misfeasance in public office [8.28]-[8.29] root concept of common law, as [4.04] rule of law [4.05]

substantive legitimate expectation [1.08], [6.30],

[7.13]

substantive unreasonableness [6.07] unreasonableness [4.04]

ABUSE OF PROCESS

mixed issues [2.33]

procedural exclusivity [2.30]

sanctions in costs [2.05]

standing [3.68]

ACCESS TO A COURT

Article 6 ECHR.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS; RIGHT TO A HEARING

common law fundamental right [6.10], [7.31] right to a hearing. See RIGHT TO A

HEARING

ACTUAL BIAS. See BIAS

ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

effectiveness requirement [2.29], [2.35] requirement to use [2.29]

exceptions [2.35]

justification [2.34]

sanctions in costs [2.29]

setting aside leave [2.29]

ANTI-TECHNICALITY PROVISION. See PRO­CEDURAL EXCLUSIVITY

effect of [2.05], [2.28], [2.32] limits to use [2.12], [2.32]-[2.33]

ANXIOUS SCRUTINY

absolute rights [5.19]

closer look [6.10]

common law fundamental rights. See COMMON LAW

�fundamental principle' of the common law [4.04]

fundamental rights [1.09], [4.04] error of fact [4.39]

precedent fact [6.10]

relevancy [4.41], [5.45]

APPARENT BIAS. See BIAS

APPEALS

after leave stage

applicant's right of appeal [3.42]

criminal causes [3.21]

notice parties options [3.26], [3.43]

renewal contrasted [3.42] respondent's options [3.26], [3.43]

after substantive hearing

amended statement of case [3.92] appeals to Court of Appeal [3.92] �leap-frog' appeals to the Supreme Court [3.92]

new evidence [3.92]

out of time appeals [3.93]

range of possible grounds for appeal [3.92] time-limit [3.93]

criminal appeals.

BAD FAITH

abuse of power [5.52]. See ABUSE OF POWER actual bias compared [5.52], [7.65]. See BIAS intent [5.51]

meaning [5.51]

misfeasance in public office, and [5.51], [8.28]. And see MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE

purposes, and [5.51]. See too PURPOSES relevancy, and [5.51]. See too RELEVANCY BALANCE. See PROPORTIONALITY

BIAS. See too INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL

TRIBUNALS

actual bias [7.63]

abuse of power [7.65] bad faith compared [7.65] definition [7.65] need for clear evidence [7.65] question of fact [7.65] administrative decision-makers [7.62] apparent bias [7.63]

administrative decision-makers [7.66] Article 6 ECHR, impact of [7.63] automatic disqualification [7.67]-[7.68] context, importance of [7.66] elected decision-makers [7.72] examples of disqualifying bias [7.70] �fair-minded and informed observer' test

[7.63], [7.66], [7.69]

judicial decision-makers [7.66], [7.71]

old test [7.63]

other common law systems [7.63]

�party to the dispute' [7.68] pecuniary interests [7.67] political decision-makers [7.71]-[7.72] arbitrariness [7.62]

Article 6 ECHR. See INDEPENDENT AND

IMPARTIAL TRIBUNALS

difficulties for judicial review [7.64]

BIAS — continued

�independent and impartial tribunals’ [7.64] �full jurisdiction’ [7.64]

�objective risk’ formulation [7.63]

test for bias [7.63]

breach of rule, effect of [7.83] context, importance of [7.62] essence of rule [7.62] exceptions to the rule

necessity [7.81]

statute [7.80]

judicial decision-makers [7.62]

�public confidence’ [7.62]

refusal of remedy [7.83]. And see REMEDIES remedies. See REMEDIES

transparency [7.62]

waiver [7.62], [7.81]

BELFAST AGREEMENT

constitutional importance [1.13], [1.34]-[1.35] relevancy [5.44]

BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY

breach element [8.26]

causation element [8.26]

common law constitutional tort rejected [8.27] duty element [8.26]

complex cases [8.26]

literal terms of statute [8.26] public, not private duties [8.26] statutory source [8.26] target duties [8.26]

negligence compared [8.26] restrictive approach of courts [8.27]

State liability doctrine, and [3.80], [8.39]

CANDOUR, DUTY OF

discovery, and [3.51] leave stage [3.18] refusal of remedy [3.87], [7.58], [8.08] sanctions where breach of [3.51]

Carltona doctrine.

Attorney General, no leave requirement [3.17] availability in Human Rights Act 1998 cases [8.43]

coercive nature [8.13] contempt of court [8.13] decisions taken on basis of impugned decision

[8.14]

declaration instead of [8.14] difficulties with [8.14] effect [3.76], [8.13] flexible use [8.14] inferior courts [8.13]

liberty to re-take decision in light of order

[8.13]

origins [8.13]

partially unlawful decisions [8.14]

power to remit decisions without quashing [3.78], [8.15]

power to reverse/vary decisions [8.15] prohibition, and [8.13]

rule of law [8.14] safeguarding administration [8.14] severance [8.14]. And see SEVERANCE subordinate decision-makers [8.13] subordinate legislation [8.14]

CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

THE EUROPEAN UNION

effect [1.19] fairness [7.04] nature [1.19]

provisions [1.19]

reasons [7.49]

relationship with ECHR [1.19]

�CLOSER LOOK’ REVIEW. See ANXIOUS

SCRUTINY; PROPORTIONALITY COLLATERAL CHALLENGES

private law proceedings [2.33] subordinate legislation. See SUBORDINATE

LEGISLATION

COMMON LAW. See too �ROOT CONCEPTS’ anxious scrutiny as �fundamental principle’ [4.04]

constitutional statutes. See CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES

constitutional torts rejected [3.83], [8.27], [8.29] dynamism of [1.14]

ECHR, influence of [1.01], [1.20], [4.01] EU law, influence of [1.01], [1.15], [4.01] equality. See EQUALITY fairness. See FAIRNESS

fundamental rights

�closer look’ review, and [6.10] freedom of expression [6.10] relevancy, and [5.45]

right of access to a court [6.10], [7.31] right to life [6.10]

statutory interpretation, and [1.26], [6.10] subordinate legislation, and [5.35]

general principles of law [1.15] grounds for review [4.01] judge-led method [1.14] other jurisdictions [1.15] reasons. See REASONS

relationship with Parliamentary sovereignty

[1.14]

rule of law. See RULE OF LAW

source of law, as [1.14]-[1.15]

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES.

COMMUNITIES ACT 1972; HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998; NORTHERN IRELAND ACT 1998

content [5.04]

definition [1.28], [5.04]

European Communities Act [1.29], [5.04] Human Rights Act [1.31]-[1.33], [5.04] illegality [5.04]-[5.05]

implied repeal [1.28], [5.04] interpretation of [1.36]

judicial activism [1.28] narrow approach to [1.28],[1.33]

Northern Ireland Act [1.34]-[1.35], [5.04] parliamentary sovereignty [5.05]

CONSULTATION

common law requirement

adequate consultation, elements of [7.24], [7.33]

context, importance of [7.33] legitimate expectation [7.10], [7.25] refusal of remedies [7.33] remedies [7.33] right to a hearing [7.33] subordinate legislation [7.25] statutory requirement

adequate consultation, elements of [7.24] common law supplementing statute [7.25] consultees [7.23]

context, importance of [7.24]

effect of failure to respond to invitation

[7.24]

effect of non-compliance [7.24] legislative intent, importance of [7.18], [7.21] legitimate expectation [7.23] public participation [7.23] refusal of remedies [7.24]

Wednesbury challenges [7.23]

CONTEXT SENSITIVITY. And see JUSTICIA­BILITY; REVIEWABILITY; DEFERENCE; SOFT-EDGED REVIEW

closer review, depending on [2.09] importance of [1.05], [4.01], [4.03], [4.14] interpretation of statute [1.27], [4.22] judicial restraint [2.09] proportionality [6.13] unreasonableness [6.06]

CONTRACTING-OUT

�problem' of [2.23]-[2.25]

CONTRACTUAL DISPUTES

exclusion from review [2.10]

public sector disputes [2.11]-[2.13]. See

�NATURE OF THE ISSUE' TEST COSTS

�costs follow the event' [3.35], [3.95] discontinuation

reason for influencing orders [3.95]

discovery [3.52]

leave

applicant cover own costs where refused

[3.36] discontinuance [3.36] respondents costs [3.36] orders for respondents [3.95] orders for successful applicants [3.95] orders/part orders against successful applicants

[3.95]

protective costs orders/the Corner House prin­ciples [3.35], [3.95]

applicant must have no private interest in outcome [3.35]

financial position of applicant relevant [3.35] Human Rights Act 1998 [3.35]

issues raised must be of general public importance [3.35]

likelihood of proceedings being discontinued [3.35] likely costs involved relevant [3.35] made at any stage in proceedings [3.35] public interest requires resolution of issue [3.35]

sanctions in,

abuse of process, for [2.05] failure to prepare papers as directed by the court [3.19], [3.64]

COURTS OF LAW.

appeals after substantive hearing [3.94]

appeals at leave stage [3.21]

composition of court [3.21] definition [3.21]

power in respect of sentences [8.32] CROSS-EXAMINATION

approach to discovery as guide [3.61]

availability [3.61]

general approach [3.61]

human rights [3.61]

leave stage [3.61]

substantive hearing [3.61]

CROWN. See REMEDIES

DAMAGES. See BREACH OF STATUTORY

DUTY; EUROPEAN UNION LAW; HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998; MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE; NEGLIGENCE basic position [3.77], [8.21] ex gratia compensation [8.21] exceptional remedy [8.21] need for claim to sound in private law [3.77], [8.21] restrictive body of case law [8.21] statutory rights to damages [8.21]

DECISION

decision letter [3.05]

notice of as precondition to legality [3.05] remedy depending on nature of decision [3.05] when to challenge [3.10]-[3.13]

DECLARATIONS

academic disputes general approach [8.18] where issues raised are of public importance [8.18]

advice of courts [8.18] availability in Human Rights Act 1998 cases [8.43]

consequence of failure to observe [8.17] declaratory judgments [3.78], [8.18] effect [3.76], [8.17] flexible remedy [8.17]

form of the remedy [8.17]

interim [3.44]

�must serve some useful purpose' [8.18] non-coercive [8.17]

private law remedy, as [3.76]

sole remedy, as [8.17]

DECLARATIONS OF INCOMPATIBILITY. See

HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

DEFERENCE

meaning of term [4.17]

DEFERENCE - continued

judicial aversion towards [4.17]

reviewability, and [4.17]

separation of powers, and [4.17] DELAY

ECHR, compatibility with [3.30]

EU law, compatibility with [3.30] good administration [3.28], [3.29] objective of requirement [1.07] prematurity. See PREMATURITY promptitude, importance of [3.28] provision [1.07], [3.28] third party interests [3.28] time, when it runs, [3.28] time-limit, �good reason' for extending examples [3.29] several periods [3.29] substantive hearing [3.29] reasonable and objective justification [3.29] DELEGATION

Carltona doctrine

�alter ego' [5.54]

devolved executives [5.54] fundamental rights [5.55] local authorities [5.54] meaning [5.54] ministerial responsibility [5.54] executive agencies [5.51] rationale [5.54] statutory bodies [5.54] principle of non-delegation

agents [5.53] employees [5.53] fettering of discretion [5.53].

TERING OF DISCRETION presumption not rule [5.53] rationale [5.53] when presumption rebutted [5.53] DEVOLUTION ISSUES

decision of court [3.24], [5.24]- [5.26], [5.28] definition [3.24]

notice requirements [3.24], [3.38], [5.24], [5.28],

[5.29]

procedural requirements [3.07]

Supreme Court approach [1.36], [5.25] when arise [1.13], [5.16], [5.24], [5.28] DIRECTORY REQUIREMENTS. See PROCE­DURAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATUTE DISCOVERY. See too HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998; EUROPEAN UNION LAW

context, importance of [3.53], [3.54] contingent discovery [3.52] costs and [3.52]

duty of candour. See CANDOUR, DUTY OF

�fair disposal' test [3.52], [3.54] fairness challenges [3.53] freedom of information. See FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION 2000

general approach [3.50]

Human Rights Act 1998. See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

judge in chambers [3.52]

appeals [3.52]

justification for traditionally limited approach

[3.50]

�Micawber' discovery [3.52] power of High Court [3.52] proportionality challenges. See HUMAN

RIGHTS ACT 1998

public interest immunity. See PUBLIC

INTEREST IMMUNITY

relevancy challenges [3.53] Wednesbury unreasonable challenges [3.53] when orders should be sought [3.51]

DISCRETION. And see POWERS, STATUTORY; DUTIES, STATUTORY centrality to decision-making [4.22] definition [4.22], [5.41]

duties [4.22]

grounds for challenging exercise of. See

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

justification for judicial intervention [5.41] limited discretion and closer look review [6.03] non-statutory power [4.06]-[4.08], [5.41] non-fettering of discretion. See FETTERING OF DISCRETION

�policy' decisions and judicial restraint [6.03] powers [4.22] source of [4.22]

statutory interpretation [4.22], [5.41], [6.03] �unfettered' [4.23]

rule of law [4.23]

wide discretion and judicial restraint [6.03]

DISCRETIONARY AREA OF JUDGMENT absolute rights [6.26] centrality to case law [6.26] �deference or latitude' [6.25] disagreement as to use [6.26] economic choices [6.25] effect [1.22], [6.25] error of material fact [4.43] guiding considerations [6.25] margin of appreciation, and [1.22] �margin of discretion' [6.25] meaning [6.25] �no evidence' rule, and [4.42] political decisions [6.25] relevancy, and [4.42] relevant constitutional considerations [6.25] self-restraint [6.25] separation of powers [6.25] use in specific cases [6.26] when easier to apply [6.25]

DUTIES, STATUTORY

damages [4.26]

�policy' choices [4.28] reluctance to award [4.28] declarations [4.27] discretion, and [4.27] mandamus [4.26] mandatory language [4.26] powers compared [4.26] spending priorities [4.27] statutory interpretation [4.22]

�target' duties [4.27], [8.26]

DUTY TO GIVE REASONS. See REASONS

EFFECTIVENESS PRINCIPLE. See EUROPEAN

CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS;

EUROPEAN UNION LAW; REMEDIES

EMANATION OF THE STATE DOCTRINE purpose [2.20]

�spill-over' [2.20]

test for amenability to review [2.20]

other tests compared [2.21]

EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES

excluded from review [2.11]

nature of the issue exception [2.11] EQUALITY

common law

basic tension [6.46]

�closer look' review [6.46]

decisions taken in absence of policy [6.50] decisions taken in light of a policy [6.50] discretionary area of judgment [6.51] irrationality [6.51] legitimate expectation, and [6.50] proportionality [6.51] separation of powers [6.50] Wednesbury [6.46], [6.51]

ECHR, Article 14

�closer look' review [6.48] comparator requirement [6.58] direct discrimination [6.59] discretionary area of judgment [6.48], [6.58] indirect discrimination [6.59] justification [6.58] legitimate objective [6.58] not free-standing [6.57] proportionality [6.58]

�within the ambit' test [6.57]

EU law

age [6.54]

�closer look' review [6.48] direct effect [6.54], [6.55] Directives [6.55] disability [6.54]

TFEU [6.54]

free movement [6.54]

gender [6.54]

general principle of law [6.56] justification [6.56]

margin of appreciation [6.48] nationality [6.54] proportionality [6.56] racial or ethnic origin [6.54] religion or belief [6.54] sex [6.54] sexual orientation [6.54]

essence of principle [6.46]

formal meaning

Dicey [6.49]

legislative supremacy [6.49] rule of law [6.49]

legitimate expectation, and [6.35], [6.50]

Northern Ireland Act 1998 duties of public authorities [5.30] Equality Commission, role of [5.30] equality schemes [5.30] judicial review [5.32] public authorities defined [2.26]-[2.27], [5.30] Secretary of State, role of [5.30] statutory remedy [5.31]

separation of powers concerns [6.46] statute law

alternative remedies [6.47], [6.53] examples [6.52]

substantive fairness, and [6.46]

substantive meaning

European law, influence of [6.49]

EQUALITY DUTIES

generally [5.31]-[5.32]

relevant considerations, as [5.46]

EQUALITY COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

powers [5.22]

role in relation to public authorities [5.30] ERROR OF FACT

degree, matters of [4.36]

distinction between law and fact [4.36] error of material fact

Article 6 ECHR, importance to [4.44] discretionary area of judgment [4.43] fairness [4.43] meaning of [4.43] proportionality [4.43] relevancy [4.43] unreasonableness [4.43] �wrong factual basis' doctrine [4.43] error of precedent fact close review for [4.39] defined [4.38] fundamental rights [4.39] illegality, and [4.38] �jurisdictional' origins [4.38] rarely arises [4.39] fact and degree [4.36] limited scope for intervention [1.05], [2.34],

[4.29], [4.36]

�no evidence'

basis of rule [4.42] discretionary area of judgment [4.42] proportionality [4.42] unreasonableness [4.42]

relevancy. See too RELEVANCY �anxious scrutiny' [4.41] discretionary area of judgment [4.41] error of material fact [4.43] express considerations [4.40] implied considerations [4.40] judicial approach [4.41] meaning [4.40] proportionality [4.41] unreasonableness [4.40], [4.41]

ERROR OF LAW

Anisminic principle [4.30]. See too OUSTER CLAUSES

courts of law

ERROR OF LAW — continued

appeal as alternative remedy [4.33]

confusion as to review [4.32]

damages claims [4.34]

leave, conditions for grant [4.33]

lower court decisions open to review [4.32] need for caution when reviewing [4.33] �domestic’ decision-makers

exception to Anisminic principle [4.35] meaning of [4.35]

jurisdictional theory

error of law going to jurisdiction [4.30]

error of law on the face of the record [4.30],

[4.31]

error of law within jurisdiction [4.30] modern position [4.05], [4.30] previous relevance [4.05], [4.30] retained by statute [4.34]

meaning [4.05]

ultra vires doctrine [4.31]

void and voidable [4.05]

basis of distinction [4.31]

end of distinction [4.31]

ESTOPPEL. See LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT 1972. And see

EUROPEAN UNION LAW

constitutional statute, as [1.29], [5.04] damages [1.17], [5.09]. See EUROPEAN UNION

LAW

direct effect of EU law [5.06]

effect of [5.07] general principles of law [1.17], [5.09] implementation of EU measures [5.06] interpretive obligation [1.17], [5.06], [5.09] key provisions [5.06] parliamentary sovereignty [5.07] primary legislation

margin of appreciation [6.04]

review for compliance with EU law [6.04] proportionality. See PROPORTIONALITY references to ECJ [1.17], [5.06], [5.09] remedies. See EU LAW; STATE LIABILITY

DOCTRINE

requirement to give effect to case law of ECJ [8.33]

�spill-over’ [8.33]

supremacy [5.07]

Walton case [8.40]

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS

absolute rights, nature of [1.21]

�anxious’ scrutiny [5.19]

role of courts [5.19]

Article 2 ECHR

adjectival dimension [1.33]

national security decisions [4.19] proportionate use of force [6.20]

reasons [7.29]

Article 3 ECHR

national security decisions [4.19]

reasons [7.29]

Article 5 ECHR

damages [8.46]

reasons [7.48]

Article 6 ECHR. See too FAIR HEARING; BIAS; INDEPENDENT AND IMPAR­TIAL TRIBUNALS

access to a court, right of [7.31] administrative determinations [7.15] broad approach [7.15] civil rights, meaning of [4.13], [7.15] common law fairness compared [7.16] criminal charges [7.17]

error of material fact, importance of [4.44] examples of �civil’ rights [7.15] �full jurisdiction’ requirement [7.16] impact on bias at common law [7.16], [7.63] limitations [6.20] national security [4.19]

Northern Ireland courts, and [7.15] ouster clauses [4.13] private law rights [7.15] �public law’ rights [4.13] reasons [7.29] requirements of [4.13]

right of access to a court [7.31]

Article 8 ECHR

reasons [7.29]

Article 9 ECHR

margin of appreciation [6.22] proportionality [6.20] qualified nature of right [3.56] Article 10 ECHR

proportionality [6.20]

qualified nature of right [3.56]

Article 11 ECHR

margin of appreciation [6.22] proportionality [6.20] qualified nature of [3.56]

Article 14 ECHR. And see EQUALITY proportionality [6.20]

when discriminatory measures permissible

[6.20]

Article 15 ECHR

margin of appreciation [6.22] proportionality [6.20]

when derogations permissible [6.20] autonomous meaning [1.21] common law, influence on [1.01], [1.20] delay. See DELAY derogable rights [1.21] dynamism [1.21] effectiveness principle [3.82], [8.43] general principles of EU law, and [1.20] illegality [5.01] judicial review procedure, impact on [3.02] �just satisfaction’ [8.44] legality [1.22] living instrument [1.21] margin of appreciation

absolute rights [6.22]

decision-makers who enjoy [6.21] effect of [6.21]

meaning [6.21]

positive obligations [6.22]

public emergencies [6.22]

qualified rights [6.22] reasonableness requirement [6.22] resources [6.22]

when invoked [6.21]

national security [4.19] non-derogable rights [1.21] proportionality. See PROPORTIONALITY qualified rights, nature of [1.21]

discretionary area of judgment. See DISCRE­TIONARY AREA OF JUDGMENT proportionality. See PROPORTIONALITY role of courts [5.19]

primary legislation

discretionary area of judgment [6.04] review for compatibility [5.13]-[5.15], [6.04] reasons. See REASONS

relationship to Human Rights Act [1.20] remedies. See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 role before Human Rights Act [1.20] source of law, as [1.20]-[1.22]

EUROPEAN UNION ACT 2011

dualism, and [1.30]

effect [1.30]

EUROPEAN UNION LAW

agriculture [5.08]

areas of competence [1.16], [5.08] capital, free movement of [5.08] Charter of Fundamental Rights [1.18] common law, influence on [1.01], [1.15] competition [5.08]

constitutional basis for reception [1.16] delay. See DELAY

damages [1.17], [5.09], [8.37]-[8.39]. See STATE LIABILITY DOCTRINE

direct effect doctrine [8.33]

Directives, challenges to [3.08] discovery [3.55]

effective protection of rights doctrine [3.47], [5.09]

emanation of the state doctrine. See EMANA­TION OF THE STATE

environment [5.08]

equal pay [5.08] equality. See EQUALITY foreign policy [1.16], [5.08] general principles of law [1.17], [5.09] goods, free movement of [5.08] health and safety [5.08]

illegality [5.01]

injunctions

effective protection of rights, need for [3.47] references to ECJ, when [3.47] �spill-over’ of remedy [3.47]

test when challenging EU measures [3.08],

[3.48]

internal market [1.16], [5.08] interpretive obligation [1.17], [5.09] judicial review procedure, impact on [3.02] legitimate expectation [6.17]

�loyalty’ clause [5.09]

margin of appreciation [6.13], [6.15] administrative decision-makers [6.16] Directives and implementing measures [6.15] executive decision-makers [6.16] national legislative choices [6.15]

national security decisions [4.19]

persons, free movement of [5.08] precautionary principle [6.17]

primary legislation

margin of appreciation [6.04] substantive review of [5.07], [6.04] proportionality. See PROPORTIONALITY reasons. See REASONS

references to ECJ [1.17], [3.08], [5.09]

Regulations, challenges to [3.08] remedies

damages [3.80]. See STATE LIABILITY DOCTRINE

direct effect [8.33] effective protection of rights, and [3.47], [3.79], [5.09], [8.33]

equivalent protection of rights [3.79], [8.33] European Commission, and [8.33] injunctions [3.47], [8.35]-[8.36] link with national remedies and procedures [3.79], [8.33]

supremacy of EU law, and [3.79], [8.33] uniform protection of individual [8.33] security [1.16], [5.08] services, free movement of [5.08] social policy [5.08]

source of law, as [1.16]-[1.19]

�spill-over’ [1.18]

emanation of the State doctrine [2.20] general principles of law [5.09] injunctions, and [3.47], [8.36]

State aid [5.08]

supremacy of [1.16]

EXECUTIVE AGENCIES.

Carltona doctrine. See DELEGATION

FACT. See ERROR OF FACT

limited scope for intervention [1.05], [2.34],

[4.29], [4.36]

FAIRNESS. See too NATURAL JUSTICE bias. See BIAS

context dependent [7.11]

counter terrorism [7.11] national security [7.11], [7.39], [7.52] prosecution decisions [7.12], [7.53] renewal cases [7.11] revocation cases [7.11]

�curative’ principle

appeals [7.12]

�composite’ compliance [7.12] judicial review [7.12]

flexible concept [7.01]

human rights protection, and [4.04] legitimate expectation [6.29], [6.37]

nature of [1.08]

preliminary determinations

challengeable in some instances [3.12]

FAIRNESS — continued

fairness as an objective at each stage [7.12] whether overall process fair [7.12] procedural fairness [6.29]

abuse of power, and [6.30] consultation [7.13] legitimate expectation [6.30], [7.13] prosecution decisions [7.12], [7.53] reach of

administrative determinations [7.09] consistency [7.10] contract of employment [7.09] consultation [7.10]. See too

CONSULTATION

interests [7.09]

judicial determinations [7.09] liberty [7.09] licences [7.09]

modern approach [7.09]

procedural legitimate expectations [7.10] property [7.09]

prosecution decisions [7.12]

rights [7.09]

rule of law [7.10]

right to a hearing. See RIGHT TO A HEARING

root concept of common law, as [4.04] substantive fairness [6.29], [7.13]

abuse of power [7.13]

criticism [7.14]

equality, and [6.46]

legitimate expectation [4.04], [7.13] separation of powers [7.14]

FETTERING OF DISCRETION

contracts

effect of [5.57]

relevance of statutory scheme [5.57] delegation [5.57]. See DELEGATION policies [5.56]

fair hearing challenges [5.56]

Human Rights Act 1998 [5.56] legitimacy of [5.56] need to retain discretion [5.56] reasonableness challenges [5.56] relevancy challenges [5.56] ultra vires challenges [5.56] rule against fettering [5.56] substantive legitimate expectation doctrine, tension with [5.58]

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 absolute exemptions [3.59] conclusive evidence certificates

appeals against [3.60]

effect [3.60]

decision notices [3.59]

discovery, and [3.58]-[3.60] duty of authority [3.58] fees notice [3.58]

High Court, appeals to [3.59]

Information Commissioner [3.59]

appeals made by [3.60]

Information Tribunal

appeals to [3.59]

role in relation to conclusive evidence certifi­cates [3.60]

internal complaints procedures [3.59] judicial review procedure, impact on [3.02] ministerial override certificates

effect [3.60]

judicial review as remedy [3.60] national security [3.60] nature of requests [3.58] public authorities for purposes of [2.26]-[2.27], [3.58]

qualified exemptions [3.59] refusal of requests [3.58] time-frame for decisions [3.58] when requests may be made [3.58]

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. See COMMON LAW;

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS; HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 sources of [1.09]

GOOD ADMINISTRATION

delay requirement, and [1.07], [3.28], [3.29] reason for refusing a remedy, as [3.84], [3.88] GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW abuse of power. See ABUSE OF POWER bad faith. See BAD FAITH bias. See BIAS

constitutional purposes of [4.03]

activism [4.03]

justiciability. See JUSTICIABILITY reviewability. See REVIEWABILITY constitutional statutes. See ILLEGALITY context-sensitivity [4.01] delegation. See DELEGATION OF POWER ECHR. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS equality. See EQUALITY error of fact. See ERROR OF FACT EU law. See EUROPEAN UNION LAW;

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT 1972 fairness. See FAIRNESS, NATURAL JUSTICE fettering. See FETTERING OF DISCRETION Human Rights Act. See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

illegality. See ILLEGALITY improper purposes. See PURPOSES irrationality. See IRRATIONALITY, UNREA­

SONABLENESS, WEDNESBURY legitimate expectations. See LEGITIMATE

EXPECTATIONS

Northern Ireland Act. See NORTHERN IRELAND ACT 1998

overlapping nature of [4.02], [5.03] proportionality. See PROPORTIONALITY purpose of [4.01]

reasonableness. See UNREASONABLENESS relevancy. See RELEVANCY �review, not appeal' distinction [4.01] right to a hearing. RIGHT TO A HEARING root concepts of the common law. See ROOT CONCEPTS. soft-edged review. See SOFT-EDGED REVIEW unreasonableness. See UNREASONABLENESS Wednesbury. See UNREASONABLENESS

�HOLDING OF PUBLIC OFFICE'. See

INJUNCTIONS

HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998. See also

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS damages [3.83]

�Act not a tort statute' [8.45] cause of action [3.83], [8.44] declaration instead of [8.45] guidelines [8.45] judicial acts [8.46] �just satisfaction' [8.44] narrow approach to [3.83], [8.45] requirement to �take into account' ECtHR case law [8.44] declarations of incompatibility

competent courts [5.15], [8.47]

effect [1.30], [5.11]

legislative supremacy, and [8.47] notice. See NOTICE PARTIES parliament [5.15], [5.17] primary legislation [1.31], [5.15], [8.47] procedural requirements [3.23] subordinate legislation [1.31], [5.17], [8.47] when to be made [1.31]

devolution issues. See DEVOLUTION ISSUES discovery

proportionality, and [3.55] public interest immunity [3.57] when further discovery is needed [3.55] when further discovery not needed [3.56] discretionary area of judgment. See DISCRE­TIONARY AREA OF JUDGMENT

effect [1.22]

margin of appreciation, and [1.22] injunctions

availability [3.49]

non-applicability to primary legislation [3.49] interpretive obligation [1.25], [1.31]-[1.32], [8.47]

contextual techniques [5.14]

directory provisions [7.21] discretionary area of judgment [5.13] judicial debate about [5.14] limits to judicial role [5.13] mandatory provisions [7.21] precedent [5.14] purposive techniques [5.14] reading words in/out of legislation [5.14] revised meaning of words [5.14] �strong adjuration' [5.14] when arises [5.13] leave application

procedural requirements [3.23]

specification of remedies [3.23] legislative supremacy [8.41] Northern Ireland Assembly. See NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY notice requirements [3.23], [3.38], [8.49] objectives [1.30], [8.41] parliamentary sovereignty

acts of public authorities [5.21]

declarations of incompatibility [5.15], [5.17] design of Act [1.31]

primary legislation

declarations of incompatibility [5.15], [5.17] discretionary area of judgment [6.04] interpretative obligation [1.31], [5.13] meaning [5.13]

substantive review [6.04] proportionality. See PROPORTIONALITY public authorities for purposes of. See PUBLIC

AUTHORITIES

acts [5.18]

contracting-out [2.23]-[2.24]

courts and tribunals [5.18]

discretionary area of judgment [5.19], [5.20] defences under Act [5.21], [8.48] �definitions' [2.22]-[2.25]

excluded authorities [5.18]

failures to act [5.18]

failure to consider rights, consequence of

[5.20]

mixed function/hybrid [2.22]

obligations [2.22]

Parliament excluded [5.18]

public acts, private acts, distinguished

[2.23]-[2.24]

pure/obvious authorities [2.22] reasons. See REASONS remedies. And see REMEDIES

availability [3.49], [3.82], [8.01], [8.43] binding remedies [8.41]

damages [3.83], [8.44]-[8.46] effectiveness principle [3.82], [8.01], [8.43] requirement �to take into account' ECtHR case law [8.43]

victim requirement [8.42]. And see

STANDING

retrospective effect [1.33], [5.12]

role of courts

absolute rights [5.19]

public authorities, as [2.22], [5.18]

qualified rights [5.19]

standing

core public authorities [3.72]

ECHR case law, relevance of [3.69]

mixed function authorities [3.72] non-governmental organisations [3.72] proceedings in Strasbourg, and [3.71] public authorities [3.72]

public interest applications [3.70] representational applications [3.70] statutory exceptions to �victim' requirement [3.70]

sufficiency of interest requirement [8.42]

�victim' requirement [3.69]

subordinate legislation

Acts of the Northern Ireland Assembly as

[5.16]

HUMAN RIGHTS ACT - continued declarations of incompatibility [5.17] interpretive obligation [1.31], [5.16] meaning [5.16] parliamentary sovereignty, and [5.17] when subordinate legislation can be struck- down [5.16]

when subordinate legislation cannot be struck-down [5.17]

�take into account' ECHR case law, obligation common law overlap [5.19] not a blanket obligation [5.12] proportionality following from [5.12] review of acts of public authorities [5.19]

�victim' requirement [3.69]-[3.72]

ILLEGALITY. See too CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES; ERROR OF LAW; SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION;

ULTRA VIRES

Bad faith. See BAD FAITH

common law constraints [5.02] definition [5.01]

delegation. See DELEGATION discretion [5.01]

ECHR. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS

EU law. See EUROPEAN UNION LAW

European Communities Act. See EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT 1972

failure to act [5.01]

fettering of discretion. See FETTERING OF DISCRETION

Human Rights Act. See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

improper purposes. See PURPOSES no legal basis for decision [5.01] Northern Ireland Act. See NORTHERN

IRELAND ACT 1998

relevancy. See RELEVANCY IMPROPER PURPOSES. See PURPOSES INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNALS (ARTICLE 6 ECHR)

administrators [7.74]

�civil rights', meaning of [4.13], [7.15] �composite' approach to compliance [7.12], [7.32]

appeals [7.51], [7.74]

�full jurisdiction' [7.51], [7.74]

�full jurisdiction' absence of [7.77] accountability to Parliament [7.75] challenge for judicial review [7.64], [7.74] considerations relevant to [7.75] context, importance of [7.75] discretionary area of judgment [7.76] disputed questions of fact [7.77] error of fact doctrine, importance of [7.76].

See too ERROR OF FACT grounds for review [7.76] licensing [7.75] meaning [7.75]

Ministers [7.75] planning [7.75] private rights [7.75] proportionality [7.76] reach of civil rights [7.78] separation of powers, importance of [7.75] simple questions of fact [7.77] social welfare decisions [7.75] traditional grounds for review sufficient [7.76] impartiality [7.73]

actual bias [7.73]. See too BIAS

objective test [7.73]

objectively justified doubts [7.73] subjective test [7.73] independence

meaning [7.74] judicial decision-makers [7.74] political decision-makers [7.74]

INJUNCTIONS. See too EUROPEAN UNION

LAW; HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 availability in Human Rights Act 1998 cases

[8.43]

EU law

effective protection principle [8.35]

Factortame decision [8.35]

�spill-over' [8.36]

final

coercive nature [8.19] contempt of court [8.19] effect [3.76], [8.19] mandatory [8.19] private law remedy, as [3.76] prohibitory [8.19] when issue [8.19]

�holding of public office', power in relation to [3.78], [8.31]

Interim

availability [3.46] balance of convenience test [3.45], [8.19] civil proceedings, meaning [3.46] considerations to be taken into account [3.45] effect [3.45]

influence of EU law [3.46] Ministers of the Crown [3.46] relationship with other remedies [3.46] test in private law proceedings [3.45], [8.19] test in public law proceedings [3.45], [8.19] mandamus and prohibition compared [8.20] Ministers of the Crown

availability [3.46], [8.19]

contempt of court [3.46], [8.19]

EU law, influence of [3.46], [8.05],

[8.35]-[8.36] when may issue [8.19] when should be sought [8.20]

INTERIM MATTERS. See CROSS-EXAMINA­

TION; DISCOVERY; INTERIM REMEDIES; INTERROGATORIES

INTERIM REMEDIES. See too EU LAW;

HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

interim declarations [3.44] interim injunctions [3.44]-[3.46]

Ministers of the Crown. See INJUNCTIONS stays [3.44]

INTERNATIONAL LAW

customary international law

common law, and [1.23]

definition [1.23]

difficulties with [1.23]

unincorporated treaties and conventions dualism [1.23], [6.36]

legitimate expectations [6.36] parallelism in the common law [1.23] relevance [1.23]

INTERROGATORIES

approach to discovery as guide [3.60]. And see

DISCOVERY

availability [3.60]

IRRATIONALITY. See UNREASONABLENESS equated with Wednesbury [6.05] equality, and. See EQUALITY

JUDICIAL RESTRAINT. See too CONTEXT SENSITIVITY; DEFERENCE; SEPARATION OF POWERS

context and [2.09]

debate about [1.03]

JUDICIAL REVIEW

appeals contrasted [1.05], [2.34] available when no other remedy [2.13] constitutional importance [4.03] constitutional justification [1.06]-[1.10] �control' function [4.03], [4.04] definitions [1.04]

discretionary remedy [2.05]. And see

REMEDIES

efficiency in public decision-making [1.06] grounds for. See GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ouster clauses, approach too. See OUSTER CLAUSES

problem of the province of [2.03]-[2.05] procedure, when to use [2.04]-[2.05], [3.04]-[3.13]

protection of the individual [1.06]

purposes [1.06]

range of challengeable measures [3.05]-[3.08] review, not appeal [1.03], [1.05]

tests for amenability [2.06]-[2.27] tribunal proceedings compared [2.34] when appropriate. See ALTERNATIVE

REMEDIES; PREMATURITY

JURISDICTIONAL THEORY. See ERROR OF LAW

JUSTICIABILITY

criticisms of [4.16]

customary international law [1.24]

meaning [4.07], [4.14]

�non'-justiciability [4.15]

damages actions, and [8.23] �policy' decisions [4.15], [8.23] royal prerogative [4.15] separation of powers [4.15] reviewability. See REVIEWABILITY royal prerogative [4.07], [4.14]

LEAVE. See too APPEALS; COSTS; DELAY; STANDING

application to set aside grant of [3.26]

�arguable case' threshold available material determining whether met [3.25]

respondent's view [3.26]

when appropriate to grant leave [3.25]

Attorney General [3.17]

book of exhibits [3.18], [3.19] costs. See COSTS criminal causes

composition of court [3.21] when arise [3.22]

devolution issues. See DEVOLUTION ISSUES hearings [3.20]

Human Rights Act 1998. See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

Judicial Review, Practice Note 01/2008 [3.19] making the application

affidavits, content [3.18] disclosure [3.18] documents [3.18] fee [3.18]

Order 53 statement, content [3.18] notice parties. See NOTICE PARTIES onus of proof [3.25] pre-action protocol. See PRE-ACTION PROTOCOL

purpose of [3.17]

standing. See STANDING urgent cases

heard as substantive cases [3.32]

when required [3.17]

where granted

affidavit of service of notion of motion [3.34] appeals in respect of partial grants [3.33] fee [3.34]

originating motion [3.34] permitted grounds for challenge [3.33] pre-hearing review [3.34] respondent's affidavit(s) [3.34]

LEGAL AID. See RIGHT TO A HEARING

LEGALITY. See ERROR OF LAW; RULE OF LAW; ULTRA VIRES

LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

abuse of power, and [1.07], [6.29]

basis of doctrine [6.29] development of doctrine [6.29] differing tests, criticism [6.40] estoppel compared [6.44]-[6.45] fairness [1.07], [4.04], [6.29] fettering of discretion, tension with [5.58] intra vires representations [6.31] �lawful' expectations, when they are recognised

[6.29]

actions of public authority [6.33] context, importance of [6.33] detriment [6.33] policies [6.35] practices [6.34] representations [6.33]

LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION - continued unincorporated international treaties [6.36] procedural expectations

abuse of power, and [6.30]

fairness [6.30]

procedural expectations, how they are protected consultation [6.37]

fairness [6.37]

overriding reason to deny [6.37]

statutory duties [6.29]

substantive expectations, how they are protected abuse of power [6.30], [6.38] balance [6.30], [6.38]

context, importance of [6.38], [6.39]

equality [6.35]

public interest reason to frustrate [6.38] reliance [6.38]

restraint [6.39]

Wednesbury unreasonableness [6.30], [6.39] substantive expectations, when they are recognised

abuse of power, and [6.30]

definition [1.08], [6.29] fairness [4.04], [6.30]

influence of EU law [6.30]

separation of powers concerns [6.30] revocation of decisions contrasted [6.32] rule of law [6.29] ultra vires representations [6.31]

constitutional question [6.31]

ultra vires doctrine [6.31], [6.41] when they are made [6.31], [6.41]

�unlawful’ expectations

benevolent exercise of powers doctrine [6.43] compensation [6.43]

ECHR, influence of [6.31], [6.41], [6.43] estoppel [6.31], [6.44]-[6.45] fairness [6.41]

how they are protected [6.31], [6.44]-[6.45] legislative supremacy [6.41]

negligent misstatement [6.43]

ultra vires doctrine [6.41]

ultra vires representations [6.41] unauthorised representations [6.41] when they are not protected [6.42]-[6.43] when they arise [6.41]

LOCUS STANDI. See STANDING

MANDAMUS

availability in Human Rights Act 1998 cases

[8.43]

coercive nature [8.11] constitutional limits to judicial role [8.12] contempt of court [8.11]

context, importance of [8.09] declarations, and [4.27], [8.09]

�demand and refusal’ requirement [8.11] discretionary choices [8.09], [8.12] effect [3.76], [8.09], [8.11]

fines for failure to comply [8.11] judgment of court sufficient [8.09] judicial restraint [2.34] public duties [8.09], [8.11] resource implications as reason for restraint [8.09]

separation of powers [4.27], [8.09] statutory duties [8.09], [8.11] target duties [8.12]

time-limits for compliance [8.11] when ordered [8.12]

MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS. See PRO­CEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATUTE

MARGIN OF APPRECIATION. See DIS­

CRETIONARY AREA OF JUDGMENT; EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; EUROPEAN UNION LAW MATERIAL FACT, ERROR OF. See ERROR OF FACT

MERITS REVIEW

forbidden [1.05]

�review, not appeal’ distinction [1.03], [1.05], [4.01], [4.29], [6.01]

MINISTERS OF THE CROWN. See INJUNC­TIONS; NOTICE PARTIES; REMEDIES Northern Ireland Ministers contrasted [8.07]

MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE

abuse of power [8.28]

bad faith [5.51], [8.28] common law constitutional tort rejected [8.29] elements of [8.28]

intent [8.28]

need for special damage [8.29] not suited to protecting EU law rights [8.39] overlap with cases under Human Rights Act 1998 [8.29]

rejection of rigid distinctions [8.29]

targeted malice [8.28]

vicarious liability [8.28]

NATIONAL SECURITY

absolute rights [4.19]

Article 2 ECHR [4.19]

Article 3 ECHR [4.19]

Article 6 ECHR [4.19]

conclusive evidence certificates [4.19] need for effective remedy

EU law [4.19]

fairness [7.11]

historic approach [4.18]

influence of ECHR [4.19]

legitimate expectations, and [6.37] modern approach [4.18] notification, tension with [7.39] tribunals, remedies before [4.19]

NATURAL JUSTICE. See FAIRNESS administrative decision-makers [7.03] audi alteram partem [7.03]. See RIGHT TO A HEARING

fairness, and [7.03]

historical importance [7.03]

judicial decision-makers [7.03]

nemo judex in causa sua [7.03]. See BIAS privileges [7.09]

rights [7.03]

�NATURE OF THE ISSUE' TEST

content [2.11] effect [2.12] public sector employment disputes [2.11]-[2.13] NEGLIGENCE

breach element [8.23] caution in respect of discretion [8.25] �reasonable in all the circumstances' [8.25] restrictive approach [8.25]

Wednesbury [8.25] causation element [8.23] discretion, importance of [8.23] duty of care element [8.23]

Article 6 ECHR [8.24] child care cases [8.24] educational needs cases [8.24] fair, just and reasonable requirement [8.24] foreseeability requirement [8.24] healthcare workers [8.24] highway authorities [8.24] police [8.24]

proximity requirement [8.24] restrictive approach [8.24] striking-out [8.24]

established negligence scenarios [8.23] judicial reluctance to impose liability [8.23] non-justiciable choices [4.15], [8.23] policy choices [4.15], [8.23]

public policy considerations [8.23] when claims arise [8.23]

�NO EVIDENCE' DOCTRINE. See ERROR OF LAW

NORTHERN IRELAND ACT 1998

�constitution for Northern Ireland' [1.34], [5.22] constitutional statute, as. See CONSTITU­

TIONAL STATUTES

equality. See EQUALITY Northern Ireland Assembly. See NORTHERN

IRELAND ASSEMBLY

Northern Ireland Ministers [5.29], [8.07] public authorities

definition [2.26]-[2.27] devolution issues [5.29]

ECHR [5.33]

EU law [5.33] equality obligations. See EQUALITY limits on powers [5.29]-[5.30]

Northern Ireland departments, as [5.29]

Northern Ireland ministers, as [5.29] NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY

Acts

constitutional status [1.13], [5.25] devolution issues [1.13], [1.36], [5.25] Human Rights Act, status under [5.16] statute law, as [1.13] ultra vires challenges [1.13], [5.24] elections [5.22]

executive power in [5.22]

Orders in Council

constitutional status [1.13], [5.23] devolution issues [1.13], [5.24]

Human Rights Act, status under [5.16] statute law, as [1.13] ultra vires challenges [1.13], [5.24] parliamentary sovereignty [5.24] powers [5.22]

�excepted' matters [5.24] limits on [5.24] �reserved' matters [5.24] �transferred' matters [5.24]

Statutory Rules challenges to [5.27] devolution issues [5.28] legislative bases [5.27] legislative forms [5.27] subordinate legislation, as [5.27]

subordinate legislation

Statutory Rules [5.27] suspension [1.13], [5.23]

NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

interventions in proceedings [1.27], [3.39] powers [5.22]

NOTICE PARTIES

Attorney-General [3.24], [3.38], [8.06]

Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [3.24], [3.38], [8.06]

challenging grant of leave [3.26], [3.43] courts power to join [3.37] Crown [3.23], [3.38], [8.06] definition [3.37]

devolution issues, [3.24], [3.38], [5.24], [5.28],

[5.29]

Human Rights Act 1998, [3.23], [3.38], [5.15],

[5.17]

Minister of the Crown [3.23], [3.38], [8.06],

[8.49]

Northern Ireland Ministers [3.24], [3.38], [8.06],

[8.49] originating motions, and [3.37] pre-action protocol [3.15] reason for notification [3.37] NOTIFICATION. See RIGHT TO A HEARING

OUSTER CLAUSES.

absolute clauses Anisminic, importance of [4.10] Article 6 ECHR, and [4.13] effect of [4.10] lawful determinations [4.10] purported determinations [4.10] time-limited clauses

Article 6 ECHR, and effect of [4.11] judicial acceptance of [4.11] legislative supremacy [4.11] proportionality [4.13] reasonableness of limit [4.11] rule of law [4.11] statutory remedy, significance of [4.12]

PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY declarations of incompatibility [1.30]

PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY - continued rule of law

historically limited meaning [4.09] modified relevance [4.09]

statute law, and [1.12]

ultra vires doctrine [2.07]

POLICY

choices, non-justiciable [4.15], [8.23] discretion, and. See FETTERING OF DISCRETION

political decisions, as [6.03]

POWERS, STATUTORY

common law duties

act consistent with legislative purpose, to

[4.25]

act in good faith, to [4.25]

act in public interest, to [4.25]

act fairly, to [4.25]

act reasonably, to [4.25] avoid undue delay, to [4.25], [7.34] communicate a decision, to [4.25] consider whether to exercise power, to [4.25] influence of ECHR [4.25] reasons, to give. See DUTY TO GIVE

REASONS

discretion. See DISCRETION

�narrow’ powers anxious scrutiny [4.24] duties, as [4.24] fundamental rights [4.24] reasonableness [4.24]

permissive terms [4.23]

purposes. See PURPOSES

relevancy [4.24]

statutory interpretation [1.26], [4.22]

�wide’ powers interpretation [4.23] scope for judicial intervention [4.23] separation of powers [4.23] �soft-edged’ review [4.23] substantive review [4.23]

PRE-ACTION PROTOCOL

no need to observe, when [3.16]

Practice Note 1/2008 [3.15]

reason for [3.14]

requirements of pre-action letter [3.15] respondent’s reply [3.15] interested parties [3.15]

PRECEDENT FACT. See ERROR OF FACT PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS. See FAIRNESS

PREMATURITY (�RIPENESS’)

fairness [7.12]

rationale [3.11]

time-limits [3.13]

when early challenges permissible [3.12] PRIMARY LEGISLATION

Acts of Northern Ireland Assembly [5.25] definition [5.12]

ECHR. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS

EU law. See EUROPEAN UNION LAW Human Rights Act. See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

parliamentary sovereignty [1.12] substantive review. See ECHR; EU LAW

PROCEDURAL EXCLUSIVITY, RULE. See too ANTI-TECHNICALITY PROVISION anti-technicality provision [2.05], [2.32] difficulties [2.31] mixed issues of public law and private law

[2.31], [2.33] origins [2.05], [2.28], [2.30] purpose [2.30]

PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY. See too BIAS; FAIRNESS; RIGHT TO HEARING accountability [7.05]

Article 6 ECHR. See BIAS; RIGHT TO A HEARING

bias. See BIAS

common law rules of fairness. See FAIRNESS context, importance of [7.01] democratic function [7.05]

meaning [7.01]

participation [7.05] presumption against arbitrariness [7.05] �promoting just decisions’ [7.05] reasons. See REASONS

right to a hearing. See RIGHT TO A HEARING

statute. See PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATUTE

transparency [7.05]

PROCEDURAL LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION. See LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATUTE

common law fairness. See too FAIRNESS exhaustive procedural codes, and [7.08] interests [7.07] legislative supremacy [7.08] presumption [7.08] procedural fairness a question for the courts [7.07]

provides additional safeguards [7.07] rights [7.07] supplements legislative scheme [7.07] consultation. See CONSULTATION �directory’ provisions [7.18]

classification no longer decisive [7.19] discretion, and [7.19] effect of non-observance [7.19] Human Rights Act [7.21] illegality [7.19]

general position [7.07] importance of interpretation [7.01], [7.18] legislative intent [7.18], [7.21] legislative supremacy [7.07]

�mandatory’ provisions [7.18] classification as no longer decisive [7.19] effect of non-observance [7.19] flexible reading [7.20] formal adherence [7.20]

Human Rights Act [7.21] illegality [7.19] imposing duty to act in particular way [7.19] public policy [7.21] substantial compliance, and [7.20] technicalities [7.20]

precise compliance [7.18] reasons. See REASONS substantial compliance [7.18], [7.20] ultra vires [7.07]

PROHIBITION availability in Human Rights Act 1998 cases

[8.43] certiorari, and [8.16] coercive nature [8.16] contempt of court [8.16] effect [3.76], [8.16] mandamus and injunction compared [8.16] PROPORTIONALITY

Acts of Parliament [6.04] balance [6.12] �closer look' review, as [6.12] courts �well-equipped’ to use [6.12] debate about displacing Wednesbury

[6.27] -[6.28]

discretionary area of judgment. See DISCRE­TIONARY AREA OF JUDGMENT duty to give reasons [6.12]

ECHR. See too EUROPEAN CONVENTION

ON HUMAN RIGHTS content of principle [6.20] discrimination [6.20] general principle of law [6.20] margin of appreciation, and. See ECHR public emergencies [6.20] qualified rights [6.20] right of access to a court [6.20] right to life [6.20] textual basis [6.20]

EU law

administrative decision-makers [6.16] close scrutiny [6.15] decision-makers [6.14]

Directives and implementing measures [6.15] equality, and [6.17]

European Communities Act [6.14] executive decision-makers [6.16] free movement [6.14], [6.15] legitimate expectation, and [6.17 margin of appreciation. See EUROPEAN UNION LAW

national legislative choices [6.15] nature of enquiry [6.14] precautionary principle, and [6.17] role, in [6.14] supremacy, and [6.14] unreasonableness compared [6.16] variable application [6.15] elements of test [6.12] error of material fact [4.44] fuller justification required [6.12] Human Rights Act central to case law [6.19] closer review [6.19], [6.23] declarations [6.24] discretionary of judgment. See DIS­CRETIONARY AREA OF JUDGMENT

elements [6.23] judicial review procedure modified [6.24] no merits review [6.19] principle recognised [6.18] statutory interpretation [6.24] unreasonableness compared [6.18] use in specific cases [6.24] legitimate expectation [6.30] meaning [4.41] more intensive scrutiny [6.12] �no evidence’ [4.42] not merits review [6.12] primary legislation [6.04] relevancy [4.41] root concept of common law, as [4.04] separation of powers [6.13] �spill-over’ [6.17] variable standard [6.13] WednesburyZunreasonableness compared [6.12] WednesburyZunreasonableness compared con­trasted [6.12]

Prosecution decisions. See fairness; REASONS; RIGHT TO A HEARING PUBLIC AUTHORITIES. See FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000, HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998, NORTHERN IRELAND 1998

test for amenability to review [2.22]-[2.27] public interest test compared [2.25]

PUBLIC FUNCTIONS

test for amenability to review [2.18] caution when using [2.21] centrality in England and Wales [2.18] content [2.18] public interest test compared [2.19] use in Northern Ireland [2.19]

PUBLIC INTEREST

immunity. See PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY standing. See STANDING test for amenability to review

application of [2.15]-[2.16] caution when using [2.21] content [2.14]

other tests compared [2.17], [2.19], [2.25], problem [2.16]

strength [2.17]

PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY

context, importance of [3.57] discovery, and [3.57] human rights [3.57] question for court [3.57] when arguments arise [3.57]

PUBLIC LAW. See too �EMANATION OF THE STATE’ DOCTRINE, �NATURE OF THE ISSUE’ TEST, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, PUBLIC FUNCTIONS, PUBLIC INTEREST

PUBLIC LAW — continued

contracting-out [2.04]

mixed with private law [2.05] private law distinguished [2.10] privatisation [2.04] royal prerogative [2.03] statute [2.03], [2.10]

PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE. See PUBLIC LAW PURPOSES

bad faith, and. [5.51]. And see BAD FAITH collateral purpose [5.50] dominant purpose test [4.25], [5.49]

difficulties with [5.49] elements [5.49] severance compared [5.49] value of [5.49]

duty to exercise power for proper purpose [4.25] express purposes [5.48] extraneous purpose [5.50] implied purposes [5.48] improper purpose [5.50]

intent [5.50]

moral impropriety [5.50] political decisions [5.50] mixed purposes [5.49] nature of arguments [5.48] relevancy, and [5.48] root concept of common law, as [4.04] ulterior purpose [5.50] ultra vires, and [5.48] unreasonableness, and [5.48]

RANGE OF REVIEWABLE MEASURES

[3.05]-[3.08]

REASONABLENESS. See UNREASONABLENESS root concept of the common law, as [4.04] REASONS

common law duties

�adequate and intelligible' [7.26], [7.46] administrative decisions [7.28], [7.46] arguments against [7.46] arguments in favour [7.26] context, importance of [7.28] function performed by [7.26], [7.46] guiding principles [7.47] magistrates [7.28], [7.46] no general duty [7.28], [7.46] prosecution decisions [7.53] subordinate legislative choices [7.28], [7.46]

ECHR, and

Article 2 ECHR [7.29], [7.48] Article 3 ECHR [7.29], [7.48] Article 5 ECHR [7.48] Article 6 ECHR [7.29] Article 8 ECHR [7.29], [7.48] civil rights [7.48] criminal rights [7.48] Human Rights Act [7.29] magistrates [7.46] prosecution decisions [7.53] sufficiency requirement [7.48] transparency [7.29], [7.48]

EU law, and

Charter of Fundamental Rights [7.49] general principles [7.30], [7.49] transparency [7.30], [7.49] Treaty basis [7.30], [7.49] statutory requirement

�adequate and intelligible' [7.26] common law supplementing statute [7.28] context, importance of [7.26] function performed by [7.26] late reasons [7.27]

legislative intent, importance of [7.18], [7.26] reasons as part of notification of decision

[7.27]

remedies [7.26]

RELEVANCY

bad faith, and. See BAD FAITH common law fundamental rights [5.45] �discretionary area of judgment' doctrine [5.45] discretionary considerations [5.43] dominant considerations [5.47] equality duties, as [5.46] examples of [5.44]

express considerations [5.43] implied considerations [5.43] interpretation of statute [5.43] irrelevancy not entailing illegality [5.47] meaning [5.43]

nature of arguments [5.44] obligatory considerations [5.43] proportionality [5.45] purposes, and [5.48] reasons, and [5.44] rule of law [5.43] unreasonableness [5.45]

RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS. See RELEVANCY

REMEDIES. See CERTIORARI; DAMAGES; DEC­LARATION; EUROPEAN UNION LAW; HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998; INJUNC­TION; INTERIM REMEDIES; MANDAMUS; PROHIBITION alternative remedy as reason to refuse remedy [7.57], [8.08]

counter arguments [3.90] effective and efficient alternative remedy [3.90]

public interest better served [3.90] conduct of applicant as reason to refuse remedy inconsequential oversights [3.87] lack of candour [3.87], [7.58], [8.08] context, importance of [8.09]

Crown

cannot issue against the Crown [8.05] notice requirements [8.06]. And see NOTICE PARTIES

position in respect of Ministers of the Crown [8.05]. And see INJUNCTIONS vicarious liability [8.05]

delay as reason to refuse remedy [3.88], [8.08]. See too DELAY

�good reason' counter-argument [3.88] interests of good administration [3.88] interests of third parties [3.88] respondent’s ability to defend proceedings [3.88]

time-limit for making applications [3.88] discretionary nature of [3.74], [3.84], [8.01], [8.08]

effectiveness requirement

ECHR [3.84], [8.01]

EU law [3.84], [8.01], [8.40] supremacy of EU law [8.40]

Walton case [8.40]

Ministers of the Crown [8.05]. And see INJUNCTIONS

Northern Ireland Ministers compared [8.07] origins

absence of alternative remedies [8.04] administrative decision-makers [8.04] certiorari [8.03]

consolidating effect of Judicature (NI) Act 1978 [8.04]

courts [8.03]

declarations [8.03]

equitable remedies [8.03] expansion of judicial review [8.04] historical role of the Crown [8.03] injunctions [8.03]

judicial aversion to declaratory relief [8.03] judicial decision-makers [8.04] mandamus [8.03]

non-royal decision-makers [8.03] prerogative orders [8.03] prohibition [8.03]

rejection of historical distinctions [8.04] uniform procedure irrespective of remedy sought [8.04]

range of [3.76]

rule of law [4.05] �technical irregularity’ as reason to refuse remedy [3.86], [8.08]

�utility’ as reason to refuse remedy [7.59], [8.08] academic matters [3.86] declaration as preferred remedy [3.86] interests of �good administration’ [3.86] rationale [3.85]

reluctance to �beat the air’ [3.85]

technical irregularities [3.86]

REPRESENTATION. See RIGHT TO A HEARING

RES JUDICATA [3.26], [3.27]

REVIEW, NOT APPEAL DISTINCTION Article 6 ECHR, problem of [7.16], [7.64], [7.73]-[7.79]

importance in judicial review [1.03], [1.05], [4.01], [4.29], [6.01]

reluctance to use power to reverse/vary decisions [8.15]

remedies, and [1.05], [8.01]

REVIEWABILITY

content of decision, and [4.16]

deference. See DEFERENCE justiciability and [4.16]

meaning [4.16]

nature of decision-maker [4.16] objective [4.17]

REVOCATION OF DECISIONS fettering of discretion [6.32] legal certainty [6.32] legitimate expectation doctrine contrasted [6.32] when permissible [6.32]

RIGHT TO A HEARING

Article 6 ECHR

access to a court, right of [7.31] adequate time to prepare [7.38] appeals, significance of [7.32], [7.50] �civil rights’, meaning of [7.16] composite compliance [7.12], [7.32], [7.51] disclosure [7.38] effect of breach of right [7.32], [7.56] effective protection of rights [7.45] �equality of arms’ principle [7.38], [7.43] evidence, rules of [7.43] exceptions [7.32], [7.55]

�fair and public hearing’ [7.43]

�full jurisdiction’ requirement [7.51]. And see INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNALS

�gisting’ [7.40]

impact on common law [7.31] legal aid [7.45]

legal and factual complexity [7.45] national security [7.39] notification [7.38] obligations during the hearing [7.32] oral hearings [7.41]

post-hearing obligations [7.32] pre-hearing obligations [7.32] proportionality [7.55] prosecution decisions [7.53] reach of common law compared [7.16] reasonable time requirement [7.34], [7.43] reasons. See REASONS

representation [7.45]

right of access to a court [7.31] right to respond [7.38]

common law

access to a court, right of [7.31] adequate time to prepare [7.37] appeals, significance of [7.32], [7.50] Article 6 ECHR, influence of [7.32] bias, and [7.31]. And see BIAS; INDE­PENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNALS

consultation [7.33]. And see CONSULTATION

cross-examination [7.37], [7.42] curative principle [7.32], [7.50] disclosure of material facts [7.37] disputed facts [7.41] effect of breach of right [7.32], [7.56] evidence, rules of [7.42] exceptions [7.11], [7.32] �fundamental principle’ [7.36] �gisting’ [7.40]

RIGHT TO A HEARING - continued

historical importance [7.31] legal aid [7.45]

legitimate expectation [7.33] modification [7.52] national security [7.52] nature of hearing [7.41] notification [7.36] objective [7.31] obligations during the hearing [7.32] opportunity to respond [7.37] oral hearings [7.41] overall fairness [7.42] participation [7.37] post-hearing obligations [7.32] practical considerations [7.54] pre-hearing obligations [7.32] prosecution decisions [7.53] reach of right [7.09]-[7.12] reasonable time requirement [7.34] reasons. See REASONS refusal of remedy [7.57]-[7.59]. And see REMEDIES

remedies. See REMEDIES

representation [7.44] right of access to a court [7.31] right to know case [7.36] �strong impulse for practical justice' [7.37] Tarrant criteria [7.44] urgent cases [7.54] waiver [7.60]

ROLE OF COURTS

context [4.03] debate about [1.03]

�ROOT CONCEPTS' OF THE COMMON LAW. See ABUSE OF POWER; FAIRNESS; PROPORTIONALITY; PURPOSES; REASONABLENESS examples of [4.04]

ROYAL PREROGATIVE

�anomalous' nature [4.08] armed forces [4.07]

�constitutional laws' of Northern Ireland [4.06] description [4.06]

dissolution of Parliament [4.07] executive government, meaning [4.06] historical approach [4.06] justiciability [4.07]. And see JUSTICIABILITY �high policy' [4.07] meaning [4.07] modern conditions, significance of [4.07] open categories [4.07]

legislation, effect of [4.06]

mercy [4.07]

Northern Ireland ministers [4.06] passports [4.07] prerogative Orders in Council [4.07] public law issues [2.03] rule of law [4.06], [4.08] context sensitivity [4.08] grounds for review [4.08]

treaties [4.07]

RULE AGAINST BIAS. See BIAS

RULE OF LAW

abuse of power [4.05]

Diceyan meaning [6.49]

error of law. See ERROR OF LAW

legitimate expectation [6.29] meaning [4.05] non-statutory power [4.06] parliamentary sovereignty. See PARLIAMEN­

TARY SOVEREIGNTY

relevancy [5.43] remedies [4.05] royal prerogative. See ROYAL PREROGATIVE ultra vires doctrine [4.05]

SATELLITE LITIGATION

collateral challenges compared [5.38] judicial aversion [2.36]

meaning [2.36]

when permissible [2.36]

SELF-RESTRAINT

deference. See DEFERENCE imperative of [4.01] justiciability. See JUSTICIABILITY reviewability. See REVIEWABILITY soft-edged review. See SOFT-EDGED REVIEW

SENTENCES IN CRIMINAL CASES. See

CRIMINAL CAUSES

SEPARATION OF POWERS

deference [4.17] discretionary area of judgment [6.25] equality, and [6.46]

importance [6.03]

legitimate expectations [6.30] meaning [1.03] non-justiciability, and [4.15] proportionality [6.13]

restraint where wide discretion [6.03] statutory powers [4.23]

substantive fairness, concerns [7.14]

Wednesbury unreasonableness [6.05] SEVERANCE

benefit of [5.40]

�blue pencil' test [5.40]

certiorari, and [8.14] dominant purpose test compared [5.49] limits to [5.40]

meaning [5.40]

relevancy, and [5.47] subordinate legislation [5.40], [8.14]

SOFT-EDGED REVIEW

economic policy [4.20] law/politics divide [4.21] meaning [4.20], [6.09] political decisions [4.20] restraint, and [4.20] unreasonableness, and [4.20], [6.09] variable application [4.21]

SOURCE OF POWER

test for amenability to review contract excluded [2.10] statute [2.04], [2.07]-[2.10]

limits [2.04]

STANDING

abuse of process [3.66]

Human Rights Act 1998. See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

leave stage [3.31]

�hopeless and meddlesome applications’

[3.66]

liberal approach [3.66]-[3.67]

�public interest’ applicants [3.66] criticism of case law [3.67] justification [3.67] rule of law, and [3.67]

representative applicants [3.66] substantive hearing [3.31]

full legal and factual context, importance of [3.65]

�sufficiency of interest’ test [3.31], [3.66] �victim’ requirement, and [8.42]

STATE LIABILITY DOCTRINE

administrative acts [3.80], [8.37]

breach of statutory duty, and [3.80], [8.39] damages as a matter of EU law [8.37] domestic causes of action, and [8.39] elements of doctrine [8.38]

�Euro-tort’, and [8.39] executive acts [3.80], [8.37]

failure to implement a Directive [8.37]

failure to repeal legislation [8.37] judicial acts [3.80], [8.37] legislative Acts [3.80], [8.37]

misfeasance in public office, and [8.39] origins of doctrine [8.37]

�sufficiently serious’ breach requirement [3.80],

[8.38] guidelines [8.38] limited discretion [8.38] �manifest and grave disregard’ [8.38] �mere infringement’ [8.38] wide discretion [8.38]

STATUTE LAW. And see PRIMARY LEGISLA­

TION; SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION centrality to judicial review [1.12] delegated power [1.12]

intensity of review [2.09]. See too

CONTEXT

equality. See EQUALITY

Northern Ireland Assembly [1.13] parliamentary sovereignty [1.12] procedural requirements. See PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY

ultra vires doctrine [1.12]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

common law fundamental rights [1.26], [6.10] context, importance of [1.27], [4.22]

directory provisions

discretion, depending upon [2.09], [4.22]. See DISCRETION

European Communities Act [1.25]

EU law [1.26]

Hansard [1.26]

headings, aid to [1.26]

historical context, aid to [1.26]

Human Rights Act 1998 [1.25], [1.30]. See too HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

illegality determined by [1.25] literal interpretation [4.22]

definition [1.26]

purposive contrasted [1.26] rationale [1.26]

mandatory provisions [4.22] mischief rule [1.26]

proportionality principle, effect of [6.24] purposive interpretation [4.22]

definition [1.26]

European influence [1.25]

literal contrasted [1.26] reading power into legislation [4.22] reading words out of legislation [4.22] reasonably incidental powers [4.22]

STATUTORY RULES. See NORTHERN IRELAND

ACT 1998; and SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

Acts of Northern Ireland Assembly as [3.07], [5.34]

debate about constitutional status [5.25]-[5.26]

challenges to [3.07]

bad faith. See BAD FAITH

common law fundamental rights standards [5.35]

ECHR [5.35]

EU law [5.35]

improper purposes. See PURPOSES legitimate expectations [5.36] pre-approval stage [5.37]

procedural impropriety. See RIGHT TO A HEARING

relevancy. See RELEVANCY unreasonableness. See

UNREASONABLENESS

collateral challenges

criminal cases [5.38]

meaning [5.38] presumption about Parliamentary intent [5.38]

�satellite’ litigation [5.38] when permitted [5.38]

common law constitutional rights [5.35] consultation, and [7.23]-[7.25] definition [5.34]

effect of finding that ultra vires [5.34], [5.39] Human Rights Act 1998. See HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT 1998

Northern Ireland Orders in Council as [3.07], [5.34]

debate about constitutional status

[5.25]-[5.26]

remedies

declaration [5.39]

refusal [5.39]

severance [5.40]. See SEVERANCE

Statutory Rules as [5.34]

SUBSTANTIVE HEARING. See GROUNDS FOR REVIEW; REMEDIES; STANDING; THIRD PARTY INTERVENERS

papers, for [3.63]

core bundles [3.64] preparation of [3.63] sanctions in costs [3.64] skeleton arguments [3.63] when must be filed [3.63]

SUBSTANTIVE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION.

See LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW. See WEDNESBURY; PROPORTIONALITY; LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION; EQUALITY

historical reluctance to engage in [6.01] meaning [6.01]

primary legislation. See ECHR; EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT 1972; EUROPEAN UNION LAW; HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

subordinate legislation. See SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

THIRD PARTY INTERESTS. See too NOTICE PARTIES

delay. See DELAY

reason for refusing remedy [3.88]

restraint in light of [2.21]

THIRD PARTY INTERVENERS

amicus curiae compared [3.39] discretion of the court [3.40] function [3.39]

interests of parties to dispute [3.39] leave stage [3.39]-[3.41]

Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission

[1.27], [3.39]

oral arguments [3.40]

Practice Direction 1/2013 [3.40] scope of submissions [3.40] statutory power [3.39] substantive hearing [3.73] written submissions [3.40]

TIME-LIMITED CLAUSES. See OUSTER CLAUSES

ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE

criticism [2.07]

error of law. See ERROR OF LAW

legitimate expectation. See LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

parliamentary sovereignty [1.12], [2.07] procedural requirements, and [7.07] rule of law [4.05]

UNREASONABLENESS. See too IRRATION­ALITY; WEDNESBURY

common law fundamental rights [6.06] anxious scrutiny [6.10] �closer look' review [6.10] freedom of expression [6.10]

fuller justification [6.10]

Human Rights Act [6.11]

right of access to a court [6.10]

right to life [6.10]

context sensitive [6.06], [6.09]-[6.11]

doubts about continuing relevance [6.05], [6.11],

[6.27] -[6.28]

equated with irrationality [6.05]

historical position [6.02]

judicial restraint [6.05]

meaning [6.05]

multi-faceted principle [6.06]

�no evidence' [4.42]

political questions [6.06] economic choices [6.09] imperative of judicial restraint [6.09] national security [6.09] �policy' decisions [6.09] soft-edged review [6.09]

relevancy [4.40], [4.41], [5.45]

separation of powers [6.05] subordinate legislation basis for challenge [5.37] context, importance of [5.37]

�substantive' unreasonableness demanding threshold [6.08] imperative of self-restraint [6.08] nature of review [6.08]

�umbrella' unreasonableness

bad faith [6.07]

overlap with illegality [6.07] purposes [6.07] relevancy [6.07]

URGENT CASES. See LEAVE

VICTIM TEST. See STANDING

VOID AND VOIDABLE [4.05]

basis of distinction [4.31]

end of distinction [4.31]

ultra vires, and [4.31]

WEDNESBURY. See UNREASONABLENESS

doubts about continuing relevance [6.05], [6.11],

[6.27] -[6.28]

equality, and. See EQUALITY

historical position [6.02]

meaning [6.05]

negligence [8.25]

substantive legitimate expectation [6.30], [6.39] �substantive' Wednesbury

demanding threshold [6.08] imperative of self-restraint [6.08] nature of review [6.08]

�umbrella' Wednesbury

bad faith [6.07]

overlap with illegality [6.07] purposes [6.07] relevancy [6.07]