Hemmingsen’s Philosophical Account of Natural Law
4.1 The Occasion of the Work: Hemmingsen’s Dedication to Erik Krabbe
Hemmingsen was explicit about continuing this Philippist programme in De lege naturae. In the preface, Hemmingsen remarked that others had touched upon the law of nature before him, although not discussed it in a methodological manÂner.
These included the ancient poets and philosophers as well as Melanchthon, whom Hemmingsen explicitly defended against his detractors.[149] [150] [151]Hemmingsen explained the occasion and aim of the work in the dedicatory letÂter to the nobleman and member of the Council of the Realm Erik Krabbe. Here, Hemmingsen emphasised, with copious quotations from ancient authors, the necessity of justice for political order and government. His work, Hemmingsen explained, was an investigation into the nature and foundation of justice. Furthermore, the work had contemporary relevance, for Krabbe was engaged in compiling and systematising Danish laws. Since these were in fact a collection of several, disparate local laws from the various parts of the Danish realms, they had to be compared and related to their foundation, the law of nature from which they were derived?8
Hemmingsen emphasised that by treating the law of nature according to a demonstrative method he wished to illustrate a â€?part of philosophy that ought to be known by all’. Hemmingsen recognised that since he, as a theologian, was treating the law of nature, others might suspect him of, with the old expression, â€?putting his sickle in another man’s crop’. He therefore explained that he had come across the topic while lecturing on Paul’s letter to the Romans. Romans 2.14 menÂtioned the law of nature, and this had prompted Hemmingsen to turn to a sepaÂrate investigation of the topic?9
Hemmingsen emphasised that he had wished to prove that the law of nature and moral philosophy could indeed be demonstrated and thus based on cerÂtain knowledge.
Despite Hemmingsen being a professor of theology, he thus emphasised that the investigation of the law of nature were primarily useful to other professions: moral philosophers, lawyers, and statesmen. In particuÂlar, he wished that the â€?students of ethics and jurisprudence’ would not be led astray by those who â€?deny that the science of morals and laws can be demonÂstrated’. Instead, he wished to show them that the conclusions of the law of nature could be demonstrated as well and with as much certainty as those of â€?Euclid's science'.[152] [153] [154] [155]4.2 Hemmingsen on Method
Hemmingsen's reference to Euclid in claiming to demonstrate the law of nature would earn him the criticism of later historians of the discipline. But this was from the perspective of subsequent, seventeenth-century changes in the conÂception of scientific method, and Hemmingsen's conception of method was not theirs.31 Rather different from later seventeenth-century conceptions of method, Hemmingsen was more indebted to classical and humanist rhetoric and dialectic, particularly in the guise Melanchthon had given them.
As such, Hemmingsen could adopt different methods in different places. In the preface, Hemmingsen mentioned â€?philosophical proof' as well as the â€?synÂtheses and analyses of the demonstrations'^2 In the same section, Hemmingsen also said he would adopt as method the Galenic analysis in explicating the law of nature.33 Where the former related to demonstrations, the latter was rather a method of exposition, for it consisted in formulating a comprehensive defiÂnition of the law of nature on the basis of which the different characteristics or parts of the definition could be explained.
Some years prior Hemmingsen had completed his own work on method, De methodis libri duo. This work gives some further pointers to the methods Hemmingsen adopted in the work, and how he saw them. In De methodis Hemmingsen explained the various kinds of methods and arguments which could be used in philosophy (book one) and theology (book two).
In book one, he first gave accounts of the two basic methods, namely the synthetic and the analytic, in general. The first, Hemmingsen explained, proceeded from the simÂple parts to the complex whole. This was the method Aristotle had adopted in the Politics, and which Euclid had used in his geometry.[156] [157] [158] [159] The analytic method in general, on the other hand, started from the end or the whole to explain â€?those things which attend to that end or whole'.3≡Here, Hemmingsen further informed the reader that â€?my most dear teacher Philipp Melanchthon' had used this method both in treating religious docÂtrine methodically as well as in his Philosophiae moralis epitome. Accordingly, Melanchthon, Hemmingsen explained, had started by determining the end of man, namely that he was created to honour God, and then shown how all should refer to that end.36 As we shall see, it was precisely these methods that Hemmingsen adopted himself in De lege naturae.
4.3 Hemmingsen’s Definition of the Law of Nature
In De lege naturae, Hemmingsen first started by clarifying the concept of natÂural law according to the â€?Galenic’ method. He did so by giving a â€?just and complete definition’ and explain its various parts. Natural law, according to Hemmingsen, is â€?the certain knowledge divinely impressed on the minds of men of the principles of knowledge and action, as well as of the conclusions that demonstrably follows from these principles in accordance with the end specific to man. These conclusions reason constructs by necessary conseÂquence from the principles so that man knows, wills, chooses, and does that which is right, and refrains from the contrary, in order to govern human life, to all of which the conscience is a divinely given witness and judged7
After a few words on the divine authorship of natural law guaranteeing its authority, dignity, and equity, Hemmingsen proceeded to show the certiÂtude and means of knowing natural law.
This was done through a larger disÂcussion of the principles of action, namely will and intellect or cognition. In further explaining how we gain knowledge of the principles of natural law, Hemmingsen made it clear that these principles were not simply present in the mind of man. This was signposted by a quotation from Cicero's Academica on how the mind uses the senses and creates the arts as an aid in cognition.[160] [161] So, Hemmingsen explained, human cognition proceeds in two direction: from the senses by way of induction to axioms, and syllogistic conclusions from these axioms by the mind. It was not the case, in Hemmingsen or in Melanchthon, that the precepts of natural law were fully formed and present in the mind. It was only in observing the world around us that the knowledge of the principles were â€?awakened' so to speak and grasped by the mind.3≡Having discussed the â€?mode' of knowing the principles of natural law,[162] Hemmingsen turned to discuss the content or â€?material' of the practical prinÂciples of natural law[163] [164] [165] [166] [167] These were called principles for two reasons: because they are (1) primary, and do not depend on previous demonstrations/2 and (2) self-evident, which Hemmingsen expressed by saying that they are â€?a light divinely impressed on the human mind'.43 This self-evidence was furÂthermore shown by the comparison of contraries, and by the comparison of contrary effects. Hemmingsen further gave as example the principle or axiom that what conserves nature was required by nature. Since the just and the morally good conserves nature, the just and the good were required by nature.44 4.4 God as the End of Man To further explicate that fundamental principle of the law of nature, Hemmingsen then turned to determine the â€?end of man, towards which all the actions of man should be directed'. On this basis he would then propose some further axioms of the law of nature, â€?from which all other true hypotheÂses about morals are constructed'/5 The end of man, Hemmingsen explained, could be determined in a threefold way. First, by considering the perfect state of man, which was when the soul ruled over the body, reason over the will, and the will over the passions. This would result in the four cardinal virtues,justice, prudence, temperance and courage. Second, in Aristotelian fashion, by considering the faculties specific to man. Since man alone possessed the faculties necessary to search for the truth, choose the good, and live virtuously, these could be said to be his proper end.[168] Third and most significantly, by considering the order of things according to which the lower things had the higher things as their end. Since God was the Supreme Being, all actions of man, Hemmingsen argued, should be referred to God, in obeying and honouring HimΛ[169] In light of Hemmingsen’s De methodis, we can see that Hemmingsen here adopted the â€?synthetic’ method: considerÂing the parts first of man, and secondly the world, to determine the end to which they were directed. 5