Gacaca extended nationwide and modified
Few changes were made to the running of gacaca between the end of the initial pilot phase of seventy-three cells and the introduction of a further 623 cell jurisdictions on 25 November 2002.[167] The government intended to introduce gacaca in approximately another 10,000 cells in March 2003.
This was delayed, however, by the slowness of the jurisdicÂtions where gacaca was already operating and the spate of major political and social events, particularly the provisional release of approximately 23,000 detainees from prisons around Rwanda, the establishment of ingando for genocide suspects in January 2003 and the preparations for the first post-genocide presidential and parliamentary elections in the middle of 2003.[168]In June 2004, the government responded to several perceived probÂlems with the running of gacaca jurisdictions by enacting a modified version of the Gacaca Law, which coincided with the expansion of gacaca from 751 to more than 11,000 cell- and sector-level jurisdictions around the country.[169] The main purpose of the amended Gacaca Law was to streamline and strengthen the running of gacaca in key areas. Among other changes, the 2004 version of the Gacaca Law decreased the number of levels of gacaca jurisdictions and the number of judges required to run gacaca hearings, established fixed sentences for individÂuals found guilty of harming or harassing gacaca witnesses or interfering with judges' investigations of genocide-related crimes, and allowed vicÂtims of sexual crimes to give evidence in camera to a single judge of their choosing or, if they do not trust any of the judges concerned, to give evidence directly to the public prosecutor.[170] The main reasons given for these modifications to the number of judges and levels of jurisdictions were the government's desire to make the best use of the talents of the best qualified judges and thus to speed up the gacaca process by decreasÂing the number of unqualified judges and ensuring that the best judges were assigned the more difficult cases at a smaller number of jurisdicÂtions.
Codifying a system for sentencing those found guilty of intimiÂdating witnesses or judges was a response to reported cases of detainees returning from ingando who injured or killed gacaca witnesses or interfered with judges' running of gacaca investigations and hearings.[171] Providing greater privacy for victims of sexual crimes when they gave evidence constituted a response to reports of the widespread reluctance of such victims, particularly women who suffered rape or sexual torture during the genocide, to come forward at gacaca to discuss the crimes committed against them.[172] These changes paved the way for the beginÂning of the judgment phase of gacaca in some communities in March 2005. As detailed below, further significant rewriting of the Gacaca Law occurred in 2006 and 2008, with the objectives of again decreasing the caseload in the national courts and hastening the entire gacaca process to deal with its original caseload as well as the new cases arriving from the national courts.The discussion above of the various historical developments of gacaca - from a traditional practice for hearing low-level criminal cases to the modern version intended to deal with genocide and crimes against humanity - underscores that gacaca is an organic, dynamic system that has undergone myriad changes in the past century and that a wide range of state and non-state actors has influenced its evolution. Gacaca is not a static, traditional institution, as some sources have contended, but rather a hybrid of traditional and modern elements. Many features of gacaca - in its various incarnations, before and after colonisation, in prisons and religious communities, in preparatory phases leading to its current form and in its handling of genocide crimes - have remained consistent, for example the conducting of hearings outdoors in communal spaces, the high value placed on public participation and the linkage of gacaca and notions of social cohesion and reconciliation. Meanwhile, important features of gacaca have changed over time, with the most radical phase of evolution occurring as it has been restructured to deal with genocide cases and as it has been continually revised to respond to difficulties encountered in jurisdictions around the country.
The current manifestÂation of gacaca reverts to the traditional practice of employing judges chosen by the communities in which hearings take place. As we have seen, during different periods in the twentieth century colonial and local-government officials played a greater role in the selection of gacaca judges, but in this regard modern gacaca displays an important similarity to gacaca as it existed in the pre-colonial era (although, as will be disÂcussed in later chapters, the state still plays a vital role in the day-to-day operation of gacaca). Modern gacaca, however, diverges from the tradÂitional system by relying on written law, involving women both as judges and members of the General Assembly, displaying a more systematic organisation between the administrative divisions of local government, and imposing prison sentences on those found guilty. Such developments counter the argument that gacaca in the post-genocide context is little more than a return to a well-established, widely understood indigenous form of conflict resolution that the Rwandan population will automaticÂally accept.As an endogenous rather than indigenous response to crimes, gacaca remoulds tradition to suit current circumstances. Gacaca was not an automatic choice as the primary transitional or reconstructive instituÂtion after the genocide, and the Rwandan government considered variÂous other options before settling on gacaca. Furthermore, after gacaca was selected as a model for the main post-genocide justice institution, it did not inherently possess the concepts and methods necessary to address genocide crimes and therefore required major reform. As highlighted by the analysis above of government debates over gacaca, the Gacaca Law eventually adopted was the result of a political compromise between difÂferent factions, with a crucial division between lawyers and non-lawyers in the government, particularly over the issue of popular participation in gacaca, and between influential diasporic and non-diasporic political figures.
Once gacaca was underway, senior state officials expressed dissatÂisfaction with many aspects of gacaca and called for the sorts of reforms represented in the 2004, 2006 and 2008 changes to the Gacaca Law. Kagame said in 2006, â€?I still don't think gacaca gives us all we need and it has major limitations. But it gives us most things and certainly more than most other processes... Today the genocide caseload is still masÂsive, so with gacaca we may have to think of new ways to address this.'[173] As later chapters will show, the regular changes to gacaca's operation have greatly complicated popular participation in the process. For now, however, such changes point to the dynamism and evolution of gacaca.Even during its so-called â€?traditional’ phase, gacaca as an institution and a set of ideas developed according to the needs of the population and the influences of outside forces such as local and colonial political elites. Similar ranges of local and external influences have shaped the evolution of gacaca since 1994. The single greatest catalyst of this evolution, howÂever, has been the government’s and the population’s need to respond holistically to the massive social, cultural, legal and economic challenges resulting from the genocide.
More on the topic Gacaca extended nationwide and modified:
- Gacaca extended nationwide and modified
- Clark Phil. The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers. Cambridge University Press,2010. — 400 p., 2010