Freedom of Human Actions and Sociability
I shall begin by briefly explicating what Pufendorf says on the freedom of human actions and the coercion of beliefs in his main opus on natural law, De jure naturae et gentium (1672) (hereafter DeJure).[801] [802] [803] It is widely acknowledged in the literature that Pufendorf's moral theory is based on the will of God as a crucial foundation of morality. God has imposed the basic moral norms onto the world. The most fundamental moral norm, the principle of sociability, commands us to â€?cultivate and maintain towards others a peaceable sociabilÂity (socialitasf.u Our duty to cultivate sociability as much as we can, depends on the will of God accessible through the use of the natural capacity of reaÂson alone. Pufendorf's natural law theory depends on a kind of minimalistic natural theology as the crucial foundation of morality. As he explains in De officio hominis et civis (1673) (hereafter De officio), lacking the idea of God as the supreme lawgiver, natural law norms â€?might be observed for their utility, like the prescriptions doctors give to regulate health'?2 Pufendorf therefore refutes Hugo Grotius's moral realism and his famous statement (which goes back to Gregory Rimini) about the possibility that â€?the dictates of reason' (rationis dictamina) could be laws even without the premise of God's existence.[804] [805] [806] [807] [808] [809] [810] Like Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius in De imperio circa sacra (see also the conÂtribution of Stefanie Ertz in this volume), Pufendorf distinguishes law from council. A duty of compliance is owed to superior authority that imposes the law.14 In theory, all normal adults have the capacity to understand the basic prinÂciples of natural law and appreciate the divine nature of morality via reason. There is an elitist leaning in Pufendorf's natural law theory. In numerous passages in Dejure he argues that since common people's capacity to use reaÂson is fairly limited, most people cannot guide their actions without interÂference from the authorities?9 For Pufendorf, conscience cannot work as an operative moral compass unless agents are completely familiar with the law.[811] [812] [813] [814] [815] [816] [817] Most people guide their action by probable (probabiles) conscience and only few can examine how â€?the duties of life flow from the first sources’?1 Therefore, rather than acting according to one’s own private conscience, â€?an ignorant man is safest in following the authority of the more prudent.22 When describing how people adopt sociability as their moral standard, Pufendorf focuses priÂmarily on how the establishment of political governance may turn men into sociable and political animals. When speaking of the faculties of understanding and will, Pufendorf’s intention is to argue that people always own their actions and are responsiÂble for them. Human actions are initiated by understanding that provides guidelines for actions. Will ought to follow thejudgement of the understanding but it can effectively choose to act otherwise as well. In other words, human will is free to choose whether to act according to the dictates of right reason, that is, the law of sociability. Notice that the will is not the solitary locus of human freeÂdom. Pufendorf also considered the understanding to be a free (liberis) faculty in the sense that it is â€?under man's control to pay close attention to the thing to be considered' and make an accurate assessment of its â€?good and evil feaÂtures'. With this remark Pufendorf aims to underscore that people are morally responsible for using their faculty of understanding effectually. Nevertheless, the understanding is not capable of a similar kind of effective freedom as the faculty of will. People have no choice in their perception of things. Accordingly, â€?since assent (assensus) or belief (fides) cannot but respond to the image appreÂhended by the understanding, a person cannot judge differently about a thing as he himself has seemed to perceive it. Nor is there any law by which someone rightly demands that he do otherwise - just as no one can be wise from a bare and simple command'. 28 Although Pufendorf does not develop any detailed account of the epistemology of belief, this passage clearly implies that interÂnal consent that accompanies beliefs can never be acquired by mere coercion. It is important to note that although beliefs cannot be directly compelled, it is possible to employ coercive policies indirectly in order to induce people's consideration. Pufendorf argues that there is â€?a place for cultivating and legisÂlating' about the rational part of the soul. â€?Those charged with the care of othÂers' should ensure that enough opportunities are available for thorough conÂtemplation. Authorities may also employ penalties as an instructional means of inducing people to carefully reconsider the real conditions of things?9 Despite his defence of the freedom of human actions, Pufendorf does not proÂmote the idea of liberty of actions without regard for its practical moral and political effects. His focus is not so much to show that human understanding always works successfully but to maintain that if people are not free to choose, they cannot be held responsible for their actions. A person's beliefs must be interfered with when there are reasons to hold that those beliefs are mistaken or depraved. 2