CONCLUSION

[1.37] This chapter has provided an overview of: the purposes of judicial review; the main sources of law of (potential) relevance in review proceedings; the importance of approaches to statutory interpretation; and the significance of common law constitu­tional statutes.

i. Judicial review is a dynamic body of law that develops in the light of the (sometimes competing) imperatives of efficient public decision-making and of the need for indi­viduals to be able to vindicate their rights/interests in the face of exercises of public power (see [1.04]-[1.10]).

ii. Developments in judicial review are crucially affected by judicial attitudes to the sources of law of relevance in review proceedings. These attitudes, in turn, reflect understandings of the constitutional role of the courts (see [1.11]-[1.24]).

iii. The grounds for review are common law creations that continue to develop (see [1.14]-[1.15]). The three traditional grounds of illegality, Wednesbury unreasonable­ness, and procedural impropriety have since developed to include new sub-categories such as substantive legitimate expectation, equality, and proportionality.

iv. The literal approach to statutory interpretation is increasingly being supplanted by the purposive approach. This change has been caused in part by the demands of European law, although the courts have also modified their interpretive techniques in cases that have not involved European law issues (see [1.25]-[1.27]).

v. Some judges now recognise a category of common law constitutional statutes (which include the European Communities Act 1972, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998). These statutes are superior to other statutes; are not subject to the ordinary rules of implied repeal; and have led the courts, in some instances, to review administrative and other decisions with reference to the wider political processes that have given rise to the Acts (see [1.28]-[1.36]).