Christian Francken: Natural Law in the Critique of Theism

After converging towards and getting into confrontation with different Lutheran and Calvinistic circles, Francken turned up in Poland and partici­pated in the inner debates of the Antitrinitarians in 1584. He left Poland as well because of his conflict with Fausto Sozzini concerning the theological question of the adoration of Christ and moved to Transylvania. During his first stay in Cluj in 1585, he was employed as lecturer of philosophy in the Antitrinitarian College and published an edition of Epictetus's Encheiridion with commentar­ies^¹ His second residence in Transylvania dates between the years 1589 and 1593, during which Francken established deep personal contacts not only to Antitrinitarian thinkers in Cluj, but also to political leaders of the Principality - such as to Janos Gerendy, the Head of the Court of the National Assembly in Transylvania.

The threat of the forthcoming Fifteen Years' War (1593-1608) between the Turks and the Habsburgs forced him to leave Transylvania, his safe haven. From 1594 onwards, we find him in Prague, in the service of the papal nuncio Cesare Speciano. Francken travelled to Italy in 1598 in Speciano's company, where he was detained by the Jesuits in Milan and was imprisoned in Rome.

3.2 The Disputatio Inter Theologum et Philosophum de Incertitudine Religionis Christianae^[397]

Francken wrote the Disputatio during his second residence in Transylvania around 1590. The work has two protagonists: a Theologian and a Philosopher - the latter presenting the author's positions. Francken outlines the subject of the work in a short Praeludium. In the second part, the Theologian explores 37 arguments for God's existence, each of them refuted by the Philosopher. We read a catalogue of ancient atheists^{[398] [399] [400] [401] [402] at the end of the Disputatio: this list of ancient atheists is an inherent part of the refutation of the Theologian's 37th argument. A detailed analysis of the atheistic argumentation would exceed the intended aims of this chapter, so I would like to outline only arguments related to the topic of natural law.3θ}

Like other authors of his time, Francken was motivated by the comparative observation of religions while focussing on the conflict between positive rev­elation and natural law. Accordingly, the Philosopher of Francken's Disputatio draws the reader's attention upon the parallels between the prophets and apostles on the one hand and those figures of pagan antiquity on the other hand, who stated themselves being in immediate relationship with the gods.3⁷ There are phenomena in the world outside of Christianity that correspond to God's miraculous interventions in human history in Christianity^⁸ One can­not set aside this comparative point of view by introducing the difference between â€?superadded laws' (leges superadditae) and natural laws (leges natu­rae).

The theologian's twelfth argument posits the appropriate goal of human existence and the means of reaching it into the realm of supranatural cogni- tion.4³ The argument clearly separates the spheres of natural and supranatu­ral cognition with a strong emphasis on the latter. Acknowledging any human moral values at all presupposes supranatural theism, i.e. it requires God known through specific Christian revelation. The refutation focuses on the theologian's claim for the impossibility of recognising the ultimate goal of human existence with man's natural capacities and denies God's necessary guidance concerning human goals and means.44 The philosopher has to face the possible objection that man sinks down to the level of animal existence if his supranatural goal is eliminated. For this purpose, Franckeris philosopher introduces qualitative differences between the goals peculiar to human and bestial existence respec­tively. In sum: the dependence of human morality on positive moral theology is untenable.

The theologian's next argument adresses this question straightaway.^[404] It claims namely that Gospel's ethics agrees perfectly with the natural moral laws. Although the Gospel's ethics was proposed by God, its commands are essentially rational. The positive Christian law proves to be consistent with the right reason and hence was accepted by the multitude as true.

According to the philosopher, the propagation and the multitude of the fol­lowers are not necessarily consequences of the rational character of a law in question. With reference to ancient poets, Francken's philosopher follows the classical procedure of attributing psychological motifs to constitutions. The wide propagation of law can be explained by its irrationality as well: Christian religion could gain a great number of followers because of its tyrannical and irrational nature, too.

By emphasising the differences among constitutions of antiquity, Francken excludes the laws of Athens as well as the laws of Sparta from the circle of nat­ural and rational laws: they promulgated contradicting laws regarding the right of citizenship. As the cases of Athens and Sparta shows, the idea of the natural law proves to be contradictory in itself. This is a very remarkable feature of Francken's criticism: It is not only the perspective of divine mercy and theo­logical epistemology which raises doubts regarding the claim for rationality of Christian apologetics, but it is uncertain also - so to speak - from beneath, that is from the perspective of natural theistic grounds. There is no unique politi­cal or moral law established by natural use of rationality which could provide moral theology with possible points of connection.

Despite what was afore said and despite of a sceptical refutation of God's natural cognition relying on Sextus Empiricus, Francken does not abandon the concept of nature. According to Francken's philosopher, the validity of the Gospel's ethics can be refuted in the name of the reason, as - following Aristotle and Plato - a certain member of the state can be executed if demanded by public utility, although it contradicts the moral principles of Jesus's Sermon on the Mount.^{[405] [406] But the critique does not aim only at the eliminating of a supra­natural deduction of morality: the word utility alludes to the ancient critiques of the metaphysical - namely natural - establishment of morality in several arguments. The rationality of the interpretation of laws is indeed subject to the contingent social utility. The Socratic schools of ancient philosophy had rightly stated that we are able only to draw the borderline between human moral values and the real natural order of morality at best, without having cer­tain knowledge of the latter. The reception of these relativising elements of ancient Greek moral reflections urges Francken to express a critique of natural theism as well.47}

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