Some modern legal systems recognize a further, practically very dangerous, threat to the life of obligations: the lapse of time.

South African law provides a good example. According to § 10 I of the Prescription Act 68/1969, debts are extinguished (as a rule) three years^[3928] after they have become due.^[3929] In certain cases prescription may be interrupted^[3930] or its completion may be delayed,^[3931] but under normal circumstances a creditor may be expected to pursue (and, if necessary, enforce) his claims within a reasonable period.

The reason lies, as Windscheid/Kipp^[3932] somewhat romantically describe it, in the obfuscating power of time: as the years pass by, it becomes more and more difficult for the debtor to defend himself.^[3933] He may no longer be able to remember and to prove those circumstances which thwart the plaintiffs claim. More particularly, he can hardly be required to keep all his receipts indefinitely; yet, without them it may be impossible for him to establish that he has already satisfied the claim. Prescription^[3934] thus provides the debtor with a convenient all-round protection against the claims of a creditor who has shown little interest in pursuing them. O? course, prescription is somewhat of a double-edged sword, for it affects unfounded as well as justified claims. But that is a price most modern legal systems are prepared to pay: long dormant claims, as a rule, "have more cruelty than justice in them".^[3935] Not all modern legal systems, however, regard a debt which has prescribed as extinct. According to § 222 I BGB, for instance,^[3936] the debtor is entitled to refuse performance after the period of prescription has expired. The obligation thus continues to exist but the person bound by it is granted a peremptory defence. Yet the difference between these two constructions of prescription is largely of a technical nature. Even in South African law, prescription has to be raised in court by the defendant; the court cannot of its own motion take notice of the fact that the debt has fallen away.^[3937] Also payment in satisfaction of a claim which has prescribed is—rather irregularly—not regarded as indebitum solutum and may therefore not be claimed back.^[3938] Hence in practice, both under the South African system of a "strong" prescription and under the "weak" approach adopted by the BGB, it is up to the debtor either to render performance or to invoke the rules of prescription; if he decides to do the latter, the creditor has lost any possibility of enforcing his claim.

Much more important is the difference in the actual periods of prescription. According to § 195 BGB, the regular period of prescription is 30 years.^[3939] As so often, this provision of the German Code only restates a rule of the European ius commune. It ultimately derives from the praescriptio longi temporis, introduced by the Emperor Theodosius II in A.D. 424 for all actiones perpetuae, i.e. for claims which had hitherto not been subject to any temporal limitation.^[3940] Whatever its merits in the (also not-so-tranquil) circumstances of the 5th century, a prescription period of 30 years is totally unsuitable for times in which history appears to have "accelerated" in an entirely unprecedented manner; it is so long that it completely frustrates the aims sought to be achieved with periods of prescription.^[3941] ^{^[3942] A radical readjustment (which would at the same time obviate the countless problems arising from the number and diversity of exceptios from the "regular" period)⁴⁴⁹ is urgently required.^[3943]}

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Source: Zimmermann R.. The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition. Juta & Co, Ltd,1992. — 1241 p.. 1992

Some modern legal systems recognize a further, practically very dangerous, threat to the life of obligations: the lapse of time.

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