Roman Law Terms with Letters I

lacens hereditas. See hereditas iacens.

lacobus. A glossator of the twelfth century, disciple of I menus'.—See glossatores.

Berra, NDI 6, 515 (s.v. Jacopo Bolognese). lactura.

Berger, RE 9, 551; Lattes, RendLomb 47 (1914).

lactus mercium. Jettison; the throwing of goods overboard from a ship in distress in order to lighten it (navis levandae causa).—See lex rhodia de iactu. —D. 14.2.

Berger, RE 9, 546; Arno, AT or 76/11 (1941) 290. lactus missilium. See missilia.

lactus retis. As the object of a sale, the catch made by a fisherman (syn. captura piscium). The sale is made before the fisherman leaves and the risk is assumed by the buyer who has to pay the agreed price even in the event that no fish was caught.—See emptio spei.

Berger, RE 9, 555; F. Vassalli, Miscellanea critica 1 (AnPer 1913) 49.

lavolenus (Octavius I. Priscus). A Roman jurist. Born about a.d. 60, he was still alive under Hadrian. He was the head of the Sabinian school and the teacher of the famous jurist Julian. His most im­portant and original work, Epistulae (in fourteen books), fully reveals his juristic individuality. Other writings of lavolenus are collections of excerpts from earlier jurists (libri ex Cassio, ex Plautio), frequently

provided with his own comments. He edited also a collection of texts from Labeo’s posthumous work POSTERIORES.

Berger, RE 17, 1830, no. 59; idem, BIDR 44 (1936/7) 91; Orestano, NDI 6 (s.v. Giavoleno) ; Di Paola, BI DR 49-50 (1948) 277.

Id est. To wit, namely, sometimes = for instance. Many explanatory remarks, introduced by id est, are postclassical glosses or interpolations by Jus­tinian’s compilers, mostly of a harmless nature.

Guarneri-Citati, Indice² (1927) 49 (Bibl.) ; Chiazzese, Contribute testuali, AnPal 16 (1931) 149.

Id quod interest. “That what I have lost and what I would have gained” (D. 46.8.13 pr.). If a defendant was to be condemned in id quod (or quanti) actoris interest, the judge had to estimate the claimant’s losses and his material situation which would have resulted if the fact for which the defendant was liable would not have occurred.—C. 7.47.—See damnum EMERGENS, LUCRUM CESSANS, QUANTI EA RES EST.

Beretta, SDHI 3 (1937) 419; Giffard, Conflnst 1950, 61. Idem est (erit). This and similar locutions, such as idem dicendum est, observandum est, placet (placuit), introduce a new legal situation but similar to the preceding one in order to state that the foregoing norm or opinion has to be applied to the new instance. Ideo. In phrases et ideo, ideoque ( = and therefore), this serves often—but not always—for the insertion of glosses or interpolations. In any case the con­clusions introduced in this way have to be examined as to their genuineness since through such locutions a classical decision is sometimes introduced although in consequence of the omission of the preceding deliberations by the compilers the conhection with the foregoing text is interrupted.

Guarneri-Citati, Indice² (1927) 45 (Bibl.) ; idem, St Riccobono 1 (1936) 723.

Idiologus. (From the Greek idios logos.) A fiscal administrator of the emperor’s res privata in Egypt. —See GNOMON.

Plaumann, RE 9, 882; S. Riccobono, Jr., Il gnomon dell’i., 1950, 11.

Idoneus. Used not only of the financial solidity and solvency of a person (a debtor, a surety, a guardian) but also of his honesty, trustworthiness, and moral reliability. In connection with security given by a debtor, idonee caver e — to give security either through suretyship or a pledge.

Kiibler, S7 Albertoni 1 (1935) 506; G. Nocera, Insolvensa, 1942, 36.

Ignis. See INTERDICERE AQUA ET INGI, CREMATIO. Ignobiles. See NOBILES.

Ignominia. A deprivation of one’s good name as result of a blame expressed by the censors (nota censoria) or of a dishonorable discharge from the army.

Pfaff, RE 9, 1537.

Ignominiosus. One whose conduct is dishonorable; marked with ignominia.

Ignominiosa missio. See missio ignominiosa.

Ignorantia facti. See error facti.

Ignorantia iuris. Ignorance or an error concerning the existence or meaning of a legal norm. It is preju­dicial (nocet), i.e., it does not afford an excuse and the person who acts from lack of knowledge of the law has to bear the consequences of his ignor­ance. Some persons, however, such as women, minors, soldiers, inexperienced rustic persons (rus­tici) may be excused.—D. 22.6; C. 1.18.

Vassalli, StSen 30 (1914) ; Volterra, BIDR 38 (1929) 75; De Martino, SDHI 3 (1937) ; Scheltema, Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn 56 (1937) 253; Guarino, AnMac 15 (1941/2) 166; idem, ZSS 63 (1943) 243; F. Schwarz, Die Grund­lage der Condictio, 1952, 65.

Ignorare litteras (ignorantia litterarum). To be il­literate (syn. nescire litteras). An illiterate person may be excused from guardianship. In written dec­larations to be made for the authorities his signature could be written by another person.

Illata. (From inferre.) See introducta.

Illatio. An installment, especially in the payment of taxes.

Illatio mortui. Burying a dead person either in a family grave or in one which belongs to another family on the ground of a ius mortuum inferendi. The illatio mortui makes the place a locus religio­sus even when the dead was a slave.—D. 11.8.—See INTERDICTUM DE MORTUO INFERENDO, SEPULCRUM.

Taubenschlag, ZSS 38 (1917) 251.

Illegitimus.

Illicitus. What is not permitted by law or custom, improper. Generally illicit acts are not valid. An illicit condition or testamentary disposition is con­sidered pro non scripta (= as if it would not have been added, written). Ant. licitus.—See collegium ILLICITUM, CONDICIO TURPIS.

Ferrini, NDI 6, 657; J. Macqueron, L’histoire de la cause immorale ou illicite, 1924.

Illustratus. The dignity of a vir illustris. Syn. illus­tris dignitas.

Berger, RE 9, 1071.

Illustris. (Sc. vir.) An honorific title of the highest officials of the later Empire. Frequent in imperial constitutions from the second half of the fourth cen­tury on, and in inscriptions, the title is connected with the prefects of the city of Rome and of the praetorium, with the magister militum, comes sacra­rum largitionum, quaestor sacri palatii, etc. Although the title was normally attached to the office there were illustres honorarii upon whom it was bestowed by the emperor as a special privilege (through codi­cilli honorariae dignitatis). The wives of the illustres were illustres, too; similarly the office itself was called illustris {illustris praefectura, administratio, sedes, etc.). The illustres enjoyed special personal privi­leges, such as exemption from public charges {mu­nera), a privileged position in civil and criminal trials and as witnesses, and the like.—C. 5.33.—See SPECTABILIS.

Berger, RE 9; Jullian, DS 3; Brasiello, NDI 6; De Rug­giero, DE 4, 55; A. Stein, Bull. Acad. Belgique, Cl. Let- ires, 1937, 365.

Imaginarius. Used of a transaction {contractus imagi­narius, solutio imaginaria) concluded by common consent of the parties pro forma in order to cover up another one intended by the parties but some­what contrary to the law. Such a transaction was, e.g., one that looked on the surface like a sale but was in fact a donation prohibited by the law (be­tween husband and wife). Imaginarius is called also a party to such a transaction, e.g., imaginarius emptor.

Berger, RE 9; Rabel, ZSS 27 (1906) 300; G. Pugliese, La simulasione nei negozi giuridici, 1937, 147.

Imago. See ius imaginum.—C. 1.24.

M. Segre, Rend. Pontificia Accad. Archeologica 19 (1942/3) 269.

Imagines. In the army, medallions with the portrait of the reigning emperor, used as insignia of military units (legions, urban cohorts).

Imbecillitas. Mental or physical weakness which may deprive a person of the ability to conclude a legal transaction. Imbecillitas is brought in connection with the age {imbecillitas aetatis) or sex {imbecillitas sexus), i.e., as imbecillitas of women.

Imitatio veteris iuris. See vetus ius.

Immiscere se. To meddle, to interfere in another’s affairs {negotiis alienis). The term was primarily used when such an interference was done against the will or without authorization of the person involved. Immiscere creates the liability of the person so acting since “it is culpable to interfere in a matter which is not ours” (D. 50.17.36).

Berger, RE 9.

Immiscere (miscere) se hereditati (or bonis). See PRO HEREDE GERERE.

Berger, RE 9, 1108.

Immittere. To let into a place. It occurs when the owner of an immovable commits certain acts which do harm to the adjacent property (be it in private ownership or a public place or building), e.g., to let water or a sewer run into it, to disturb the neighbor by steam or smoke, to bring a beam {tignum) into the wall of the neighbor’s house. Such acts normally can be inhibited by prohibitory or restitutory inter­dicts {interdicta).—See interdicta de viis publicis, FUMUS, STILLICIDIUM.

Pasquera, NDI 6, 723.

Immobilis. See res immobiles.

Immoderatus, immodicus. Excessive, immoderate, unreasonable. The terms are applied to acts or doings which exceed the normal or licit limits, e.g., to a donation, an obligation, the price of an object sold.

Immunes. Persons permanently exempt from military service (e.g., priests, persons over forty-six years of age, those who served ten years in cavalry or sixteen—later twenty-five—years in infantry). Tem­porarily relieved from service were the furnishers of the army, persons employed in lower official service {apparitores). Syn. nounvacaffi? militiae.—Immunes were also those who for any reason were exempt from public charges, taxes, and the like.—See immunitas, MUNERA.

De Ruggiero, DE 4; Fiebiger, RE 9; Jullian, DS 3; De Visscher, Les edits d’Auguste, 1940, 103; Welles, JRS 28 (1938) 41.

Immunitas. Exemption from taxes or public charges (munera). It was granted as a personal privilege to individuals, as a privilege of a social group (pub­lic officials, soldiers) or of a community in Italy or in a province. The extension of immunitas was different; it varied according to the kind of the charges or the profession of the persons exempted (physicians, teachers, clergymen, etc.). Immunitas was granted by the senate through a decree {senatus­consultum) and under the Empire by the emperor through a general enactment {edictum) or a special personal privilege. Of particular importance were the exemptions in the domain of municipal adminis­tration.—D. 50.6; C. 10.25.

Ziegler, RE 9; Kiibler, RE 16, 650; Messini, NDI 6, 727 ; Stevenson, OCD; Ferrari Dalle Spade, Immunity ecclesi­astiche nel dir. rom., APen 99 (1939/40).

Impedire (impedimentum). To hinder (a hindrance, impediment). The terms are used of legal norms which impede the conclusion of certain legal acts, or to legal requirements which, when not complied with will produce the non-validity of the act done.

Impendere. To spend.—See impensae. Impendium. See syn. impensae, dispendium. Impensae. Expenditures made on a thing. They become juristically important when made in behalf of another’s property {in alienum) or by one co­owner in behalf of a thing he owns together with others. Legal situations whereby one comes into the position to make expenditures for another are mani­fold. They may originate from a contract {impensae made by a depositee, or by one who received a thing as a gratuitous loan, commodatum, or as a pledge, by a husband with regard to the dowry) or from the possession of another’s thing in good faith as one’s own. For the various kinds of impensae, see the following items. The liability of the owner for the restitution of expenses could be established in a spe­cial agreement or by his consent to a specific ex­penditure. In the absence of a mutual understanding the legal rules were applied which settled the problem in various ways for specific legal situations. The proceeds derived from the thing held, are deducted from the impensae to be restituted.—D. 25.1.—See POSSESSIO BONAE FIDEI.

Guarneri, Citati, NDI 12 (s.v. spese) ; Riccobono, AnPal 3-4 (1917) 319; idem, BIDR 47 (1940); S. Riccobono, Jr., AnPal 17 (1937) 53; Daube, CambrLR 1945, 31.

Impensae dotales. Expenses made by the husband on the property he received as a dowry (in dotem [res dotales] factae). Specific rules determined the bus­hand’s right to recover his expenditures at the resti­tution of the dowry. They underwent various changes in the course of time. “Necessary expenses diminish the dowry by the force of law (ipso iure)” (D. 25.1.5 pr.). D. 25.1. See RETENTIONES DOTALES.

Guarneri-Citati, NDI 12, 1, 723; Schulz, ZSS 34 (1913) 57; E. Deter, Impensae dotem minuunt, Diss. Erlangen, 1935; J. P. Levy, Les i. d., These, Paris, 1937.

Impensae funeris. Expenses made for the funeral of a person. If made by a person not obliged to do it under the law, they can be recovered from the per­tinent relatives.—See actio funeraria, sumptus FUNERIS.

Impensae in fructus. (Or fructuum precipiendorum causa.) Expenses made to increase the produce of a land. They are taken into account when the person who laid out the money is sued for the restitution of the produce. “What remains after the deduction of expenses is considered a produce” (D. 5.3.36.5).— See FRUCTUS.

Riccobono, AG 58 (1897) 61; Riccobono, Jr., AnPal 17 (1937) 53.

Impensae litis. See sumptus litis.

Impensae necessariae. Necessary expenditures made to prevent deterioration, destruction, or loss of a thing, e.g., repairing a building, medical attendance on a slave. They must always be made good except to the holder of a stolen thing. Ant. impensae utiles, voluptariae.

Impensae utiles. Useful, beneficial, expenditures made to promote the improvement of a thing, to increase its produce or selling value. Generally the improve­ments may be taken away by the person who made them to the profit of the owner if it is feasible without damage to the thing. Impensae utiles must be re­stored by the owner if they were made with his con­sent. Ant. impensae necessariae, voluptariae.—See I US TOLLE NDI.

Impensae voluptariae (voluptuosae). Expenditures made on a thing which serve only to increase its beauty or for ornaments. Impensae voluptariae are neither necessary (necessariae) nor beneficial (utiles). As a matter of rule, there is no liability on the part of the owner to refund them, but the person who made the ornament at his expenses has the right to take it away (ius tollendi).

Imperator. The commander (one who imperat) of the army. Under the Republic a high magistrate (consul, praetor, proconsul) who, by virtue of his imperium, commanded the troops, was hailed (saht- tatio, acclamatio) by them after the victory over an enemy as imperator, at the end of the battle or during his triumphant entrance in Rome. He used to be so addressed afterwards in public and private life. Augustus assumed the term imperator as a prae­nomen (Imperator Caesar) and so did his successors. Thus gradually the former honorific title became an appellative title of the princeps, the head of state (“the emperor”).—See princeps.

Rosenberg, RE 9; Cagnat, DS 3; Orestano, NDI 6; De Ruggiero, DE 4, 41, 43; MacFayden, The History of the title Imperator under the R. Empire, Chicago, 1920; Stroux, Die Antike 13 (1937) ; Momigliano, Bull. Comm. Archeol. Comunale di Roma 53 (1930) 42; idem, OCD; De Sanctis, St Riccobono 2 (1936) 57.

Imperatoriam. The initial word of Justinian’s enact­ment by which his Institutes were promulgated (No­vember 21, 533).—See INSTITUTIONES IUSTINIAN1.

Imperfectus. Not complete. A transaction is < incom­plete when one of its essential elements is not ful­filled or missing, e.g., if in a stipulatio the object of the promise or another essential element is not indi­cated. See testamentum imperfectum. Imperfect acts or transactions lack legal validity.—See leges PERFECTAE, MINORES.

Aru, AG 124 (1940) 3.

Imperialis. Connected with, or originating from the emperor (e.g., constitutio, statuta, praeceptum, libera- litas, auctoritas, maiestas, etc.). Imperialis occurs as frequently as its syn. principalis.

Imperitia. The lack of professional skill, capacity (knowledge). It created liability of the person who through a contract (locatio conductio operis, or locatio conductio operarum) assumed the duty to render certain professional services, without having the nec­essary knowledge. It is considered as a form of culpa (culpae adnumeratur). Imperitia is used of artisans and craftsmen as well as of persons exercis­ing liberal professions (physicians, land-surveyors, etc.). Also the lack of knowledge of the law (in­ability) in a judge is qualified as imperitia.

Arangio-Ruiz, Responsabilitci contrattuale, 2nd ed. 1933. 188.

Imperium. An order, command. A legal norm is called imperium legis when referring to a statute. Imperium means also the right to give orders (ius imperandi). the power over a smaller group such as a family (hence imperium domesticum is the impe­rium of the head of the family, pater familias). The supreme power of the Roman people, its sovereignty = imperium populi Romani. In a technical sense imperium — the official power of the higher magis­trates {magistratus maiores) under the Republic, and of the emperor under the Empire. The magisterial imperium embraced various domains of administra­tion, legislative initiative through proposals made before the popular assemblies {ius agendi cum populo), and military command. With regard to the administration of justice, imperium is sometimes op­posed to, and distinguished from, iurisdictio, some­times coherently connected with it. See imperium merum. The juristic sources do not agree as to the attribution of certain magisterial acts of jurisdic­tional character {restitutio in integrum, missiones, appointment of guardians) to imperium or iurisdictio. The confusion is doubtless the result of alterations of the texts or misunderstanding on the part of Jus­tinian compilers for whom older distinctions lost their practical significance.—Finally imperium means the territory of the state.—See lex de imperio, potestas.

Rosenberg, RE 9; Toutain, DS 3; Lauria, NDI 6; De Ruggiero, DE 4; Balsdon, OCD; Nocera, AnPer $7 (1946) 145; F. Leifer, Die Einheit des Gewaltgedankens im rom. Staatsrecht, 1914, 68; Radin, St Riccobono 2 (1936) 21; Caspary, 57 Albertoni 2 (1937) 394; G. Pugliese, Appunti sui limiti dell’imperium nella repressione penale, 1939; Balsdon, JRS 29 (1939) 57; Rudolph, Neue Jahrbucher fur das klas. Altertum, 1939, 145; H. Wagen- woort, Roman dynamism, 1947, 70; C. Gioffredi, Contributi alia storia della procedura civ., 1947, 16; Vogel, ZSS 67 (1950) 62.

Imperium domesticum. The power of the pater jami- lias.—See imperium.

Imperium domi. See dome

Imperium maius. The imperium of a higher magis­trate when compared with that of a magistrate lower in the hierarchy, e.g., the imperium of a consul was imperium maius when confronted with the praetor’s imperium. Ant. imperium minus. Par imperium = the imperium of magistrates equal in rank (see col­LEGAE ). See INTERCESSIO.

Rosenberg, RE 9, 1209; Hugh Last, JRS 37 (1947) 157; M. Grant, From imperium to auctoritas, 1946, 411.

Imperium merum. The full magisterial power. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, it is limited only to criminal matters {ius gladii, potestas gladii) and does not include jurisdiction in civil matters. If, however, the latter was granted too, the imperium was termed imperium mixtum. The origin of this distinction is somewhat obscure.

Pfaff, RE 9; Rosenberg, ibid. 1210.

Imperium militiae. See dome Imperium mixtum. See imperium merum. Imperium par. See imperium maius.

Imperium proconsulare. See proconsul.

Impetrare (impetratio). To obtain on request. The term is used of judicial and administrative measures which individuals succeeded to obtain by petitions {petere, postulare, desiderare), addressed to magis­trates, imperial officials, or the emperor. The locu­tion impetrare actionem belongs to the language of the imperial chancery.—C. 1.22; 2.57.

Naber, RStDIt 11 (1938) 5.

Impetratio dominii. A request of a creditor {creditor pigneraticius) addressed to the emperor to the effect that he be recognized as the owner of the thing, pledged to him by the debtor, for which he could not find a purchaser. Justinian ordained that if the value of the pledge exceeded the debt, the surplus had to be restored to the debtor. The latter had moreover the right to redeem the pledge within two years by paying the sum due with interest.—C. 8.33. —See HYPEROCHA.

A. Burdese, Lex commissoria (Mem. 1st. giur. Torino 63, 1949) 206.

Impetus. Mental impulse. A crime committed impetu is considered neither intentional nor casual. It is in the middle like culpa between casus and dolus. Acts committed in drunkenness (ebrietas, per vinum, temu­lentia) are punished mildly, especially when com­mitted by soldiers. Imperial legislation considered violent excitement of the wrongdoer an extenuating circumstance. Impetus doloris was also taken into consideration (e.g., when one killed his wife caught in adultery) “since it is extremely difficult to master a justified grief” (D. 48.5.39.8).

F. De Robertis, Studi di dir. penale rom., 1943, 140.

Implere. To fulfill (an agreement, an obligation, a condition), to satisfy legal requirements (e.g., of an usucapion), to complete, to bring to an end.

Impleri. Condicio impletur, see condicio.

Implorare. To request a judicial remedy (e.g., an in integrum restitutio), to supplicate. The term oc­curs frequently in imperial constitutions.

Imponere. To impose (a duty, a charge, a penalty) upon a person. For imponere festucam {vindictam) in the legis actio sacramento in rem, see vindicta. Imponere libertatem = to grant freedom. Imponere servitutem = to impose a servitude upon an immov­able by agreement or in a testament.

Gradcnwitz, ZSS 23 (1902) 337.

Importata. See introducta.

Impossibilium nulla obligatio. “An obligation to do impossible things is not binding” (D. 185.50.17). “Things which cannot be given {impossibilia dari) are considered not to be included (jc. in a transac­tion)” (D. 135.50.17). A condition is considered impossible when nature makes its fulfillment impos­sible.—See CONDICTIO IMPOSSIBILIS.

Rabel, Mel Gerardin, 1907, 473; idem, Fg Bekker, 1907, 193; Longo, AnMac 2 (1934) 213; F. Pastori, Pro filo dogmatico dell'obblig. rom., 1951, 171.

Impostura. See stellionatus.

Improbare. To disapprove, to reject. The term is applied to agreements or contractual clauses (con­ditions) condemned (improbari) by law or custom. Improbare is also used of a disapprobation of a person who is considered to be unqualified for certain duties (e.g., a guardian) or works.—Ant. adprobare, pro­bare.

Improbus. Dishonest, lacking in moral integrity. Im- probus is a person who, for instance, knowingly sues for a debt which has been paid or who conducts a trial knowing that he is wrong (improbus litigator). “He who does not know how much he owes cannot be considered dishonest” (D. 50.17.99).—See nemo DE IMPROBITATE.

Kleinfeller, RE 9.

Improbus et intestabilis. See testis.

Improbus litigator. See improbus. Syn. calumniator (see calumnia), temere litigans. According to Jus­tinian’s constitution he must pay his adversary all damages and expenditures caused by the trial (C.. 3.1.14.1).

Imprudentia. Want of knowledge of law or facts, ignorance, inadvertence, imprudence. In legal mat­ters it is treated like ignorantia. On the other hand, however, “almost in all criminal trials assist­ance is given to youth and lack of prudence” (D. 50.17.108).—See iudex Qui litem suam facit, IMPERITIA.

Impubes. A person below the age of puberty, one who has not attained manhood. In earlier times no cer­tain age was fixed for puberty (pubertas). Physical condition (habitus corporis) was decisive, both in men (qui generare possunt = who are capable to pro­create) and women (nubilis, viripotens =■ fit for mar­riage). The beginning of puberty had its external distinction in the man’s garment, toga virilis, hence the youth was called praetextatus. Later the age of fourteen years for boys, and twelve for girls, was established as the end of impuberty. An impubes, who is not under the paternal power (patria potestas) and is therefore sui iuris, must have a guardian (tutor), see tutela. An impubes under guardian­ship may conclude legal transactions only with the consent of his guardian, profitable transactions even without such consent. After completion of the age of fourteen, an impubes becomes pubes and enters the age of a minor which lasts until the completion of twenty-five years. Within the age of impuberty some distinctions are made (they are perhaps of later origin) : impubes infantiae proximus = one who has somewhat exceeded the age of infancy (infantia, see infans) and impubes pubertati proximus = one who is near the age of puberty. The latter may be respon­sible for criminal wrongdoings if he is capable to understand the importance of his acts. A general classical rule was, however, that an impubes was not capax doli, i.e., he had no capacity of understanding the fraudulent (criminal) character of his actions.— See CAPAX DOLI, CURATOR IMPUBERIS, TOGA PRAE­TEXTA.

Baudry, DS 2; S. Perozzi, Tutor impubes, Scritti 3 (1948, ex 1918) 127; Tumedei, AG 89 (1923) ; Albertario, Studi 1 (1933) 81; Di Marzo, St Besta 1 (1939) 111.

Impune. Without punishment, with safety. Impune is frequently used with a negative (non impune, nemo impune, and the like) and indicates that a person acting in a certain way may expect punishment. Non impune is sometimes syn. with illicite.

Impunitas. Freedom from punishment.—See abolitio. Impunitus. Unpunished, one who escaped punish­ment. The emperor Trajan made in a rescript the following statement : “It is better to leave a criminal unpunished than to condemn an innocent person” (D. 48.19.5 pr.).—See suspicio.

Imputare. To reckon into (for instance, into ex­penses, a legacy, the quarta Falcidia, a debt), to make a deduction. Imputare is used also to mean charging one with fault or negligence (culpa, negle­gentia).

In bonis esse (or rem habere). When a res mancipi was conveyed by a mere delivery (handing over, traditio), and not by one of the solemn acts required for the transfer of property of such things (manci­patio, in iure cessio), the transferee did not acquire ownership under Quiritarian law but he had the thing only in bonis ( = among his goods, so-called bonitary ownership) which was protected by prae­torian law. He might acquire Quiritarian ownership through usucapio.—See actio publiciana, domi­nium EX IURE QUIRITIUM, DOMINIUM DUPLEX.

A. Audibert, Histoire de la proprietà prĂ©torienne, 2 vol., 1889; P. Bonfante, Scritti 2 (1926) 370; M. Kaser, Eigen- turn und B esite, 1943, 297.

In continenti. See CONTINENS.

In diem. Until, on, a fixed day.—See dies.

In diem addictio. See addictio in diem.

In domum deductio. See deductio in domum.

In factum actiones (formulae). See formulae in IUS CONCEPTAE.

In integrum restitutio. See restitutio in integrum. In iudicio. Used (not correctly) in literature to de­note the stage of a civil trial before the private judge. The correct expression is apud iudicem. Ant. in IURE.—See IUDEX.

In iure. Before the judicial magistrate. The first stage of a civil trial in the proceedings of legis actiones and per formulas took place before the magistrate (the praetor), while the second, final stage, normally ended with a judgment, took place before the private judge (iudex), apud iudicem.— See FORMULA, ius, IUDEX, confessio in iure, in­terrogatio in iure, iusiurandum necassarium.

R. Diill, Der Giitegedanke, 1931 ; F. De Martino, Giurisdi­zione, 1937, 41; Jolowicz, ACDR Bologna 2 (1935) 59; idem, RIDA 2 {-Mèi De Visscher 1, 1949) 477; Kaser, Fschr Wenger 1 (1946) 106; Wenger, St Solassi (1948) 47 (Bibl. 48).

In iure cessio. A fictitious trial in the form of a rei vindicatio before the magistrate (in iure) the pur­pose of which was the transfer of Quiritarian owner­ship. The plaintiff (the transferee) asserted that the thing was his (vindicare), the defendant (the trans­feror), interrogated by the praetor whether he wanted to make a countervindication (contra vindicare), re­mained silent or replied in the negative, whereupon the praetor assigned (addictio) the thing to the plain­tiff. Thus the transfer was completed, without litis contestatio, or a procedure apud iudicem. The in iure cessio does no longer exist under Justinian.— See REI VINDICATIO.

Kipp, RE 3 (s.v. cessio) ; Baudry, DS 1 (s.v. cessio) ; De Villa, NDI 6 (j.z/. in iure c.) ; S. Schlossmann, In iure c. und mancipatio, 1904; Rabel, ZSS 27 (1906) 309; H. LĂ©vy-Bruhl, Quelques problèmes du très ancien droit rom., 1934, 114; idem, Nouvelles etudes, 1947, 144; Pflüger, ZSS 63 (1943) 301; Μ. Kaser, Das altröm. Ius, 1949, 104; Meylan, RIDA 6 (1951) 103.

In iure cessio hereditatis. A cession of an inheritance in the form of in iure cessio to a third person by an heir on intestacy of the agnatic group. The heredes sui were not permitted to transfer the inheritance through in iure cessio. If the heir did it before taking over the estate, the cessionary became heir as if he were heir appointed by the law. If he did it after the acceptance of the inheritance (aditio hereditatis) he remained obligated to the creditors of the estate whereas the debts owed to the estate were extin­guished since through in iure cessio only corporeal things were conveyed. The in iure cessio hereditatis disappeared together with the in iure cessio. It was absorbed by the sale of an estate; see emptio here­ditatis.—See the foregoing item.

Garaud, RHD 1 (1922) 141; Cugia, Alienazione dell'ere­dità, St Besta 1 (1939) ; Ambrosino, SDHI 10 (1944) 3; Guarino, St Solazzi, 1948, 38; De Martino, ibid. 568; Betti, ibid. 594 ; B. Albanese, Successione ereditaria, AnPal 20 (1949) 285; Scherillo, St Carnelutti 4 (1950) 257; Ambrosino, SDHI 17 (1951) 203; Solazzi, lura 3 (1952) 21.

In iure cessio servitutis. The constitution of a servi­tude through an in iure cessio in court, modeled on a trial for a servitude (vindicatio servitutis). It could be applied for predial servitudes and usufruct. See IN IURE CESSIO.

In iure cessio tutelae. A guardian of a woman who under the law was entitled to assume the guardian­ship (tutor legitimus), could surrender the tutorship to another through an act before the magistrate, in iure cessio. The tutor thus appointed = tutor cessi­cius. At the latter’s death the guardianship returned to the tutor legitimus. The tutor cessicius ceased to be tutor when the guardian under law died.

Sachers, RE 7 A, 1594.

In iure cessio ususfructus. See IN IURE CESSIO SERVI­TUTIS.

In ius conceptae actiones (formulae). See formulae IN IUS CONCEPTAE.

In ius vocatio. The summons of a debtor by the plaintiff to appear in iure (before the magistrate) where the plaintiff will claim his right. The de­fendant was bound to follow the summons according to a provision of the Twelve Tables : si in ius vocat, ilo ( — if, sc. the plaintiff, summons to court the de­fendant shall go). The summoned defendant must not answer the plaintiff's summons immediately if he gives a surety (vindex) warranting that he (the sum­moned) would appear in court on a fixed day. Cer­tain persons could not be summoned at all, such as consuls, praetors, and high provincial officials ; others were exempt from in ius vocatio only when exercising a specific activity (a pontiff during a sacrifice, a judge or an advocate during a trial) or on specific occasions (wedding, funeral). Certain persons were prohibited from summoning other persons related to them by specific ties. Thus parents, patrons and their children and parents could not be summoned by children or freedmen, respectively, unless the latter obtained a special permission from the praetor. In later law a summons was performed by the plaintiff in writing in the presence of a clerk of the court; see denuntiatio litis. In the later Empire the summons became an official act in which the plaintiff did not participate.—D. 2.4-7 ; C. 2.2.—See domus, EVOCATIO, VINDEX, VADIMONIUM, MANUS INIECTIO, ORATIO MARCI, THEATRUM.

Cuq, DS 3, 743; Sacchi, NDI 6; Pugliese, RIDA 3 (= Mèi De Visscher 2, 1949) 249.

In locum alicuius succedere. See succedere in locum.

In manum conventio. See conventio in manum, MANUS.

In mora esse. See mora.

In personam actiones. See actiones in personam. In pendenti esse. To be in suspense.—See condicio,

PENDERE.

In possessione esse. Syn. DETINERE. The term pos­sessℱ is not used here with its technical meaning. —See POSSESSIO.

In procinctu. Before the troops gathered in face of the enemy. A testament made by a soldier in pro­cinctu before a combat is one of the earliest forms of testament. Details are unknown.

In re sua. See res sua.

In rem actiones. See actiones in rem.

In rem agere per sponsionem. See agere per spon- SIONEM.

In rem versum. See versum in rem, peculium.

In summa. In conclusion, finally, generally. It was a favorite locution of some classical jurists (especially Gaius) to introduce a conclusive rule (in summa sciendum est, dicendum est = it must be said, under­stood).

Guarneri-Citati, Indice* (1927 ) 46; Sargenti, AG 122 (1939) 53; Solazzi, La tutela delle servitù prediali, 1949, 148.

In transitu. Used of official acts accomplished by a magistrate when passing by (c.g., when a praetor or a high provincial officer went to the theatre or into a bathing establishment). Only acts of voluntary jurisdiction (e.g., manumissions) could be performed on such occasion.

Inaedificatio. What was built on a land belongs to its owner, no matter who was the builder or to whom belonged the materials used. The maxim, “all that is built on soil goes with the soil” (D. 43.17.3.7; Gaius 2.73; Inst. 2.1.33), is an application of the rule superficies cedit solo. The owner of the mate­rials remains their owner and may recover them by vindicatio only when the building for any reason comes down. However, one who knowingly built a house on another’s land with his own materials, lost the ownership of them.—See tignum, superficies.

A. Suman, Saggi minimi di dir. rom., 1919, 71; Guarneri- Citati, AnPal 14 (1930) 315; E. Nardi, St sulla ritenzione, 1947, 320.

Inanis. (When used of a legal transaction, obligation, action) void, of no legal effect.

Inauguratio. A religious ceremony celebrated by the augurs in republican Rome after the election of a high magistrate or the appointment of a high priest (flamin). A favorable result of the sacrifice was considered an approval by the gods.—See augures. Wissowa, RE 2, 2325; Richter, RE 9; Bouche-Leclercq, DS 3.

Incantare (incantatio). To enchant by a magic for­mula. According to the Twelve Tables incantare was punished as a crime. Syn. excantare.—See excan­tare FRUGES, MALUM CARMEN, OCCENTARE, MAGIA. Pfaff, RE 9; F. Beckmann, Zauberei und Recht in Roms Fruhzeit, 1928, 26, 45.

Incendere (incendium). To set fire, to burn (an­other’s property). Incendium — arson.—See incen­diarius.

Incendiarius. An incendiary, one guilty of arson (in­cendium). An incendiarius was punished with the death penalty (by burning) when he willfully had set fire to another’s property _within the city, either for reasons of enmity or for the purpose of committing a robbery. See crematio. The burning of a country­house, outside the city, was punished less severely. Damage done to property by fire could be claimed by an actio legis Aquiliae. According to Lex Cor­nelia de sicariis an incendiarius was treated.as a murderer when human life was destroyed by the fire. In minor cases arson was considered a crimen vis (violence). Syn. incensor.

Kleinfeller, RE 9; Humbert, DS 3; Condanari-Michler, Scr Ferrini 3 (Univ. Sacro Cuore, Milan, 1948) 74.

Incendium. A fire. The praetorian Edict granted a penal action for fourfold damages against a person who at a fire took things by violence or fraud or received goods stolen during a fire. After a year the action could be brought only for double the damages. Analogous actions were set in the Edict for robbery committed in a shipwreck ( naufragi um), when a house collapsed (ruina) or during an attack against a boat (expugnare navem).—D. 47.9.

Lend, Edictum perpetuum? (1927) 396.

Incensitus. Not registered in the tax payers’ list. Ant. censitus.

Incensor. See 1 NCENDIARIUS.

Incensus. One who abstained from registering in the census in order to avoid military service. According to ancient law he could be sold abroad losing liberty and citizenship (capitis deminutio maxima).

Pfaff, RE 9.

Incertae personae. See personae incertae.

Incertum (incertus). See certum, actiones (for­mulae) CERTAE, CONDEMN ATI O INCERTA, DIES CERTUS.

Incestus (incestum). Incest, sexual union between persons tied by blood relationship. It was prohibited since the earliest times for physiological, ethical, and social reasons by veteres mores (old customs), un­doubtedly under religious sanctions (fas). Later legislation was concerned only with the prohibition of marriages between persons closely related by blood (nuptiae incestae), without taking into account as a specific crime sexual intercourse outside a marital union, since such coition was punished under the law concerning related crimes (stuprum, adulterium). Incestus was always forbidden between descendants and ascendants (termed incestus iuris gentium as being prohibited with all nations). As to cognatic relationship the extension of the concept incestus (and the interdiction of marriage) varied in the course of time. As a matter of principle, “man com­mits incestus if he marries a woman among those whom by custom we are forbidden to marry” (D. 23.2.39.1). A marriage between brother and sister, uncle (or aunt) and niece (or nephew) always re­mained under ban. Legislation of Christian em­perors dealt frequently with the matter. Punishment was originally the death penalty by throwing down the culprit from the Tarpeian ro'ck ; later deportatio, relegatio, and seizure of property were inflicted. At times penalties for the woman were severer than those for the man. Ignorance of the law or of the existing relationship was taken into consideration in setting the penalty. The marriage itself (incestae nuptiae) was null and the children were illegitimate. —C. 5.5.

Klingmuller, RE 9; Humbert, DS 3; Brasiello, NDI 6; Lotmar, Mèi Girard 2 (1912) ; De Martino, SDH I 3 (1937) 405 ; Guarino, St sull’i., 1942 ; idem, ZSS 63 (1943) 175 (Bibl. 177) ; G. Lombardi, Ricerche in tema di ius gentium (1946) 3.

Incestus superveniens. Adoption of his son’s wife or his daughter’s husband by a father dissolves the exist­ing marriage as incestuous, the spouses being now in a relationship (although created artificially), which would exclude the conclusion of a valid marriage between them.

Inchoare actionem (indicium, litem). When refer­ring to the procedure extra ordinem, to initiate a law­suit; when referred to the formulary procedure the term indicates the litis contestatio.

Solazzi, ANap 63 (1951).

Incidere. To become involved in a situation which makes a law (a statute) or a criminal or private action applicable against the person entangled, e.g., incidere in legem Aquiliam, in edictum, in senatus­consultum.—See COMMUNIO INCIDENS.

Incidere testamentum. To cut through a written testament (tabulas testamenti) in order to destroy the last will. If a testator in a state of insanity did so with the testament he had made when he had been mentally sane, the testament remained valid.

Incisus. (Sc. acre). One whose name was engraved on a bronze tablet containing a list of persons for a specific purpose, e.g., for participation in the gratui­tous distribution of grain in Rome.

De Ruggiero, DE 4.

Incola. An inhabitant of a city or municipality, one “who conferred his domicile at a certain place” (D. 50.16.239.2). Hence syn. qui domicilium habet. See domicilium. An incola is distinguished from an originarius, i.e., a citizen of the community where he was born; see origo.—“An incola has to obey the magistrates of the place where he is an inhabitant as well as those where he is citizen” (D. 50.1.29).— D. 50.1; C.10.40.—See consistentes.

Berger, RE 9; Lechat, DS 3.

Incolatus (ius). Rights and duties connected with the domicile, the quality of being an incola in a commu­nity,—See domicilium, incola.

Incommodum. See commodum.

Inconcussa possessio. Undisturbed possession of an immovable (inconcusse possidere). Unknown in the classical language, the term appears in later imperial constitutions.

Inconsiderate, inconsulte (inconsulto). Inconsider­ately, thoughtlessly, without deliberation. One who is so acting must bear the consequences of his trans­actions or declarations made without deliberation.

Inconsultus. (Adj.) Not consulted. Inconsulto prae­tore (principe) — without asking the praetor (the emperor) for permission or advice.

Incorporalis. See res incorporales.

Incorporatio. The incorporation of confiscated prop­erty into the private property (res privata) of the emperor.—C. 10.10.

Incrementum. An increase, augmentation, produce. The term is applied to increases of a dowry, of an inheritance or legacy, of a peculium, and becomes juridically important when the restitution of such patrimonial units is involved.

Incubare (incubatio). To take and retain another’s thing in unlawful possession. Incubator = an un­lawful holder of a thing.

Daube, CambLJ 9 (1945) 37.

Inculpanter, inculpate. Free from fault, from culpa­bility, without blame. Syn. sine culpa.—See culpa. Incursio, incursus (latronum, praedonum). An as­sault of bandits. An attack made by a group of robbers was considered a vis maior. It released the holder of another’s things from responsibility.

Incusare. To accuse, to blame, to complain. The term appears only in the language of the imperial chancery. Indebite. See INDEBITUM.

Indebitum (indebita pecunia). A debt which in fact does not exist. In a brtoacier sense the term is used of an existing debt which may be repealed by a per­emptory exception. What has been paid in discharge of a not existing debt may be recovered by a special action, condictio indebiti.—D. 12.6; C. 4.5.—See CONDICTIO INDEBITI.

F. Fitting, Sciens indebitum accipere, Lausanne, 1926; Van Oven, lura 1 (1950) 21; J. G. Fuchs, lusta causa traditionis (Basel, 1952) 163.

Indefensus. A defendant who by his negative attitude refused the cooperation necessary for the continuation of a trial. Indefensus is one who does not accept the formula (accipere iudicium) proposed by the plaintiff and approved by the magistrate, one who does not offer security ordered by the praetor, who does not answer when questioned by the praetor in court (interrogatio in iure), or who is hiding himself (lati­tare) so that he cannot be summoned by the plaintiff; see in ius vocatio. The sanction for the frustration of the process by the defendant was that the plaintiff was authorized by the praetor to enter into possession of the defendant’s property, missio in possessionem. In trials in which a right over a thing is involved, the thing itself is called res indefensa when the de­fendant assumed a passive attitude. In such a case the plaintiff was given possession of the thing. In­defensus is also one who being personally incapable to defend himself in court, is not properly represented by his tutor or curator.—See latitare, missio in possessionem rei servandae causa, duci iubere, DEFENSIO, DEFENDERE.

Wlassak, Confessio in iure, Sb Munch, 193^, Heft 8.

Indemnis. Secure from loss, incurring no loss. In­demnem praestare aliquem = to indemnify either by reimbursement of the damages already done or by giving security against future losses.

Indemnitas. Security against loss, indemnification. See INDEMNIS, CAUTIO INDEMNITATIS.—C. 5.46.

Index. One who denounces a crime without being a formal accuser in a criminal trial; an informer. An index who had been an accomplice of a criminal fre­quently went unpunished if his information led to the discovery of the culprit. Both the denunciation and the award given to the index were termed indicium.

Kleinfeller, RE 9; Kaser, RE 5A, 1047.

Index. A summary of a juristic text or of a written document (index scripturae). In the Byzantine legal literature indices were resumes of older collections of legal texts in the form of concise formulations of legal norms with the omission of discussions, polemics, historical reminiscences, and the like. The most renowned Byzantine jurists (Theophilus, Dorotheus, Stephanus, Kyrillos) wrote indices of the Digest or of parts thereof. Authors of indices were designated as indikeutai.

Berger·, Justinian's Ban, Bull. Polish Inst, of Arts and Sciences in America 3 (1945) 676 (= BI DR 55-56, Post- Bellum, 1951, 148, Bibl.).

Index Florentinus. A list of juristic works which had been excerpted for Justinian’s Digest. Justinian ordered that such a list be composed, but only the manuscript of the Digest of Florence (see Floren­tina) contains such a list. However, some works of classical jurists are listed therein of which no excerpt is preserved in the Digest but on the other hand some works are excerpted in the Digest which are not mentioned in the index Florentinus.

Peters, Die oström. Digestenkommentare, 1913, 75; Ro- tondi, Scr. giur. 1 (1922 ) 298.

Index rerum gestarum. (Of Augustus.) See res gestae.

Indicere. To impose a duty. The term applies to both official orders (imposing public services, munera or other charges) and to testamentary dispositions by which an heir or a legatee was charged with the per­formance of services or with a moral duty (indicere operas, indicere viduitatem).—C. 6.40.

Indicere bellum. To declare war. Under the Republic the decision about a declaration of war depended upon the comitia centuriata.—See indictio belli, lex de BELLO INDICENDO, FETIALES, CLARIGATIO.

Indicia. Circumstantial evidence. “Indicia have no less force of evidence than documents” (C. 3.32.19), provided thley are not prohibited by law. The term appears in imperial constitutions (from the time of Diocletian) in connection with both criminal and civil matters.

Indicium. In criminal matters the denunciation of a crime and its perpetrator.—See index, nuntiator. Indicium. The promise of a recompense for a certain service. It used to be announced publicly (edie ere), as, for instance, the announcement of a reward for the return of a runaway slave. The award was prom­ised to anybody who succeeded in fulfilling the action to be compensated.

R. v. Mayr, Die Auslobung, 1905; R. Villers, Remarques sur la promesse de recompense, 1941; Düll, ZSS 61 (1941) 23.

Indictio. An imperial enactment ordaining an extra­ordinary requisition of corn from the owners of pro­vincial land. From the beginning of the fourth cen­tury on, the indictio became a regular annual impost. The revision of the land taxes was carried out every fifteen years (= three censuses). These fifteen-year cycles came to serve afterwards as a new system of dating, the years being indicated by the number of the indiction and by one to fifteen according to their sequence in the given indiction. The first indictio cycle started in a.d. 297 and the beginning of an indictio was on September 1st.—Indictio (indicere) was the term for the imposition of public charges (munera).—C. 10.17; 43.—See superindictio.

De Ruggiero, DE 4, 48 ; Humbert, DS 3 ; Seeck, RE 9 ; Ferrari dalle Spade, Immunità ecclesiastiche, AVen 99, 2 (1939-40) 149.

Indictio belli. A ceremonial act (throwing a blood­stained spear into the enemy’s territory), performed by the fetiales ; it completed the declaration of war. See INDICERE BELLUM, LEX DE BELLO INDICENDO, CLARIGATIO, FETIALES.

Walbank, CIPhilol 1949, 15.

Indigena. A person living at his birth place. The term is used in imperial constitutions.—See origo, domicilium.

Indignus. In the law of successions, a person who because of his (ungrateful) attitude towards the tes­tator became unworthy to benefit by the latter’s last ‱will. He was deprived of the advantages granted therein. Generally it was the fisc which might claim the return (erip ere, puf erre, see ereptorium) of the things already taken by 'the indignus under the testa­ment. * Indignitas (= the quality of being indignus) was primarily introduced by the imperial legislation. An indignus was one who killed the testator or did not take the necessary measures to revenge his as­sassination; one who impugned the last will as in­officious (see QUERELA INOFFICIOSI TESTAMENTI) Or as forged and lost the trial; one who concealed the last will in order to avoid the payment of legacies, or who, appointed as a guardian, refused to accept the guardianship without any just reason, or the like.— D. 34.9; C. 6.35.—See inulta mors, nubere.

E. Nardi, I casi di indegnità, 1937 ; idem, SDH I 6 (1940) 393; B. Biondi, Successione testamentaria, 1943, 155.

Indiscrete, indistincte. Without any distinction, with­out a specific indication which person or thing is meant, e.g., when a payment is made by a debtor liable for several debts without stating to which debt the payment refers.

Individuus. Indivisible. Things or rights which can­not be divided and things which cannot be separated into parts become the common property of the per­sons to whom they happen to be assigned. Individuus is sometimes syn. with indivisus (undivided). See the following item.

Indivisus. Undivided, not separated into parts. Pro indiviso possedere (habere) is used of owners who have a thing in common ownership (communio pro indiviso). In such instances the right of any one of them is expressed by a fraction and the thing itself remains undivided.—See communio (Bibl.), pignus.

Indotata mulier. A woman who entered a marriage without a dowry.—See dotare.

Inducere (inductio). To cross out, e.g., the institu­tion of an heir or a legacy in a testament. See inter- L1NERE, PERDUCERE.—Inducere with reference to a statute (e.g., inducere legem Palcidiam), a senatus- consult, or a legal remedy (an action, an exception) = to apply.—D. 28.4.

Inducta. See introducta.

Indulgentia (indulgere). An act of grace (by the emperor = indulgentia principis), a benefit granted as a favor (ex indulgentia'). The term occurs pri­marily in imperial constitutions concerned with acts of amnesty in criminal matters.

Kleinfeller, RE 9; Cuq, DS 3; De Ruggiero, DE 4; P. Duparc, Origine de la grace dans le droit penal rom., 1942, 25; Carrelli, Restitutio i. principis, AnBari 53, 2 (1934).

Indulgentissimus. A title given to emperors (after Hadrian).

De Ruggiero, DE 4.

Indutiae. A truce, armistice.

C. Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of An­cient Greece and Rome, 2 (1911) 287; E. Taubler, Im­perium Romanum (1913) 29.

Inefiicax. Deprived of legal effectiveness, ineffective. Ant. EFFICAX.

Inemptus. Not bought. Certain sales contained a clause to the effect that under specific circumstances the sale should be considered not valid and the object of the sale not bought (res inempta).—See lex com- MISSORIA, PACTUM DISPLICENTIAE.

Inesse. To be contained in. It is used of clauses (conditions) inserted in an agreement by the will of the parties, or of essential elements of tegal institu­tions or transactions, which are either fixed by law or self-evident. Inesse officio iudicis = to be part of the office of a judge.

Infamare. To defame, injure the good reputation of a person. The praetorian edict forbade the doing or saying anything (orally or by writing, see libelli famosi) infamandi causa (=for the purpose of defamation). The person injured could sue the of­fender by actio iniuriarum.·—See iniuria.

Daube, ACIVer 3 (1952) 413.

Jnfamia. Evil reputation, the quality of being in­famous (infamis). Infamia was not only connected with a diminution of the estimation of a person among his fellow citizens but produced also certain legal disabilities which differed according to the grounds for the infamy. In Justinian’s law various groups of persons were added to those whose legal ability had been restricted already in earlier (primarily prae­torian) law. The oldest measure to brand a petson as dishonest was the nota censoria which was a moral punishment by the censors for misconduct in political or private life. See ignominia. The praetorian edict deprived certain persons for moral reasons of the right of appearance in court as advocates or repre­sentatives of a party to the trial, or of being repre­sented by another. In particular, persons condemned for crimes or private wrongdoings (delicta) were struck by this measure. Infamia as it appears as a developed institution in Justinian’s law originated either in the exercise of a dishonest profession (per­sonae turpes) or in a condemnatory judgment in trials resulting from contractual relations which re­quired a particularly honest behavior and in which the violation thereof appeared as a flagrant break of confidence (as, e.g., partnership, deposit, mandatum, fiducia). See actiones famosae. Bankruptcy, a dishonest discharge from military service, misbehavior in family life, simultaneous betrothal with two per­sons, and many other wrongdoings made a person infamis ( = qui notatur infamia, as Justinian says). Besides procedural disabilities infamia caused other disadvantages such as exclusion from tutorship and denial of the right to obtain a public office or to be an accuser in a criminal trial. Under specific cir­cumstances, infamia was not without repercussion in the rights of succession.—D. 3.2; C. 2.11; 10.59.— See NOTA CENSORIA, IGNOMINIOSUS, INTESTABILIS, INUSTUS, TURPIS PERSONA, TURPITUDO.

Pfaff, RE 9; Humbert and Lecrivain, DS 3; Sacchi, NDI 6; De Ruggiero, DE 4; Berger, OCD; A. H. J. Greenidge, I. in R. law, 1894; Schulz, Fschr Zitelmann, 1913, 11; E. Levy, St Riccobono 2 (1936) 77; L. Pommeray, Etudes sur iinfamie, 1937; U. Brasiello, Repressione penale, 1937, 152.

Infamis. (Adj.) See infamia. Syn. infamatus.— C. 10.59.

Infans. Qui fari non potest ( — one who cannot speak), a child who cannot express his ideas reasonably. “Children have no intellect” (Gaius 3.109). From the time of Justinian, or perhaps a little earlier, infantia (= childhood) comprehends children under seven completed years. An infans is completely in­capable under the law. After the completion of seven years an infans becomes impubes.—D. 37.3.

Cuq, DS 3; Sciascia, NDI 6; Tumedei, AG 89 (1923); Solazzi, BIDR 49-50 (1947) 354.

Infantia. The age of an infans.—See impuberes.

Infantiae (infanti) proximus. See impubes.

Infanticidium. The term does not occuf in juristic texts. A legal prohibition of infanticide is ascribed to the legendary founder of Rome, Romulus. The Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a new-born child that turned out a monster. Generally infanti­cide was punished as murder, both under the Republic (Lex Cornelia de sicariis, Lex Pompeia de parri­cidiis) and under imperial legislation, particularly that of Christian emperors. Syn. necare infantem, partum.—See exponere filium.

Cuq, DS 3.

Infectum damnum. See damnum infectum. Inferre. See illata, introducta, illatio mortui. Inferre. (With reference to account books.) To make an entry.—See rationes, codex accepti.

Inferre. (In procedural language.) To proceed with an action (actionem, litem) in a civil matter; to bring in an accusation (accusationem, crimen) against a person in a criminal matter.

Infirmare. To annul, to rescind, to revoke a uni­lateral act (a testament, legacy, donation). Infirmare actionem — to oppose an exceptio to the plaintiff’s claim.

De Sarlo, AG 136 (1949) 102.

Infirmitas aetatis (or sexus). The weakness of an individual because of his age (or sex). It is given as a reason for guardianship or curatorship over a person under a certain age or over women.—See CURA IMPUBERIS, TUTELA MULIERUM.

Solazzi, AG 104 (1930).

Infitiae. Ad infitias ire = to deny the plaintiff’s claim. Syn. infitiari.

Infitiari (infitiatio). To deny the plaintiff’s claim. In certain actions (actio legis Aquiliae, actio iudicati, claim for a legacy left in the form of a legatum per damnationem), a defendant who deliberately denied the claim although he knew that the claimant was right was judged liable to double the amount involved; see actiones in duplum. Such an action is charac­terized as an actio quae infitiando crescit in duplum (duplatur). ₍

Thomas, NRHD 27 (1903) 579; Betti, ATor 50 (1915) ; J. Paoli, Lis infitiando crescit in duplum, 1933; Kaser, Das altröm. Ius, 1949, 121.

Infligere. To impose (a penalty), to cause damage (damnum). Similar expressions are imponere, iniun- gere.

Ingenuitas. The status of a free-born person. See ingenuus. In a trial as to whether a person was free-born, there had to participate an ads er tor in­genuitatis whose role was analogous to that of the adsertor libertatis in a trial in which it was examined whether or not a person was free.—See adsertio, VINDICATIO IN LIBERTATEM.

H. Krüger, St Riccobono 2 (1936) 227.

Ingenuus. Free-born. Ant. servus (=a slave) and libertinus (=a freedman, i.e., born as a slave and freed afterwards).—See ingenuitas, natalium restitutio.—Inst. 1.4; D. 40.14; C. 7.14.

Kübler, RE 9; Cuq, DS 3; Sciascia, NDI 6.

Ingenuus manumissus. A free-born person who er­roneously served as -a slave (liber homo bona fide serviens) and was manumitted by his “master” could initiate a trial for the recognition that he was born a free man. The restriction that he might do it only within five years after the manumission, was abolished by Justinian.—C. 7.14.—See ingenuitas.

H. Krüger, St Riccobono 2 (1936) 234.

Ingratus. Ungrateful, ingrate. An emancipated son or daughter could in the later Empire be brought back under paternal power in case of ingratitude towards his father (e.g., a verbal offense, convicium). A freedman, ungrateful towards his former master (libertus ingratus), could be assigned to the latter as a slave. Non-fulfillment of his duties towards the patron, refusal of maintenance in the case of poverty, participation in a plot against the manumissor, treat­ing him with contempt (contumelia, convicium, casti­gatio fustibus) and the like, were considered ingrati­tude of a freedman. Accusatio liberti ingrati = the complaint of a former master about an ungrateful freedman.—C. 8.49.—See obsequium.

De Francisci, Mel Cornil 1 (1926) 304; C. Cosentini, St sui liberti 1 (1948) 96, 206; 2 (1950) 31.

Ingredi (ingressus). (With reference to an office.) To enter on official duties (a magistracy).

Ingredi in alienum fundum. To trespass upon an­other’s land. The owner or possessor could oppose himself against such violation particularly when the trespasser committed it for hunting or catching birds. Possessory interdicts were available against the in­vader if he attempted to remain on the spot and keep it for good.-------------- See INGREDI POSSESSIONEM.

Ingredi possessionem. To enter into another’s im­movable in order to take lawful possession thereof, e.g., after buying it or with the authorization by a magistrate (missio in possessionem). Ingredi pos­sessionem may take place also unlawfully when the invader uses force (vi) or enters stealthily (furtive). The pertinent possessory interdicts (see INTERDIC­TUM quod vi aut clam) serve for protection against such ingression.

Inhabilis militiae. Unfit for military service. A father who mutilated his son to make him inhabilis when a levy for war was ordered, was punished with deportation.

Inhabitare. See syn. habitare.

Inhibere. To check, to stop, e.g., another’s act, a suit or transaction by a lawful countermove or with the help of a judicial authority. When used of a legal enactment inhibere = to forbid.

Inhibitio. See INHIBERE.

Inhonestus. Dishonest. Ant. honestus. The term is used of illicit or dishonest professions (prostitution, lenocinium) or of things forbidden by law or good customs.

Inhumanus, inhumanitas. See ant. humanus, hu­manitas.

Inicere condicionem. To add a condition to a trans­action or to a testamentary disposition.

Inicere manum (iniectio manus). See manus iniec- TIO, LEGIS ACTIO PER MANUS INIECTIONEM.

Iniquitas. See iniuria iudicis.

Iniquus. Ant. of aequus. Iniquus is frequently used of unjust judgment or arbitration.

Inire. (With regard to an office.) To enter on one’s official duties. Syn. ingredi.

Inire consilium. (With reference to wrongdoings.) To take a decision, to form a design.—See con­silium.

Initium. A beginning. Initium is used of the starting sentence of a written document (e.g., a testament, a contract, a letter) or of a statute. It refers also to the beginning of certain legal relations (partnership) or situations (usucapio) normally lasting for some time. Ab initio = from (at) the very beginning. A legal rule stated: “A legacy (an appointment of an heir) which’ is invalid (nuZ) at the beginning cannot become valid by a later event (ex post facto),” D. 30.41.2; 50.17.210.—See ex post facto, tractus temporis.

Iniungere. To impose upon a person a burden (guard­ianship) or a public charge (munus) ; to inflict a damage or a penalty.

Iniuria. A wrongful act, unlawfulness. Generally speaking, iniuria is “all that has been done non iure, i.e., against the law (contra ius),” Inst. 4.4 pr. On damages done iniuria (unlawfully) to another’s prop­erty, damnum iniuria datum, see damnum, lex aquilia. Specifically iniuria embraces particular crimes, both bodily injuries (iniuria re facta) as well as offenses against the good reputation of a person, as defined in the Twelve Tables, in the praetorian edict, in the Lex Cornelia de iniuriis, and later in imperial constitutions. It was in particular the prae­torian law which efficiently defended the honor of a Roman citizen against defamation by according a spe­cial action, actio iniuriarum. Iniuria was a private crime (delictum), prosecuted only at the request of the offended person. “There is no iniuria done to those who wished it (to be done)/’ D. 39.3.9.1. Penalties varied in the course of time from pecuniary reparation (fixed fines in the Twelve Tables)—the amount of which was set by the judge, who had great discretion in estimating the damage done to the repu­tation and the social rank and respectability of the individual injured—to more severe penalties, such as flogging, scourging, exile, according to the gravity of the injury and the social status of the culprit. In the actio iniuriarum the plaintiff made his own as­sessment of the extent of the damages in a sum of money and the judge sentenced the defendant to what seemed to him bonum et aequum, but not to a larger sum than demanded by the plaintiff. The actio iniuriarum was granted a father for iniuria done to a son under his paternal power, and the master of a slave for an injury done to the slave.—Inst. 4.4; D. 47.10; C. 9.35.—See carmen malum, libellus fa- MOSUS, INFAMARE, OS FRACTUM, MEMBRUM RUPTUM, CONVICIUM, CONTUMELIA, OCCENTARE, PUDICITIA AD- TEMPTATA, LEX CORNELIA DE INIURIIS, MANUS IN­FERRE, PERCUTERE, PUGNUS, THEATRUM.

Steinwenter, RE 9; Cuq, DS 3; De Villa, NDI 6; H. F. Hitzig, Iniuria, 1899; R. Maschke, Persdnlichkeitsrechte des rom. Iniuriensy stems, 1903 ; P. Huvelin, Mel Appleton, 1903; Thiel, Iniuria und Beleidigung, 1905; Audibert, Mèi Girard 1 (1912) 35; Berger, KrVj'16 (1914) 77; L. Vos,

I. en de actio iniuriarum, Amsterdam, 1913 ; P. F. Girard, Mel de dr. rom. 2 (1923) 385; Lenel, ZSS 47 (1927) 381 ' De Visscher, TR 11 (1932) 39; Donatati, St Ratti, 1934, 369; De Dominicis, An Ferrara, 1937; G. Pugliese, 57 sull’iniuria, 1941; Santi di Paola, AnCat 1 (1947) 268; Lavaggi, SDHI 13-14 (1948) 141; Kaser, Das altrom. Ius, 1949, 37, 207; Yvonne Bongert, in Varia, 1952, 131 ; Sanfilippo, Il risarcimento del danno per ! uccisione di un uomo libero, AnCat 5 (1951) 120; Dupont, ADO-RIDA 1 (1952) 423.

Iniuria. (Abl.) Wrongfully, not lawfully. Syn. non iure.

Iniuria atrox. An atrocious, aggravated outrage. It occurred, e.g., when the victim was flogged or wounded, when the wrong was done in a public place (theatre, forum), when the offended person was a magistrate, or when a senator was insulted by a per­son of a lower social class. The atrocity (atrocitas) of the iniuria was thus distinguished according to the fact itself (ex facto), the place (ex loco), and the person (ex persona).—See percutere.

Iniuria cadaveri facta. See cadaver.

Iniuria iudicis. An unjust judgment, condemnatory or absolutory, handed down by a judge or a magistrate in the exercise of his judicial functions, “when the praetor or a judge non iure (unlawfully) decides against a person” (Inst. 4.4 pr.). Other expressions used in such cases are iniustitia, iniquitas (“when one pronounced an unequitable or unjust judgment” = inique vel iniuste sententiam dixerit). Iniuria (in­iquitas sententiae) can be corrected (abolitio) on appeal.

J. Dauvillier, Iniuria iudicis dans la procedure formulaire, Rec. de l^fAcad. de legislation de Toulouse, 13 (1937).

Iniussu. Without the order (iussum) of the person whose order is required or presumed. Iniussu populi — without the order of the people. The term appears in connection with the prohibition against carrying out a death sentence without the approving order of the people.

Iniustitia. See INIURIA IUDICIS.

Iniustum—iustum sacramentum. It is generally as­sumed that the judgment in the legis actio sacra­mento stated whose (of the parties to the trial) sacramentum was just and whose unjust by which the decision on the claim itself was expressed im­plicitly. The distinction is based on Ciceronian texts (pro Caec. 33.97; de domo 28.78).

v. Mayr, Mel Girard 2 (1912) 177; Wenger, ZSS 59 (1939) 342 (Bibl.) ; v. Liibtow, ZSS 68 (1951) 322.

Iniustus. Unjust, unlawful.—See condictio ex in- iusta causa. For iniusta sententia, see iniuria iudicis.—Iniusta appellatio (iniuste appellare) — an appeal not founded on legal grounds and rejected (pronuntiata) as unjust.—See testamentum inius­tum.

Ini-. See ILL-.

Innocens. Innocent. A remarkable saying of the emperor Trajan in one of his rescripts states: “It is better to leave unpunished a crime of a guilty person than to condemn an innocent man” (D. 48.19.5 pr.). The innocence of an accused person established after his condemnation could be ground for an appeal to the emperor and lead to the annulment of the con­demnatory judgment. When the innocence of the accused has been established during the trial, he must be discharged even though he hac admitted respon­sibility.—See IMPUNITUS, SUSPICIO.

Innocentius. A jurist of the time of Diocletian who allegedly had the ius respondendi “granted by the emperors.” The notice goes back to a source of the late fourth century and is not fully reliable.

Seeck and Steinwenter, RE 9; Massei, Scr Ferrini (Univ. Pavia, 1946) 440.

Inofficiosus. One who disregards his natural duties to his next relatives or, in the case of a freedman, to his patron. A testament, a donation, or a dowry by which the rights of succession of the nearest relatives are violated is inofficiosus.—See querela inoffi­ciosi TESTAMENTI, QUERELA INOFFICIOSAE DONA­TIONIS, dotis.—Inst. 2.18; D. 5.2; C. 3.28-30.

Inopia. Indigence, poverty, lack of necessary re­sources for living. It is ground for exemption from public charges and guardianship. A fine imposed on a person who is unable to pay it may be suspended or commuted into corporal punishment.

Inops (inopes). See LOCUPLETES.

Inp-. See imp-.

Inquietare. To trouble, to vex a private individual or a magistrate with suits.

Inquilinus. A tenant living in a rented dwelling. Syn. habitator. In the later Empire inquilinus = co­lonus. There are two possibilities of living in an­other’s house: either on a lease {locatio conductio rei) or on a personal servitude to use another’s house, see habitatio.—See interdictum de migrando.

Humbert, DS 3; Saumagne, Byzantion, 17 (1937).

Inquisitio. (From inquirere.) Investigation, inquiry in criminal trials, conducted in the form of cognitio proceedings. The inquisitio is made by subordinate official organs under the direction of a jurisdictional officer who is the prosecutor of the matter from the beginning to the end. Inquisitio is opposed to the accusatio in the earlier criminal procedure (see quaestiones). In the inquisitio procedure an ac­cuser was admissible, but his rights were rather lim­ited in comparison with his position in the earlier procedure. Inquisitio in civil matters occurs pri­marily in the procedure concerning the appointment of tutors and curators. It was the inquiry by the magistrate to establish whether or not the individual to be appointed had the necessary personal and finan­cial abilities (idoneus). In certain instances such inquisitio was obligatory, for instance, when the guardian was designated by a woman.

M. Lauria, Accusatio—inquisitio, ANap 56 (1934) 304.

Inquisitio localis. A local inspection in the case of a controversy between neighbors.

Inr-. See IRR-.

Insania (insanus). A general term for mental dis­ease.—See FURIOSUS, DEMENS, MENTE CAPTUS.

Insciens, inscientia. Ant. of sciens, scientia.

Inscribere. To give a title (inscriptio) to a book; to write down (into a written document) ; to register in a list of persons or things (e.g., an inventory).

Inscribere operi publico. To engrave on a public building (or construction) the name of the emperor or the person at whose expense the building was erected.

Inscriptio (inscribere). In criminal trials, to enter in official records the accusation made against a per­son; see accusatio.—D. 48.2; C. 9.2.—See sub­scriptio, LIBELLUS INSCRIPTIONIS.

Pfaff, RE 9, 1561.

Inserere. To insert (a clause, a condition, a provi­sion). The term is used with reference to statutes, last wills, agreements, etc.

Insidiae. An ambush, cheating, fraud.

Insidiari. To lie in wait to attack another by sur­prise; to bring into danger.

Guarino, SDH I 5 (1939) 457.

Insignia. Distinctive outward signs of high officials when they appeared in public. It was an old Roman custom to grant high officials the right to use certain insignia which varied according to the rank of the office. The Republic preserved most of the regal insignia for its high magistrates. The insignia were also differentiated according to the occasion; the most spectacular were on the occasion of a triumph (see triumphus) when a victorious commander of the army entered the city of Rome after the end of a war. The use of improper insignia for the purpose of assuming the character of a higher official was severely punished as crimen jalsi (see falsum).—See LICTORES, SELLA CURULIS, FASCES, GLADIUS, TOGA PRAETEXTA.

De Ruggiero, DE 4; Alföldi, Insignien und Tracht der röm. Kaiser, Mitt. Deutsch. Archaeol. Instituts, Röm. Abt. 50 (1935).

Insimulare (insimulatio). To accuse (in imperial constitutions of the third and later centuries).

Insinuare. To inform, to give'notice. Insinuare (insinuatio) actis. See acta.

Μ. Kroell, Le role de I’ecrit dans la preuve de confrat, 1906, 129.

Insinuatio testamenti. (In Justinian’s constitutions.) Syn. with APERTURA TESTAMENTI.

Inspector. An inspector, examiner (in private enter­prises).

Schulz, Haftung für das Verschulden der Angestellten, GrZ 38 (1911) 10.

Inspector. In administrative law, an official in the later Empire charged with investigations in census matters.—C. 11.58.

Seeck, RE 5, 1184; 9, 1562.

Inspectio tabularum (inspicere tabulas, sc. testa­menti). To inspect a testament. Any person who has an interest in knowing the content of a testament could obtain permission from the praetor to look into it and to examine the seals.—D. 29.3.—See interdic­tum DE TABULIS EXHIBENDIS, APERTURA TESTAMENTI. Inspicere ventrem. To examine a woman as to whether she is pregnant or not. The measure was applied when there was a controversy between a man and his divorced wife about her pregnancy, in par­ticular when the woman claimed to be pregnant, or denied it, contrary to the assertions of the husband. A similar situation occurred, when after the death of her husband, a widow declared that she was preg­nant and there was a reasonable suspicion that the pregnancy was simulated. A similar institution is custodire partum = to watch the confinement in order to prevent the substitution of another child. The procedures, which were performed with the assistance of midwives, were precisely defined in the praetorian Edict.—D. 25.4.

Instantia. Perseverance, in particular of a claimant or defendant acting in court in claiming or defending his rights.

Instar. A resemblance, likeness. The term indicates that a legal act is to be dealt with like a certain definite legal institution (e.g., a donation, a sale, a legacy) with which it has some common features (instar esse, instar habere).—Ad instar is used by classical jurists to extend existing legal rules to new factual situations.—Syn. ad exemplum.

Instaurare. (With reference to trials.) To resume a civil or criminal prosecution, to re-open a contro­versy. The term appears frequently in imperial constitutions. As a matter of principle, controversies settled by a judgment cannot be resumed.—See bis de EADEM RE, RES IUDICATA.

Institor. The manager of a commercial or industrial business, appointed by its owner. For obligations contracted by an institor and connected with the business, the principal could be sued directly by an action called actio institoria. Later, but still in classi­cal times the requirement that the business have a commercial character was dropped so that any one could be sued for obligations contracted by the man­ager of his affairs (procurator) under an action named actio quasi institoria (term not classical), modeled on actio institoria. These actions belong to the category of actiones adiecticiae qualitatis (see exercitor navis) because the manager was also liable. Institor could be a slave of the principal or of another person.—D. 14.3; C. 4.25.—See pro- SCRIBERE.

Klingmuller, RE 9; Steinwenter, RE 9 (s.v. institoria a.) ; Humbert-Lecrivain, DS 3; E. Costa, Actio excrciforia e institoria, 1891; L. F. Dentraygues, Ft. hist, sur !actio institoria, 1910; Rabcl, Ein Ruhmesblatt Papinians, die a. quasi institoria, Fschr Zitclmann, 1913; P. Fabricius, Der gezvaltfreie institor im klass. rom. R., 1926; P. Huvelin, Ftudes d'hist, du droit commercial, 1929, 160; Albcrtario, Studi 4 (1940, ex 1912) 189; E. Carrelli, St Scorsa, 1940; Solazzi, RDNav 7 (1941) 185; Kreller, Fschr Wenger, 2 (1945) 73.

Instituere actionem (litem, querelam, accusatio­nem). To prosecute in court in a civil or criminal matter.

Instituere heredem (institutio heredis). See here­dis INSTITUTIO.

Institutiones. Elementary law textbooks written pri­marily for students. Institutiones were written by Gaius (see institutiones gai), Florentinus, Calli­stratus, Paul, Ulpian and Marcian. Some of these works may have originated in the lectures of their authors. One part of Justinian’s codification is also entitled Institutiones ; see institutiones iustiniani.

Kotz-Dbbrz, RE 9; Kiibler, RE 1A, 396; De Villa, NDI 6; Kreller, ZSS 66 (1948) 572.

Institutiones Gai. An introductory textbook of legal institutions in four books (called “commentarii” by the author) written by Gaius about a.d. 161. The system adopted by Gaius is tripartite : law of persons, law of things (including-succession), and law of ac­tions (civil procedure). The work, discovered in 1816 in Verona (hence called Gaius Veronensis) in a manuscript of the (late) fifth century, is preserved nearly in full. Some of the lacunae have been filled by a few parchment sheets, found in 19^3, seemingly of the late fourth century (now in Florence, hence named Gaius Florentinus). The new texts confirmed the reliability of the Veronensis to a large extent. Modern Romanistic literature has applied to the In­stitutes of Gaius the same critical (and hypercritical) method they used with regard to Justinian’s Digest, a method which is often far from convincing, although it cannot be denied that the text preserved evokes sometimes serious doubts, hardly amazing in a manu­script written about three centuries later than the original. For many problems of the classical law, and primarily for the classical civil procedure, Gaius’ In­stitutes remain the foremost authority the importance of which has not been lessened by the recent “puri­fication” of the text.—See GAIUS.

Editions: in all collections of ante-Justinian sources (see General Bibl., Ch. XII), the best is by Seckel-Kiibler in Huschke’s lurisprudentia anteiustiniana, 7th ed. 1935 ; Bizoukides, Gaius, 3 vol., Salonika, 1937-1939; Arangio- Ruiz and Guarino, Breviarium iuris romani, 1943 ; Alvaro d’Ors Perez-Peix, Gaius Institutiones, Testo latino con una traduccion, Madrid, 1943 ; F. de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius, 1 (transl.) 1946 ; 2, 1953; M. David, Gai I., Leiden, 1948; J. Reinach, Gaius Institutes (with French translation, Collection Bude, 1950). Italian translation: P. Novelli, Gaio, Elementi di dir. rom., 1914.—Kiibler, RE 6, 494; Berger, OCD 376; Kniep, Gai Institutionum com­mentarii, 4 voi. incomplete (1911-1914) ; Beselcr, TR 10 (1930) 161; Solazzi, Glosse a Gaio, 1 (St Riccobono 1, 1936); 2 (CentCodPavia, 1933); 3 (SDI1I 6, 1940); 4 (Scr Ferrini, Univ. Pavia, 1947, 141) ; Albcrtario, St 5 (1937) 441; Schulz, History of R. Legal Science, 1946, 159; Bellinger, AmJPhilol 70 (1949) 394; Wieacker, RIDA 3 (1949) 577; idem, Fschr Schuls 2 (1951) 101; Maschi, 17 (1947) 77; idem, ACIVer 1 (1951) 9; H. J. Wolff, St Arangio-Ruis 4 (1952) 171.—For Bibl. on the Gaius Florentinus ( = Papiri Società Italiana 11, no. 1182, 1933) see Baviera, FIR F (1940) 195; Van Oven, TR 13 (1934) 248.—For the few fragments of the fourth book, preserved on a papyrus from Oxy- rhynchos (P. Oxy. xvii no. 2103), see Baviera, ibid. p. 201; Wenger, Scr Ferrini 4 (Univ. Sacro Cuore, Milan, 1949) 268.

Institutiones lustiniani. A part of Justinian’s codi­fication, compiled in 533 after the final draft of the Digest had been finished, and published on November 21, 533. It entered into force simultaneously with the Digest, published a few weeks later. The sources exploited for the composition of the Institutes are Gaius’ Institutiones and his Res cottidianae, the Insti­tutes of Florentinus, Marcianus, Ulpian, and Paul, and several imperial constitutions in some of which the reforms introduced by Justinian are emphatically stressed. The work was intended as an elementary manual—hence its title Institutiones sive Elementa— for law students in their first year. It was edited by the law professors, Theophilus and Dorotheus, under the supervision of Tribonian.

Editions: In P. Kriiger-Mommsen, Corpus luris Civilis 1 (15th ster. ed., 1928); Girard, Textes de droit romain, 6th ed. by Senn, 1937; J. B. Moyle, Imperatoris lustiniani In­stitutiones, 5th ed. 1913; V. Arangio-Ruiz and A. Guarino, Breviarium iuris romani, 1943. Vocabulary: G. Ambro- sino, Vocabularium Institutionum lustiniani, 1942.—Sacchi, NDI 6; Kotz-Dobrz, RE 9, 1566, 1583; Ch. Appleton, Re­vue generate de droit 15 (1891) 12, 97; A. Zocco-Rosa, lustiniani Institutionum Palingenesia, Annuario dell’I st. di storia del dir. rom. Catania, 9, 1-2, 10 (1901-1911); Ebrard, ZSS 38 (1917) 327; C. Ferrini, Suile fonti delle 1st., Opere 1 (1929, ex 1901) 307; De Villa, StSas 17 (1939) 354; R. W. Lee, Elements of R. law, rev. ed. 1946. Instructum domus (fundi). The necessary furnish­ings, equipment of a house (or a landed property) ; almost syn. with instrumentum domus (fundi), although some jurists assumed that instructum is the broader term. Both instructum and instrumentum are discussed casuistically by the jurists in connec­tion with legacies of a land or house cum instrumento or a jundus instructus (domus instructa).—See le­gatum instrumenti.—D. 33.7.

Instruere. To instruet, to teach; to impart knowledge (information) of a legal norm or legally important facts.

Instruere causam (litem). To support a judicial— civil or criminal—case with legal arguments and factual evidence.

Instruere domum (fundum). To provide a house (a land) with the necessary equipment (furnishings, utensils, implements).—See instructum, instru­mentum FUNDI.

Instrumentum. In a broader sense, this embraces all means of evidence (including the oral testimony of witnesses), but the regular meaning is that of a document; another word is often added to indicate the subject matter of the document, as instrumentum donationis (of a donation), emptionis (sale), divi­sionis (division of property), instrumentum nuptiale (concerning a marriage) or dotale (dowry). In later law documents acquired constantly increasing

value as evidence, particularly when written with the assistance of a public or private notary (instrumentum publice conjectum) or when signed by three trust­worthy witnesses (instrumentum quasi publice con­jectum). See EDITIO INSTRUMENTORUM, FIDES IN­

STRUMENTORUM.—D. 22.4; C. 4.21; Nov. 73.—pro­dere INSTRUMENTA, TRADITIO CHARTAE, RETRACTARE CAUSAM, SUBSCRIPTIO, STIPULATIO.

Steinwenter, RE 9; De Sario, NDI 6; Arangio-Ruiz, DE 4, 61; Riccobono, ZSS 35 (1914), 43 (1922); H. Levy- Bruhl, Temoignage instrumentaire, 1910; A Steinwenter, Beiträge zum öffentlichen Urkundenwesen der Römer, 1915; Siegel, Archiv für civilistische Praxis, 113 (1915) ; L. De Sarlo, II documento oggetto di rapporti giuridici, 1935; idem, RendLomb 1937-1938; idem, Riv. di dir. proc. civ. 14 (1937) ; J. P. Levy, Annales Fac. Droit, Aix-en- Provence 43 (1950).

Instrumentum causae (litis). A document connnected with a judicial controversy.—See instruere causam. Instrumentum domus. See instrumentum fundi.

Instrumentum donationis. See Instrumentum.

Riccobono, ZSS 34 (1913) 159.

Instrumentum dotale. A written instrument concern­ing a dowry. It contained details of the dotal agree­ment (pactum dotale) concerning the objects consti­tuting the dowry and its restitution at the end of the marriage by death or divorce. The instrumentum dotale came into use in the postclassical period.—See DOS, TABULAE NUPTIALES.

Kubier, RE 4 A, 1951; Riccobono, ZSS 34 (1913). 175; Castello, SDH I 4 (1938) 208.

Instrumentum fundi (domus). The equipment neces­sary for a reasonable management of rural (instrumen­tum jundi) or industrial property, or for the use of a house (instrumentum domus) : furniture, tools, utensils, and all kinds of appurtenances needed for some specific use of the immovable. The interpreta­tion of the term and its extension in the case of a lease or a legacy of a house or rural property cum instrumento is widely discussed in juristic works. It is pointed out that instrumentum fundi is not a part of the land; it may be therefore the object of special agreements.—D. 33.7.—See instructum, in­struere DOMUM, FUNDUS, FUNDUS UTI OPTIMUS MAXIMUS, LEGATUM INSTRUMENTI, VENATIO.

Arangio-Ruiz, DE 4, 59; Riccobono, St Brugi, 1910, 173; Steinwenter, Fundus cum instrumento, SblVien, 221, 1 (1943) 24, 71.

Instrumentum nuptiale. See tabulae nuptiales.

Instrumentum publice confectum. See instrumen­tum.

Insula. A tenement house of a few stories, occupied by several families, chiefly of the indigent classes.

De Ruggiero, DE 4, 62; Lugli, Rend. Pontif. Accad. di Archeologia, 18 (1941-2) 191.

Insula in flumine nata. An island which came into being in a river. If located in the middle of the river, it belonged as a common property to the land-owners on both banks; if it arose nearer one bank it became property of the land-owners along that bank. Such an island in a public stream (flumen publicum) be­came public property.

Cogliolo, St per I’ottavo centenario dell’Univ. di Bologna, 1888; Pampaloni, Scr giuridici 1 (1941, ex 1885) 505; Herzen, NRHD 29 (1905) 561.

Insula in mari nata. An island which arose in the sea was res nullius (it belonged to nobody) and as such it became the property of the first occupant.

Insularius. A tenant in a rented dwelling in an insula. Insularius is also the guard or adminis­trator of a tenement house.

Integer. Unchanged, untouched, whole. Res integra — an unchanged legal or factual situation. Integer, when used of the reputation of a person — blameless, irreproachable, upright.—See homo integrae fron­tis, MORS, LOCARE EX INTEGRO, RETRACTATIO CAUSAE. Integritas. Uprightness, integrity.—See integer. Intellectus. The power of understanding, of judging (intellegere). Insane persons have no intellectus (intellectu carent) and are therefore not able to con­clude a legal transaction. With regard to dumb or deaf persons, the decisive element is whether they have intellectus or not.—See furiosus, mutus, SURDUS.

Intellegere. To understand. With regard to persons having only physical (not mental) defects (deafness, blindness, muteness) and those acting with the as­sistance of their guardians, the requirement that they understand what is being done is imperative.—See INTELLECTUS.

Intellegi. Used primarily in impersonal form (intelle­gitur = it is considered) or in locutions such as intellegendum est (= it is to be considered), refers to instances in which a legal or customary rule pre­scribed a definite estimation of certain doings or in which a jurist recommends a certain interpretation of specific words or facts.

Intendere. Used of the plaintiff’s claim in trial. In­tendere is also a general term to indicate the activity of a person seeking justice in court, either in a civil (intendere actionem, litem, syn. agere) or in a crimi­nal matter (intendere accusationem, syn. accusare). See INTENTIO.

Intentare. Appears frequently in imperial constitu­tions with reference to criminal matters as syn. with INTENDERE (= to RCCUSe).

Intentio. An intention, design. In criminal trials intentio — the accusation by an accuser (accusator) or an incrimination by an informer.

Intentio. In formulary procedure, “that part of the formula in which the plaintiff comprehends his claim” (Gaius 4.41). “If it appears that X (name of the defendant) ought to pay to Y (name of the plaintiff) the sum of...” is the wording of an intentio certa since the amount of the payment due is indicated pre­cisely therein. An intentio incerta says instead: “Whatever (quidquid) it appears that the defendant ought to pay to the plaintiff.” In an actio in rem

(for the recovery of a thing) the intentio says: “If it appears that... (designation of the thing, e.g., the slave X) belongs to... (the plaintiff) under Quiritary law.” The intentio is expressed in the form of a condition “if it appears (si paret)upon which the condemnatory judgment depends, because, if the condition does not materialize (si non paret — if it does not appear), the judge must absolve the defendant. In certain exceptional cases, the whole formula consists only of an intentio, as in formulae praeiudiciales in which no specific claim is expressed but only a question is posed (for instance, whether one is a freedman or what was the amount of the dowry), which is preliminary to a subsequent legal measure.—In postclassical procedure, intentio is any assertion of the plaintiff which must be proved by him. See PRAEIUDICIA, SI PARET.

Audibert, Formules sans i., Mèi Girard 1 (1912) 35; Berger, KrFj 16 (1914) 77; Juncker, St Riccobono 2 (1936) 325; Philonenko, RIDA 3 (1949) 231.

Inter absentes (praesentes). See absentes.

Inter vivos. Refers to legal acts which have to pro­duce legal effects while the interested parties are still alive. Ant. mortis causa.—See donatio mortis causa.

Intercalare. See lex acilia de intercalando, men­sis INTERCALARIS.

Intercedere. See intercessio.

Intercessio. (From intercedere.) To assume on one­self another’s debt or a liability for another. For the interdiction of intercession of women, see senatus­consultum velleianum. According to its terms, an intercessio embraced all kinds of assumption of an obligation for another, either primary or accessory one (suretyship, pledge, novation), in other words any obligation assumed by an agreement with an­other’s creditor and concerning a third person’s liabil­ity.---- See SENATUSCONSULTUM VELLEIANUM (Bibl.).

Intercessio. In public law, a veto by a higher magis­trate against an official act (decision) of his col­league (e.g., by one consul against an act of the other) or of a magistrate of a lower rank (e.g., by a consul against the act of a praetor). The perform­ance of the act (the execution of the decision) was thus inhibited. Of greatest importance was the veto power of the plebeian tribunes over the official acts not only of other tribunes but of any magistrate. By vetoing the proposal of a bill made by any magis­trate before a popular assembly or in the senate they could paralyze legislative activity, as well as any mo­tion presented before the assemblies. The introduc­tion of the tribunician intercessio was aimed at the protection of the interests of the plebs against abuses by magistrates, but in practice the institution turned out to be an important political weapon used by the tribunes for personal purposes. No intercessio was permitted against an act of a dictator.—See tribuni PLEBIS, AUCTORITAS SENATUS.

Leonhard, RE 9, 1607; Siber, RE 21, 182; Cuq, DS 3; Lengle, RE 6 A, 2472; Anon., NDI 12, 2 (s.v. tribunato) ; Lecrivain, DS 5, 421; O’Brien, RE Suppl. 6, 684 ; 717; F. Leifer, Die Einhcit des Gewaltgedankens, 1914, 182; 209.

Intercessio militaris. In imperial constitutions of the later Empire, the intervention of a public official to enforce the payment of taxes or other sums due to the state. Syn. exsecutio.

Cuq, DS 3, 556.

Intercessor. One who assumes an obligation on behalf of another.—See intercedere, intercessio.

Intercessores. See EXSECUTORES.

Intercidere. To perish, to be extinguished, to lose validity. The term is used of actions, obligations, legacies, and the like, which became void for one reason or another.

Interdicere (interdictio). Indicates any kind of pro­hibition, ban, or exclusion decreed by the competent magisterial or imperial authority.

Interdicere. In interdictal procedure (see interdic­tum) this is the procedural activity of a claimant who requests the issuance of an interdict. It is analogous to postulare actionem in an ordinary process. Syn. agere interdicto. When applied to a magistrate, interdicere means his issuing an interdict.

Interdicere aqua et igni (interdictio aquae 6t ignis).

The exclusion of a culprit from the common life with his fellow countrymen (= interdiction of fire and water). Interdicere was pronounced by the senate or a high magistrate when the accused left the com­munity before the condemnatory sentence was passed and went into voluntary exile. Practically interdi­cere meant banishment connected with loss of citizen­ship and property. In case of return without permis­sion the interdictus was deprived of legal protection and outlawed. He might be killed by anybody who met him within the boundaries of the country from which he was banished. Interdicere disappeared un­der the early Principate when the criminal procedure was reorganized.—D. 48.22.—See deportatio, exi­lium, PATRIA.

Hartmann RE 2; U. Brasiello, Repressione penale, 1937, passim; Gioffredi, SDH I 12 (1946) 101; idem, Archivio penale 3 (1947) 426; De Villa, StSas 23 (1950) 1.

Interdicere bonis (interdictio bonorum). The exclu­sion of a person from the administration of his prop­erty. According to the Twelve Tables it was applied to spendthrifts who were committed to the care of curators.—See prodigus.

Kaser, 57 Arangio-Ruis 2 (1952) 152.

Interdicere commercio. See commercium.

Interdicere honore (honoribus). To deprive a person condemned in a criminal trial of the capacity to obtain an official or honorific position, or of the right to exercise a certain profession (e.g., advocacy) for­ever (in perpetuum) or temporarily.

InterdlCtiO. See INTERDICERE.

Interdictio aquae et ignis. See interdicere aqua ET IGNI.

Interdictio bonorum. See interdicere bonis.

Interdictio locorum. An order issued by the compe­tent authority, originally a popular assembly, exclud­ing a person from a certain territory (Italy or a province) or from the whole state with the exception of a certain place (lata jug a).—See exilium.

Interdictum. An order issued by a praetor or other authorized official (proconsul in the provinces) at the request of a claimant and addressed to another person upon whom a certain attitude is imposed: either to do something or to abstain from doing something. The interdictal procedure is more administrative than judicial in nature and differs from a normal trial in that there is no division of the proceedings into two stages inasmuch as the issuance of an interdictum depends upon the magistrate as an act of his imperium, not of jurisdiction. The interdictum is a provisory remedy with the purpose of protecting existing situa­tions by a quick decision of the official. It fulfills its task—a speedy ending of a controversy—only when the adversary complies with the order. If he does not, the subsequent procedure which assumes the form of a normal trial, though not without certain particularities resulting from the fact that an interdict had been issued, is rather complicated and perhaps even slower than an ordinary process. The inter­dictal procedure is very summary; no long hearings of witnesses, no examination of evidence. What the plaintiff, i.e., the person who asks for the interdictum (postulare interdictum) affirms is taken for granted, if the authority considers that his claim deserves pro­tection either in his interest or in public interest. If the assertions of the claimant are not true, the de­fendant will disregard the order and defend his right in the subsequent ordinary trial. Various interests are defended by interdictal protection. They are of both private and public character. In Justinian’s law the differences between actions and interdicts are effaced. What was formerly proposed in the prae­torian Edict as a form of interdict—an order or a prohibition—is in Justinian’s law a legal rule. Acting against that rule may give rise to a judicial trial, just as in classical times a trial followed the transgression of an interdictum in a specific case, although the later procedure is quite different. Many interdicts lost their applicability entirely, however, and references to them were deleted or made unrecognizable by Jus­tinian’s compilers. The reconstruction of the formula of interdicts is therefore sometimes problematic. The law of interdicts is presented in the following items. The various types or groups of interdicts are specified below under interdicta, particular inter­dicts under interdictum. Some interdicts took their name from the initial words of the pertinent form.— Inst. 4.15; D. 43.1; C. 8.1.—See agere per spon­sionem, PROPONERE ACTIONEM.

Berger, RE 9 (Bibl. until 1915) ; Humbert—Lccrivain, DS 3 ; Riccobono, NDI 7 ; Arangio-Ruiz, DE 4 ; Berger, ZSS 36 1915, 176; idem, Vol. delle onoranze Simoncelli, 1915. 171; Gintowt, St Albertoni 2* (1937) ; Fabi, AnCam 15 (1941) 99; A. Biscardi, La protezione interdettale nel pro­cesso rom., 1938; Albertario, St 4 (1946) 115; L. Beretta, RISG 2 (1948) 391; Daube, RIDA 6 (1951) 22.—For iriterdicts not mentioned below, see Berger, RE cit.; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum, 3rd ed. 1927, 446 ff.

Interdicta adipiscendae possessionis. These belong to the group of possessory interdicts serving for the protection of possession (possessio). The purpose of the possessory interdicta is either the acquisition of possession by a person who had not had it at all before, interdicta adipiscendae possessionis (such as, for instance, INTERDICTUM QUORUM BONORUM, INTER­DICTUM QUOD LEGATORUM, INTERDICTUM SALVIANUM), retention of possession by the actual possessor, inter­dicta retinendae possessionis (interdictum uti possi­detis, interdictum utrubi) or resumption of pos­session (interdicta reciperandae possessionis) by the claimant who had been violently ejected from his land or house (interdictum unde vi).

Berger, RE 9, 1615; Siber, Ser Ferrini 4 (Univ. Sacro Cuore, Milan, 1949) 98; Levy, ibid. 3 (1948) 109; idem, West Roman vulgar law, 1951, 243.

Interdicta annalia (annua, temporaria). Those in­terdicta which can be requested only within one year after the allegedly wrongful act was done against which the plaintiff remonstrates. Ant. interdicta perpetua which are not limited as to time.—See EXCEPTIO ANNALIS.

Berger, RE 9, 1620; 1689; 1690.

Interdicta de cloacis. Several interdicts are granted for the maintenance of public and private sewers in good condition in the interest of public health. Any attempt to damage them or to prevent their repair could be frustrated by an appropriate interdictum.

Berger, RE 9, 1633; Solazzi, Tutela delle servitù prediali, 1949, 79.

Interdicta de divinis rebus. Ant. interdicta de hu­manis rebus. This distinction of interdicta is based on that of res divini iuris and res humani iuris. Among the interdicta de humanis rebus there are some which serve for the protection of things which belong to nobody (res nullius) as the interdictum de homine libero exhibendo, of things which are in the private ownership of individuals (res singu­lorum) or of things used by the people (interdicta DE FLUMINIBUS PUBLICIS, DE VIIS, DE LOCIS PUBLICIS). Some of them refer to single things, others to a universitas rerum (interdicta de universitate). Berger, RE 9, 1627.

Interdicta de fluminibus publicis. They are ac­corded for the protection of navigation on public rivers (flumina publica). Any construction on the bank (see ripa) or in the river proper which impedes the traffic of boats, the use of the harbors, the access to the river, etc., can be prevented by one of these interdicts which on the other hand were extended as interdicta utilia on similar wrongdoings on the seashore or harbor. When the construction has already been executed, the interdict orders its destruction and restoration of the former state.— D. 43.12; 13; 14; 15.

Berger, RE 9, 1634; Branca, AnTr 12 (1941) 40, 177.

Interdicta de fonte. These serve for the protection of the servitus aquae haustus.—D. 43.22.

Berger, RE 9, 1637; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum² (1927) 480; Solazzi, Tutela delle servitù prediali, 1949, 77.

Interdicta de humanis rebus. See interdicta de divinis rebus.

Interdicta de itineribus publicis. These protect the use of public roads against any act which may hinder traffic. A specific interdictum is granted to anybody who is impeded in repairing a damaged public road. —D. 43.7; 11.

Berger, 9, 1641; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum² (1927) 458.

Interdicta de locis publicis. These serve for the pro­tection of public places against damage or harmful constructions which may impede their public use. Obstacles already constructed are interdictally or­dered to be removed.—D. 43.8; 9.

Berger, RE 9, 1643; 1654; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum² (1927) 459; Branca, AnTr 12 (1941) 169.

Interdicta de reficiendo. There are several interdicts which refer to particular situations between neighbors in connection with predial servitudes (servitutes praediorum). Using the neighbor's land for the exercise of a servitude (iter, actus, via) sometimes requires the possibility of entering it in order to re­pair the way if the owner is not bound to do so. To secure this right to a person entitled thereto an interdictum is proposed “for repairing" (de refici­endo), such as interdictum de fonte reficiendo, de itinere actuque privato reficiendo, de sepulcro refici­endo, de cloaca privata reficienda, de rivis, de ripa munienda. For similar interdicta with regard to public roads, see interdicta de itineribus publicis. All these interdicta are prohibitory since the order of the praetor, vim fieri veto, is addressed to anyone who prevents the claimant from doing the necessary work.—See ripa, interdicta prohibitoria.

Berger, RE 9, 1633 no. 4a; 1637 no. 6b; 1640; 1647 no. 24.

Interdicta de universitate. Interdicta the object of which is a complex of things, as, for instance, an inheritance (interdictum quam hereditatem, in­terdictum QUORUM BONORUM).

Berger, RE 9, 1627.

Interdicta duplicia. See interdicta simplicia. Interdicta exhibitoria. See interdicta restitutoria. Interdicta in praesens vel praeteritum relata. The distinction is based on the circumstance whether the actual situation at the moment when the interdictum is demanded or the situation which existed during a certain period before the postulatio of the interdictum, is decisive for the issuance of the interdict. The latter is the case in the interdictum utrubi. Berger, RE 9, 1617.

Interdicta mixta. Interdicta of a mixed character being both prohibitoria and exhibitoria.

Berger, Vol. onoranze Simoncelli, 1915, 171; idem, ZSS 36 (1915) 198.

Interdicta ne vis fiat ei qui in possessionem missus est. Three interdicts are proposed to protect a per­son who by a praetorian missio in possessionem is granted the right to take possession of another’s property. They are prohibitory since the order for­bids the use of force to prevent the claimant’s entry. —D. 43.4.

Berger, RE 9, 1656.

Interdicta noxalia. See noxa.

Interdicta perpetua. See interdicta annalia. Interdicta popularia. See interdicta privata. Interdicta privata. Ant. interdicta popularia. The distinction is based on the same principle as that of actions in actiones privatae and actiones populares. Interdicta popularia are those interdicta which may be requested by “anyone from the people.” Although most of the popular interdicta are introduced in the interest of public utility {utilitas publica}, this ele­ment is not decisive for the distinction in question. In the interdictal form, the private character of the interdicta is recognizable by the reference to the claimant through the pronouns ille or is, lacking in the interdicta popularia.—See actiones populares. Berger, RE 9, 1621.

Interdicta prohibitoria. Those interdicta in which the magistrate’s order contains a prohibition {aliquid fieri prohibet). They impose upon the defendant the duty not to do the thing exactly indicated in tlje interdictal formula through “ne... facias," “ne... immittas," or not to hinder the plaintiff in the exercise of his right. The prohibition is expressed by the words vim fieri veto ( = I forbid the use of force), where vis is used in a broader sense and not pre­cisely as force or violence. The interdicta prohibitoria constitute together with the interdicta restitutoria and exhibitoria the principal division of the interdicta. Berger, RE 9, 1613.

Interdicta quae causam proprietatis habent. Ant. interdicta quae possessionis causam habent. The dis­tinction appears only in one confused text and has given occasion to controversial interpretation. It may be of postclassical or Justinian origin and is based on the distinction -whether the interdict takes into consideration the ownership of a thing or only possession.

Berger, RE 9, 1618; idem, ZSS 36 (1915) 183.

Interdicta reciperandae (recuperandae) possessionis.

See INTERDICTA ADIPISCENDAE POSSESSIONIS.

Interdicta restitutoria. Order the restoration {resti­tuas) of things to their former condition or of pos­session to the plaintiff who has been deprived of it. They are distinguished from interdicta exhibitoria, which order the defendant to produce {“exhibeas”) a person (a free man, a slave, a child; see interdic­tum DE HOMINE LIBERO EXHIBENDO, INTERDICTUM DE liberis exhibendis) or a thing (a testament, see INTERDICTUM DE TABULIS EXHIBENDIS) held by him, but do not impose the duty to deliver the person or the thing to the claimant. Both types of interdicta are also called decreta.—See interdicta prohibi­toria.

Berger, RE 9, 1613.

Interdicta retinendae possessionis. See interdicta ADIPISCENDAE POSSESSIONIS.

Interdicta simplicia. Ant. interdicta duplicia. The distinction is based upon the role of the parties in the interdictal proceedings. Simplicia are those in which one party is the plaintiff and the other the defendant to whom the prohibitory order is addressed or by whom things have to be restored or produced. In the interdicta duplicia both parties are at once defendant and plaintiff, as in the possessory interdicts uti possidetis, utrubi. Here the praetor speaks “in an equal language” {pari sermone, Gaius 4.160) to both parties. In the terminology of Justinian’s com­pilers, interdicta duplicia are those interdicta which exceptionally aim at acquiring and regaining posses­sion; see INTERDICTUM QUAM HEREDITATEM, INTER­DICTUM QUEM FUNDUM.

Berger, RE 9, 1616; idem, Voi. di onoranze Simoncelli, 1915, 186; idem, ZSS 36 (1916) 222; Arangio-Ruiz, DE 4 (1926) 69.

Interdicta temporaria. See interdicta annalia. Interdicta unde vi. See interdictum de vi.

Interdicta «utilia. These are created by the extension of a normal interdictal formula beyond its limits. Thus a normal interdict becomes available to a larger group of persons and applicable to situations different from those protected by the original interdictum. The interdicta utilia are a creation analogous to actiones utiles, but the term interdictum directum is not to be found in the sources.

Berger, RE 9, 1623.

Interdictum de aqua. Issued for the protection of servitudes consisting in the use of water from an­other’s property. See SERVITUS AQUAE DUCTUS, CAS­

TELLUM.—D. 43.20.

Berger, RE 9, 1630; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 479; Solazzi, Tutela delle servitù prediali, 1949, 66.

Interdictum de arboribus caedendis. Accorded to the owner of an immovable against a neighbor who does not remove tree branches hanging over the plaintiff’s property. The latter may cut them and keep the wood if the tree owner does not obey the interdictal order.—D. 43.27.

Berger, RE 9, 1632.

Interdictum de glande legenda. Granted to protect the right of the owner of a tree to collect the fruits that fall on the neighbor’s property.—D. 43.28.

Berger, RE 9, 1638; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 487.

Interdictum de homine libero exhibendo. A man who unlawfully holds (retinere) a free man as a slave is ordered by this popular interdictum to pro­duce the man in court.—See lex fabia.—D. 43.29; C. 8.8.

Berger, RE 9, 1638; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 487.

Interdictum de itinere actuque privato. Serves for the protection of the servitudes iter and actus. The order is directed to the owner of the land on which the servitude is imposed, to the effect not to hinder the plaintiff in the exercise of his right.—D. 43.19.

Berger, RE 9, 1639; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 478; Biondi, Actio negativa, AnMes 3 (1929) 55; Solazzi, Tutela delle servitu prediali (1949) 57; Daube, RIDA 6 (1951) 40.

Interdictum de liberis ducendis. See the following item.

Interdictum de liberis exhibendis. When a person alieni iuris (filius or filia familias) is held by another, even by a member of the same family, against the will of his pater familias, the latter may request this interdictum which orders that the person withheld be produced (exhiberi). If through the exhibition the identity of the person involved was established, the magistrate issued a second interdict, de liberis ducendis, ordering his delivery to the pater familias, who then takes him home (ducere). Therefore the first interdictum is called praeparatorium with refer­ence to the second. In later development analogous interdicts were introduced: de uxore exhibenda and de uxore ducenda in favor of a man whose wife was withheld by another, even her father.—D. 43.30; C. 8.8.

Berger, RE 9, 1641.

Interdictum de liberto exhibendo. This was issued in favor of a patron whose freedman, being held by another person, was not able to render the services due to the patron.

Berger, RE 9, 1643.

Interdictum de loco publico fruendo. A lessee of public land may request the issuance of this inter­dictum to secure his unimpeded use according to the lease agreement.—D. 43.9.

Berger, RE 9, 1643.

Interdictum de migrando. Granted to the tenant of a rented apartment against the landlord who retained his things under the pretext that the rent has not been paid. A distinction is made, on the one hand, between things which the tenant hypothecated to the landlord and those not hypothecated, on the other hand between things which were brought in by the ten­ant (introducta, importata, such as furniture, slaves) and those which were afterwards made by him or became his (slaves born in his house). The tenant who wants to move (migrare) to another place ap­plies for this interdictum in order to release his property.

Berger, RE 9, 1646; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 490; Kreller, ZSS 64 (1944) 313.

Interdictum de mortuo inferendo. When somebody has the right to bury a deceased person in a certain place that belongs either to him or to someone else (ius mortuum inferendi), he is protected by this pro­hibitory interdict against any disturbance in so doing. —D. 11.8.

Berger, RE 9, 1646.

Interdictum de precario. See precarium. Interdictum de ripa munienda. See ripa.

Interdictum de rivis. The free access of the user of water-works, aqueducts, sluices, channels, cisterns, etc., for purposes of repair or cleaning is protected by this interdictum against anyone who attempts to prevent him from so doing. The interdictum is complementary to the interdictum de aqua.—D. 43.21. Berger, RE 9, 1647; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 480; Solazzi, Tutela delle servitù prediali, 1939, 73.

Interdictum de sepulcro aedificando. This is con­nected with the INTERDICTUM DE MORTUO INFERENDO inasmuch as he who has the right to bury a corpse in another’s property must be permitted to erect a tombstone on the grave.—D. 11.8.

Berger, RE 9, 1648.

Interdictum de superficiebus. See superficies.—D. 43.18.

Berger, RE 9, 1647; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 476; H. Vogt, Das Erbbaurecht, 1950, 86.

Interdictum de tabulis exhibendis. Issued in the interest of a person to whom it is important to know the contents of a last will after the testator’s death. The interdictal order compels the holder of the testa­ment to produce it.—D. 43.5.

Berger, RE 9, 1648.

Interdictum de uxore ducenda (exhibenda). See INTERDICTUM DE LIBERIS EXHIBENDIS.

Berger, RE 9, 1642 (no. 12 c).

Interdictum de vi. This belongs to the group of inter­dicta unde vi which serve for regaining possession (interdictum recuperandae possessionis) on behalf of persons who have been deprived of possession by physical force (vi deiecti). He who gave order to others (family members, slaves) to dispossess, was also responsible. When the aggressor acted with the assistance of armed persons engaged for this purpose (vis armata), a special interdictum de vi armata was issued. Another interdictum was proposed for the case of rejection of a person by force from an immov­able on which he had only an usufruct.—D. 43.16; C. 8.4.

Berger, RE 9, 1677 ; E. Levy, Konkurrenz der Aktionen 1 (1918) 285; G. Maier, Praetorische Bereicherungsklagen 1932 66; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1947) 461; Aru, AnPal 15 (1936) 152; Biscardi, Scr Solazzi, 1948, 730. Interdictum de viis publicis. There are several in­terdicts protecting the use of public roads and ways by private individuals. Analogous prohibitory inter­dicts are granted with«regard to public areas (loca publica) such as squares, streets, islands, market places, etc., which “are intended for public use” (D. 43.8.2.5). These interdicta forbid any construction at a public place which might damage it or render it less available for use. Not only are constructions built on the road or place itself, e.g., a monument, hit by the prohibition but also works done on adjacent lands which directly or indirectly damage the place in question. Constructions permitted by law or by the local authorities are exempt from the prohibition. The demolition of a harmful work already done may be obtained by similar interdicts of restitutory char­acter, by which restoration of the place to its original state, the removal of the obstacles, or reconstruction of what was damaged is ordered.—D. 43.8; 9.

Berger, RE 9, 1649; 1653 (no. 35); Lenel, Edictum per­petuum⁹ (1927) 459.

Interdictum demolitorium. See operis novi nun­tiatio.

Interdictum ex operis novi nuntiatione. See operis NOVI NUNTIATIO.

Interdictum fraudatorium. In classical law one of the measures to rescind any transaction (alienation) by which a debtor intentionally deprived himself of his rights or of his property to the detriment of his creditors (fraudandi causa). The purpose of the interdictum was the restoration of the legal situation which existed before the fraudulent act. Other means leading to the same effect were actio Pauliana and in integrum restitutio. The relationship between these different expedients is rather obscure since the interdictum fraudatorium is effaced in Justinian sources.—D. 42.8; C. 7.75.—See fraus.

Berger, RE 9, 1650; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum⁹ (1927) 495; G. Maier, Praetorische Bereicherungsklagen, 1932, 73; G. Segre, BIDR 48 (1941) 38; Solazzi, Revoca degli atti fraudolenti 1 (1945).

Interdictum momentariae possessionis. See posses­sio MOMENTARIA.

Interdictum ne quid in loco sacro religioso fiat. A prohibitory interdictum serving for the protection of sacred and religious places (see res religiosae, res sacrae), similar to those which are granted for use of public roads and places (interdictum de viis publicis). It is directed against all kind of wrongful doing (facere, such as constructions, and immittere, e.g., to let water run).—D. 43.6.

Berger, RE 9, 1655.

Interdictum ne vis fiat aedificanti. See aedificatio. Interdictum possessorium. See bonorum venditio. Berger, RE 9, 1657.

Interdictum quam hereditatem. An interdictum is­sued when in a trial for recovery of an inheritance (hereditatis petitio) the defendant, i.e., the actual possessor of the estate, refused to cooperate in the manner prescribed for actiones in rem, e.g., to give security. In such a case he is considered indefensus, not defended as prescribed by the law, and his adver­sary could request the issuance of the interdictum quam hereditatem which was an interdictum adipis- cendae possessionis since the claimant obtained pos­session of the estate. The new situation, although provisional, was of great advantage to him inasmuch as in any future process that might be brought against him by the former defendant in the interdictal con­troversy he had the favorable position of defendant. Some other interdicts are constructed on similar premises, such as interdictum quern fundum when the object of the claim is land, inter dictum quam servitu- tem, when a praedial servitude is claimed, or inter­dictum quern usuf rue turn when the claimant demands the delivery of an immovable on which he pretends to have the right of usufruct. In all these cases the victorious claimant obtains provisional possession of the controversial object.

Berger, RE 9, 1650; idem, Vol. di onoranse Simoncelli, 1915, 186; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum⁹ (1927) 474.

Interdictum quam servitutem. See interdictum QUAM HEREDITATEM.

Berger, RE 9, 1659; Solazzi, Mel De Visscher 4 (= RIDA 5, 1950) 466.

Interdictum quern fundum. See interdictum quam HEREDITATEM.

Berger, RE 9, 1660.

Interdictum quern usufructum. See interdictum QUAM HEREDITATEM.

Berger, RE 9, 1661; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum⁹ (1927) 475.

Interdictum quod legatorum. When somebody holds a thing under the pretext that it was bequeathed to him, he may be sued in interdictal proceedings by the heir under praetorian law (bonorum possessor), who denies the legacy, for recovery. The claimant must give security for the return of the thing if there is a valid legacy.—D. 43.3; C. 8.3.

Berger, RE 9, 1661; Lotmar, ZSS 31 (1911); Perrot, Bt. Girard 1 (1913); Lenel, ZSS 52 (1932) 282.

Interdictum quod vi aut clam. A restitutory inter­dict issued against a person who forcibly (vi) or secretly (clam) did a “work” on the claimant’s prop­erty. The work (opus) is here conceived in the broadest sense of any act done which changes the state of the land or its surface, such as cutting trees, ploughing, digging, demolition of existing construc­tions, etc. Vis ( = force, violence) is also interpreted very broadly since any action taken against the pro­hibition by the owner is considered to be vis. The defendant is also liable for his slave’s wrongdoings. The aim of the interdictum is restoration to the former state by the defendant himself or at his expense.—D. 43.2; C. 8.2.

Berger, RE 9, 1662; Cicogna, I. quod vi aut clam, 1910; E. Levy, Konkurrenz der Aktionen 1 (1918) 295; Lenel, Edictum perpetuuw? (1927) 482; Marcel David, Btudes sur Vi. q.v.a.c., Annales Univ. Lyon, 3rd ser., 10 (1947).

Interdict im quorum bonorum. An interdictum avail­able to a successor under praetorian law (bonorum possessor) against anyone who holds things belong­ing to the estate and asserts to hold them as an heir or simply as a possessor without any title (sine causa). If he pretends to hold them as a legatee he is exposed to the interdictum quod legatorum. The interdictum belongs to the category of interdictum adipiscendae possessionis.—D. 43.2; C. 8.2.—See BONORUM POSSESSIO.

Berger, RE 9, 1666; Humbert and Lecrivain, DS 4 (s.v. quorum b.) ; De Martino, ANap 58 (1937) 348.

Interdictum Salvianum. An interdictum available to a landlord against his lessee for the latter’s failure to pay the rent due. The interdictum is adipiscendae possessionis, since the claimant obtains possession of the tenant’s things which were brought in (invecta, illata) and pledged for rent. It is prohibitory be­cause the tenant is forbidden to impede the landlord in taking away the things.—D. 43.3; C. 8.9.

Berger, RE 9, 1667; Sacchi, NDI 7; Lenel, Edictum per­petuum³ (1927) 490; Kreller, ZSS 64 (1944) 320; v. Bolla, RE 18⁴, 2479; Daube, RIDA 6 (1951) 46.

Interdictum sectorium. See sectio bonorum.

Interdictum secundarium. A second interdictum is­sued in a possessory controversy when one of the parties involved did not completely fulfill the order or refused to cooperate in the proceedings subsequent to the interdictum first issued in the matter. The details of this complicated procedure are not known since the sole pertinent text in Gaius’ Institutes is not fully preserved.

Berger, RE 9, 1670; 1697; Gintowt, AnPal 15 (1934) 228.

Interdictum uti possidetis. Accorded in order to maintain an existing possessory situation at the re­quest of the actual possessor who has been disturbed in the possession of an immovable by the adversary and is threatened with a suit over ownership. The order of the magistrate forbids any change in the actual situation. The interdictum is directed to both the parties; it is an interdictum duplex (see inter­dicta simplicia) and inhibits the use of force (vim fieri veto) to dispossess the actual possessor. The plaintiff is protected only when his holding of the controversial immovable is not a defective pos­session (possessio vitiosa), to wit, acquired and kept by force (vi), secretly (clam) or through a gratuitous revocable loan (precario). In such cases the de­fendant avails himself of the so-called exceptio vitiosae possessionis.—D. 43.17; C. 8.6.

Bcrgcr, RE 9, 1682; Anon., NDI 12 (s.v. uti p.) ; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 469; Passerini, Ath 1937, 26; Ciapcssoni, St Albertoni 2 1937 15; Kaser, Eigentum und Besits, 1943, passim.

Interdictum utrubi. An interdictum based on the same principles as the foregoing, but limited to mov­ables. It is an inter di ctttm duplex and takes into account the exceptio vitiosae possessionis. Victorious in retaining or regaining possession is the party who, during the year preceding the issuance of the inter­dictum, possessed the object for a longer period. Justinian extended the inter die turn uti possidetis to movables; thus the interdictum utrubi lost its actu­ality in Justinian’s law.—D. 43.31.

Berger, RE 9, 1684; Lenel, Edictum perpetuum³ (1927) 488; Fraenkel, ZSS 54 (1934) 312; M. Kaser, Eigentum und Besits, 1943, passim; Daube, RIDA 6 (1951) 32.

Interdictus. An individual punished by banishment, confinement, or any kind of interdictio locorum. --- See DEPORTATIO, RELEGATIO. D. 48.22.

Interdum. Sometimes. The word is often inserted by Justinian’s compilers to limit a general classical rule and to leave a way open for exceptions. Interpolation of the adverbs plerumque (= very often) and non- nunquam (— sometimes) has a similar function.

Guarneri-Citati, Indice² (1927) 48, 67.

Interesse. See the following items.

Interest. There is a difference; multum interest ~ there is a great difference; nihil interest = it makes (there is) no difference.

Interest alicuius. It is of interest (importance) to a person. If the phrase is cuius interest refers to a public authority, a magistrate, judge, or imperial functionary is meant. Rei publicae (or publice) interest = it concerns the welfare, the interests of the state (or the Roman people). The term interest is of particular importance in the cases involving pay­ment of damages. There were no general rules for the evaluation of a person’s interest when compensa­tion was taken into consideration. It was the judge’s task to estimate it in each instance according to the rules governing the extension of the liability of the defendant, in particular as to whether real damages only or also lost profit should be identified.—See ID QUOD INTEREST, QUANTI EA RES EST, VERITAS.

Steinwenter, RE 9; Fliniaux, RHD 7 (1928) 326; Beretta, SDHI 3 (1937) 419; Guarino, Giurisprudensa comparata di dir. civile, 6 (1941) 197.

Interim. Meantime. The adverb is used with refer­ence to the time intervening between two legally im­portant events, for instance, between the conclusion of a transaction or the bequeathing of a legacy and the fulfillment of a condition upon which the effec­tiveness of the agreement or legacy depends; or the time between a judgment and the appeal brought against it.

Interitus. (From interire.) Destruction, extinction. The term is used of the extinction of certain rights (a servitude, a usufruct) or of actions.

Interlinere. To efface, to obliterate a written docu­ment (a testament, an account book) wholly or in part. If a person did so illegally, he could be sued by any one who had an interest in the existence of the document, primarily through the actio legis Aquiliae.

Interlocutio. An order, a statement or preliminary decision issued by a magistrate, judge or chairman of a tribunal during a trial. Interlocutio is also an interlocutory statement or decision by the emperor in the course of a trial before the imperial court.— D. 42.1; C. 7.45.—See definitiva sententia, multa PRAEIUDICIALIS.

Arangio-Ruiz, RE 4, 72.

Interminatio. In later imperial constitutions, threat­ening with punishment for a specific infraction.

Interna causae. In later imperial constitutions, the essential elements of a judicial affair.

Internuntius. (Syn. nuntius.) A messenger used for the oral transmission of a legally important decision (a declaration, a consent). Ant. of per internuntium is per epistulam (=by letter).

Interpellare (interpellatio). To press a debtor who had failed to pay on time, for payment. See mora.— Interpellare is also used when one sues his adversary in court (hence interpellatio = an action, a suit) or when one forbids another to accomplish a certain act. With regard to usucaption (usucapio interpellatur), interpellare indicates that the usucapio is interrupted either through the logs of possession by the holder of the thing or through a successful action of the person who claims the recovery of the thing.

Kaser, RE 16, 255; Biscardi, StSen 60 (1948) 607 (Bibl. on interpellatio in the case of default) ; Siber, ZSS 29 (1909) 47.

Interponere. Used of the conclusion of an obligatory transaction (stipulationem, contractum, donationem, giving security), of taking an oath (interponere iusiurandum), of writing down a document (inter­ponere instrumentum), even of committing fraud (interponere fraudem).

Interponere aliquem. To appoint a person as a rep­resentative or mediator; see interposita persona.

Interponere auctoritatem. See auctor, auctoritas. Interponere se. When said of a private individual, to interfere, meddle in a legal controversy between other persons; when said of a magistrate = to inter­vene officially, to take official measures.

Interposita persona. An intermediary, sometimes a straw man interposed in order to disguise an unlawful transaction (syn. supposita persona).

Interpositio decreti. In Diocletian’s and later con­stitutions, the issuance of a decretum by the em­peror or a high imperial official.

Interpres. An interpreter. References to the use of interpreters in judicial proceedings, in.hearings be­fore a magistrate or public corporate bodies (the senate, on the occasion of a reception of foreign envoys) are very scarce. In provincial administra­tion the service of interpreters is better evidenced. Their use in imperial courts, in particular in the later Empire, is beyond any doubt (interpretes diversarum gentium). The jurist Paul defined the custom (con­suetudo) as “the best interpreter of laws” (D. 1.3.37).

De Ruggiero, DE 4, 72; Taubenschlag, The interpreters in the papyri, Charisteria Sinko, Warsaw, 1951, 361.

Interpretatio. The explanation of the significance of a legal norm or term. Originally the pontiffs who alone mastered the knowledge of the law and legal customs, accomplished the task on interpretation, later it was assumed by the jurists as the men “learned in the law.” The interpretation of the law exercised a great influence on the development of the law from what­ever source it originated. This refers not only to the interpretatio of the law of the Twelve Tables, which, being only a limited codification, was unable to satisfy the growing legal needs, but also to the interpretatio of legal customs. The interpretatio prudentium thus became a primary source of law, since it extended the norms of the decemviral legislation to new legal situ­ations and problems and took into consideration cus­tomary practices which through the comprehensive activity of the jurists acquired a more perceptible ex­pression. Hence the jurists were later designated as those who iura condiderunt ( = established the law, see iurisprudentia) and their law as a law which “without writing was composed by the jurists and so became a ius civile proper consisting exclusively in the interpretatio of men learned in the law” (D. 1.2.2.12). The interpretative activity continued when legislative enactments were passed by the people (statutes = leges) and when the praetors began to create new legal rules in their edictal pronounce­ments. In the later Empire, the interpretation of law became a special province of the emperor and ultimately Justinian made the emphatic statement (Tanta, 21 in fine) that the emperor as the exclusive legislator had the exclusive right to interpret the law (cui soli concessum est leges interpretari; so-called authentic interpretation). The Roman jurists did not elaborate a specific theory of the interpretation of law, some rules of interpretatio are to be found, however, scattered through the Digest, such as: “Whenever a statute provides, something there is a good opportunity to add further rules which aim at the same benefit (utilitas = Utility) through inter­pretation or jurisdiction” (D. 1.3.13). “To know the laws (scire leges) means to adhere not to their words but to their force and sense” (D. 1.3.17). “The term ex legibus (= according to the laws) is to be understood according to both the sense and to the words” (D. 50.16.6.1). Several texts stress the importance of the intention and spirit of a statute. See BENIGNA INTERPRETATIO, HUMANITAS.----------------------------------------------------------------- The in­

terpretatio of the laws is to be distingushed from the interpretation of manifestations of will by private individuals in their legal acts, both unilateral (testa­mentary dispositions) and bilateral (agreements). Under the regime of strict formalism the ancient law gave no opportunity to differentiate between verba (what has been expressed) and voluntas (the intention) of the party or parties. In the later devel­opment, owing to the activity of the jurists, the evaluation of voluntas as against verba gradually in­creased, starting in the field of testaments and legacies and passing from there into other domains of the private law. Some interpretative directives given by the classical jurists appear in Justinian’s legislative work, such as: “If ambiguous utterances occur, the intention of the person who used them should be taken into consideration” (D. 50.17.96). “Where there is ambiguity of words, what (in fact) was acted, is valid” (D. 34.5.21). “Where there is no ambiguity of words, the question of intention should not be admitted” (D. 32.25.1). The final two titles of the Digest contain a large number of interpretative suggestions concerning single words or locutions which are of importance for the understanding of juristic texts (D. 50.16) and a long series of general legal rules (regulae iuris, D. 50.17) of an interpre­tative nature.—See ius respondendi, responsa, VERBA, VOLUNTAS.

Kleinfeller, RE 9; Berger, ibid. 1167; Anon., ND! 7; R. Pound, Harvard L R 21 (1908) 383; Donatuti, Dal regime dei verba al regime della voluntas, BIDR 34 (1925) 185; J. Strouk, Summum ius summa iniuria. Ein Kapitel aus der Gesch. der i. iuris, 1926 (2nd ed. Rom. Rechtswiss. und Rhetorik, Potsdam, 1949) ; J. Himmelschein, Symb. Frib. Lend, 1931; Biondi, BIDR 43 (1935) 139; C. A. Maschi, St sull’i. dei legati, verba-voluntas, 1938; Schiller, Virginia LR 27 (1941) 733; F. Schulz, History of R. Legal Science (1946) 24, 75, 132, 293; Riccobono, in several articles, see voluntas (Bibl.); Berger, In dubiis benigniora, ACIVer 2 (offpr. 1951) 187 (=Sem 9 [1951] 36).

Interpretatio duplex. The interpretation of a text in Justinian’s codification (primarily in the Digest) from two points of view: on the one hand, what the text meant in the time and the language of the jurist who wrote it; on the other hand, the significance it acquired in Justinian’s legislation. Many texts in the final title of the Digest (50.17: On various rules of the ancient law) offer instances for such an inter­pretation, since certain rules formulated by tile classi­cal jurisprudence on a specific occasion and for a specific legal situation were drawn out of their original context and settled as a general rule ap­plicable at all times (semper) or at least “very often” (plerumque). The expression interpretatio duplex is of modern coinage.

Riccobono, BIDR 49-50 (1948) 6.

Interpretationes ad Codicem Theodosianum. Sum­maries or paraphrases of the constitutions collected in the Codex Theodosianus. They are preserved in the lex romana visiGOTHORUM and frequently con­tain additional remarks and references to other sources. The Lex Romana Visigothorum contains also interpretations of some texts of Paulus’ Senten­tiae. The interpretationes may originate from various private commentaries written to the sources men­tioned.—See CODEX THEODOSIANUS.

Kleinfeller, RE 9, 1712; Berger, RE 12, 2400; Stouff, Mel Fitting 2 (1908) 165; M. Conrat, Der westgothische Paulus, Amsterdam, 1907; Checchini, 57 sull’interpretatio al Cod. Teodosiano, Scritti in memoria di Monticolo, 1913; G. Ferrari, Osservasioni sulla trasmissione diplomatica del Codice Teodosiano e sulla interpretatio Visigotica, 1915; Wieacker, Symb Frib Lend, 1931, 259; Chiazzese, AnPal 16 (1931) 301; Niccolai, RendLomb 75 (1942) 42; Buck­land, LQR 60 (1944 ) 361.

Interpretatores (interpretes) legum, iuris. Justinian refers to the classical jurists by such terms as “the ancient interpreters of the law” or “the interpreters of the ancient law.”

Interregnum. The interval between the death of a king and the election of his successor. At the be­ginning of the vacancy a senator elected by the senate was appointed interrex only for a period of five days. If this period expired without the election of a new king, the interrex designated his successor for the consecutive five days.—See interrex, pro­dere INTERREGEM.

Liebenam, RE 9; Ehrenberg, RE 13, 1498; Foligno, NDI 7; Giannelli, DE 4 (j.v. interrex); De Ruggiero, DE 2, 825; Heuss, ZSS 64 (1944) 79.

Interrex. See interregnum. Under the Republic an interrex selected from among the patrician senators was appointed by the senate when both consuls died or abdicated, for five days only. His principal func­tion was to order the election of new consuls. The following interreges were consecutively designated by their predecessors for a five-day term as Jong as the election was not accomplished.

Giannelli, DE 4, 73.

Interrogatio. In a stipulatio, the question addressed by the future creditor to the debtor.—See stipulatio. Interrogatio. In criminal trials, the question ad­dressed by the court to the accused as to whether he pleads guilty or not. If he admits having com­mitted the crime or if he is silent, which is considered an admission, the proceedings are quickly brought to an end. Interrogatio also means the questioning of a witness.

Berger, RE 9, 1729.

Interrogatio. In the senate, a request for opinion addressed to the senators by the presiding magistrate. The opinion given by a senator — sententia. Syn. sententias rogare.

Interrogatio in iure. Questioning the defendant in a civil trial. This was a specific institution for the purpose of establishing certain important points re­garding the defendant’s liability. In some actiones in personam the plaintiff was permitted to question the defendant during the first stage of the trial before the magistrate (see in iure) about certain circum­stances that were decisive for the further progress of the trial. Thus, in a suit against the heir of his debtor, a creditor could ask the defendant whether he was in fact the heir (an heres sit) and of what share. In noxal actions (see noxa) the plaintiff asked the de­fendant whether the son or slave for whose wrong­doings he was being sued was in his power legally and factually (in potestate). These were the two most practical uses of interrogatio. An affirmative answer by the defendant was binding even if it did not correspond to the truth. The fact of the affirma­tive answer was then inserted into the pertinent pro­cedural formula; actions with formulae so modified were termed actiones interrogatoriae. The defend­ant’s negative answer put an end to the trial. If the plaintiff was able to prove its untruth, the trial was continued and entailed considerable disadvantages for the defendant in case of condemnation. The interro­gatio was not a general institution relieving the plain­tiff of the burden of proof in any trial. There were also instances in which the magistrate might question the defendant in iure about some details which were prejudicial to further proceedings. The actiones in­terrogatoriae disappeared when the civil process ceased to be bipartite.—D. 11.1.

Berger, RE 9; Anon., NDI 6; Lautner, Fschr. Hanausek, Abhandlungen zur antiken Rechtsgesch., 1925; Sanfilippo, Circolo giuridico 10 (1939).

Interrumpere (interruptio). To interrupt. With reference to possession, interrumpere is mentioned as a negative requisite of usucaption since the inter­ruption makes impossible the usucaption.—C. 7.40. —See USURPATIO, USUCAPIO, INTERPELLARE.

Interusurium. If the debtor pays the money due on a fixed day before that date, the creditor has the profit (commodum) of having the money at his disposal and of being able to lend it at interest for the remainder of the term (interusurium medii tem­poris). The debtor may deduct the interusurium from his payment only if the creditor consents, be­cause the latter is not bound to accept a payment with a deduction before it is due.

De Dominicis, NDI 7, 87.

Intervalla dilucida (lucida). Periods during which an insane person regained full mental capacity and, consequently, legal capacity. Syn. furor inter­missus.—See furiosus, demens.

De Francisci, BIDR 20 (1921) 154; Solazzi, AG 89 (1923 ) 80; Lenel, BIDR 33 (1923) 227, 45 (1925) 517.

Intervenire. A general term to indicate that a legally important event occurred, e.g., an agreement (stipu­latio, pactum), a wrongdoing creating legal liability (dolus, fraus, culpa), a procedural measure (cautio, accusatio), hnd the like.

Intervenire (interventor, interventio, interventus). In obligatory relations syn. with intercedere. It is frequently used of sureties.

Intervenire. In judicial proceedings to intervene in a trial as a representative of a party, either as a general representative (tutor, curator) or as one appointed for a specific trial (procurator).

Interversio. An embezzlement.

Intestabilis. A person who is unable to be a witness at a solemn act requiring the presence of witnesses (e.g., mancipatio, testamentum per aes et libram) or to invite another to witness such an act to be made by himself. Intestabilis was one who had been con­victed of libel (carmen famosum) or who had refused to give testimony about an act in which he partici­pated as a witness.—See improbus testis.

Manigk, RE 9.

Intestato. (Adv.) Refers to a succession in which there is no valid testament. Syn. ab intestato.

Intestatus. A person who died without leaving a valid testament or whose testament, originally valid, became ineffective because the appointed heirs re­fused to accept the inheritance or by other reasons. Ant. testatus.—See testamentum ruptum, testa­mentum IRRITUM, NEMO PRO PARTE TESTATUS, etc.

Manigk, RE 9; Michon, RHD 2 (1921) 128; Daube, RHD 15 (1936) 341; La Pira, La successione ereditaria intestata, 1930.

Intexere. To interweave. The owner of a piece of doth acquires ownership of whatever has been woven into it.

Arno, Textura, Mèi Girard 1 (1912) 27.

Intimare. In the language of the imperial chancery, to perform a legal act before an official or to register it in the official records; to announce official ordi­nances publicly; to send official instructions to the appropriate offices.

Intra. Within. With regard to a period of time, the word includes the last day, e.g., intra centum dies takes in the hundredth day. Intra with regard to years includes the last year in full. This kind of reckoning is applied to acts to be accomplished intra a certain lapse of time. In later imperial constitu­tions, intra connected with a number of days or months means exactly the last day of the term. For intra miliarium, see miliarium.

Introducta. (Syn. importata.) Things brought into a rented apartment by the tenant (furniture, slaves, etc. ). The analogous expressions in the lease of land are invecta, illata (furnishing, tools, instruments of husbandry, cattle, slaves, etc.).—See interdictum de MIGRANDO.

Introductio actionis, litis (introducere actionem, litem). Starting a civil trial. In Justinian’s lan­guage introductio litis is syn. with litis contestatio as conceived in the procedure of his time.—See litis CONTESTATIO.

Introire domum alicuius vi. To invade another’s house by violence. It was punished under the lex CORNELIA DE INIURIIS. See DOMUS, INGREDI.

Introire fundum. To enter a landed property in order to take physical possession thereof. It sufficed to set foot on any part of it.—See possessio.

Introitus. The sum paid for obtaining a subaltern post in the civil service.—See militia.

Marchi, AG 76 (1906) 319.

Intuitu. With regard to, in consideration of. The term is frequent in later imperial constitutions and those of Justinian in connection with humanitas or pietas (intuitu humanitatis, pietatis). In the Digest the word is rather suspect as to its classical origin.

Guarneri-Citati, Indice² (1927) 49.

Inulta mors. A murder which has remained unavenged (without prosecution) by the dead man’s son. The latter was held unworthy (indignus) to benefit from the will of the father.

Inustus. (From inurere.) Stigmatized, branded by infamy (in the language of imperial constitutions). See INFAMIA.

Inutilis. Legally ineffective. The term is used of acts (testaments, transactions, actions) which are void because of the non-fulfillment of a legal requirement. Inutiliter — without legal effect.—Inst. 3.19; C. 8.38. Hellmann, ZSS 23 (1902) 422.

Invadere. To enter with violence another’s immovable in order to take possession of it (invadere bona, pos­sessionem).—See INGREDI, INTROIRE.

Invalidus. See validus.

Invasio (invasor). The act of committing an invadere (the person who does it).—See invadere.

Invecta (illata). See introducta, interdictum de MIGRANDO.

De Villa, NDI 7.

Inventarium. An inventory of property (e.g., belong­ing to a ward). An inventarium should be made by a guardian, when he assumed the tutorship, in his own interest since his liability for the administration is limited to the amount of the ward’s property. Such an inventory became later obligatory. Syn. repertorium. An inventarium was also made by creditors who obtained missio in possessionem into the property of a bankrupt debtor. The inventarium had a particular importance in the law of succession; see beneficium inventarii.

Kaser, RE 7A, 1571.

Inventor thesauri. A person who finds a treasure­trove. See THESAURUS.

Investigare (investigator). To search for a criminal or a fugitive slave; to investigate a crime. Syn. in­quirere (see inquisitio), quaerere.

Invicem. Mutually, reciprocally. With regard to agreements, invicem denotes that both parties assume reciprocal obligations (obligari, deberi) and each party thus is both creditor and debtor.

Invitator. An imperial functionary charged with send­ing out invitations to appear before the emperor. He also assisted at the audiences in the imperial palace.

Invitus. One against whose will or without whose con­sent something is done. “An invitus is not only he who contradicts, but also someone of whom it is not proved that he has agreed” (D. 3.3.8.1). Generally, no legal effect is produced for or against a person by an act for the validity of which his consent was re­quired but not given. Acquisitions, however, made by a slave for his master even without his will are valid. The payment of another’s debt releases him from it even against or without his will. Remark­able rules are the following: “No one can be forced to bring a suit or to accuse against his will” (C. 3.7.1). “No one is given a benefit, a favor, against his will” (D. 50.17.69).—See emptio ab invito, NOLENS, NEMO INVITUS.

Fadda, St Brugi, 1910, 145.

locus. A joke. A stipulation made for the sake of a joke (per iocum) does not create an obligation.

Ipse. Used in Justinian’s language in lieu of is ( = he). It is an evident Grecism, and therefore considered a criterion of interpolation when it appears in classical texts in the Digest.

Guarneri-Citati, Indice² (1927) 49.

Ipso iure. By virtue of the law itself^ The locution is opposed to ope exceptionis (=by virtue of an exception) or to tuitione praetoris (by the aid of a praetorian remedy).—See aditio hereditatis.

Iracundia. Anger, irritation, indignation. “Whatever is done or said in the heat of anger is not considered binding, unless it appears through perseverance to have been an act (judgment) of the mind” (D. 50.17.48 = D. 24.2.3). A wife who had left her husband in a state of irritation and Returns to him after a short time is not held to have been divorced (D. ibid.).

Ire. As a servitude, ius eundi.—See iter, actus, via.

Ire ad iudicem (iudicium). To proceed judicially; to go to court after having been summoned. Ire ad arbitrum = to appear before an arbitrator to settle a controversy.

Irenarcha. A provincial officer charged with the func­tions of a justice of the peace and with the mainte­nance of public order. He conducted criminal inves­tigations.—C. 10.77.

Iri in bona (possessionem). To be.granted posses­sion of another’s property through a decree of the praetor. Syn. mitti in bona, mitti in possessionem.— See MISSIO IN POSSESSIONEM, VACUA POSSESSIO.

Irnerius. (Also Guarnerius.) A famous jurist of the late eleventh and the first decades of the twelfth cen­tury. He was the founder of the law school in Bologna which became the center of legal studies in medieval Italy. He is often referred to as lucerna iuris (= the lantern of law) and is considered the initiator of the revival of the study of Roman law in Italy. As teacher of law he enjoyed great esteem and he was one of the most prominent, if not the first, of the so-called Glossators.—See glossatores.

Schupfer, RISG 1894, 346; H. Fitting, Die Summa Co- dicis des I., 1894; idem, Quaestiones de iuris subtilitatibus des I., 1894; E. Besta, Uopera di Irnerio, 1-2, 1896; Pa- tetta, StScn 14 (1897) ; Chiappelli, AG 58 (1897) 554; H. Kantorowicz, Studies in the Glossators of the R. Law, 1938, 33; Zanetti, AG 140 (1951) 72.

Irreverens miles. A soldier who violated military discipline or offended his superior by lack of respect. —See delicta militum.

Irritus. Invalid (a legal act or transaction), either from the beginning or by a later event. Ant. ratus. See TESTAMENTUM IRRITUM.

Irrogare. To inflict a penalty (poenam, multam) either in a normal criminal proceeding or as an act of magis­terial COerdtio. See MULTA.

Is qui agit. Syn. actor; is qui agere vult (acturus) = the plaintiff before the litis contestatio; is cum quo agitur = the defendant.—See reus, agere, petitor.

Italicus. Italian, situated in Italy. Land in Italy (praedia Italica, solum Italicum, terra Italica) is dis­tinguished from provincial land. Only a plot of land situated in Italy (not a provincial one) is a res mancipi and transferable by mancipatio.—See ius ITALICUM.

Iter. A rustic servitude (servitus praediorum rusti­corum) which entitles the beneficiary “to pass (ius eundi), to walk ( ius ambulandi), and to ride on horse-back through another’s land” (D. 8.3.1 pr.). He has not the right to drive a draught animal.—See SERVITUTES PRAEDIORUM RUSTICORUM, ACTUS, VIA.

De Ruggiero, DE 4, 120; Arangio-Ruiz, St Brugi, 1910; Saumagne, Revue de Philologie 53 (1928) 320; Grosso, St Albertario (Estr., 1950) 596.

Iter ad sepulcrum. Access to a grave through an­other’s property. Free access (aditus) to a family tomb is granted to persons interested therein either as a servitude or as a revocable concession given through a mediation of the competent official (extra ordinem). The right is not extinguished through non use.

Iter aquae. See servitus aquae ducendae.

Iter privatum. Indicates both a private road and a servitus itineris (see iter) through another’s land. D. 43.19. See INTERDICTUM DE ITINERE PRIVATO.

Berger, RE 9, 1639; Maroi, St Bonfante 3 (1930), 619.

Iter publicum. A public road the use of which is per­mitted to all. For the protection of the public use of such roads, see interdicta de itineribus publicis. —D. 43.7; C. 12.44.

Berger, RE 9, 1641, 1654.

Iteratio. Holding the same magistracy a second time. Iteratio was permitted only after an interval of ten years. The pertinent rules were often violated for political reasons. Syn. iterum fieri (e.g., consul).

Mommsen, Staatsrecht I³, 519; Kübler, RE 14, 404.

Iteratio. (In manumissions.) A second manumission was necessary when the first one was performed in a form not recognized by ius civile, or by a master who had only bonitary (in bonis) ownership over the slave. Since such defective manumissions gave the ex-slave restricted citizenship (see latini iuniani) a second manumission (iteratio) in a form prescribed by ius civile or a manumission by the quiritary owner gave the freedman full Roman citizenship.

Steinwenter, RE 12, 921.

lubere. To order, to command. By use of the word iubeo a testator instituted an heir (heredem esse iubeo) and formulated other dispositions, such as legacies, or manumissions ( “Servum meum Stichum liberum esse iubeo”). lubere is also applied to the right of magistrates to issue orders (ius, potestas iubendi), particularly in their jurisdictional activity. All commands issued by the praetor in the first stage of a civil trial, in iure, originate in a iussum (praetor iubet), e.g., stipulationes praetoriae, cautiones, mis- siones. Injunctions ordered by the judge (iudex) in the second stage of the bipartite trial are also covered by the term iubere. Precepts in written enactments are referred to by iubere, e.g., lex (senatusconsultum, edictum) iubet. lubere is also the technical term for the vote of the Roman people when a statute is passed. —In domestic relations, iubere is applied to the orders given by a father to a son under his paternal power or by a master to his slave, as well to the authoriza­tion given by them to a son or slave to conclude a transaction with a third person which involved the responsibility of the father or master, respectively.— D. 15.4.—See iussum (Bibl.), iudicare iubere, duci IUBERE.

ludaei. Under the Principate, the Jewish ^religion was recognized by the state as a religio licita which gave its followers the right to build synagogues for re­ligious gatherings, to perform there ceremonies in conformity with their religion, and to have ceme­teries. These religious privileges were, however, not respected by all emperors (e.g., Tiberius, Caligula, Vespasian, Hadrian). Legally the Jews were aliens (see peregrini), subject to taxation, except for groups and individuals who for one or another reason were granted Roman citizenship. As peregrines they were exempt from military service. After a.d. 49 they had the right of association. Jewish communi­ties had their own courts for litigation between Jews. A Jew was admitted to tutorship over a non-Jew. Of Alexander Severus it is said: “He confirmed the privileges of the Jews (ludaeis privilegia rcscrvavit).” The policy of the Christian emperors varied from toleration and religious neutrality to the most severe restrictions. As a matter of principle, the Jewish religion remained a religio licita, and the synagogues were treated as loca religiosa and were exempt from billeting soldiers. From the beginning of the fifth century the Jews were excluded from public office, but they were subject to public charges (munera). Among the measures taken against the expansion of the Jewish religion were such as the interdiction of the construction of new synagogues (a.d. 415) and of the conversion of persons of other religions under threat of severe penalties. Manifold restrictions in private law were imposed in the later Empire on the Jews with regard to the acquisition of land, ownership of Christian slaves, last wills, marriage with Chris- tions (forbidden and prosecuted as adultery), exclu­sion from public office and military service. After a.d. 415 Jews were excluded from arbitration in con­troversies in which one party was a Christian.—C. 1.9; 1.10.—See senatusconsulta de iudaeis, cir­CUMCISIO, FISCUS 1UDAICUS, UNIVERSITAS IUDAEORUM.

T. Reinach, DS 3; Jones, OCD (s.v. Jews'); Heinemann, RE Suppl. 5 (s.v. Antisemitismus) ; Corradi, DE 4 (s.v. Judaea); Mommsen, Jur. Schriften 3 (1907) 416; W. D. Morrison, Gli Ebrci sotto la dominazione romana, 1911; J. Juster, Les Juifs dans I’Empire rom., 1-2 (1914); G. Costa, Religione e politico neirimpero rom., 1923, 151; La Piana, Uimmigrazione a Roma, Ricerche religiose 4 (1928) 193; A. Momigliano, Ricerche sull'organizzazione della Giudea, Annali della Scuola Norm. Superiore Pisa, ser. 2, vol. 3 (1934) 346; Browe, Die Judengesetzgebung Justi­nians, Analecta Gregoriana 8 (1935) 109; Solazzi, BIDR 44 (1936/7 ) 396; idem, ANap 59 (1938) 164; M. Briickl- meir, Beitrage zur Stellung der Juden im rom. Reich, 1939; A. Segre, Note sullo status civitatis degli Ebrei neirEgitto, Bull. Soc. Royale Archeol. d’Alexandrie 28 (1933) 143; idem, Jewish Social Studies 6 (1944) 375; V. Colorni, Legge ebraica e leggi locali, 1945; Ferrari Dalle Spade, Fschr. Wenger 2 (1945) 102; idem, Giurisdizione speciale ebraica neirimpero r. cristiano, Scr Ferrini 1 (Univ. Cat., Milan, 1947) 239. For further bibl. see R. Marcus, A Selected Bibliography of the Jews in the Hellen.-Rom. Period (1920-1945), Proceedings of the Amer. Acad, for Jewish Research, 16 (1947) pp. 97-141, passim; S. W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, An­cient Times, 1-2, Philadelphia, 1952.

Iudex. Originally a iudex was any magistrate who de­cided about a controversy by a judgment (qui ius dicit). In the bipartite civil procedure the rendering of a judgment (iudicare) was separated from ius dicere, and the index was the private judge. In the classical juristic language iudex was a private indi­vidual (judge) appointed as a judge in a specific trial. He was neither a magistrate nor a magistrate’s sub­ordinate, and he was bound solely by the instructions given in the formula. The right to serve as a judge was denied deaf (surdi), dumb (muti), and insane (furiosi) persons, to impuberes, and women. Sena­tors removed from the senate were excluded from judgeship. The circumstance that one was under paternal power was no bar. A judge sitting in court (cum de re cognoscat) could not be summoned before the magistrate (in ius vocatus) by a creditor. Syn. iudicans (a term frequently interpolated in lieu of any jurisdictional official who did no longer exist in Justinian’s times). In the later Empire and in Jus­tinian’s language iudex is any imperial official who has any jurisdiction at all, and indices is a collective term for all administrative functionaries of the Em­pire.—See C. 1.45; 1.48; 7.49; Inst. 4.17; D. 11.2.— See the following items and album iudicum, de­CURIAE IUDICUM, LEX PINARIA, LEX SEMPRONIA IUDI- CIARIA, LEX AURELIA, CONTRACTUS IUDICUM, POSTU­LATIO IUDICIS, IURARE SIBI NON LIQUERE, INIURIA IUDICIS, SUUS IUDEX, IUDICES.

Kubler, RE 6, 289; Steinwenter, RE 4 and Suppl. 5, 350; Humbert and Lecrivain, DS 3; Bozza, DE 4; Berger, OCD; Seckel, Handlexikon⁹ (1914) 291; Wildenauer, Richterwahl im rom. Privatprozessrecht, 1919; J. Ma- zeaud, La nomination du iudex unus dans la procedure formulaire, 1933; Collinet, Le role des juges, Recueil F. Geny, 1 (1934) 23; J. Dauvillier, La theorie de I’iniuria iudicis, Rec. Acad, de legist. Toulouse 13 (1937); Weiss, BIDR 49-50 (1948) 194; Jolowicz, RIDA 2 (=Mel De Visscher, 1, 1949) 477; Kaser, Fschr. Wenger 1 (1945) 122.

Iudex appellationis. A judge (jurisdictional official) vested with the power to decide on appeals from decisions of an inferior court.

Iudex competens. A judge competent in a specific matter, i.e., legally authorized to examine a judicial controversy and to pass judgment. The term com­petens is frequent in postclassical and Justinian’s constitutions; the compilers substituted it frequently where a judicial magistrate was mentioned in the classical work.—C. 7.48.

Iudex compromissarius. An arbitrator selected by the parties to a controversy by virtue of a compro­mise; see COMPROMISSUM.

Iudex datus. In classical law, a private person ap­pointed with the cooperation of the magistrate to be the judge in a specific trial. In postclassical law = a judge appointed by a higher official, primarily the provincial governor, to examine a controversy and to pass judgment. Syn. iudex pedaneus.

Iudex delegatus. A lower (auxiliary) judge whom a higher jurisdictional official appointed for a specific case to be examined and decided upon by him.

Iudex esto. The introductory part of the written pro­cedural formula in which an individual person is authorized to be the judge in a specific litigation (“Titius iudex esto”).

Steinwenter, RE 9, 2468.

Iudex extra ordinem datus. A judge appointed in a cognitio extra ordinem by a jurisdictional official to examine a case and deliver a judgment.

Iudex in re propria (sua). A judge in his own affair. No one may be judge in his own controversy with another (sibi esse iudicem, sibi ius dicere). “It is highly improper to give one the liberty to pass a judgment in a matter of his own” (C. 3.5.1).—See IURISDICTIO.

Iudex ordinarius. Refers to the governor of a prov­ince in his capacity as a judge.

Iudex pedaneus. A judge to whom as a iudex dele­gatus a judicial official assigned a case in the cognitio procedure. Provincial governors used to delegate minor cases (negotia humiliora) to a iudex pedaneus if governmental affairs made it impossible for them to act personally.—C. 3.3.

Wlassak, RE 3, 3102 (s.za chamaidikastes).

Iudex privatus. A private individual selected by the parties with the cooperation of the judicial magis­trate to serve as a judge under the regime of the legis actiones and the formulary procedure. He examined the evidence and rendered the judgment. Hence the second stage of a civil trial is termed apud iudicem (before the judge). In later imperial constitutions iudex privatus is syn. with iudex compromissarius.

Iudex quaestionis. The chairman of the jury in crimi­nal trials in the quaestiones-procedure (also called iudex quaestionis rerum capitalium), primarily in capital matters. Normally a magistrate of a rank lower than the praetor or an ex-magistrate was charged with such function.

Iudex qui litem suam facit. A iudex who intention­ally (dolo malo) gave a false judgment made himself liable (“he makes the trial his”). An action for damages lay against him. This was the case when the judgment exceeded the limits fixed in the written formula. The extension of the judge’s responsibility to judgments delivered per imprudentiam (= by neg­ligence, lack of knowledge) may have been a later innovation.—D. 50.13.

J. Bartoli, Du juge qui l.s.f., These Paris, 1910; E. Levy, Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz, 1915, 48; P. De Fran- cisci, Synallagma 2 (1916) 129; Küblet, ZSS 39 (1918) 215; G. A. Palazzo, Obbligazioni quasi ex delicto 1919, 31; J. Dauvillier, Iniuria iudicis, Rec. Acad, legist. Tou­louse, 13 (1937) 163.

Iudex sacrarum cognitionum. See iudicans.

Iudex specialis. A judge assigned to a particular case by his superior. The term seems to be a postclassical (Justinian’s?) creation.

Iudex suspectus. A judge whose impartiality is doubted. He may be rejected by the parties involved in a litigation. The term appears only in later im­perial constitutions.

Iudex tutelaris (tutelae). A term interpolated for praetor tutelaris.

Iudex unus. One judge conducting the part of the trial called apud iudicem. See in iure, iudex. Ant. decemviri, centumviri as collegiate courts, and recu- peratores, a tribunal of three judges.—See iudicium LEGITIMUM.

J. Mazeaud, La nomination du iudex u. dans la procedure formulaire, 1933; Wenger, ZSS 55 (1935) 424.

Iudicans. See iudex.

Iudicans vice sacra. A judge appointed by the em­peror to decide in his name as an appellate judge. Syn. iudex sacrarum cognitionum.

De Ruggiero, DE 2, 323.

ludicare. The judicial activity, the rendering of a judgment or decision by a person who is acting as a judge in civil or penal proceedings. In criminal matters, iudicare is opposed to c o'er cere (coercitio) which is not preceded by an ordinary trial. In ancient law, iudicare is syn. with adiudicare = to adjudge a person to his creditor on account of an unpaid debt. See RES IUDICATA, EXCEPTIO REI IUDICATAE, IUDI- CATUM.

Betti, RISG 56 (1915) 31; Μ. Kaser, Das altröm. Ins, 1949, 126.

Iudicare iubere (iussum iudicandi). The order given by the praetor to the private judge to pass judgment according to the terms of the written formula.

Steinwenter, RE 9, 2468; Wlassak, SbWien 197, 4 (1921) ; Lauria, St Bonfante 2 (1930) 506; E. Carrelli, La genesi del procedimento formulare, 1946, 121.

ludicare vetare. To remove a iudex who is or has become unable to exercise his duties.

ludicatio. See iudicare. In the language of later constitutions iudicatio = a judgment (syn. with sen­tential.

ludicatum. The condemnatory judgment (sententia) as well as its contents, i.e., the sum of money which the defendant was condemned to pay to the victorious plaintiff, iudicatum = the judgment-debt. Under the classical law the defendant had to pay the judgment­debt within thirty days; otherwise he was sued by the plaintiff in,a special action for the execution of the iudicatum, actio iudicati. The action was in­itiated in the same way as any other action; it was terminated in the in-iure.stage through a decree of the praetor ordering fulfillment of the judgment-debt. See addictus. Only when the defendant contested the validity of the judgment or asserted that he had paid his debt, did the actio iudicati come before a private judge (apud iudicem), and if the allegations of the defendant proved untrue, he was condemned to pay double. In certain cases the defendant was bound to give security that the judgment-debt will be paid (cautio, satisdatio iudicatum solvi), e.g., when a representative appeared at the trial on his behalf. If the defendant appointed a cognitor, he had to provide the guaranty himself ; if a procurator acted for him, however, the procurator gave the se­curity iudicatum solvi. Other instances in which such a security was obligatory were when the de­fendant was a bankrupt (see decoctor), when his property was seized by his creditors by virtue of a missio in possessionem, when an heir suspected of insolvency (see heres suspectus) was sued, or when a debtor who had been condemned in a previous trial and did not pay the judgment-debt was sued by actio iudicati.—D. 46.7.—See cautio iudicatum SOLVI, TEMPUS IUDICATI, DUCI. IUBERE, MANUS IN- IECTIO, RES IUDICATA, EXCEPTIO REI IUDICATAE.

Steinwenter, RE 9; Cuq, DS 3; L. Wenger, Die Lehre von der actio i., 1901 ; P. Gay-Lugny, La cautio i. solvi, 1906; Duquesne, Mèi Gerardin, 1907, 197; idem, Mèi Fit­ting 1 (1907) 321; Pflüger, ZSS 43 (1923) 153; Liebman, St Bonfante 3 (1930) 397; Biondi, ibid. 4 (1931) 35.

ludicatus. A defendant in a civil trial against whom a judgment has been rendered.—See iudicatum.— Syn. condemnatus.

Indices civiles—militares. In imperial constitutions, civil and military officials exercising special juris­diction in fiscal and military matters.—C. 1.45 ; 46 ; 48. Indices decemviri. See decemviri stlitibus iudi-

CANDIS.

Indices delecti. Jurors selected from the panel (see album) for a specific trial.

Indices maiores—minores. A distinction made in the later Empire and by Justinian between superior and inferior courts.

Indices sacri. Judges appointed by the emperor pri­marily for appellate matters.

ludices selecti. Persons entered in the official panel of jurors (see album).

ludicia. See iudicium and the subsequent items, ludicialis. Connected with the functions of a iudex or the administration of justice.—See stipulationes IUDICIALES.

ludiciarius. Referring to judicial proceedings; see LEGES IUDICIARIAE.

ludicio sistere (se sisti). See sistere aliquem. Iudicium (iudicia). Used in various technical senses.

It is frequently syn. with actio and comprises the whole process without regard to bipartition; at other times it indicates only the second stage, apud iudicem, i.e., the proceedings before the private judge. Not seldom iudicium refers to the written formula (iudi­cium in rem, in factum) and at times to the act which separates the two stages of the classical process, the litis contestatio (e.g., ante iudicium, iudicium con- testari). The elasticity of the term diminishes in the cognitio proceedings in which the distinction in iure— apud iudicem no longer exists. There it denotes the whole trial and refers generally to any proceedings before an official acting in a jurisdictional capacity. Finally iudicium is used of the judgment itself (syn. sententia) by which the trial is brought to an end. This last use is hardly classical. Justinian’s compilers frequently inserted the term iudicium to replace ref­erences to the bipartition of the classical process, in particular when the classical text alluded to the stage in iure or when mention of a classical institution obsolete in Justinian’s time had to be deleted (see vadimonium). In criminal matters iudicium refers to the trial as a whole as well as to its initial act (accusatio) and the process pending (see iudicia publica). The various meanings of iudicium are clarified by the context in which the word appears.— D. 5.1; C. 3.1.—See exceptio rei in iudicium de- ductae and the following items (iudicia for various types of actions, iudicium for specific actions, both civil and penal).

Leonhard, RE 9; Humbert and Lecrivain, DS 3; Flore, DE 4; Kiiblcr, ZSS 16 (1895) 137; Jobbe-Duval, Mel Cornil 1 (1926) 532; Beseler, ZSS 46 (1926) 131, 52 (1932) 292; Lend, ZSS 47 (1927) 29.

Iudicia absolutoria. See absolutorius. ludicia arbitraria. See actiones arbitrariae. ludicia bonae fidei. Contractual actions in which through the clause ex fide bona in the intentio of the written formula the judge (iudex) was given full power to decide the controversial matter according to the principles of good faith) i.e., to estimate what should be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The pertinent clause does not refer to the actionability of the case but to the extension of the performance re­quired of the defendant. All actions arising from consensual or real contracts (except mutuum), the actio tutclac, rei uxoriae, negotiorum gestorum, and some others were bonae fidei. The authority given

[TRANS. AMER. PHIL. SOC. to the iudex was broad and it increased gradually; he might take into account formless pacts added to actionable contracts immediately after their conclu­sion and modifying their effects (pacta conventa). Ant. iudicia stricta (actiones stricti iuris), the for­mulae of which had no clause ex fide bona. There the judge could take into consideration only what was expressed in the formula.—See actiones in BONUM ET AEQUUM CONCEPTAE, CONDEMNATIO.

Longo, St Sen 22 (1905); De Francisci, ibid. 24 (1907) 346; Biondi, AnPal 7 (1920) 3; idem, BIDR 32 (1922) 61; C. Zevenbergen, Karakter en geschiedenis der i.b.f., Amsterdam, 1920; Grosso, StUrb 1927, 1928; idem, RISG 3 (1928) ; Koschembahr-Lyskowski, St Riccobono 2 (1936) 159; F. De Martino, La giurisdizione, 1937, 95; Daube, ZSS 68 (1948) 92.

Iudicia contraria. Syn. actiones contrariae: see ac­tiones DIRECTAE, IUDICIUM CONTRARIUM.

Iudicia directa. See actiones directae.

ludicia duplicia. Actions in which each party is both plaintiff and defendant. This is the case in divisory actions for the partition of common property (actio communi dividundo, actio familiae erciscundae). The term interdicta duplicia is to be understood in the same sense.—See interdicta simplicia.

Berger, St Simoncelli (1915) 185; Leone, AnBari 6 (1943) 187.

Iudicia extraordinaria. Trials conducted in the form of proceedings extra ordinem. See cognitio extra ordinem. An interpolated text (D. 3.5.46.1) says: “In iudicia extraordinaria the use of written formulae (conceptio formularum) is not observed.’' Ant. iudi­cia ordinaria.

ludicia generalia. Trials in which a complex of dis­puted matters is examined and decided upon. This occurs when a person (a guardian, a partner, or a negotiorum gestor) administers all or much of an­other’s affairs. Ant. iudicia specialia in which the litigation concerns one specific matter, as in the case of actio mandati, depositi, commodati, etc. All actions in rem in which a specific thing (not a complex of things, universitas) is claimed are actiones speciales. The distinction is important in cases in which a spe­cial action concurs with a general one or when the settlement of a special controversy appears necessary before a general action can be brought against the adversary.

Peters, ZSS 32 (1911) 179.

ludicia legitima. Trials between Roman citizens which took place in Rome or within the first mile­stone of the city, before one judge (iudex unus) only. Ant. iudicia quae imperio continentur (iudicia imperio continentia), in which any one of these requi­sites is missing. The former are governed by statu­tory law (see legitimus), the latter depend upon the imperium of the jurisdictional magistrate. A iudicium legitimum expires (moritur = “dies,” see lis mori­tur) if the trial has not been brought to an end within eighteen months from its beginning (lex

iulia iudiciaria), whereas a iudicium quod imperio continetur expires with the termination of the impe­rium of the magistrate before whom the trial began. Bonifacio, St Arangio-Ruiz 2 (1952) 207.

Indicia ordinaria. Ant. of iudicia extraordinaria.

Indicia poenalia. In a broader sense, merely crimi­nal trials. Syn. poenales causae. In a narrower sense (syn. with actiones poenales) — civil trials involving a penalty to be paid to the plaintiff.

Iudicia populi. Trials in criminal matters before the popular assembly (comitia) when a Roman citizen had been condemned by a magistrate to capital pun­ishment or to a fine (see multa) exceeding the legal maximum (thirty oxen and two sheep or 3,000asses). In the first case the comitia centuriata were compe­tent, in the second the comitia tributa. The introduc­tion of the quaestiones procedure diminished the role of the iudicia populi.

Berger, OCD; E. E. Hardy, JRS 3 (1913) 25; Brecht, ZSS 59 (1939) 261.

Iudicia privata. See actiones privatae. Ant. iudi­cia publica.

Leonhard, RE 9.

Iudicia publica. Proceedings in criminal matters. Ant. iudicia privata. The distinction is clearly mani­fested in the Augustan legislation (lex Iulia iudi- ciaria) which deals separately with iudicia publica and iudicia privata.—Inst. 4.18; D. 48.1.

Leonhard, RE 9; Humbert and Lecrivain, DS 3; Gatti, AG 113 (1935) 59, 115 (1936) 44; Pugliese, Riv. dir. processuale civile, N.S. 3, 1 (1948) 63.

Iudicia quae imperio continentur. See iudicia le­gitima.

Nicolau, Rev. de philologie 9 (1935) 352.

Iudicia specialia. See iudicia generalia. Iudicia stricta. See iudicia bonae fidei. ludicis postulatio. See postulatio iudicis. Indicium accipere. Refers to the acceptance by the defendant of the procedural formula proposed by the plaintiff. Through such an agreement made under the supervision of the praetor, the object of the con­troversy is fixed (lis contestata) and the stage in iure of a civil trial comes to an end. Post iudicium ac­ceptum = after litis contestatio.—See litis contes­tatio.

Wlassak, RE 1 (j.v. accipere i.).

Iudicium calumniae (actio calumniae). An action for calumnia (see calumnia). If a defendant was sued maliciously, the plaintiff having full knowledge that his claim was unjust, and was absolved, he could bring an action against his adversary for a tenth of the amount claimed in the former trial, but he had to prove that the latter acted calumniae causa ( = with chicanery).—See iudicium contrarium.

Hitzig, RE 3, 1420.

Iudicium Cascellianum. A special trial (iudicium secutorium), when the defendant against whom the praetor issued a possessory interdict, did not obey 521 the order.—See interdictum, AGERE per sponsio­nem.

Berger, RE 9, 1693; 1697.

Iudicium centumvirale. Refers to the second stage in a trial before the centumviral court. The first stage took place before the jurisdictional magistrate (the praetor).—See centumviri.

Iudicium contrarium. A counter-action brought by a defendant against a plaintiff who had sued him inconsiderately and had lost the claim. Such a counter-suit was admissible only in a few specific cases, e.g., with regard to an actio iniuriarum. In a iudicium contrarium the former plaintiff was con­demned for one tenth of his unsuccessful claim, even if he had acted without malicious intention. The iudicium contrarium concurs with iudicium calumniae. —See iudicium calumniae.

G. Provera, Contributi alia teoria dei iudicia contraria, MemTor 75 (1951).

Iudicium curationis. A term used by Justinian for the action which a ward under curatorship (see cura) could bring against his curator for damages resulting from bad management of the ward’s affairs. In classical law the pertinent action was the actio negotiorum gestorum.—D. 27.3.—See actio cura­tionis causa utilis.

Iudicium de moribus. See actio de moribus.

Iudicium de operis libertorum. See operae liberti. Iudicium domesticum. A domestic court in which the head of the family (pater familias) exercised his jurisdiction over family members under his power. It was an ancient, customary institution in which his unlimited power (see ius vitae necisque) found its most evident expression. In the case of major crimes he was assisted by the family council (concilium pro­pinquorum) but the judgment lay with him. For women sui iuris and those under tutorship, the iudi­cium domesticum was composed of their nearest relatives.

Humbert and Lecrivain, DS 3; Dull, ZSS 54 (1943); Volterra, RISG 85 (1948) 103.

Iudicium imperio continens. See iudicia legitima. Nicolau, Revue de philologie 9 (1935) 352.

Iudicium liberale. See causa liberalis.

Iudicium noxale. See noxa.

Iudicium operarum. See operae liberti, iurata promissio liberti.

Iudicium petitorium. See formula petitoria.

Iudicium quinquevirale. A tribunal in the later Em­pire, composed of five senators under the chairman­ship of the praefectus urbi, for criminal offenses com­mitted by senators.

C. H. Coster, The i.q. (Cambridge, Mass., 1935) ; idem, Byzantinische Zeitschr. 38 (1938) 119.

Iudicium rectum. See actiones directae.

Iudicium restitutorium. See actio restitutoria. Iudicium secutorium. See agere per sponsionem. Iudicium societatis. Syn. actio pro socio; see socie­tas.

ludicium supremum (ultimum, test at or is). A last will (testament).

ludicium triumvirale. See triumvirale iudicium. lugatio terrena. A tax paid on landed property. It is to be distinguished from the poll-tax, capitatio humana. The term iugatio comes from the land unit, iugum, which served as the basis for the assessment of the tax to be paid in natural products of the soil (annona).—See iugum.

Thibault, Revue generate du droit, de la legislation 23 (1899) 481.

Iugum (iugerum). A plot of land (three-fifths of an acre) “which two oxen can plow in one day.”— See IUGATIO TERRENA.

A. Deleage, La eapitation du Bas-Empire, 1945, passim.

lulianus, Salvius. A jurist of the second century, member of the imperial council under Hadrian, pupil of lavolenus and teacher of Africanus, the last known head of the Sabinian school. In his official career he held many important posts from the tribunate to the governorship of several provinces as is testified by a well preserved inscription (CIL 8, 24094) found in North Africa, near Hadrumetum, where he may have been born. lulianus was one of the outstanding Roman jurists, an original and independent thinker, whose works, in particular his digesta, are among the most highly appreciated products of the Roman juristic literature. At Hadrian’s initiative, he revised the praetorian edict; see edictum perpetuum. His Digesta (in 90 books) were richly excerpted by the compilers of Justinian’s Digest and frequently quoted by later classical jurists. It is a comprehensive col­lection of responsa on real and hypothetical cases; in general, it followed the edictal system. Julian also wrote commentaries on works of two earlier, little known jurists, Urseius Felix and Minicius, and a booklet De ambiguitatibus (= on doubtful ques­tions). With lulianus, the Roman jurisprudence reached its apogee.

Pfaff, RE 1A, 2023; Orestano, ND I 6 (s.v. Giuliano) ; L. Boulard, Salvius I., 1902; Rechnitz, St zu S.I., 1925; Solazzi, St Besta 1 (1937) 17; A. Guarino, S.L, 1946 (Bibl.); D’Orgeval, RHD 26 (1948) 301; Berger, St in memoria di Albertario 1 (1952) 605; Wolff, Sem 7 (1949) 69; Kunkel, lura 1 (1950) 192; idem, Herkunft und soziale Stellung der rom. Juristen, 1952, 157: R. Reggi, Studi Parmensi 2 (1952) 105.

lumentum. A beast of burden (horse, mule, ass). The edict of the aediles laid down certain rules con­cerning the sale of iumenta, and the liability of the seller for physical defects and diseases of the animal, similar to the provisions referring to the sale of slaves. Through an additional clause (elogium) the rules were expanded to other kinds of cattle (pecus') and domestic animals.—See edictum aedilium, ACTIO REDHIBITORIA, PECUS.

H. Vincent, Le droit des ediles, 1922. luniani. See LATINI IUNIANI.

luniores—seniores. Each centuria in the early mili­tary organization consisted of two groups, seniores (men from forty-six to sixty) and iuniores (men un­der forty-six). The seniores formed the reserve troops.—See TABULAE IUNI0RUM.

lungere. See accessio, tignum iunctum.—Iungi ( = se iungere) = to be tied to another person,by mar­riage or kinship.

lura—leges. See lex.

lura praediorum. Rights attached to an immovable property, servitudes. For the various iura prae­diorum, see SERVITUTES PRAEDIORUM RUSTICORUM, SERVITUTES PRAEDIORUM URBANORUM, and the per­tinent items.

luramentum. An oath. See iusiurandum. luramentum calumniae. See iusiurandum calum­nia, ACCUSATIO.

lurare (iurari). To take an oath.—See iusiurandum. lurare bonam copiam. A rather obscure expression which appears in connection with the Lex Poetelia Papiria on nexi and is linked with an oath of the debtor, apparently about his pecuniary inability to pay his debts.

Steinwenter, RE 10, 1259; Berger, RE Suppl. 7, 406; Humbert, DS 1 (b.c. iurare) ; G. Rotondi, Leges publicae pop. rom., (Encicl. giur. ital. 1912) 231; P. Noailles, lus et fas, 1948, 109; Berger, St Arangio-Ruiz 2 (1952) 117. lurare in leges. Taking an oath by a magistrate when entering office to the effect that he would observe the laws. The oath was administered by a quaestor.— See EIURATIO.

Kiibler, RE 14, 416; Steinwenter, RE 10, 1257; R. Maschke, De magistratuum Romanorum iure iurando, 1884. lurare sibi non liquere. A private judge (index) in a civil proceeding to whom the controversy did not appear sufficiently clarified, so that he felt unable to render a judgment, might take an oath that the matter “was not clear to him.” He was released from the trial which was then submitted to another judge (translatio iudicii). For criminal cases, see am­pliatio.

Leonhard and Weiss, RE 13, 726; Lemosse, Cognitio, 1944, 164.

lurata promissio liberti. A promise under oath by which a manumitted slave assumed the duty of render­ing certain services to his patron. In order to ascer­tain whether the slave would make such a promise after his manumission, it was usual to allow him to take the oath before he was freed, which created only a religious duty for him. After his manumission the iurata promissio liberti produced a civil, contractual obligation under oath. The pertinent action was iudicium operarum.

Cuq, DS 3, 771; M. Chevrier, Du serment promissoire, 1921, 90.

luratores. Reliable persons who assisted the censors in their work of registering the citizens (see census) and who administered an oath to them on the truth of their declarations.

Passerini, DE 4.

Juratorius. See cautio iuratoria.

luratus. A person who upon assuming a public office, even a temporary one, took an oath before entering service.

Passerini, DE 4.

lure. (Abl.) According to the law, legally, lawfully, in particular with reference to the solemn formalities prescribed by the law. lure valere = to be legally valid. Non iure — iniurid (abl.).—See ipso iure, MERITO.

Riccobono, ZSS 34 (1913) 224.

lure suo uti. See UTI SUO IURE.

lure uti. (In phrases like hoc [eo, quo] iure utimur.) In this way the jurists used to refer to a legal norm still valid, particularly to one established in an im­perial rescript, in order to stress the fact that it was still applicable. The phrases are not linked with responsa. Occasionally they were interpolated by Justinian’s compilers when they wished to point out that the classical rule has remained unchanged. There is, however, no reason to exclude all such phrases from the classical juristic language.

Berger, KrVj 14 (1912) 440; Guarneri-Citati, Indice², 1927, 51; Magdelain, RHD 28 (1950) 169.

lurgium. Used of those kinds of legal controversies which are brought before an arbitrator, such as dis­putes on division of property or on boundaries be­tween neighboring properties, or quarrels between family members. It is opposed in a certain measure to lis. Later both terms were used rather indis­criminately.

Leonhard, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3; Brunelli, NDI 7; A. Mag- delain, Origines de la sponsio, 1943, 192.

luri alieno subiectus. See alieni iuris.

luridicatus. The office of a iuridicus. See iuridici in provinces.

Iuridici. In Italy, jurisdictional magistrates of sena­torial rank, introduced by Marcus Aurelius with competence in civil and criminal matters. Terri­torially their competence was limited to one or more districts (regiones) into which Italy was divided. There were four iuridici altogether. In their juris­diction in civil matters, fideicommissary and tutelary controversies were of particular importance. They also had jurisdiction in administrative disputes (e.g., munera, corn supply).—D. 1.20.—See dioecesis ur- BICA, REGIONES ITALIAE.

Rosenberg, RE 10; Jullian, DS 3; Samonati, DE 4; Berger, OCD.

Iuridici. In provinces, high officials of provincial ad­ministration with broad activity in judicial matters (legati iuridici) concurrent with that of the governor. The official title of the iuridicus in Egypt was iuridicus Aegypti with the frequent addition, et Alexandreae. —C. 1.57.

For bibl. see iuridici in Italy; Wlassak, Zwn rom. Pro- 'uincialprozess, SblVien 190, 4 (1919) 59; Balogh, ACDR Roma 2 (1935) 309; v. Premerstein, RE 10, 1151; Coroi, Actes V-e Congrcs Papyr. Oxford (Brussels, 1938) 628.

Iuridici dies. See dies iuridici.

Iuris auctor. See iurisperitus. Iuris conditor. See condere iura.

Iuris est. (In such locutions as id iuris est, certi, manifesti iuris est.) “This is the law” in a specific question submitted to a jurist for opinion. Quid iuris est ( = what is the law?) is the corresponding interrogatory phrase.—See iure uti, ius certum.

Iuris scientia. The knowledge of the law, jurispru­dence.—See syn. IURISPRUDENTIA.

Iuris sui (or alieni) esse. See alieni iuris. lurisconsultus. A jurist. The word alludes to the activity of the jurists as qui consuluntur, i.e., who are consulted for an opinion in a legal matter and who give responsa to the consultants (consultator). Other terms are iurisperitus (iuris peritus), iuris prudens, or simply prudens. The jurists “enjoyed the highest esteem among the Roman people” (Cic. de orat. 1.45.198). Their profession was considered one which “cannot be evaluated or dishonored by a price in money” (D. 50.13.1.5).—See iurisperitus, iurispru- DENTIA, IUS RESPONDENDI, RESPONSA.

Berger, RE 10, 1164; Kübler, Die klass. Juristen und ihre Bedeutung für die Rechtsentwicklung, ConfMil 1931, 128; Massei, Scr Ferrini (Univ. Pavia, 1946) 42; Magdelain, RHD 28 (1950) 4; W. Kunkel, Über Herkunft und soziale Stellung der röm. Juristen, 1952.

lurisdictio. (From ius die er e.) The power and ac­tivity of ius die ere, i.e., of settling legal principles which serve to adjust controversies. The term covers any judicial activity in civil matters, and in a broader sense, all activity connected with the administration of justice. With reference to the praetor, the juris­dictional magistrate par excellence of the classical times, it embraces all his acts and orders issued dur­ing the stage in iure of a civil trial, such as the ap­pointment of a iudex (private juror), the grant of an action to the plaintiff as well as its denial (dene- gatio), the order to the judge to decide the case in dispute, and so on. The power of iurisdictio is given to all magistrates with imperium; magistrates of lower rank (magistratus minor es) had only a limited iurisdictio (see aediles). In a territorial sense, iurisdictio refers to the judicial district in which a magistrate may exercise his jurisdictional rights. The judicial activity of municipal magistrates is also covered by the term. Under the Empire, all higher officials are vested with iurisdictio. With reference to provincial governors the term comprehends the whole administration of the province, which is a sign of the extension in the significance of iurisdictio in later times. The classical iurisdictio refers only to the activity of judicial magistrates and imperial of­ficials, and not to the activity of the private judge developed in the stage apud iudicem in a civil trial. The transition from the bipartite process to the cog- nitio procedure could not remain without influence on the content of iurisdictio, which was applied there­after to any official acting as a iudex (iudices) in the broad sense which this term acquired in the later Empire; see iudex. “A person provided with iuris­dictio shall not ius dicere in matters in which he him­self, his wife or children, his freedmen or other per­sons of his household are involved” (D. 2.1.10).— D. 2.1; Cod. 3.13.—See the following items, forum, IUDEX IN RE PROPRIA.

Steinwenter, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3; Lauria, ND! 5; Bozza, DE 4; F. Leifer, Die Einheit des Gewaltgedankens (1914) 68, 86; L. Falletti, Evolution de la juridiction civile, These Paris, 1926; Lauria, St Bonfante 2 (1930) 479; F. de Martino, La giurisdizione nel dir. rom., 1937; C. Gioffredi, Contributi allo studio del proc. civ. rom. 1947, 9.

lurisdictio contentiosa. Jurisdiction in cases involv­ing a legal controversy between the parties to the trial. Ant. iurisdictio voluntaria = the intervention of a magistrate in matters in which there is no quarrel between the parties and the fictitious trial serves only as a way of performing certain legal acts or trans­actions (in iure cessio, emancipatio, adoptio, manu­missio). lurisdictio voluntaria also comprises co­operation of officials in guardianship matters and legal acts for the validity of which a permission of the com­petent authority is required. The distinction is im­portant inasmuch as some magistrates who have no full iurisdictio may intervene in acts of iurisdictio voluntaria and as the personal interest of the magis­trate is not a hindrance to the performance before him of such acts as adoptions, manumissions, emanci­pations in which he himself or his next relatives are involved.

Solazzi, AG 98 (1927) 3; Gonnet, RHD 16 (1937) 193. lurisdictio delegata. The delegation of jurisdiction by the emperor to an official or a private person to examine a case (delegatio causae) and render judg­ment, either in the first instance or in appellate pro­cedure. Such a jurisdictional delegate (ex divina delegatione) may subdelegate the matter to another judge. On the other hand, iurisdictio delegata occurs when a higher official (one of the prefects in Rome, a proconsul in the province) delegates another to act in a certain kind of judicial affair, or for a limited period or in a single case. The right of the pro­vincial governors to delegate their jurisdiction was reduced to minor matters by imperial legislation of the fourth century or to exceptional situations when the governor was overburdened with jurisdictional duties, in order to relieve him to a certain extent. Through the delegation of jurisdiction a new instance arose because an appeal from the decision of the iudex delegatus to the delegans was admissible. In this important point the iurisdictio delegata differs from iurisdictio mandata. Ant. iurisdictio propria.— See IURISDICTIO, IURISDICTIO MANDATA.

De Ruggiero, DE 2, 321; H. J. Conrad, Die i.d. im rom. und kanon. Recht, 1930 (Diss. Koln).

Iurisdictio extraordinaria. (In the language of the imperial chancery.) Jurisdiction in the cognitio pro­cedure.

lurisdictio iudicis. (Of postclassical origin.) After the disappearance of the bipartite civil procedure there was no further reason to distinguish between the functions of a magistrate and those of the private judge. Hence iurisdictio iudicis refers to the judicial activity of any public official.—C. 3.13.

F. De Martino, La giurisdizione nel dir. rom., 1937, 177.

lurisdictio mandata. Jurisdiction transferred through mandate by a magistrate vested with iurisdictio to another person (magistrate or not). “He who as­sumes iurisdictio mandata has no right of his own but exercises the jurisdiction of his mandator’^r (D. 1.21.1.1). Therefore, he is not authorized to appoint another as a mandatary and his jurisdictional rights are extinguished when the mandator revokes his man­date or dies. An appeal from the decision of the mandatary goes not to the mandator but to his superior. The transfer of jurisdiction through man­date was widely practiced in the Republic. One of its most developed applications was the iurisdictio mandata of the legatus proconsulis in the provinces, who received his jurisdictional powers from the pro­consul. There was a rule that “what is assigned to a magistrate by a statute, a senatusconsult or an imperial constitution as a special assignment, cannot be transferred to another as a iurisdictio mandata¹⁹ (D. 1.21.1 pr.) ; only what belonged to the province of his magistracy (ius magistratus) might be en­trusted to another through mandate. Ant. iurisdictio propria. See IURISDICTIO DELEGATA.---------------------------- D. 1.21.

Steinwenter, RE 10, 1157.

lurisdictio praetoria. The jurisdiction of the praetor. It embraces not only his activity in civil trials (in the stage in iure) but also his edictal creations (the issu­ance of new legal rules, formulae, interdicts, etc.).

Betti, 57 Chiovenda, ¥)27.

Iurisdictio voluntaria. See iurisdictio contentiosa. lurisperitus. A man learned in the law, a professional jurist. The term alludes to his knowledge of the law, while iurisconsultus refers rather to a jurist con­sulted in legal matters. See iurisconsultus. Syn. iuris auctor, iuris prudens (or simply prudens), iuris conditor.

Massei, AG 133 (1946) 48; idem, Scr Ferrini (Univ. Pavia, 1946) 428.

lurisprudens. See the foregoing item.

lurisprudentia. Defined as “the knowledge of divine and human matters, the knowledge of what is just and what unjust” (D. 1.1.10.2). lurisprudentia is syn. with iuris scientia: it is knowledge of the law in the broadest sense of the word, the science of the law. The Roman jurists were the most important element in the development of the Roman law, and with good reasons they are named iuris auctores, iuris condi­tor es; see condere iura. This refers in particular to the classical period of Roman jurisprudence, i.e., in the last century of the Republic and the two cen­turies and a half of the Principate. The creative influence of their responsa, their literary and teaching activity, their participation in the councils of judicial magistrates and private judges as assessor es, and later in the imperial consilium as legal advisers of the emperors furthered the development of the law through creative and progressive ideas based on the understanding of the necessities of the life, to which they adapted their opinions and doctrines taking into consideration the changes in the economic, political, and social development of the empire. They did not care for philosophical doctrines and conceptions, for precise definitions or etymologies, but they had a keen eye for the exigencies of everyday legal life with which they were constantly in touch in their various capacities. The high value of their works does not lie in theoretical deliberations and doctrinal speculations, but in the elaboration of a systematic structure of the law as a whole, in the gradual building up of a legal system composed of legal institutes with an admirable logical strength and guided by ideas which justify the conception of the law as ars boni et aequi. The juristic literature of the classical period acquired particular significance in the later Empire in spite of its completely different political, economic, and social structure, through the so-called Law of Citations, issued in 426 by Theodosius II. It laid down rules for the use of classical juristic writings as authorities in legal matters. The works of Papinian, Paul, Ul- pian, Modestinus. and Gaius were established as the principal authorities. Their views had to be consid­ered authoritative in legal disputes. Works of jurists other than the five mentioned might be taken into consideration only if they were quoted by the pri­mary authorities and if those quotations could be strengthened by a comparison with the original works. In the case of divergent opinions of the jurists, the majority was decisive; if there was no majority, the opinion of Papinian prevailed. If none of these cri­teria was applicable the judge had free choice in rendering judgment. The greatest homage paid to the works of the classical jurists was Justinian’s Digest, based as it was exclusively on excerpts from them.—D. 1.2; C. 1.17. For particular jurists, see the pertinent items; for their literary products, see DIGESTA, INSTITUTIONS, RESPONSA, QUAESTIONES, REGULAE, NOTAE. ED1TI0 SECUNDA.—See IUS EST ARS BONI ET AEQUI.

Jors, RE 3. 2608 (s.v. Citiergets) ; Solazzi, ND! 7 (Legge delle citasioni) ; Berger, RE 10; OCR 472\ Riccobonp, NDI 7; E. Seckel, Das riim. R. and seine IVissenschaft, 1920; F. Senn. Les origines de la notion de jurisprudence. 1926; Donatuti, La definisione di {Jlpiano, AG 98 (1927) 51; Stclla-Maranca, Hist 8 (1934) 640; F. Pringshcim. Hohc and Ende der riim. Jurisprudens. 1933; La Pira, La genesi del sistenia nella qiurisprudensa ram., St l/irgilii 1935, BIDR 42 (1934) 336, SDHI 1 (1935) 319, BIDR 44 (1936-37); Biscardi, StSen 53 (1939); Riccobono, Scr I'errini (Univ. Pavia, 1946) 17; Biondi, ibid. 201; Grosso, ibid. 251 ; Massei, ibid. 438 (on Law of Citations) ; Kagan, Tulane Law Rev. 21 (1946) 192; Schulz, History of R.

Legal Science, 1946; Schiller, The Jurists and the Prefects of Rome, RIDA 3 (=Mel De Pisscher 2, 1949) 319; F. Wieacker, Über das Klassische in der röm. Jurisprudenz, 1950; Biondi, Scr Carnelutti 1 (1950) 97; idem, St Arangio-Ruiz 2 (1952) 79.

lus (iura). In the Roman juristic language, ius has different meanings. In the broadest sense the term embraces the whole of the law, the laws {iura populi rqmani), without regard to the source from which they emanate. When used with a special attribute it applies to a bigger field of the law {ius publicum, privatum, honorarium, etc.) or to exceptional provi­sions {ius singulare). Even references to a single legal provision are not missing. The meaning of ius as the law in general is reflected in expressions like iure (abl.) — legally, in conformity with the law, or ipso iure — by virtue of the law itself. Allusions to specific legal provisions are in locutions such as “idem iuris est” or “quid iuris estl” when a ques­tion is put concerning the specific norm to be applied in a particular case. Conceived as the whole of the law originating from various sources—hence the dis­tinction between ius and lex (a statute which is a source of ius)—the ius is defined by the jurist Celsus “ius EST ARS BONI ET AEQUl” (see AEQUITAS) which is not far from another formula expressed by the jurist Paul, “what always is just and fair {acquum et bonum) is called ius” (D. 1.1.11 pr.). The fun­damental principles {praccepta) of the ius are “to live honestly, not to do harm to anybody, to give any one what is his {suum cuique tribucre)” (D. 1.1.10.1). Along with the juxtaposition ius—lex, not always exactly distinguished by the jurists, there is another one, ius—fas, see fas. Beside the use of the term in the objective sense as “the law,” ius is applied to indicate the subjective right or rights {iura) of an individual, as the right to do something in a certain legal situation, to acquire a thing or to dispose of it. to claim something from another. In this sense the praedial servitudes are called iura prae- diorum, and the general term, ius in re alicna, is coined. Almost synonymous with ius in this mean­ing are the expressions facultas and potestas although the legal element is not explicit in them. The patri­monial rights of an individual as a whole are termed iura or simply ius {universum), as in the locution succcssio in ius. Ius also indicates the personal status of a person, as in the technical phrases, sui (or alieni) iuris esse, a distinction made according to whether a person is under the power of another or legally independent. With regard to landed property, ius may indicate the legal situation thereof including servitudes and liens {ius fundi). A specific meaning is attached to ius in procedural language. Ius is the place where the magistrate (praetor) administers the law. Hence the stage of a civil trial which takes place before him is named in iure. Here “the term is transferred from what is being done {ius dicitur} to the place where it is done” (D. 1.1.11). Hence some procedural institutions have their denomination, as in ius vocatio, interrogatio in iure, confessio in iure. Slight shades of difference in the meaning of ius will be found in the following entries, which deal with some more important expressions in which ius (or iura) is connected with either a noun or an adjective. In the language of the later imperial constitutions and of Justinian, ius appears in associations unknown in the classical juristic language.—Inst. 1.1; D. 1.1.— See IURE, IPSO IURE, IUR1SDICTI0, IURIS ESSE, AUC­TORES, AUCTORITAS, IGNORANTIA, SOLLEMNIA, IN IURE, IN IURE CESSIO, INTERROGATIO, CONFESSIO, RIGOR IURIS, REGULA IURIS, and the following items.

Leonhard, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3; Biondi, NDI 7\ May, Mei Gcrardin, 1907, 402; Clark, Mèi Eitting 1 (1907) 241; Kamphuisen, RHD 11 (1932) 389; Villey, Le droit sub- jectif et Ics systemes jnridiqucs rom., RHD 24-25 (1946/7) 201 ; Goidanich, Atti Accad. d'Italia, Sez VII, voi. 3 (1943) 499; M. Kaser, Das altromischc Ius 1949, 29; D’Ors, St Albertario 2 (1952) 279.

Ius abstinendi. See abstinere se hereditate.

Ius acta conficiendi (actorum conficiendorum). The right of magistrates and imperial officials to keep public records.—See acta.

Ius adcrescendi. The law of accrual under which the portion of a co-owner increases, as, for instance, if a co-owner manumits a common slave, the manumission being void, the other co-owner acquires full ownership over the slave (Justinian ordered the slave freed). In the law of succession, the share of a co-heir in­creases when the other co-heir fails to take his share under the will or on intestacy.

Leonhard, RE 10; Humbert, DS 3; P. Bonfantc, Scritti giuridici 3 (1926) 434; Macqueron, RHD 8 (1929) 580; Vaccaro-Delogu, L'accrescimento nel dir. ereditario, 1941 ; U. Robbe, lus a. e la sostituzione volgare, 1947.

Ius adeundi. See aditus.

Ius adfinitatis. A relationship based on adfinitas.— See adfinitas.

Ius aedificandi. The owner of a plot of land has the right to construct a building on it, provided that his neighbor has no title under which to protest. In the case of a neighbor’s unjustified protestation, the builder has an action against the neighbor in which he claims his right (ius) sibi esse ita aedificatum habere, i.e., to build the house in the way he wants to do it. On this occasion he also has the possibility of claiming some specific servitudes (e.g., servitus altius tollendi, immittendi) to which he is entitled. In the case of common property the ius aedificandi depends upon the consent of all the co-ownerè any one of whom may exercise the ius prohibendi (right of prohibition) against the partner who intends to build. See AEDIFICATIO, OPERIS NOVI NUNTIATIO.

Ius Aelianum. See aelius paetus catus.

Ius aequum. See aequitas.

Pringsheim, ZSS 42, 643.

Ius agendi (iumentum). The right to drive draft animals through another’s property.—See actus, via.

Ius agendi cum populo (cum patribus, cum plebe). The right to convoke a popular assembly (comitia), primarily for legislative purposes. It was granted to the highest magistrates (consuls, praetors, dictators). A similar right of the plebeian tribunes to convoke the plebeian assemblies (concilia plebis) was the ius a(jendi cum plebe. The ius agendi cum patribus re­fers to the convocation of the senate which under the Principate was a prerogative of the emperor.

Fadda, NDI 1, 238.

Ius agnationis. Rights deriving from the agnatic rela­tionship. See AGNATIO.

Ius altius tollendi. See servitus altius tollendi.

Ius ambulandi. See iter, via.

Ius anuli aurei. The right to wear a golden ring. It was a privilege of persons of equestrian rank.—D. 40.10; C. 6.8.—See equites, restitutio natalium.

Ius antiquum. The earlier law referred to for com­parison with new legal provisions. In imperial con­stitutions of the later Empire and with Justinian, ius antiquum denotes the classical law, sometimes going as far back as the Twelve Tables. Syn. ius vetus, ant. ius novum.

Ius appellandi (appellationis). The right to appeal to a higher court. Syn. auxilium appellationis.—See APPELLATIO.

Ius applicationis. The relationship created through a voluntary placing of oneself under the protection of a powerful person (patronus) by a solemn act, appli­catio ad.patronum. The individual, a plebeian or a stranger (peregrinus), thus became a client (see clientes) of the patron.

Premerstein, RE 4, 32; Manigk, RE 10.

Ius aquaeductus (aquae ducendae). See servitus ADQUAEDUCTUS.

Ius augurium. The sacral rules concerned with the activity of the augurs. They were collected in Books of the augures (libri augurum or augurales).—See AUGURES.

Ius auspiciorum. See auspicia.

Ius auxilii. The right of the plebeian tribunes to assist a plebeian wronged by an official act of a patrician magistrate.—See tribuni plebis.

Ius (iura) belli. The rules which governed the con­duct of war. They were observed by the Romans from the moment of the formal declaration of war.— See BELLUM INDICERE.

Ius caduca vindicandi. See caduca, caducorum VINDICATIO.

Ius calcis coquendae. A praedial servitude of lime­burning on another’s land.

Ius capiendi. The right to take under a will.—See CAPAX, CADUCA, LEGES CADUCARIAE.

Ius certum. Phrases like certi iuris est or certo iure utimur are used in juristic writings and imperial con­stitutions to indicate that the opinion of the jurist or the imperial decision is beyond question because it is based on a certain, doubtless legal rule. In the language of the imperial chancery, particularly in Justinian’s time several analogous expressions occur as certissimi, ex.plorati, evidentissimi, indubitati, mani- jcsti, manijestissimi iuris est (or in the nominative ius est).

lus civile. With regard to the sources from which the ius civile derives, a definition given by Papinian says “ius civile is the law which emanates from statutes {leges), plebiscites, decrees of the senate (senatus- consulta), enactments of the emperor and from the authority of the jurists” (D. 1.1.7). Ant. ius prae- torium (honorarium). Etymologically ius civile de­notes the law of a given civitas or of the citizens; with reference to Rome it is the ius civile proprium Romanorum. Syn. in earlief times ius quiritium. To the republican jurists, ius civile was the law among the cives, applied in their mutual relations, therefore the private law. The earliest treatises on ius civile, entitled Libri iuris civilis or Commentarii iuris civilis (or de iure civili), therefore deal al­most exclusively with the private law. In a nar­rower sense, the interpretation of the law by the men learned in law is called proprium ius civile ( = ius civile proper). One of the most renowned textbooks on the ius civile was the libri iuris civilis by the jurist Sabinus. His system was followed by later writers on the ius civile, who called their works “ad Sabinum.”—A counterpart of ius civile is ius hono­rarium (praetorium) on the one hand, the ius gen­tium on the other.—Inst. 1.2.—See the following item.

Weiss, RE 10; Pacchioni, NDI 2 (diritto civile) ; Berger, OCD; E. Ehrlich, Beitrdge zur Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1902; B. Biondi, Prospettive romanistiche, 1933; 40; Lauria, Scritti Ferrini (Pavia, 1946) 595; G. Segre, Inter- ferenze, rawicinamenti e nessi fra diritto civile e pretorio,' ibid. 729; De Francisci, Scritti Ferrini 1 (Univ. Sacro Cuore, Milan, 1947) 192; Gioffredi, SDHI 13-14 (1948) 12; M. Kaser, Das altromische Ius, 1949.,

Ius (iura) civitatis. The law of any state; with regard to Rome, ius proprium civitatis nostrae (iura populi Romani, iura Romanorum).—See ius civile.

Ius codicillorum. The law of codicils. It is consid­ered as a special law (ius singulare).—D. 29.7.—See CODICILLI.

Ius coercendi. See coercitio.

Ius coeundi. The right of assembly granted to asso­ciations (collegia).

P. W. Duff, Personality in R. law, 1938, 94.

Ius cognationis. A relationship based on cognatic ties- (cognatio).

Ius cognoscendi. See cognoscere.

Ius commercii. A privilege granted to Latin colonies to have contractual relations, to trade with Roman citizens on equal terms, and to use the forms of contract available to Roman citizens. By a special act, the ius commercii could be conceded to other categories of foreigners, ro communities, and even to individuals. The technical term for ius commercii is commercium.—See commercium.

Ius commune. The general law common to all, the law which is binding on all peoples or all Roman citizens. Ant. ius singulare, privilegium. Ius com­mune omnium hominum (the law common to the whole of mankind) is opposed to the ius proprium (the law proper) of one nation, for all its citizens (ius civile). See IUS SINGULARE, PRIVILEGIUM

Orestano, AnMac 11 (1937) 24.

Ius compascendi (compascui). See compascere.

Ius conubii. The right to conclude a marriage recog­nized by the law. Originally it was limited to patri­cians, until the passage of the lex canuleia which permitted marriages between patricians and plebeians. Later, the ius conubii was extended to citizens of foreign communities, either generally or by special concession. The ius conubii of the parties was a necessary condition of the validity of the marriage. —See conubium (Bibl.).

Ius (iura) consanguinitatis. The reciprocal rights of persons who have the same father (brothers and sisters).—See consanguinitas.

Ius constitutum. A norm of the existing law without regard to the source from which it originates. Hence, customary law is ius moribus constitutum. Some legal decisions in the sources are proffered iure con­stituto.

Ius controversum. A concept familiar to rhetoricians and not to Roman jurists. It refers to legal norms which were controversial among jurists (ambigitur inter peritissimos, Cic. de orat. 1.57.242). Syn. ius dubium, ambiguum (in later imperial constitutions). Ant. indubitatum ius.

Schwarz, Fschr Schulz 2 (1951) 201.

Ius crediti. The creditor’s right against the debtor.

Ius debiti. A debt. Syn. debitum.

Ius deliberandi. See deliberare.

Ius dicere (reddere, statuere). Refers to the juris­dictional activity of the magistrates, primarily of the praetor.—See iurisdictio.

F. De Martino, Giurisdizione 1937, 56.

Ius distrahendi. The creditor’s right to sell the pledge (fiducia, pignus) if the debtor did not pay the debt due. Originally admitted only when it was agreed upon between debtor and creditor (pactum de distra­hendo pignore), it was later considered to be self­understood unless expressly excluded by agreement (pactum de non distrahendo pignore).—Syn. ius ven­dendi.—D. 20.5; C. 8.27; 28.

Messina-Vitrano, Per la storia del i.d., 1910; Ratti, StUrb 1 (1927) ; De Villa, StSas 10 (1938) ; Bartosek, BIDR 51-52 (1948) 238; A. Burdese, Lex commissoria e ius vendendi, 1949, 131.

Ius divinum (iura divina). Laws created by the gods and governing the relations of men to the gods. Ant. ius humanum (iura humana). A similar, but not identical distinction, is fas—ius.—See fas, res di­vini iuris.

Berger, RE 10, 1212; Orestano, BIDR 46 (1939) 195.

Ius dominii. The right of ownership. The term is rare in the Digest, more frequent in Justinian’s Code. —See DOMINIUM.

Ius domum revocandi. See ius revocandi domum.

Ius dotium. Legal provisions concerning the dowry.— D. 23.3; C. 5.12.—See dos.

Ius ecclesiasticum. (With Justinian.) Church laws. Ad ius ecclesiasticum pertinens = governed by church laws.—See ECCLESIA.

Ius edicendi. The right of the higher magistrates to proclaim edicts {edicta) to the people. The contents of the edicts were manifold, according to the sphere of functions of the magistrate. The ius edicendi was an important element in the development of the law since the edicts dealt primarily with legal and procedural problems and introduced innovations into the existing law.—See edicta, edictum, ius hono­rarium.

Kipp, RE 5, 1940; Louis-Lucas and A. Weiss, DS 2, 457.

Ius emphyteuticum (emphyteuticarium). See em­phyteusis.—C. 4.66.

Cascio, AnPal 22 (1951).

Ius est ars boni et aequi. “Law is the art of finding the good and the equitable.” This unique definition of ius in the legal sources is expressed in the initial text of the Digest (D. 1.1.1 pr.).—See aequitas, bonum et aequum, ius (Bibi.).

Arno, ATor 75 (1939/40) ; Riccobono, Quaderni di Roma 1 (1947) 32; idem, BIDR 53-54 (1948) 5 and AnPal 20 (1949) Biondi, Scr Ferrini (Pavia, 1946) 209; v. Liib- tow, ZSS 66 (1948) 578; P. Koschaker, Europa und das rom. Recht, 1947, 334; A. Carcaterra, Justitia nelle fonti, Bari, 1949, 42; Biondi, Ius 1 (1950) 107; F. Schwarz, ArCP 152 (1952) 214.

Ius eundi. See ITER, ACTUS, VIA.

Ius ex scripto (ex non scripto). See IUS SCRIPTUM. Ius exilii (exulandi). The term in literature for the possibility given a person threatened by the death penalty in a criminal trial to avoid the capital sentence by voluntarily leaving Roman territory.—See ex­ilium.

Berger, OCD 353; Arangio-Ruiz, Storia⁶ (1947) 81; Giof- fredi, SDHI 12 (1946) 191; idem, Archivio penale 3 (1947) 428.

Ius experiri. See EXPERIRI.

Ius extraordinarium. A rare term in the juristic sources (once in the Digest in a suspect text, D. 50.16.10, and once in the Code, 7.73,5). It is linked with the cognitio extra ordinem. See IUS NOVUM. The expression ius extra ordinem used sometimes in literature does not occur in juristic sources.

Ius fetiale. The norms concerning primarily the sol­emn forms to be observed by the priests called jetiales in relations between Rome and other states.—See FETIALES.

De Ruggiero, DE 3, 71; C. Phillipson, International Law of Ancient Greece and Rome 2 (1911) 315.

Ius (iura) fisci. The state treasury (fiscus) occupied a privileged situation as creditor, with various advan­tages when acting as claimant in a trial or against an insolvent debtor, when taking a vacant inheritance or seizing private property for one reason or another. The complex of rules which determine the rights of the fisc is the ius fisci (ius fiscale).—“The norms of fiscal law cannot be overthrown by private agree­ments” (D. 2.14.42). Syn. privilegia fisci.—D. 49.14; C. 7.73; 10.1; 5; 9.—See Fiscus, bona vacantia, caduca.

Wieacker, Fschr Koschaker 1 (1937).

Ius fruendi. See USUSFRUCTUS, FRUCTUS.

Ius Flavianum. A collection of forms of civil actions, compiled about 300 b.c. by Gnaeus Flavius, a freed­man, secretary of the jurist Appius Claudius.

Danneberg, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3, 745; Gabrieli, NDI 6 (s.v. Flavio Gneo); Zocco-Rosa, NDI 7; E. Pais, Ricerche sulla storia e sul dir. rom. 1 (1915) 215.

Ius gentilicium. The law concerning the gentiles (members of a gens).—See gens, gentiles.

Bernhoft, ZVR 36 (1918), 99.

Ius gentium. Apart from the meaning, rather rare in the sources, that the ius gentium is the law governing the relations of Rome with other states (see iura belli, legati, foedus, recuperatores, etc.), the term appears frequently in juristic sources in a some­what confused picture. On the one hand, it is linked with ius naturale, or at least with the naturalis ratio which dictates the same law to all peoples. This results from the definition given by Gaius, D. 1.1.9, “what naturalis ratio introduced among all men is observed by all peoples and called ius gentium, as the law applied by all peoples.” Gaius thus gives the term the sense of ius omnium gentium which there­fore is not opposed to the Roman law proper since the Romans are included among all peoples. Gaius’ definition was fully adopted by Justinian in his Insti­tutes (1.2.1) with a confusing introduction which treats ius civile and ius gentium as synonyms. The ius gentium is also linked with ius naturale in other texts, the genuineness of which is rather suspect, how­ever. On the other hand, ius gentium appears in quite another shape as the product of the political and economic growth of the Roman state. Contact with foreign territories in the Mediterranean basin that were gradually conquered, commercial relations with those nations and the necessity of considering their legal customs in Roman courts when transac­tions were concluded in Rome, the jurisdictional activity of the praetor peregrinus, created expressly for the latter purpose and given the power to recog­nize transactions which the Roman ius civile did not recognize—all this promoted the development of a new legal system beside the formalistic ius civile. which was not accessible to peregrines. The for­malism of the ancient law had to be sacrificed in favor of the development of international trade and the peregrines had to be admitted to Roman institu­tions. The admission of the Greek language in the thoroughly Roman stipulatio is one of the most characteristic examples of this development. That the new legal rules and institutions should be ex­tended to transactions concluded between Roman citizens was a natural further step in the develop­ment, leading finally to a fusion of the two systems. It was particularly in the contractual field that the ius gentium exercised its influence, primarily by strengthening the element of reciprocal confidence (fides) without which relations with foreigners were hardly possible. The law of family and succession remained completely untouched. One common basis for all applications of ius gentium in the juristic sources could not be established. The intrusion of Greek philosophical ideas, ius naturale and naturalis ratio, brought in a certain confusion which makes it very difficult to separate what is classical from what is of later origin.—Inst. 1.2.—See ius naturale NATURALIS RATIO, PEREGRINI.

Weiss, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3, 134; Longo, RendLomb 40 (1907) ; Bögli, Beiträge zur lehre vom i.g., 1913; Clark, Illinois Law Rev. 14 (1919-1920) 243; Schönbauer, ZSS 49 (1929) 383; C. A. Maschi, La concezione naturalistica, 1937, 245; Lauria, Fschr Koschaker 1 (1939) 258; Kaser, ZSS 59 (1939) 67; Lewald, Archeion Idiotikon Dikaiou 13 (1946) 55; G. Lombardi, Ricerche in tema di i.g., 1946; idem, Sul concetto di ius gentium, 1947 (Bibi. 3) ; De Martino, AnBari 7-8 (1947) 107; Riccobono, AnPal 20 (1949) 17; Kaser, Das altrömische Ius, 1949, 82; Frezza, NuovaRDCom 2 (1949) 26 (= RIDA 2, 259); Grosso, RI DA 2 (1949) 395; Solazzi, ACIVer 3 (1951) 307.

Ius gestorum. The right of certain higher officials in the Empire (the time of Constantine) to make an official record of declarations of private individuals or of documents presented to them. By this pro­cedure the validity of the acts was officially strength­ened. Cf. IUS ACTA CONFICIENDI.

H. Steinacker, Die antiken Grundlagen der frühmittelalter­lichen PrKvaturkünde, 1927, 76.

Ius gladii. “The power to punish criminal individ­uals” (D. 2.1.3) with all kinds of punishment, the death penalty included. In Rome it was the emperor himself who exercises the right in capital trials. He could delegate it to the supreme officials in the prov­inces (governors, legati) and to the prefects in Rome, at first only in a specific case, later generally.—Syn. potestas gladii.

De Ruggiero, DE 3, 532; H. Pflaum, Essai sur les pro- curateurs equestres, 1950, 117.

Ius habitandi. The right to dwell in another’s house. It may be based on a personal servitude (habitatio) or on a lease contract (locatio conductio rei).

Ius harenae fodiendae. The right (servitude) = to dig sand from another’s sand-pit.

Ius hereditarium. The rights of an heir (heres) as opposed to the rights of a legatee. lure hereditario = by virtue of universal succession as heir.

Ius honorarium. The law introduced by the magis­trates who had the right to promulgate edicts (ius edicendi) in order to support (adiuvare), supple­ment (supplere) or correct (corrigcre) the existing law propter utilitatem publicam (in the interest of the community, D. 1.1.7.1), i.e., by taking into con­sideration the exigencies of the developed legal and economic life. A prominent jurist, Marcian, char­acterized the ius honorarium as the viva vox iuris civilis (= the living expression of the citizen’s law, D. 1.1.8). The ius honorarium which consisted pri­marily of procedural remedies, developed into a legal system parallel to the ius civile in the strict sense (see ius civile). In practice, it gradually prevailed be­cause of its more simplified forms and its accessibility to substantive and procedural innovations demanded by the changing economic and social necessities. Within the framework of the ius honorarium as a whole the ius praetorium is the larger portion by virtue of the edictal and jurisdictional activity of the praetors whereas the contribution of the aediles (ius aedilicium) is more modest. The ius praetorium was a decisive element in the development of the Roman law although it does not appear as a complete legal system covering the whole field of law and although it fluctuated somewhat dependent as it was upon the annual edicts of the praetors. In its final crystal­lization (see edictum perpetuum) the ius honora­rium assumed the shape of a complex of procedural measures which did not change the structure of the original legal institutions but which reformed their protective aspect in a way which sometimes produced essential changes in the existing law.

Cuq, DS 3, 244; Hruza, Zum. rom. Amtsrechte, 1908; Frese, ZSS 43 (1922) 466; Betti, La creazione del diritto nella iurisdictio del pretore, St Chiovenda, 1927, 67; Lauria, Scr Ferrini (Pavia, 1946) 639; G. Segre ibid.; Stein- wenter, Anzeiger Akad. Wien, 1946, no. 19; G. Grosso, Premesse generali al corso di dir. rom., 1946, 82.

Ius honorum. The right of a Roman citizen to stand for office. Generally only free-born were admitted to magisterial offices.

Weiss, RE 10.

Ius humanum (iura humana). A counterpart to ius divinum. It is created by men and it is protected by sanctions imposed by men. Its field is the gover­nance of relations between man and man. The dis­tinction between ius humanum and ius divinum ap­pears in the definition of marriage (see nuptiae) and in the division of things into res divini et humani iuris.

Berger, RE 10, 1212, 1238.

Ius imaginum. The privilege of a noble Roman family to have the portrait masks (imagines) of the an­cestors of the family carried at the funeral of a deceased family member. Usually the masks were exhibited in a shrine in the atrium.

Schneider-Meyer, RE 9, 1097; Courbeaud, DS 3, 412; Bruck, Sem 7 (1949 ) 39.

Ius imperandi. See imperium. The term is used with regard to the father’s (or master’s) right to give orders to his son (or slave).

lus in agro vectigali. The right of a lessee of an ager vectigalis. The lease of such a plot of land belonging to a public corporate body (municipium, colonia} is the classical precedent of emphyteusis. See AGER VECTIGALIS.

Cascio, AnPal 22 (1951) 27.

lus in re (aliena). A right in the property owned by someone else, such as servitude, pledge, emphyteusis, superficies. Such rights impose restrictions on the exercise of the rights of ownership by the owner. The classical jurists do not use as technical either the term ius in re in the meaning of ownership (dominium) or the term ius in re aliena (familiar in the literature) in the meaning explained above.

Arangio-Ruiz, AG 81 (1908) 361, 82 (1909) 417; Viley, RIDA 2 (1949) 417.

Ius (iura) ingenuitatis (ingenui). The political rights of a freeborn, such as ius suffragai, ius hono­rum.

Ius iniquum. See aequitas.

Ius intercedendi. See intercessio, tribuni plebis.

Ius Italicum. The privileges granted non-Italian pro­vincial cities and communities by the emperor (from the time of Augustus) through a special law (lex data) by which they acquired the legal status of Italian cities as developed in the last century of the Republic. The ius Italicum comprised various rights both of public and private character, such as self- government, exemption from the supervision by the governor of the province, land ownership ex iure Quiritium, to which mere Roman institutions (man­cipatio, usucapio) were applicable.

V. Premerstein, RE 10; Jullian, DS 3; Luzzatto, RIDA 5 (=MĂ©l De Risscher 4, 1950) 79; Vittinghoff, ZSS 68 (1951) 465.

Ius (potestas) iubendi. See iubere.

Ius lapidis eximendi. See lapis.

Ius Latii. Rights. connected with the legal position of colonies founded by the Romans as Latin colonies, and with the legal status of the citizens of such col­onies. The ius Latii could be granted individually to foreigners (peregrini) the legal situation of a Latin having been more advantageous than that of other peregrines ; it was, of course, less favorable than that of a Roman citizen.—See latini.

Steinwenter, RE 10; A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 1939, 30, 103 ; Vitucci, DE 4, 442 ; F. Vitting­hoff, R'óm. Kolonisation und Biirgerrechtspolitik (Abh. Akad. IViss. Mains 1951, no. 14) 43.

Ius legationis (legatorum). The rules governing the position of, and the relations with; the ambassadors of foreign countries. The ius legationis is “sacred (sacrum, sanctum) with all nations” (Cornelius Nepos, Pelop. 5.1; cf. D. 50.7.18).—See legati.— Ius legationis is also the privilege granted to sub­jugated cities to send embassies to Rome.

G. Lombardi, Il concetto di ius gentium, 1947, 105.

Ius liberorum. Parents of several children enjoyed certain privileges, first introduced by the Augustan legislation (lex iulia et papia poppaea). Fathers

might claim exemption (excusatio) from public charges and from guardianship to which they were called by law (tutela legitima). The most important application of ius liberorum concerned women. A freeborn woman with three children and a freed­woman with four children (ius trium vel quattuor liberorum) were freed from guardianship to which women were subject (tutela mulierum) and had a right of succession to the inheritance of their chil­dren. The women’s ius liberorum was applied even when the children were no longer alive.—C. 5.66; 8.58. See SENATUSCONSULTUM TERTULLIANUM.

Steinwenter, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3 (s.v. liberorum ius) ; Turchi, Atene e Roma 17 (1941) 333; Arangio-Ruiz, FIR 3 (1943) 71.

Ius mariti. Mentioned specifically in connection with adultery when the accusation of the wife is made by the husband iure mariti.—See adulterium.

De Dominicis, SDH I 16 (1950) 1.

Ius militate. Military law, applied to soldiers both in the field of criminal offences and military discipline, as well as with regard to some institutions of the private law (testament).—See militia, milites, TESTAMENTUM MILITIS.

Ius militiae. See militia.

Ius mixtum. A law originating from both a statute and a custom.

Ius mortuum inferendi. See ius sepulcri, inter­dictum DE MORTUO INFERENDO, RES RELIGIOSAE.

Ius multae dicendae. See multa.

Ius naturale (ius naturae, iura naturalia). Natural law (laws). Unknown to Republican jurists, the ius naturale is not considered by those of the Prin- cipate a juristic conception denoting a special sphere of law, a particular category of law, or a system of legal norms. Nor do the occasional “definitions” of the ius naturale, found in the sources, give the picture of a certain uniformity of the conception, although the influence of Greek philosophy is evident. Strik­ing by its peculiarity is the explanation of the term given by Ulpian: “that which nature taught all ani­mals” (D. 1.1.1.4), followed by examples such as union of male and female, procreation and rearing of the young. The saying has no juristic content at all, and did not get any by the repetition in Justinian’s Institutes (1.2 pr.). Quite different is the definition by Paul: “what always (at all circumstances) is just and right (quod semper est bonum et aequum)” (D. 1.1.11 pr.), but here the notion df an ideal law is expressed rather than what is the ius naturale within a legal system. The connection with aequitas is apparent also in several texts which speak of naturalis aequitas. Elsewhere, the ius naturale is identified with ius gentium as the law which all nations observe. Both ius gentium and ius naturale are linked with naturalis ratio (natural reason); nevertheless on another occasion, with reference to slavery, ius naturale is opposed to ius gentium inas­much as naturali iure all men are born free, and it was the ius gentium which introduced slavery (iure gentium servitus invasit, D. 1.1.4 = Inst. 1.5. pr.). Although those definitions may be considered of classi­cal and not of Byzantine origin (as has often been assumed in recent literature), no one of them was elaborated as a doctrine by the Roman jurists, whose practical sense was centered more on the positive law, its interpretation, and applicability or extension to the actual necessities of life. The mark “iure naturali” attached to a legal institution or a decision by a jurist means “by the natural order of things, by the reality of life,” without any legal background. Combining an earlier idea with Christian doctrines, Justinian found a new formulation of natur alia iura: “they are those which are equally observed by all nations, and are somehow established by divine providence; they re­main firm and unchangeable for ever” (Inst. 1.2.11). This Justinian doctrine produced in literature the tendency to ascribe many, if not all, sayings involving ins naturale or the related locutions, as naturalis aeqiiitas, naturalis ratio, etc., to Justinian’s compilers. As a matter of fact, in a few passages retouched by the compilers naturalis ratio was substituted by ius naturale. A great majority of the pertinent texts may be considered to be of classical origin, as recent, comprehensive studies on all the expressions men­tioned have shown.—Inst. 1.2.—See aequitas natu­ralis, IUS, RATIO, IUS GENTIUM, NATURALIS LEX.

Cuq, DS 3, 736; Longo, RendLomb 40 (1907); Goudy, Trichotomy in Roman Law, 1910; F. Senn, De la justice et du droit, 1927, 76; Arno, Atti Modena 10 (1926) 127;

E. E. Hoelscher, Vom römischen zum christlichen Natur­recht, 1931; Kamphuisen, RHD 11 (1932) 389; Albertario, Studi 5 (1937) 277; C. A. Maschi, La concezione natura­listica del diritto e degli istituti giuridici romani (Milan, Pubbl. Univ. Sacro Cuore, 1937); Orestano, Riv. intern, di filosofia di diritto 21 (1941) 21; G. Grosso, Problem! generali del diritto, 1948, 98; De Martino, AnBari 7-8 (1947) 107; L. Wenger, Naturrecht und das röm. R., Wissenschaft und Weltbild 1 (1948) ; E. Levy, Natural law in the Roman period (Univ, of Notre Dame Natural Law Institute Proceedings 2, 1949 ) 43 (reprinted in SDH1 15, 1949) ; H. Mitteis, Über das Naturrecht, 1948; Wenger, Ius 2 (1951) 1; Bartosek, St Albertario 2 (estr. 1950) 492; R. Voggensperger, Der Begriff des i.n. im röm. R. (Basel, 1952) ; Gaudemet, ADO-RIDA 1 (1952) 445.

Ius non scriptum (sine scripto). See ius scriptum, CONSUETUDO.

Ius novum. A term which is more frequently used in the recent Romanistic literature than in the sources. Gaius uses it once in the meaning of the law which originates in senatusconsulta and imperial constitu­tions as opposite to the law of the Twelve Tables. In the literature ius novum is referred to the imperial law arising from imperial legislation and jurisdiction and the practice of the cognitio extra ordinem. The latter meaning is that of the term ius extraordinarium which occurs only once in a text not free from sus­picion (D. 50.16.10). In Justinian’s language ius novum is applied with regard to the emperor’s own innovations.—See ius extraordinarium.

Riccobono, ACSR 2 (1929) 235; idem, Archiv für Rechts­und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 16 (1922/3) 520; idem, Mèi Cornil 2 (1926) 235; Chiazzese, AnPal 16 (1931) 31; G. Grosso, Problemi generali, 1948, 76; S. Riccobono, Jr., Il Circolo giuridico 20 (Palermo, 1949) 162.

Ius offerendae pecuniae. The right of a hypothecary creditor to offer the prior pledgee the sum due to him by the common debtor. Thus the later creditor gained the priority in the hypothecary degree which belonged to the pledgee whom he paid out.

Ius ordinarium. The normal law applied in regular proceedings. lure ordinario = in the way of normal proceedings (ordo iudiciorum) as opposed to the cognitio extra ordinem.—See ius extraordinarium.

Ius originis. See ORIGO.

Itis paenitendi (poenitendi). A term used in litera­ture, but unknown in legal sources.—See paeni- TENTIA.

Ius Papirianum. See papirius.

Ius pascendi. The right (servitude) to pasture cattle on another’s property.

Ius patris. The right of the father of the family. It is mentioned when the paternal power of the father over his children enters into account. A specific use of the term appears in connection with the father’s right to accuse his daughter of adultery iure patris. See IUS VITAE NECISQUE, ADULTERIUM, IUS MARITI.

Iu$ (iura) patronatus (patroni). The rights of a patron over the person and the inheritance of his freedman.—D. 37.14; C. 6.4.—See libertus, patro­natus, OPERAE LIBERTI, OBSEQUIUM.

Ius perpetuum. A right analogous to ius emphyteuti­carium, based on an irrevocable grant of agricultural land (belonging to imperial domains) to individuals for a rent (canon). It is alienable.—Cf. emphyteu­sis, IUS IN AGRO VECTIGALI.

E. Bassanelli, La colonia perpetua, 1933 ; Levy, West Roman vulgar law, 1951, 43.

Ius pignoris. See PIGNUS.

Ius piscandi. The right to fish in the sea, harbors and public rivers. It is free to all.

Ius pontificium. The laws governing the life and activity of the pontiffs of which they are both creators and guardians. Monographs were written on ius pontificium by Fabius Pictor and Fabius Maximus Servilianus. In their activity the pontiffs dealt often with questions of the ius civile. Therefore it was said : “No one can be a good pontiff without knowl­edge of the ius civile’’ (Cic. de leg. 2.19.47).—See PONTIFICES.

Berger, RE 10; Stella-Maranca, AnBari 1927.

Ius populi. The interest of the people.—See actiones POPULARES.

Ius possessionis. Occurs in a few texts in which it denotes either the right to take possession of an­other’s thing or the rights connected with the exercise of possession.

Vassalli, AnPer 28 (1914) 40; Solazzi, BIDR 49-50 (1947) 367.

Ius postliminii. See postliminium.

lus praetorium. “The law which the praetors intro­duced in order to support, to supplement or to amend the ius civile" (D. 1.1.7.1). Its development inten­sified after the reform of the civil procedure initiated by the lex aebutia.—See ius honorarium.

Riccobono, Fttsione del ius civile c praetorium, Archiv fur Rcchts- und Wirtschaftsphilos. 16 (1922/3) 503; Frese, ZSS 43 (1923).

Ius privatum. The law which governs the relations among individuals and primarily concerns the benefit of private persons. Ant. ius publicum.—See utili­TAS PRIVATA.

Leonhard, RE 3; Cuq, DS 3, 732; E. Ehrlich, Bcitrage zur Thcoric dor Rcchtsqucllen, 1902. For recent bibl. sec ius publicum.

Ius prohibendi. The right to prevent another from doing something. Its particular significance appears among co-owners or between neighbors when a prae- dial servitude entitles a person to prohibit a certain action on the neighbor’s land.—See actio prohibi­tory, COMMUNIO, IUS AEDIFICANDI. A group of interdicts serve for the protection of ius prohibendi in various situations; see interdicta prohibitoria, OPERIS NOVI NUNTIATIO.

Pacchioni, Riv. dir. commerciale 10 (1912) ; P. Bonfante, Scritti giuridici 3 (1926) 382.

Ius publice respondendi. See ius respondendi.

Ius publicum. The law which is concerned with the existence, organization (status) and functioning of the state. Ant. ius privatum which was concerned with the interest of private individuals. What is in the interest of the state or the people {publice utilia) belongs to field of ius publicum. The law dealing with sacred things (sacra), priests, and magistrates (government, administration) is ius publicum. The distinction between ius publicum and ius privatum, originating under the influence of Greek philosophy, is based on the juxtaposition of the state and the individual. Sometimes the law dealing with relations between private persons are attributed to ius publi­cum, when a general or social interest concurs with a private one (marriage, guardianship). The public law thus conceived in a larger sense “cannot be changed by agreements concluded between private individuals” (D. 2.14.38; 50.17.45.1). The law which emanates from legislative organs of the state, mainly from statutes passed by the people (populus) is also named ius publicum from which senatusconsulta and imperial constitutions are not excluded.—See ius PRIVATUM.

Leonhard, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3, 732; E. Ehrlich, Beitr'dge zur Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1902; Stella-Maranca, Le due positiones dello studium iuris, Studi Barillari, AnBari 1936; S. Romano, Scr Santi Romano 4 (1940) 159; Coli, Parallelismo del dir. pubblico e private, SDHI 4 (1938) ; Lombardi, Il concetto di i.p. in Cicerone, RendLomb 72 (1938/9) 465; G. Nocera, Ius publicum (D.2.14.38), Roma, 1946; De Francisci, Scr Ferrini 1 (Milan, 1947) 211; G. Grosso, Problemi generali, 1948, 84; Gioffredi, SDHI 13-14 (1948) 87; idem, St Solazzi, 1948, 461; Berger, lura 1 (1950) 102; Kaser, SDHI 17 (1951) 267.

Ius Quiritium. The ancient national law of the Ro­mans, a rigorous formalistic law of a primitive rural community. The term is used in the classical period as a contrast to the modernized law originating from other sources (ius praetorium, ius gentium).—For ex iure Quiritium, see ex fide bona, dominium ex IURE QUIRITIUM.

Weiss, RE 10; Moschella, NDI 7; C. L. Kooiman, Frag­menta iuris Quiritium, 1914 (Amsterdam) ; De Visscher, Fschr Schulz 2 (1951) 71; A. Guarino, L’ordinamento giur. rom. 1 (1949) 82; idem, lura 1 (1950) 265.

Ius reddere. See ius dicere.

Ius respondendi (ius publice respondendi). The right granted by the emperor (from the time of Augustus) to prominent jurists to give answers (re­sponsa) in juristic questions “on the personal au­thority of the emperor” (ex auctoritate principis). The Augustan reform produced the distinction be­tween licensed (authorized) and not licensed jurists since many jurists continued the republican usage to give responsa without being authorized by the em­peror. The imperial permission was a personal distinction; the jurists, thus authorized did not ac­quire any official character nor were their responsa legally binding on the magistrates or judges who had asked for them.—See responsa prudentium, auc­TORITAS PRINCIPIS.

Berger, RE 10, 1166; De Visscher, 15 (1936) 615 (=Nou- velles Etudes, 1949, 296); Siber, ZSS 61 (1911) 397; Mas­sei, Scr Ferrini (Pavia, 1946) 32; F. Schulz, History of R. Legal Science, 1946, 112; Kunkel, ZSS 66 (1946) 422; Guarino, RIDA 2 (1949 ) 401; idem, AnCat 4 (1949-1950) 209; Magdelain, RHD 28 (1950) 1, 157; Daube, ZSS 67 (1950) 511; Schonbauer, Anzeiger Akad. Wiss. Wien 87 (1950) 94; W. Kunkel, Herkunft und soziale Stellung der rom. Juristen, 1952, 281.

Ius retentionis. See RETENTIO.

Ius revocandi domum. A defendant who is not domi­ciled in Rome, when sued in Rome during his tem­porary sojourn, has the right to ask the praetor that his case may be sent to the court of his domicile (revocare domum).

Kipp, RE 7, 58.

Ius sacrum. Strictly connected with ius divinum and ius pontificium. It embraces the legal principles and institutions which are connected with the rela­tions of men to gods, with questions of cult, sacri­fices, temples, consecration, graves, and sacerdotal functions, whenever they may occur. The jurists Servius Sulpicius and Trebatius wrote on the subject of the ius sacrum. In oldest times the ius sacrum exercised a considerable influence on private law, the knowledge of legal rules and their interpretation and applicability having been a monopoly of the priests.— See PONTIFICES, VOTUM, COMMENTARII SACERDOTUM.

Berger, RE 10; Maroi, Elementi religiosi nel dir. rom. AG 109 (1933) 89; P. Noailles, Du droit sacre au droit civil (Cours) 1949; M. Kaser, Das altrom. I its, 1949, 78.306.

lus (iura) sanguinis. The rights of blood (blood ties = cognatio). They “cannot be destroyed by any civil law (nullo iure civili, D. 50.17.8).”

Ius scriptum. The written law, i.e., the law embodied in written form at its origin. It consists of statutes (leges'), plebiscita, senatusconsulta, enactments of the emperors, edicts of the magistrates (edicta). Ant. ius non scriptum (sine scripto), “the law which usage (usus) has approved” (Inst. 1.2.9). The distinction which follows Greek concepts is based on the external form through which the legal rules are manifested. The interpretatio prudentium was considered ius non scriptum, but in Justinian’s Institutes (1.2.3) the responsa of the jurists are listed among other forms of ius scriptum.

Leonhard, RE 10; Manenti, StSen 22 (1906) 209; Stein­wenter, St Bonfante 2 (1926) 421; Scherillo, RcndLomb 64 (1931) 1271; Schiller, Virginia Law Rev. 24 (1938) 270; Blatt, CIMed 5 (1942) 137.

Ius sententiae dicendae in senatu. See senatus.

M. S. De Dominicis, Il i.s.d. nel Senato, 1932.

Ius sepulcri. The right to bury a dead person in a grave (sepulcrum). The owner of a land may be buried therein unless he ordered otherwise in his last will. A sepulcrum was familiare, when it was designated by its owner in his testament as a grave for himself and the members of his family (house­hold) ; it was hereditarium when it was destined only for the testator and his heirs (heredes).—See sepul­crum, RES RELIGIOSAE.

E. Albertario, Studi 2 (1941) 81; Biondi, lura 1 (1950) 160; Dull, Fschr Schulz 1 (1951) 203.

Ius sine scripto. See IUS NON SCRIPTUM, IUS SCRIP­TUM.

Ius singulare. A special law issued to the advantage of a certain class of persons (e.g., soldiers, minors) or of an individual. Ant. ius commune (ius com­mune civium Romanorum) which indistinctly con­cerns all Roman citizens.—See privilegium.

Orestano, AnMac 11 (1937) 39, 12-13 (1939) 89; Guarino, ANap 1939-40, 65; R. Ambrosino, J.s., 1940; Guarino, Annuario del dir. comparato 18 (1946).

Ius soli. The legal situation of a piece of land. What is built on the soil (superficies, aedificium) sequitur ius soli, i.e., is in the same legal situation, as the land itself with all its charges (liens, servitudes).

Ius sollemne. Syn. ius civile. It is opposed to ius praetorium.

Ius statuere. See ius dicere.

Ius stillicidii (stillicidium avertendi, or non aver­tendi). Praedial servitudes connected with the water dripping from the roof.—See stillicidium.

Ius strictum. The rigid, stiff law. The term is not a technical creation of the classical jurisprudence. By a characteristic example Gaius (4.11) tries to ex­plain how rigid was the law of the Twelve Tables. Nor is technical the meaning of the locution “stricto iure” ( = strictly according to the law) which is used to stress the contrast with exceptional legal remedies, not deriving from the positive law but granted in specific cases by the praetor (exceptio) or the em­peror. Seemingly a technical significance is attached to the term in the juxtaposition actiones bonae fidei and actiones stricti iuris, which occurs only once in Justinian’s Institutes (4.6.28) and soon afterwards is substituted by iudicia stricta. The denomination actiones stricti iuris is apparently of Byzantine coin­age since it is not to be found in juristic writings (in the Digest occurs another term: actio stricti iudi- cii, D. 12.3.5.4). Possibly it goes back to an earlier conception which started from the distinction that some actions were bonae fidei and others were not; therefore the judge had to pass his judgment strictly according to the law without making use of the liber­ties he had ex fide bona or ex aequo et bono. Thus the ius strictum is conceived as a counterpart of ius aequum.—See aequitas.

Manigk, RE 10; Pringsheim, ZSS 42 (1921) 653.

Ius suffragii. The right to vote in the assemblies of the people. It was one of the most important political rights of the Roman citizens and of thos£ to whom it was exceptionally granted.—See municipium, civi­tates SINE SUFFRAGIO.

Rosenberg, RE 10.

Ius testandi. (Syn. ius testamenti faciendi.) See TESTAMENTI FACTIO.

Ius testamenti faciendi. See testamenti factio.

Ius tigni immittendi. See servitus tigni immit­tendi.

Ius tollendi. A person who possesses or holds a thing belonging to another, particularly an immovable, and makes some improvements thereon has, under certain conditions, the right to take them away (tollere) pro­vided that the object suffers no damage by such an operation. Thus a husband has the ius tollendi with regard to his expenses made on objects constituted as a dowry, a tenant in a rented house with regard to the expenses spent on improvements. According to the classical law a possessor in bad faith (possessor malae fidei) had no right to avail himself of the ius tollendi. Justinian extended the applicability of the ius tollendi.—See IMPENSAE, IMPENSAE UTILES, IM­PENSAE VOLUPTARIAE, TIGNUM IUNCTUM.

Pampaloni, RISG 49 (1911) 239; Riccobono, AnPal 3-4 (1917) 445; ibid. 20 (1949) 71.

Ius utendi. See usus, ususfructus.

Ius variandi. If parties had agreed in a contract that either the debtor (which was more frequent) or the creditor has the right to choose (electio) between two or more things which the debtor had to pay, the choice once made could be changed by the creditor as long as he did not claim judicially one of the things due, and by the debtor as long as he did not fulfill one of the alternative obligations. The ius variandi was also applicable in legacies and other testamentary dispositions when a right of selection was left to the beneficiary.—See legatum optionis.

Grosso, StSas 17 (1938) 161; idem, RDCom 38, 1 (1940) 224; Biondi, Successione testamentaria, 1943, 440; Sciascia, Ser Ferrini 2 (Univ. Sacro Cuore, Milan, 1947) 255.

Ius vectigalis. The right to collect the rents due from the lessees of public land.—See vectigal.

Ius vendendi. For the right to sell a pledge, see ius distrahendi ; for the right of the pater familias to sell his son, see patria potestas.

Ius vetus. See IUS ANTIQUUM, VETUS IUS.

Ius vitae necisque. The power of life and death.

Since the earliest times the head of a family had this right over persons under his paternal power (children and wife) and over his slaves. His right to punish them comprised also the death penalty. Before im­posing a severe penalty the pater familias had to consult the council of relatives (consilium propin­quorum) but its advice was not obligatory. An abuse of his rights was punished by infamy through a deci­sion of the censors (nota censoria). Imperial legis­lation restricted considerably the ius vitae necisque until its complete abolishment by Valentinian I.

Albanese, Scr Ferrini 3 (Milan, 1948) 343; Volterra, RISG 85 (1948) 139.

lusiurandum. An oath. There were two kinds of oaths, one during a judicial trial (iusiurandum in iure, iusiurandum necessarium, iusiurandum in litem), the other sworn extra judicially upon agreement of the parties engaged in a dispute (iusiurandum volun­tarium). The promissory oath of a freedman was of a specific character. Syn. iuramentum.—See iurata PROMISSIO LIBERTI, genius, periurium, vadimonium IUREIURANDO, SACRAMENTUM, CONDICIO IURISIU- RANDI, SENATUSCONSULTUM DE ADVOCATIONE, ABIU- ratio, and the following items.

Steinwenter, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3; Sacchi, NDI 7; M. Chevrier, Du serment promissoire en dr. rom., These Dijon, 1921; E. Seidl, Der Eid im rom. Provinzialrecht, 1933.

Iusiurandum calumniae. An oath demanded by the defendant from the plaintiff to the effect that he does not sue for mere chicanery (non calumniae causa agere) or by the plaintiff from the defendant that he does not deny the plaintiff’s claim for a similar purpose. In Justinian’s law both parties and their advocates had to take the iusiurandum calumniae.— C. 2.58.—See calumnia.

Hitzig, RE 3, 1420.

lusiurandum in iure. See iusiurandum necessa­rium.

lusiurandum in litem. An oath taken by the plaintiff upon order of the judge (apud iudicem) and concern­ing the value of the object claimed. The judge may, however, condemn the defendant to an amount minor than assessed by the plaintiff’s oath.—D. 12.3; C. 5.53.—See TAXATIO.

Solazzi, AG 65 (1900) ; Marchi, Il giuramento in litem, St Scialoja 1 (1905) ; L. Chiazzese, lusiurandum in litem, 1937.

lusiurandum iudiciale. An oath taken by one of the parties to a trial in the proceedings before the judge. It was only a means of evidence the value of which depended upon the estimation of the judge.—D. 12.2.

B. Biondi, Il giuramento decisorio nel processo civile rom., 1913, 76.

Iusiurandum liberti. See iurata promissio liberti. lusiurandum magistratuum. See iurare in leges. lusiurandum minoris. An oath taken by a minor in order to confirm an obligation he assumed without the assistance of his curator. It produced the loss of the right to request a restitutio in integrum for the minor. —See MINORES.

lusiurandum necessarium. (Syn. iusiurandum in iure.) Only in a few specific instances, when the debt was a fixed sum (certa pecunia) could the plaintiff tender the defendant an oath (def err e) to the effect that he denies the debt. The debtor was obliged to swear, because in the case of refusal he was exposed to an immediate execution on his property. He had, however, the right to retender (referre) the oath to the plaintiff which, too, was compulsory, since the plaintiff lost his claim if he refused. This oath pro­cedure took place in iure before the magistrate and led to a quick end of the trial either in favor of the party who swore or against the party who declined to take the oath.—D. 12.2; C. 4.1.

B. Biondi, Il giuramento decisorio nel processo civile ro- mano, 1913; Debray, NRHD 32 (1908) ; see iusiurandum (Bibl.) ; V. Joachimovici, Le i.n. a I’epoque classique, These Paris, 1912.

Iusiurandum voluntarium. An extrajudicial oath. It is opposed to the iuramentum necessarium since it is voluntary and is based on an agreement of the parties engaged in a controversy. “An oath contains a kind of a transaction and has a greater authority than a judgment” (D. 12.2.2). When the claimant swore to uphold his claim, he had a praetorian action (actio ex iureiurando or iureiurandi) against the debtor. When the debtor denied his debt under oath, he might oppose an exceptio iurisiurandi when sued by the creditor. The attribute “voluntarium” is a creation of Justinian.—D. 12.2.

lussio. A postclassical term, syn. with iussum. lussio sacra. An order of the emperor.

lussu. By order or authorization. Ant. iniussu.—See IUSSUM, IUBERE.

Iussum. (In public law.) An order given by a magistrate within the limits of his power to issue an order (ius iubendi). In private law = generally any act covered by the expression iubere, such as an order or authorization given by a father (or master) to a son under his power (or his slave) to conclude a transaction, to commit a licit or illicit act. All that has been accomplished iussu patris or domini is con­sidered accomplished by themselves and on their own liability. Persons entering a contractual relation with a son or slave who negotiates with the authorization (iussu) of his father or master, have a praetorian action, called actio quod iussu (“whatever by order”), which lies directly against the father or master, “be­cause the contract is concluded in a certain measure with the person who gives the authorization” (qui iubet, D. 15.4.1 pr.). A similar effect is connected with the subsequent ratification (ratum habere, rati­habitio) by a father or master.—D. 15.4; C. 4.26.— See IUBERE.

Steinwentcr, RE 10; Humbert and Lecrivain, DS 10 (s.v. quod iussu)', Accame, DE 4; Del Prete, NDI 7; G. Ci­cogna, lussus, 1906; Lemosse, RHD 27 (1949) 171.

lussum caveri. The order of the praetor in the in-iure stage of civil proceedings addressed to a party to give a CAUT1O.—See CAUTUM IUBERE.

lussum iudicandi. See iudicare iubere.

lusta causa. A just ground (cause). It is stressed as a requirement for some legal acts (adoption, manu­mission) or for the exemption from guardianship and public charges (munera). lusta causa is particularly important in connection with possessio, traditio and usucapio.—See possessio, traditio, usucapio, re­PUDIUM.

Collinet, Mel Fournier, 1929; J. Faure, Justa causa et bonne foi, These Lausanne, 1936; J. G. Fuchs, lusta causa traditionis, Basel, 1952.

lustae nuptiae. See nuptiae.

Iusti dies. See dies iusti.

Iusti liberi. Legitimate children born in a valid mar­riage (iusiae nuptiae).

lustiniani Institutiones. See institutions iusti- NIANI.

lustiniani novi. A name introduced by Justinian for students in the first year of law schools. Simul«- taneously the nick-name dupondii was prohibited. Kiibler, RE 1A, 404; Steinwenter, RE 10, 1309.

lustitia. Justice. A Roman definition of iustitia (D. 10.1.1) says: “it is a constant and perpetual desire to render every one his due.” The sentence appears on the very beginning of Justinian’s Institutes.—See Inst. 1.1; D. 1.1.—See ius, ius naturale, aequitas.

F. Senn, De la justice et du droit, 1927; Donatuti, AnPer 33 (1921) ; Sokolowski, Der G ere chtigkeitsbe griff, St Bonfante 1 (1930); v. Liibtow, ZSS 66 (1948) 460; A. Carcaterra, L nelle fonti e nella storia del dir. rom., Bari, 1949.

lustitium. The suspension of the judicial activity of the courts ordered by the highest magistrates with the approval of the senate because of an exceptionally critical situation of the state, such as a sudden menace of a war, violent riots (twmultus) or a grave national disaster.’ No statutes could be passed during iusti- tium. Therefore three plebiscites voted on proposal of a tribune Sulpicius (88 b.c.) during iustitium were annulled by the consuls.—See senatusconsultum ultimum.

Kleinfeller, RE 10; Cuq, DS 3, 779 and 2, 1407; De Rug­giero, DE 4; Berger, RE Suppl. 7, 413, no. 3; Lengle, RE 6A, 2484; Thomsen, CIMed 6 (1944).

lustum matrimonium. Syn. iustae nuptiae; see nup­tiae.

lustum sacramentum. See iniustum sacramentum. Justus. (Adv. iuste.) Conformable to the law (for instance, a judgment), justified, excusable (Justus metus, error, iusta excusatio).—Sec iusta causa, NUPTIAE, IUSTI LIBERT, DOMINIUM IUSTUM, IUSTUM PRETIUM.

Donatuti, AnPer 33 (1921) 377; Albertario, Studi 3 (1936) 404.

Justus titulus. See USUCAPIO.

Juvenes. Organizations of youths (over fourteen) of senatorial and equestrian families for educational purposes and training in sports. Widespread in the Empire they were later recognized as collegia.

De Ruggiero and Lo Bianco, DE 4; Ziebarth, RE 10, Suppl. 7, 315; Balsdon, OCD; Mohler, TAmPhilolAs 68 (1937) 442; H. I. Marrou, Histoire de reducation dans I* anti quite, 1949, 398.

Juvenis. A young man. The term has no technical meaning; it refers to both impuberes (under four­teen) and minors (under twenty-five), more fre­quently to minors in an advanced age. Syn. adu­lescens.

Berger, RE. 15, 1862; Albertario, RendLonib 54 (1921) 303 (= Studi 1, 1933, 51-3) ; Axelson, Mel Marouseau, 1948, 7.