<<
>>

DEATH OF THE LOCATOR

There are two legal texts in which the effect of the death of the locator prior to the end of the term of lease is discussed.[277] The first text (D 19.2.24.5) is by Paul, a jurist who flourished during the early years of the third century AD.[278] A piece of property had been rented out for a number of years.

During the course of the term of lease, the locator died. In his will he instructed his heir to discharge the tenant from rent payment. The reason for this request is not given. Should the heir refuse to provide the tenant with enjoyment of the leased property for the remainder of his term of lease, Paul held that he could be sued by the tenant ex conducto. This is a clear indication that the incumbent heir was tasked with the obligations arising from the lease. If he refused the instructions in the will to remit a portion of rent, on the other hand, but permitted the tenant enjoyment of the leased property for the remainder of the term of lease, he could be sued ex testamento. Paul's opinion on the matter is consistent with the legal position explained thus far. Death of the locator did not terminate the rights and duties arising from the lease. They were transferred to his heir who had to honour them or face lawsuits by the conductor.

The second text (D 19.2.9.1) is a variation on the theme by Paul's contem­porary, the third-century jurist Ulpian, who is quoting a jurist from the second century AD, Ulpius Marcellus.[279] Marcellus asked whether the heir of a usufructuary, who had let out the use and enjoyment of a piece of land and died before the end of the term of lease, was liable to provide the conductor with use and enjoyment. The jurist's response to this question is consistent with the nature of usufruct as a personal servitude. Since a personal servitude terminated with the death of the usufructuary, his heir had no legal obligation to provide the conductor with use and enjoyment of the object of lease for the remainder of the term of lease.

In this case the rights and duties arising from the lease were not connected to questions of ownership of the object of lease. The deceased locator (a usufructuary) was entitled to lease out the object by virtue of his right to enjoy the fruits of the object over which the usufruct was held. That right was personal and attached to the holder of the personal servitude. It therefore terminated upon the death of the holder of the usufruct and the rights and duties generated by the lease could not be transferred by the law of succession to the heir of the usufructuary.

These two texts demonstrate the consequences of the death of the locator on the rights and duties arising from the lease. If the locator were the owner of the leased object, his heirs were burdened by the rights and duties arising from the lease for the remainder of the term of lease. If these were not observed, they could be held liable by the tenant ex conducto. If the locator were not the owner of the object of lease, however, and merely rented it out by virtue of a lesser real right such as a servitude, for example, the death of the locator terminated the rights and duties arising from the lease owing to the nature of the lesser real right (a personal servitude).

It remains to be considered whether other “substitutions” of the locator during the course of the term of lease was permitted in Roman law. There is one analogous situation involving a change of the locator before the expiry of the conductor’s term of lease mentioned in the sources. It involves the sale of the object of lease before the end of the tenant's term of lease. Again, it could be argued that the two situations are too dissimilar to warrant comparison.

Death of the locator is an unforeseeable event that triggers the rules of testate or intestate succession, while the sale of the object of lease is a volun­tary commercial transaction created by the owner/locator’s conscious desire to sell a certain object. However, both scenarios essentially refer to a change in the locator during the course of the conductors term of lease.

The sale of the object of lease before the end of a term of lease is nowhere more clearly discussed than in the context of lease of tenement buildings.[280] While some of these were undoubtedly managed by slaves, the Roman legal sources indicate that many owners preferred to let out the entire tenement building to a single conductor (middleman) who sublet the individual spaces for profit.[281] It is in this context that the sale of the tenement before the end of the primary conductor’s term of lease has expired is discussed.

When a tenement was sold during a term of lease, tenants seemingly had little protection against their eviction by the new owner. Despite the urban tenant's apparent lack of security of tenure, Kaser argued that a seller in such circumstances would generally have obtained a guarantee (in the form of a special pactum) from the purchaser that he would allow the tenants to remain on the leased property for the duration of the term of the lease.[282] It would have been in the best interest of the seller to obtain such a guarantee, since failure to do so would enable the existing tenants, upon eviction by the new owner, to sue him in terms of the contract of lease for breach of his obligation uti frui praestare. The seller would in turn be able to sue the purchaser on the contract of sale (or the guarantee) if he broke his promise and decided to evict the tenants. One point not explicitly resolved in the legal texts is the effect of the transfer of ownership of the object of lease upon the existing contract of lease. The Romanist view is that the sale of the tenement effec­tively terminated any existing contract of lease. Zimmermann observes:

It is not the contract of sale that had any detrimental effect on the relationship between the lessor/vendor and his tenant. It is only on account of the subsequent transfer of possession and of ownership that the lessor/vendor makes it impos­sible for himself to carry out his obligation under the contract of lease (namely to provide uti frui praestare licere), and that he exposes the tenant to the risk of being expelled by the purchaser....

The contract of lease was, of course, not “broken” by either sale, transfer of ownership or any other transaction. It continued to exist and did, in fact, provide the tenant with his only remedy, the actio conducti against the lessor.[283]

It does not take much to see that this would have produced a highly cumber­some situation in practice. The lease between the tenant and the previous owner of the tenement (the original lessor) continued regardless of the sale of the object of lease, but presumably the rent now had to be paid to the new owner. The tenant was only protected against eviction in a roundabout way. It would have been far less burdensome for the purchaser to assume the role of the locator and to maintain the existing contract of lease with the primary tenant, especially where an insula was bought as an economic investment. However, this is not supported by the legal texts, nor does it seem to have been possible given the analysis of texts provided in this chapter. Once again, the Roman position seems to have been that an involuntary “substitution” of the locator on account of death did not have any effect upon the rights and duties arising from the lease. A voluntary “substitution”, on the other hand, was impossible. The sale of the object of lease to a third party did not entitle him to take over the existing lease. The incumbent owner had to wait until the term of lease had expired before being able to enter into a new one with the existing tenant.

E.

<< | >>
Source: Cairns J.W., Plessis P.J. du. (eds.). Beyond Dogmatics: Law and Society in the Roman World. Edinburgh University Press,2007. - 236 p.. 2007

More on the topic DEATH OF THE LOCATOR:

  1. DEATH OF THE CONDUCTOR
  2. Humanitas and punishment: the death sentence
  3. Death at the games
  4. DEATH, ECONOMICS AND SUCCESSIO
  5. The law of succession addresses the legal destiny of a person’s rights and duties after his death.
  6. CHAPTER XXVIII. EFFECT ON QUESTIONS OF STATUS, OF LAPSE OF TIME, DEATH, JUDICIAL DECISION.
  7. Locatio-Conductio (Hire)
  8. Universalism: the demerits
  9. Locatio Conductio
  10. Intestate Succession Under the Law of the Twelve Tables