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Citizens and non-citizens

We now turn to a consideration of the legal position of free persons. They can be divided into two broad categories—citizens and non-citizens (see Taylor, 'Social Status, Legal Status and Legal Privilege’, in OHRLS 349-61).

4.4.1 Roman citizenship

(Inst.Gai.1.11., Inst.1.4.)

4.4.1.1 Basic rights and duties

The Roman male citizen of full legal capacity had a number of rights by virtue of his status. The chief constitutional rights were the right to appeal against a death sentence, to vote in the assemblies, and to stand for public office. Women had the right of appeal but could not vote or stand for public office. Of greater interest to us were the citizen's private law rights—commercium, testamenti factio, and conubium. As a general rule, these rights were possessed by both men and women, although there were some important limitations in the case of the latter (see 4.4.2.2).

(a) Commercium This was the right (of overriding importance) to participate in the processes and transactions of the ius civile, including the right to make formal contracts and conveyances, and to seek legal remedies in the courts. Essentially, it was the bundle of private law rights to which a citizen was generally entitled other than testamenti factio and conubium.

(b) Testamenti factio This was the right to participate in the making of a valid will, whether as testator or witness, and the capacity to be made a beneficiary. It can be viewed as an adjunct of commercium but was often treated as a separate right, and one of considerable importance (given the significance of will-making in Roman society).

(c) Conubium This was the right to enter a civil law marriage. Since such a mar­riage potentially created potestas, i.e. the legal power of a paterfamilias over his chil­dren, it can be appreciated that conubium was regarded as a most important right.

Citizenship carried with it some duties. Military service in the legions was compul­sory at certain times in Rome’s history. Since citizens fought in the legions—considered the elite troops—whereas non-citizens made up the auxiliary forces, service with the legions was viewed by some as a privilege rather than as a duty. When the Roman army or the emperor was on the move, it was the duty of citizens of the relevant area to pro­vide appropriate accommodation and sustenance, a potentially onerous burden. Some cities preferred to pay large sums to avoid the army being quartered on them for the winter. Moreover, citizens were responsible for the upkeep of roads in their communi­ties and for the provision of transport animals for the State's postal service. Also, they owed a duty to act as guardians, judges, and jurors, when requested to do so, and were specifically subjected to the payment of certain taxes, notably the very unpopular 5 per cent inheritance tax introduced by Augustus. Although some of these duties were bur­densome, the legal position of a Roman citizen, compared with that of a non-citizen, was generally advantageous. It helps to explain why citizenship was generally prized so highly, and even fought over at times.

4.4.1.2 Becoming a citizen

How was citizenship acquired? Citizenship was based predominantly on a principle of personality rather than territoriality, status depending on birth (the status of the parents) or some kind of grant. See Crook, Law and Life of Rome, 38 ff., cf. Inst. Gai.l.26.-35.

(a) Birth The basic ius gentium rule applied under which the child normally took the status of the mother (see 4.3.3.4). Thus, a child was born a Roman citizen if its mother had been a citizen at the time of its birth. However, this rule did not apply in the case of a Roman civil law marriage (iustum matrimonium)·, the child took the status that its father had at the time of the child's conception. As such marriages were generally confined to citizens, any resulting children were normally born as citizens.

But it was possible for non-citizens to be parties to a iustum matrimonium if they had conubium, in which case the child would not be born a citizen if the father had been a non-citizen when the child was conceived.

The operation of these rules could create anomalies. Suppose that a female citi­zen, married to a non-citizen without conubium, gave birth to a child. The ius gen­tium rule applied since the marriage was not a iustum matrimonium. Consequently, the child was a citizen—it took its mother's status. Had the father had conubium, the other facts being identical, the child would not have been a citizen because it would have taken the father's status. To end this absurdity, a lex Minicia (passed probably in the late Republic) provided that if a female citizen married a non­citizen without conubium, the child did not acquire citizenship.

(b) Manumission As we have seen, formal manumission conferred citizenship; so did informal manumission under Justinian.

(c) Grant Citizenship was granted by the State in various circumstances— e.g. to individuals as a reward for special services to Rome, to veterans on their retirement from the auxiliary forces of the army, and to magistrates and town councillors from non-citizen communities. Occasionally, a whole community or people received a grant of citizenship. This occurred with some frequency in the early Empire, with the result that the citizen body expanded greatly. The most important grant of all was the constitutio Antoniniana AD 212, the decree which extended citizenship to all the peoples of the Roman Empire. It applied to all free people other than dediticii. However, it did not abolish the different categories of non-citizens for the future, i.e. it applied only to existing persons. The enactment appears to have been a magnanimous gesture, but was probably prompted by the need to increase revenue through taxation: the more citizens there were, the greater the tax revenues. Also, it is likely that the decree was intended to foster a greater bond between the inhabitants of the Empire at a time when its borders were beginning to be seriously threatened.

4.4.1.3 Proof of citizenship

This was a considerable problem at certain times in Roman history. The posses­sion of three names (e.g. Marcus Tullius Cicero) was regarded as a distinctive, if not invariable, characteristic of the Roman citizen. However, the clearest proof was provided by the census, which supposedly contained a list of all citizens. The political upheavals of the late Republic, and the increasing tendency to make block grants of citizenship to communities, resulted in the census becoming less reli­able. Consequently, in the lex Aelia Sentia Augustus introduced a system of birth registration for citizens. And a register was established to record citizens created by individual grant.

4.4.2 Categories of citizens

A wide disparity in legal status was possible within the citizen body because of the privileges or disabilities that were applicable to particular groups of citizens or individuals. For example, special privileges (mainly in the realm of public rather than private law) were granted to the senatorial and equestrian orders in the early Empire, such as eligibility for posts in imperial administration. However, it was dis­abilities that most affected status, and to which we must now turn.

4.4.2.1 Persons alieni iuris

The most important classification of citizens was into those who were sui iuris and those who were alieni iuris. The former were 'of their own law', i.e. legally independ­ent: they were not in the potestas of a paterfamilias. But alieni iuris persons were subject to potestas—they were 'of another's law'. The distinction was fundamental in Roman family law, and will be considered in detail in Chapter 5.

4.4.2.2 Women

Papinian, Questions, book 31: There are many points in our law in which the condition of females is inferior to that of males. (D.l.5.9.)

Disarming honesty from Papinian—and, yet, the position of women in Roman law and society was favourable compared with other ancient societies (some modern ones too).

For example, Roman wives achieved a degree of legal emancipation that would have been the envy of married women in many European legal systems prior to the late-nineteenth century (For a good recent account, see Cantarella, E., 'Women and Patriarchy in Roman Law', in OHRLS, 419-31). Still, comparisons aside, Papinian was right—the Roman woman was legally disadvantaged in many ways compared to her male counterpart, owing to her lack of potestas, see Gardner, Roman Citizen, 85-108. She lacked, for example, certain constitutional rights, such as the right to hold office and to vote in the assemblies. As regards private law rights, women suffered various disabilities. The sui iuris woman of full age was required to have a guardian; the man was not. She could not act as a guardian; the man could. There were restrictions on her testamenti factio and if she entered a manus marriage (see 5.2.3.1) she was unable to own property, as a general rule, or to make contracts. The full extent of the Roman woman's legal disabilities will become evident in later chapters (see generally, Gardner, Women in Roman Law), cf. Inst.Gai. 1.108-10, as well as the texts collected in Frier and McGinn, Casebook, 450-70. For a good survey of the sources, see also Evans Grubbs, J., Women and the Law in the Roman Empire.

4.4.2.3 Freedmen

(Inst.Gai.1.12., Inst.1.5., D.38.1.-3., C.6.7., and 10.58.)

Another basic classification of citizens was into the freeborn (ingenui) and the freed (libertini), i.e. those who had been freed from slavery. Freedmen (the term comprises freedwomen) and their issue were subjected to a number of legal disabili­ties, both in public and private law. They could not stand for the Senate or for public office, and were unable, in early law, to marry freeborn citizens. Augustus ended the ban on such marriages but prohibited freedmen from marrying members of the senatorial order. As regards private law, although freedmen were released from slav­ery by manumission, they did not become totally independent of their patron (the ex-master).

The relationship between patron (or patroness) and freedman was one of the most interesting and arcane areas of Roman civil law. It will be considered first; then the question of how freedmen could change their status.

(a) Patron and freedman A freedman owed certain duties to the patron:

(i) Services (operae) Provided that the manumission had been voluntary, the freedman had to perform services for his master (see Gardner and Wiedemann, Roman Household, 152-8). In a sense, these services constituted part of the 'price' of manumission. Which services could be claimed? First, they must have been agreed at the time of the manumission:

Modestinus, Rules, book 1: Where no services have been imposed, a slave who has been manu­mitted cannot be compelled to perform services which he has not promised, even if he has performed them of his own free will at some time or another. (D.38.1.31.)

The services had to be specified with sufficient certainty. Often, the agreement would specify how many days of work were involved in the performance of the services. Only reasonable services could be compelled, whatever the agreement:

Callistratus, Monitory Edict, book 3: Only those services are understood to have been imposed that can be performed without endangering reputation or life. For if a prostitute has been manumitted, she should not perform the same services for her patron, although she still earns her living by prostitution; nor should a gladiator offer such services after manumission, because they cannot be performed without endangering life. (D.38.1.38pr.)

Services that were illegal, immoral, or impossible would not be regarded as reason­able; nor could the freedman be compelled to do anything that was detrimental to his status. The services had to be appropriate to the abilities of the freedman and his circumstances.

Performance of services would normally be free and could benefit the patron's friends:

Julian, Minicius, book 1: If a freedman practices the profession of a ballet dancer, it is true that he should provide his services free, not only for his patron himself but also for the latter's friends' entertainments; just as it is true that a freedman too who practices medicine will attend, if his patron wishes it, the latter's friends without payment. For the patron, in order to use his freedman's services, is not obliged to be forever giving entertainment or being ill. (D.38.1.27.)

Unless otherwise specified, the freedman had to perform the services at the patron's home; however, the time spent on the journey normally counted as part of the service, i.e. the patron 'lost' the travelling time. The patron had to feed the freedman when the latter was performing services, or give him the opportunity to obtain food. Services were not compellable if the freedman was ill; or if he had either two children (of any age) or one child aged at least five years; or if he had opted to pay a money settlement in place of the services. Further, a patron lost his right to the services of a freedwoman if she attained the age of fifty; or if he married her, or if she lived with him as his concubine (see 5.2.6.2).

(a) Gifts (munera) The freedman would be expected to make gifts to the patron or his family on certain specified occasions, e.g. the marriage of the patron's chil­dren. (Freedmen were expected to contribute to the dowry.) Such gifts were com­pellable only if they had been agreed at the time of manumission.

(b) Respect (obsequium) The relationship between patron and freedman was broadly comparable to that of parent and child. Indeed, Title 15 of Book 37 of the Digest is entitled 'The obedience to be offered to parents and patrons'. The freed­man normally took the patron's name and owed a duty to behave respectfully to the patron and to his immediate family. So he could not instigate criminal proceedings against the patron or be a witness in such case. Nor could he bring any civil action that involved discredit to the patron: other actions required a magistrate's consent. If the freedman was sued by the patron, no defence could be pleaded which discredited the latter. The freedman had to give financial assis­tance, as far as he reasonably could, if his patron fell on bad times. And compet­ing in business could be considered disrespectful if such trade harmed the patron (comparable with modern restraint of trade cases):

Scaevola, Replies, book 2: Can the freedman of a clothing merchant engage in the same business in the same community and the same area without the permission of his patron? [Scaevola] has given it as his opinion that there is no rule to prevent him, if his patron will not suffer as a result. (D.38.1.45.)

Serious breach of the duty of the freedman to show respect could exceptionally result in his re-enslavement for ingratitude (see 4.3.3.2).

(c) Property (bona) Under the Twelve Tables the patron had a right to succeed to a freedman's estate if the latter died intestate and without leaving heirs. Later, the patron was able to take half of his freedman's property left by will (see Inst. Gai.3.41.); but Justinian allowed this only if the freedman was not survived by children. This was the basic position as regards the inheritance of freedmen's prop­erty. There was much complex detail in this area of the law, which lies outside the confines of this book.

The patron, too, had certain duties. For example, he had to show his freedman some respect; he could not treat him as a slave. Thus, the freedman could not be compelled to live in the patron's household, although many did so of their own accord. And if the freedman was in need, the patron had to offer him assistance, otherwise he could lose his rights as patron.

(d) Change of status It became possible in the early Empire for the status of the freedman (but probably not the freedwoman) to be changed to that of a freeborn citizen through the following devices:

(e) Restitutio natalium ('the restoration of birthrights') The Emperor could declare the freedman to be henceforth a freeborn citizen, the patron's consent normally being required since the patron-freedman relationship would be terminated:

Marcian, Institutes, book 1:... this man is treated in regard to his entire legal status as if he had been born free, nor can his patron enter on the succession. For this very reason the Emperors are generally reluctant to restore anyone to his birthrights without the patron's consent. (D.40.11.2.)

'Restore anyone to his birthrights' implies that the declaration could be made only in respect of freedmen who had actually been freeborn. However, restitutio nata­lium was often granted on a fictional basis, i.e. even though the freedman had not been freeborn.

(f) lus annuli aurei (' the grant of a gold ring') This was a mark of equestrian status, given by the emperor to a freedman to make the latter freeborn, thus enabling him to stand for public office. Unlike the case of restitutio natalium, the grant did not terminate the relationship between freedman and patron: the latter retained rights of inheritance (but could not insist on services). Justinian gave all freedmen the ius annuli aurei, their relationship with the patron being unaffected unless he expressly waived them. The practical effect of this grant was that the legal and practical disabilities associated with freedmen status disappeared.

Freedmen constituted a crucial part of Roman society and took an important role in Rome's economic development. Many freedmen possessed the sort of tal­ents that were essential to Rome's economic well-being and prosperity. By the end of the Republic, they constituted a sizeable part of the citizen body, and found themselves much envied and disliked by various classes in Roman society, espe­cially by the senatorial class (who tended to view freedmen as nouveaux riches'). See Crook in Law and Life of Rome, who describes freedmen as ‘the nearest thing Rome ever had to a middle class' (50). See also Gardner, Roman Citizen, 7-51.

4.4.2.4 Bondsmen

In some situations, a person, though theoretically free, was subjected to civil bond­age (mancipium), a semi-servile status in which his rights as a free man were in effect suspended. This occurred, for example, in the formal process required in emanci­pation (see 5.1.2.4), when the state of bondage was only very temporary. A more permanent form of bondage resulted when a paterfamilias sold a child into slavery within the city of Rome or gave up a child (who had committed a delict) through noxal surrender (see further 5.1.2.1). Although the bondsman remained free, his legal position was similar in some respects to that of slavery as regards his relation­ship with the person into whose power he had been transferred. For example, any property acquired by the bondsman during civil bondage belonged to his 'master'. But the latter did not have the power of life and death over the bondsman, and had to treat him with the respect owed to a free man. Sale of children into civil bondage became obsolete by the classical period, but noxal surrender of sons survived until Justinian, cf. Inst.Gai.1.138.-41.

4.4.2.5 Infames

These were citizens who were subjected to various legal disabilities on account of their disreputable conduct—they were in legal disgrace (jnfamiaf The concept of infamia had its beginnings in the activities of the censors, who, in drawing up the census, could mark the name of a citizen involved in misconduct. The praetors, too, contributed to the development of infamia, through their edicts and control of civil litigation. They could blacklist persons for undesirable activities and thus prevent them from acting as advocates or as a procurator in litigation, or from being repre­sented (see 3.3.2.5). And they could decree that condemnation in certain actions carried with it infamia. Although the censorial system faded in the early Empire, praetorian infamia, embellished occasionally by legislation, remained an impor­tant feature of Roman civil law. Indeed, the category of infames was to be found in Justinian's law—it was never abolished, cf. C.10.59.

What sort of conduct incurred infamia? Consider the following selection of dis­reputable activities:

Julian, Edict, book I: The praetor's words are: 'The following incur infamia: one who has been discharged from the army in disgrace... one who has appeared on the stage to act or recite; one who has kept a brothel; one who in criminal proceedings has been judged guilty of vexatious litigation or collusion in anything; one who has been condemned in his own name for theft, robbery with violence, insult, fraud, trickery or compromised in such a case....' (D.3.2.1.)

This list is far from exhaustive, but gives some insight into the variety of con­duct considered to be sufficiently disreputable to incur infamia. The low regard in which acting was held is evident from the text. However, appearing on stage did not result in infamia, it seems, unless it was done for reward. Infamia could t>e imposed for breach of certain contracts, particularly those involving trust or good faith, e.g. partnership or deposit. And infamia resulted where a person simultaneously entered into agreements for betrothal or marriage with different persons, or was in breach of the rules concerning the mourning of deceased hus­bands, e.g. anyone who married a widow before the end of the customary period of mourning (the widow, too, was liable). But it was different if it was the wife who had died:

Paul, Edict, book 5: Husbands do not have to mourn for their wives. (D.3.2.9.)

What were the consequences of infamia? Social disgrace was certainly involved, and legal disabilities: e.g. infames could not hold offices or positions of honour, could not vote (at least in early law), or bring criminal accusations, or appear as advocates, or act as representatives (or be represented) in litigation, as we have seen. And infames would often be intestabiles as well (see 4.4.2.6). The true impact of infamia as a legal penalty can only be fully understood in the context of Roman society where commerce and social progression was based on family and status connections. These ties were effectively severed when a person was branded infamous, which is why infamy is often described as social (and for that matter also economic) 'death'. See Greenidge, A. H. J., Infamia: Its Place in Roman Public and Private Law (1894), and more recently Gardner, Roman Citizen, 110-54, on the nature of infamia as a legal measure. A good survey can also be found in Knapp, R., 'Legally Marginalised Groups - The Empire', in OHRLS, 362-73.

4.4.2.6 Intestabiles

Under the Twelve Tables, persons who were involved in discreditable conduct could not act as witnesses, either in litigation or in formal transactions (such as the mak­ing of wills or the conveyance of property). Moreover, it is probable that intestabiles could not make wills or formal conveyances, although the rule was not beyond doubt. According to Gaius:

Gaius, Provincial Edict, book 22: When a person is declared by a statute to be intestabilis, the effect is that he is not acceptable as a witness and furthermore, in the view of some, that wit­nesses cannot act for him either. (D.28.1.26.)

But, Ulpian was less tentative, although it is not clear whether he was stating a gen­eral rule or simply the position as regards defamatory conduct:

Ulpian, Sabinus, book 1: If someone has been found guilty of writing defamatory verses, it is expressly laid down by senatus consultum that he be intestabilis, and, therefore, he will be able neither to make a will nor to be used as a witness to a will. (D.28.1.18.1.)

There was a close correlation between intestabiles and infames—persons subject to infamia were usually classed as intestabiles as well. But, it was possible to be one without the other.

4.4.2.7 Humiliores

In the early Empire a distinction developed, compounded later by Caracalla's grant of citizenship in AD 212, between persons of low social status (humiliores') and those from the 'respectable' upper classes (honestiores), the latter consisting chiefly of the senatorial and equestrian orders. The distinction was predominantly of importance in terms of social status, but there were some legal consequences, especially con­cerning the criminal process. The honestiores were exempt from certain types of punishment reserved for the humiliores—1flogging, condemnation to the mines, casting to the beasts, and crucifixion, for example.

4 4.2.8 Colani Adscriptii

This was a class of agricultural serfs that arose during the Empire. Originally, coloni were undifferentiated from ordinary citizens; but in the late Empire, their status suffered and became the subject of considerable legislation, which made their posi­tion in relation to their landlord very onerous, similar to medieval villeinage. They were tied to the land: they committed an offence if they left without their landlord's consent, and could be reclaimed by him. Nor could they sell or assign their interest without his consent. Suing the landlord was not possible apart from exceptional cases. On the other hand, the landlord could not dispossess coloni from their land; nor could he raise the rent, which normally consisted of part of the agricultural produce resulting from the tenant's labour.

4.4.3 Non-citizens

There were two main classes of free persons who were not citizens: Latins and per­egrines, i.e. foreigners. Within that classification there were further subdivisions.

4.4.3.1 Latins

(a) Latini prisci (the 'ancient' Latins) These were the inhabitants in the early Republic of communities neighbouring Rome and allied with her in the Latin League (see 1.2.2.1). They had most of the important rights of Roman citizenship, including commercium, conubium, testament! [actio, and the right to vote in the Roman assemblies. The status disappeared following the dissolution of the Latin League in 338 BC, after which Latini prisci were given full citizenship.

(b) Colonial Latins They were the inhabitants of the colonies that had been established at strategic points in Italy (and beyond) during the centuries of Roman expansion. These colonies possessed Latin rights whereby they enjoyed a degree of legal independence and self-government. The status disappeared in Italy fol­lowing the general grant of citizenship after the Social War. However, colonies continued to be founded abroad in the early Empire. The status of colonial Latin therefore continued to be granted until Caracalla's grant of citizenship in AD 212, see Fear, A. T., 'Cives Latini, Servi Publici and the Lex Irnitana' (1990) 37 RIDA 3, 149-66.

The status of colonial Latins was inferior to that of the Latini prisci, but still worth having. They had commercium and could vote in the assemblies; but they lacked conubium, had a restricted testament! [actio, and could not hold public office in Rome. However, special opportunities were created for them to become full citizens: local magistrates and town councillors (decuriones) were given citizenship, mainly to encourage persons to stand for these potentially onerous offices.

(c) [union Latins This status was specially created by the lex Junia (Norbana) for informally manumitted slaves and survived until its abolition by Justinian (see Inst.Gai.1.22.). Junian Latinity could occur in various ways—informal manumis­sion under the lex Junta; defective formal manumission, e.g. if a slave aged under thirty was manumitted in breach of the lex Aelia Sentia (see 4.3.5.6); reward from the State; or abandonment of a sick or aged slave. The list is not exhaustive—new ways of creating Junian Latinity continued to be found in the later Empire.

What was the legal position of a Junian Latin? He could marry, but his mar­riage could not be a Roman civil law marriage as he lacked conubium (apart from exceptional cases). Junian Latins had commercium, but only a very limited testamenti factio, restricted to the capacity to witness wills. They could not make wills or ben­efit under them except under a trust. They owed the usual duties that were owed by freedmen towards their patrons. And, when a Junian Latin died, he was some­what perversely regarded as dying as a slave, with the result that all his property reverted to his patron or the patron's heirs, even if the Junian Latin was survived by his own children—a harsh rule, indeed, and one that encouraged Justinian to abolish the status.

A number of methods of acquiring citizenship were made available to Junian Latins. The chief ones were:

(i) Iteratio (‘repetition’) If a defective manumission had occurred, the Junian Latin could acquire citizenship by repetition of the manumission procedure with­out defect.

(ii) Anniculi probatio pproofofa one-year-old') Under the lex Aelia Sentia, a Junian Latin who had been incorrectly freed from slavery, while under thirty years of age, could acquire citizenship by proving to a magistrate that, inter alia, he had married a citizen or a Latin (colonial or Junian) before seven witnesses and that a child, born of the marriage, had attained one year of age. The Junian Latin acquired citi­zenship not only for himself but also for his wife (if not a citizen) and the child. If the husband died before making use of the process, the widow was given the right to use it to acquire citizenship for herself and the child. In AD 72 anniculi probatio was made available to all Junian Latins.

(iii) Erroris causae probatio (‘proof of a mistaken ground’) This occurred where a party was seeking anniculi probatio (see (b), but was mistaken as to the status of their spouse, i.e. the latter proved to be a foreigner, and not a citizen, or Latin. On proof of the error, citizenship would be granted provided the other conditions of anniculi probatio were satisfied. The application could fail if the error had been due to gross negligence. There were other forms of erroris causae probatio (see 5.2.2.3). The provision of such procedures (and their apparently frequent use) to rectify mistakes as to status was symptomatic of a society that, in its developed form, was highly stratified, racially very mixed, and dynamic in the manner whereby status could rapidly change.

Apart from these procedures, Junian Latins could acquire citizenship through a variety of specific enactments (applying to colonial Latins too) that were aimed as inducements to perform valuable services for the State. For example, the lex Viseilia AD 25 gave citizenship to those who had spent six years as vigiles ('watch­men'). Their main duty was to fight fires—a dangerous occupation in Rome at the best of times, but particularly in the reign of Nero. See Robinson, O. F., Ancient Rome: City Planning and Administration, 2nd edn. (1994), 106 ff. Moreover, citizen­ship was offered by Nero to any Latin who built a house in Rome, spending a specified minimum amount of money on its construction. The building of sub­stantial houses was encouraged to fill the void created by the great fire of AD 64 in Nero's reign.

4.4.3.2 Peregrin) (foreigners)

Peregrines were free persons who were neither citizens nor Latins, but subject to a municipal law of their own. They lacked the rights, both in public and private law, that went with Roman citizenship; but commercium or conubium (or both) were occasionally granted to such communities or individuals as a reward for meritorious service to Rome. Nevertheless, the vast majority of peregrines were without such rights. This meant that they were outside the ins civile but were not totally excluded from the Roman legal system because the rules of the ius gentium (see 4.3.1) applied to them. For example, peregrines were able to acquire ownership over property through the ius gentium modes of acquisition (see generally 7.2). They were able to take part in Roman commercial life since some of the important contracts were of the ius gentium, and thus open to all. Indeed, the influence of foreigners was of fundamental importance in the evolution of the Roman law of contract in the later Republic. As regards legal procedure, foreigners came to be integrated into the legal system through the peregrine praetor and the development of the formulary sys­tem. Virtually all peregrines living within the Empire became citizens on the grant of citizenship in AD 212.

And, for a good recent account of the complexities surrounding the application of Roman law in the provinces, see Richardson, J., 'Roman Law in the Provinces', in Cambridge Companion, 45-58; as well as Humfress, C., 'Law's Empire: Roman Universalism and Legal Practice', in New Frontiers, 73-101.

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FURTHER READING

The literature on Roman slavery is immense, see Watson, A., 'Morality, Slavery and the Jurists in the Later Roman Republic’ (1968) 42 Tulane L. R., 289-303 on the moral attitude of the later Republican jurists to slavery.

On the interaction between slaves and citizens in the workforce, see Garnsey, P. (ed.) (1980), Non-Slave Labour in the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge: Philological Society (Suppl. vol. 6), chs. 6-9.

On manumission, see Wiedemann, T., ‘The Regularity of Manumission at Rome’ (1985) 35 CQ, 162-75, where the author investigates whether Roman slaves could almost always count on being freed during the course of their lives. See furthermore, Watson, A., 'Slavery and the Development of Roman Private Law' (1987) 29 BIDR, 105-8, on peculium and manumission.

On freedmen, see Treggiari, S. (1969), Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Weaver, P. R. C. (1972), Familia Caesaris—A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedmen and Slaves, New York: Cambridge University Press. See also Garnsey, P., 'Independent Freedmen and the Economy of Roman Italy under the I’rincipate' (1981) 63 Kilo, 359-71, where the author examines the phenomenon of the successful freedman in the context of the economy and society of Italy in the period of the Principate. Gardner, J. F., 'The Adoption of Roman Freedmen' (1989) 43 Phoenix, 236-57, explores the extent of this practice as well as its social and political implications. Weaver, P. R. C., 'Children of Freedmen (and Freedwomen)', in Marriage, Divorce and Children, 166-90, demonstrates the problems arising from the legal status of children of former slaves. See also recently Mouritsen, H. (2011), The Freedman in the Roman World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On patronage and friendship, see the texts collected in Gardner and Wiedemann (1991), Roman Household, 166-83.

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Source: Du Plessis Paul J. Borkowski's. Textbook on Roman Law. Oxford University Press,2020. — 440 p.. 2020

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