This chapter begins developing the negative claim made by the book—that the HRA does not enable the legislature to assert its understanding of rights more freely than judicial supremacy under the Indian Constitution.
In fact, political practice shows that it is similarly burdensome to respond to declarations of incompatibility in the UK as it is to respond to the striking down of legislation in India.
In the Indian context, constitutional amendments of two kinds (which I refer to as 'fundamental rights amendments' and 'Ninth Schedule amendments') have been invoked by Parliament to respond to judgments striking down primary legislation. In the UK, Parliament has some room for manoeuÂvre when responding to declarations of incompatibility, and even though no such declaration has yet been rejected outright, such a rejection canÂnot be ruled out. The following section examines political responses1 to judicial strike-downs in India, while the subsequent one will focus on declarations of incompatibility and political responses under the HRA.