The resident planter

The image of the “absentee” plantation owner commonly associated with other sugar colonies such as the West Indies does not apply in the case of Mauritius, where the majority of planters were locals of French descent, and the number of British settlers remained negligible.

These numbers were explicitly stated not to include the British troops sta­tioned at Mauritius at the time, which research indicates numbered their highest in 1813 with 4,210, and then slowly decreased over the years, being at their lowest in 1825 with 1,131, only to increase again over the following decade to

Table 4.5 White population, 1812-1822⁹⁴

reach another, albeit lower, peak in 1833 (the year the Abolition of Slavery Act was passed), with 2,228.^[461]

A count in 1825, see Table 4.6, indicates that the white population remained fairly constant.

The 19th-century planter class in the Americas has been described as having enjoyed a lifestyle similar to European nobility, a result of the power they held over the lives of slaves as well as the extensive political influence accrued by vir­tue of their wealth.^[462] From historical accounts it appears that the French plant­ers in Mauritius benefitted from a similar setting,^[463] and through intermarriage were well-connected to important figures in public life. It was the existence of this locally bred, resident group of planters which accounts for a different dynamic between the colony and the metropolitan government than witnessed in other sugar colonies. As explained in Chapter 2, the French maintained their power through the legal profession, with judges and lawyers acting as guardians to an archaic legal system, which (preserved through the Terms of Capitula­tion) acted as an counterbalance to the lack of direct governmental power. The French oligarchy had demanded an elected assembly, but to its dismay was denied.^[464] Instead, in August 1825 Governor Cole established a “legislative council” with himself as president, and only four other members: the Chief (and Commissary of) Justice, the Chief Secretary to Government, the officer second in command and one further official of the local British establishment.^[465]

Peter Burroughs states that by 1830, since sugar exports amounted to 85 per cent of the colony's income, a dramatic increase from 29 per cent in 1823. Consequentially, falling sugar prices at the turn of the decade lead to “hypersensitivity” among the planters to any imperial interference with slav­ery conditions.^[466] Meanwhile, the substantial growth of the Mauritian sugar industry caused profound concern at the Colonial Department in London. Viscount Goderich’s communication to Governor Colville in 1831 is very revealing, stating that such an expansion had been neither anticipated nor welcomed.

Had such a result been foreseen it may be doubted whether Parliament would have been induced to equalize the duties. But it was alleged at that time upon the highest local authority that the extension of Sugar cultivation in Mauritius under any circumstances could be but very inconsiderable in as much as physical obstacles placed insurmountable limits to it. In reliance probably upon such assurances Parliament passed the bill and I must now advert to the effects as connected with the interests of the Slave Population which have followed from the unexpected impulse which was thus given to the growth of Sugar. It has been very frequently alleged and upon grounds which do not appear to be easily confuted, that the extent to which Sugar is cultivated in the different Sugar Colonies is generally speaking a not inaccu­rate index of the rate of mortality amongst the Slaves. In the Colonies where the soil is most prolific and where Sugar is most abundantly grown it is found by the returns of the Slave Population that the deaths far exceed the births and that the numbers of the Slaves are consequently in a course of rapid diminution, whereas their numbers in the Bahamas where no Sugar is grown are in a course of constant increase. It has been very forcibly represented on this and other grounds, that the labour required for the cultivation of Sugar is much more severe than any other species of labour in which Slaves are employed. It is also well known that where little or no sugar is grown, the value of the Slaves to their owners is trivial.

Goderich went on to state that where slaves are not retained for sugar cultivation, they enjoy a level of independence that allows for an easy transition from slavery to “a state, if not legal at least of practical enfranchisement”. He believed there­fore that the effect of the increase in sugar cultivation to be “adverse to the health and wellbeing of the Slaves”, while at the same time serving “greatly to diminish their prospect of being able to liberate themselves by self purchase”.

A number of important conclusions can be derived from the Viscount’s dis­patch. Firstly, Goderich states emphatically that had the drastic expansion in sugar cultivation been anticipated, Mauritian tariffs would not have been equal­ized to match those of the West Indies. Where he refers to the “highest local authority” at that time who made assurances to the limits of any possible growth, this appears to be an allusion to Governor Cole who held office from 1823 to 1828, and who was incidentally responsible for the unsatisfactory implementa­tion of the amelioration directives, discussed above. Crucially, Goderich links

The abolition of slavery 99 large-scale sugar cultivation directly with poor slavery conditions, evidenced through high mortality, and further, with a decreased likelihood for slaves to achieve self-emancipation.

Thus, in an ironic, unexpected twist, instead of improving the conditions of the colony as a whole by allowing preferential access to the British market alongside the West Indies, the 1825 equalization of sugar tariffs worsened the lot of the Mauritian slaves. It gave planters a strong impetus to further ignore the ban on the slave trade and worked to actually stimulate the illegal import of slaves. It also made the local plantocracy less amenable to amelioration policies from Britain. Already loathing the “foreign” occupation, any interference with their holding of slaves, the possession of which had suddenly become much more valuable and important, would naturally be rejected. Local “discontent” with regard to slave regulations had been reported in 1831, though in the absence of any further instructions from the British administration in Mauritius, was thought to have passed “without bad consequence.”^[468]

Nevertheless, the British imperial government realized action with respect to the situation in Mauritius had to be taken. In 1832, John Jeremie, hav­ing just terminated his position as president of the royal court of St.

Burroughs argues that the unrest in Mauritius, which within the context of the wider British Empire could amount to no more than a “storm in a teacup”, nevertheless acted to precipitate abolition generally, by demonstrating the futility of amelioration efforts and thus forcing the only available alternative: the outright end of slavery.^[473] Whether the events in Mauritius may have had such a profound impact on imperial policy is open to debate. A more definite conclusion is that the French ruling class in its small and remote Indian Ocean possession was a serious concern to the metropolitan government,^[474] a fact which is also reflected in the compensation Franco-Mauritian slave-holders received post abolition.

4.5.1 Compensation

In “The Wealth of Nations”, Adam Smith makes the observation that the condi­tion of slaves is arguably better under an arbitrary government than under a free one, for under the latter, there is less likelihood of interference with private prop­erty.^[475] It is the idea that abolishing slavery was fundamentally an interference with the private property of slave-holders that drove the idea of compensation.

In his work on the issue of post-emancipation compensation, Nicholas Draper sets out that for slave-holders, indemnity was an integral part of the debate when the end of slavery was being considered, whereas several abolitionists sought to keep the question of emancipation separate from any remuneration slave-holders may or may not receive.^[476] Underlying the question of whether compensation ought to have been paid is, as Draper observes, the fraught issue of “property in men”.^[477] This has been briefly touched upon at the beginning of this chapter. A recurrent theme is also the observation that it was not slaves who were being considered for remuneration.^[478] If not as “compensation” for having been kept in slavery, the British taxpayers’ money could have been used, at least, in part, to endow them with the means to begin life outside of bondage. However, the question whether compensation ought or ought not to have been paid is argu­ably a moral one. For present purposes, it shall suffice to observe that the British Parliament did vote to indemnify the slave-holders.^[479] A fund of £20 million was

The abolition of slavery 101 set aside by the government, out of which the planters in Mauritius received approximately £2.1 million^[480] for 68,613 slaves registered.^[481]

Not much information is available on the compensation process in Mauritius. Unfortunately, Draper too excluded Mauritius from his seminal research because of the “different cultural and national backgrounds of the slave-owners”.^[482] Inci­dentally, as set out in Chapter 2, Franco-Mauritians were subjects of the Crown, and it is unlikely that had they been not considered as such, compensation would have been paid. With respect to practical aspects in the process, the history of a British company founded in Mauritius shortly after conquest provides some interesting details.^[483] Augustus Muir notes that the Mauritian planters themselves had valued their slaves at about £4 million, about double what they eventu­ally received. Compensation was paid in debentures,^[484] and James Blyth, who had arrived in Mauritius in 1830 to extend the family business, saw an immense opportunity. Muir observes that “these debentures were payable in Whitehall, and their collection in London on behalf of the Mauritian slave-owners was lucra­tive.” By requesting sufficient funds from his brothers in London, Blyth ensured his company had enough hard currency early on, a foresight which in time placed him ahead of competitors and his firm was able to negotiate a large number of the debentures.^[485]

The French plantation owners in Mauritius were thus included in the bounty the British government decided to extend upon the abolition of slavery. Their generous remuneration was largely the result of the efforts of Adrien d'Epinay, a wealthy planter of the time, who spent two years in London lobbying for the Franco-Mauritian interest.^[486] The success of d’Epinay’s efforts underline that it was their economic standing and not actual political power which presented the true source of their influence in the political sphere.^[487] This evidently held true in London with the metropolitan establishment as much as it did in Mauritius in regard to the local British administration.

Even after abolition, planters still expected slavery to be re-established. In the event, they had to look elsewhere for labour. After the compulsory period of “apprenticeship”, the fully emancipated slave did not return to the plantations even for a wage in Mauritius. The reasons for this are closely connected to the arrival of a new type of worker, who even before the apprenticeship period came to an end, began to take the slave's place on the plantations: the Indian inden­tured labourer.

4.6