The notion of slavery

Slavery has been part of social organization for a very long time, yet a full and clear definition of the concept remains elusive. As indicated previously, slavery is often associated with other types of servitude.

To this end, Herman Nieboer attempted a definition in his seminal work.^[366] For Nieboer, at its most basic, “a slave is one who is not free.” He concedes that “no man is literally free” for as long as he is a participant in society, yet “freemen, at any rate, are relatively free”. Evidently, this exposition is far from satisfactory. To further clarify, Nieboer enumerates three conditions a slave is subjected to. Firstly, slaves are subject to a master's free exercise of power, by virtue of being the latter's “property” or “possession”; secondly, a slave does not hold any political rights, for “socially he is despised”; and thirdly, he per­forms compulsory labour, though Nieboer admits that all compulsory labour is not slavery.

It is submitted that out of Nieboer's three conditions, only one holds per­manence. The third stipulation, compulsory labour, may appear as he himself admits in a variety of settings that are not slavery.

The abolition of slavery 81 in a strictly legal sense.^[367] Within the context of 19th-century plantation labour as discussed here, one attribute is indisputable: the slave is deemed chattel.

It has been stated that globally, all peoples have at one time or another been involved in slavery, either as slaves or owners of them.^[368] Historians commonly trace ancient slavery back to the Greek and Roman eras, both of which knew dif­ferent slave systems.^[369] From a jurisprudential point of view, Roman law is note­worthy for encompassing two opposed notions. On the one hand, it contained the first legal framework which regulated slavery, but on the other, it admitted that the practice was contrary to natural law, since nature postulates the equal­ity of man.^[370] Thus, as per Roman jurist Domitius Ulpian, “the introduction of slavery... lead to the benefit of manumission”, for without slavery, there is no need for liberation.^[371] The possibility of freedom then, however remote, is a nec­essary aspect of the concept of slavery.

Within the context of English law, in 1772 Lord Mansfield famously declared in the Sommersett case the state of slavery to be “so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.”^[372] Contrary to popular perception, the case did not declare slavery as illegal under English law, nor did it effect emancipa­tion. It was a decision decided on its own facts, limited to the issue of removing a slave from Britain against his will.^[373] Nevertheless, it was an important decision, not at least for its public denouncement of slavery at time when the institution supported Britain's imperial endeavour in colonies around the world.

The long-anticipated Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833^[374] however did not bring about unfettered freedom, but took effect by turning slaves over the

age of six into “apprenticed Labourers”.^[375] This delay to full liberation was not solely intended as an advantage to slave-holders but also reflected the attitude of leading abolitionists, who, like famous spokesperson William Wilberforce, favoured a gradual approach and regarded emancipation as a necessarily pro­longed process.^[376]

The Act principally made a two-fold distinction among apprentices: “prae- dials” and “non-praedials”. The former were further distinguished as being either “attached to soil” or not so attached, effectively creating three types of apprentices.^[377] The main difference was that praedials, meaning agricul­tural labourers, would serve a slightly longer apprenticeship period than non-praedials.^[378]3

Importantly, the 1833 Act was not to apply to the entirety of the Brit­ish Empire, effectively abolishing slavery only in the West Indies, the Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius.^[379] Having received Royal Assent on 28 August 1833, commencement of the Act itself was also incremental, taking effect in the West Indies on 1 August 1834, four months later at the Cape, and notably, coming into force in Mauritius last, namely six months later, on

I February 1835.^[380]

Among the reasons which facilitated the passing of the 1833 Act at that par­ticular point in time was arguably the diminishing relevance of the West Indies as producers of sugar for Britain.^[381] Eric Williams' study, which since its publica­tion has attracted supporters and critics alike,^[382] argued that behind the aboli­tion of the slave trade was in fact the desire to curb sugar production, because it was no longer commercially worthwhile.^[383] This suggestion grates against the humanitarian image Britain preferred to promote at the time.

The abolition of slavery 83 legislature, post the Reform Act of 1832.^[385] Symbolical of the more general mood to address social inequalities, a greater platform was accorded to voices criticizing the entitlement of aristocrats and the wealthy. Robin Blackburn states that during the election of 1832, demands for slave emancipation became linked to criticism of the privileged class which held colonial interests and pos­sessed significant political influence. Slave emancipation thus became a conveni­ent instrument to carry out an “assault” on the oligarchy.^[386] This observation, if true for the British ruling class, applies doubly in the case of Mauritius, where the local oligarchy was cognizably French rather than British. The latter's supe­rior standing on the island being closely linked to slavery however led them to react with an aggressive vehemence.

4.3