Lobengula and the Victorians

refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any Foreign State or Power to sell, alienate, or cede, or permit or countenance any sale, alienation or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amande- bele country under his chieftainship, or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty’s High Commis­sioner in South Africa.1³

While Lobengula remained free from outright subordination to the British crown, still he consulted its bearer, through its officeholders, for advice. Round­ed upon, throughout 1888, by �?white men who come into his country and ask to dig for gold’, Lobengula confessed to Queen Victoria: �?There is noone with him upon whom he can trust’?⁴ �?The Queen has heard the words of Lo Bengula’, so ran the manufactured response, not of Victoria herself, who did not read the note, but of Lord Knutsford, pretending in her place:

Lo Bengula is the ruler of his country, and the Queen does not interfere in the government of that country, but [...] the Queen wishes Lo Bungula to understand distinctly that Englishmen who have gone out to Matabele- land to ask leave to dig for stones have not gone with the Queen’s author­^ity [∙∙∙]

The Queen advises Lo Bengula not to grant hastily concessions of land, or leave to dig, but to consider all applications very carefully.

It is not wise to put too much power into the hands of the men who come first, and to exclude other deserving men.^{[1270] [1271] [1272] [1273]}

By the time Lobengula received this letter, he was already distancing himself from old concessions and had come to deny outright that he parted with �?any of [his] country’?⁶ Rhodes was personally identified to be the main problem. In another letter addressed to Queen Victoria in April 1889, Lobengula expressed dismay about the concessionaires attached to Rhodes who had received per­mission to prospect for minerals, but additionally claimed land rights, which were not ceded?⁷ So uneasy had Lobengula become that he sent Umsheti and Babaan - real izinDuna, though some believed them �?regular natives’ - to Eng­land at the start of 1889 to be �?his mouth, eyes, and ears’, and make enquiries into the nature of the bargains already entered into?⁸ By the time Knutsford got around to responding to Lobengula for the crown, however, the BSAC had just received its charter from conciliar representatives of the same crown; now, Lobengula was told �?to agree, not with one or two white men separately, but with one approved body of white men, who will consult Lo Bengula’s wishes and arrange where white people are to dig, and who will be responsible to the Chief for any annoyance or trouble caused to himself or his people’.^[1274] This showed a striking double standard: monopoly at home was illegal and ultra vires the charter, but monopsony abroad was fine in practice and in policy.^{[1275] [1276] [1277]} This was jarring to Lobengula. Yet he could do nothing, which gives some indi­cation of his powerlessness, but dispatch gruff messages overland with izinD- una to Cape Town and telegrams via the Resident, throughout 1890 and into 1891, to dispute the claims of Rhodes and the BSAC.21

The South African Republic protested at various stages about the increase of British influence.

1. That we regard the act of the Imperial British Government in granting exclusive right in the interior to the said Chartered Company as an un­warrantable usurpation of authority, and as an act at variance with the national and constitutional rights of the various Governments and peo­ple of South Africa.

2. That the said Chartered Company, therefore, in pretending to exercise that exclusive authority, is acting in direct conflict with the rights of the South African peoples without possessing legal or other justification for so doing.

3. That the responsibility of all bloodshed and other evils that may follow from these illegal and unconstitutional usurpations rests, therefore, with those who have permitted or perpetrated the same.

4. That the right of directing the policy and destinies of the South African Continent rests solely with the South African people, and that all interfer­ence with or usurpation of that right is illegal and unconstitutional, and in contempt of the natural liberties of the South African people.^[1278]

There is to be seen, here, a growing sense of ambivalence about the multiple legal personalities now interested in the region (transnational corporation, im­perial government, self-constituted settler communities), and those, evidently, with an absence of interest (amaNdebele, amaShona).

As the BSAC adopted violent and diplomatically troublesome tactics of in­timidation to prevent the approach of other concession hunters, the Colonial Office remained no real font of advice for Henry Loch, the High Commissioner of the Cape, who was forced to rationalise this conduct within the expanding scope of his office. The brevity and rarity of Lord Knutsford's responses from London testified both his preoccupations elsewhere and the imperfection of his understanding of Bulawayo politics. Some certainty might have followed in May of 1891, upon the delivery of an Order in Council, a prerogative instrument of delegated parliamentary authority via the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, which gave the High Commissioner jurisdiction over a protectorate-like entity which, at least on paper, reached into Matabeleland and Mashonaland.^{[1279] [1280] [1281] [1282] Even with this authority, though, Loch remained uncertain how he might exercise it prac­tically in such a way to deter foreign interests, to confine the company to an appropriate sphere of operations, and to bind �?the King' to stand by his con­tractual commitments. Knutsford offered no satisfactory answers to these questions. For this reason, Loch, at the Cape, consulted the commission’s so­licitor, W.P. Schreiner - who had read law at Downing College, Cambridge - for the �?logical, and from the standpoint of international law, legal view’?5}

Schreiner’s minute confirmed the danger of allowing the company to police, at its own discretion, competing interests.

Over the next two years, Lobengula continued to complain about the con­cessions. But the lines ran quiet. All Loch was prepared to do, from the Cape, was send assurances to Lobengula that the company was not preparing to �?smash’ him. Affrays, tit-for-tat, broke out between the company and Loben- gula’s impis at this time, as the prospect of war looked ever more likely.

Meanwhile, in the Colonial Office, differences of opinion broke out among undersectretarial officials about the veracity of reports coming out of Mata- beleland and the defensibility of Lobengula’s actions. When, at the end of 1892, Sidney Olivier had been asked to provide a brief on the BSAC for his colleagues in the Colonial Office, his report acknowledged that Lobengula continued to enjoy �?at least some kind of kingly prerogative [...] to back up his new conces­sionaires’, and it followed, by extension, to turn his back on Rhodes?^[1284] Months later, Olivier continued to harbour suspicions about the correspondence com­ing in from the Cape. �?Whether or no Lobengula is “a master of lies and deceit” as Dr. Jameson describes him’, he penned on 21 October, �?he is certainly a mas­ter of the art of sending messages which make the case against him look very queer’. He continued: �?It is impossible to suppose that he can have any opinion of the Company or the High Commissioner by this time but that they are alike double dealing and unscrupulous butchers’.^{[1285] [1286] Olivier’s colleagues disagreed, outnumbering him to silence his dissent in early November, just as open war was breaking out between the British South Africa Company and amaNdebele on the other side of the hemisphere?1}

Maxim guns in the possession of the BSAC made the war a one-sided affair. The company’s inordinate firepower overwhelmed scores of Ndebele combat­ants throughout November, and by the end of the month, Lobengula was quickly and easily beaten. His last action as sovereign of Matabeleland, before his mysterious disappearance, was a valorous one: he surrendered at the start of December, sending a message �?containing overtures for peace', along with a small fortune of gold as a symbol of vassalage to his conquerors. Alas, in a trag­ic twist of fate, this envoy was intercepted by two members of the Bechuanal- and Border Police, who made off with the gold and failed to deliver the mes­sage to the telegram office in Palapye. Four months passed before information about any of this emerged: well after the cessation of fighting and the likely abdication and probable regicide of Lobengula.^{[1287] [1288]}

At Westminster, the war along with the scuffles leading to its outbreak were topics of fiery debate. In July 1893, the colourful Member for Northampton, Henry Labouchere, took to interrogating the colonial undersecretary, Sydney Buxton, in this fashion:

by what authority 30 men of the Impi were slain for refusing to withdraw and being insolent to the employes or colonists of a Company that de­rives its sole right to exercise any sort of jurisdiction in Matabele from Lo Bengula; whether the Company has any jurisdiction over the armed forc­es of Lo Bengula; and what steps Her Majesty's Government contemplate taking to prevent such proceedings, resulting in loss of life, and tending to lead Lo Bengula to take retaliatory action?

Buxton, in a mechanical kind of way, told the house that the company's au­thority �?derived, not from Lo Bengula, but from the Charter granted by the Queen'. He gave the assured impression that all was under control in the region.33

Of course, all was not under control, which was better for the company's supporters than its critics. Come September 7th, talk of �?Matabele atrocities' was heard in parliamentary justifications of the company's firm treatment of amaNdebele, and demands for the interference of the �?Imperial Government'^[1289] When war eventually ensued, so did Labouchere. On November 9th, he ad­dressed Buxton again, but this time he received an unsatisfactory response from the Colonial Office undersecretary. In response to this deflection, La- bouchere moved for an adjournment to discuss �?the impolicy of permitting the Chartered Company of South Africa to establish any claim or contract any engagements with regard to the territory or government of Matabeleland, or to continue its warlike operations in that territory in view of the previous pro­ceedings and the position of the Company'. But when, after just 40 members rose in his support of the failed motion, all he could do was deliver an awesome tirade. Labouchere condemned the company's misinterpretation of Lobengu- la's concessions, its lack of financial transparency, and above all, its manufac­turing of the war against amaNdebele: a war, he was at pains to stress, that was both unjust and unequal.^[1290]

�?But was it so unequal after all?', Sydney Buxton objected in response, and continued: �?The handful of men advancing into such a country as this under­took a tremendous risk'. Labouchere immediately interjected with a brief but effective phonetic combination - �?Maxim guns!’ - and with that their debate was underway again^[1291] Like old foes they disagreed in their lengthy dialogue, which soon returned, at Labouchere's instigation, to the inseparable issues of the disputed concessions and Lobengula's sovereignty. Obtained under false pretences, the two main concessions defended by the BSAC had not been fully understood by Lobengula, Labouchere maintained, and the company's recent actions had been at variance with the assurances contained in Lobengula's first message from �?the queen' (which Labouchere took to insist �?that [Lobengula] should be in no way damnified in his jurisdiction and sovereignty', even though these words were Knustford's and not Victoria's)^{[1292] [1293] �?All I wish to say', said Bux­ton to close the matter for the day,}

is that Lobengula practically acquiesced by his subsequent action. He is a little out of court, because, whatever he thought of the concessions, he carefully took the consideration he was paid for them - namely, the £1,200 a year, month by month, until the other day, when hostilities were about to begin. I am not here to defend the Chartered Company; I am not myself very much in favour of government by Chartered Companies. But I am bound to say, in regard to this and other charges brought against the Company, that my hon. friend has very much exaggerated [. „]38

Labouchere's correspondences with the Colonial Office in late November and into early December enquired more specifically into the extent of the company's delegated jurisdiction and its ability to wage war in Matabeleland.

The job of responding to Labouchere’s questions fell not to the outspoken Sid­ney Olivier, but to the Undersecretarial assistant Frederick Graham. �?The Com­pany derives its rights of jurisdiction and administration, not from Lo Bengula, but from the British Crown’, Graham affirmed. �?Up to the outbreak of hostili­ties Lo Bengula’s sovereignty was, so far as these considerations admitted, rec­ognised and the assurances given to him substantially maintained. Since then the circumstances have entirely changed’, and there could be no turning back, because an �?African Chief under a British Protectorate’ - apparently Lobengula - could not be treated �?in the same way as the head of a civilized state’. The sovereignty of Great Britain now subsumed within it Lobengula and all of his people, alleged Graham, although he stopped short of explaining precisely how, because �?jurisdiction over natives in uncivilised countries rests on no constitu­tional form but is a matter of use and wont in which the practices of civilised nations differ widely’. When it came to the question of why, it was simply �?obvi­ous’, Graham wrote, that �?a certain exercise of jurisdiction over natives in their relations to white men’ was necessary anywhere �?natives’ had entered into agree­ments requiring �?responsibility towards foreign civilized powers’.^[1294]

Meanwhile, there was the matter of the future administration of Matabele- land to consider, much wrangled over by Rhodes and Loch in the early months of 1894. Eventually, their draft arrangement was sent into the Colonial Office in May, which is where it provided the necessary scaffolding for a draft Order in Council, issued on July 18th, 1894.^{[1295] [1296] By this Order, a colony was entrusted to the company under the nominal supervision of the colonial secretary. The Order introduced a new judicature, made arrangements for Shona and Ndebele cus­tomary law, and established for them a �?Land Commission’, a hut tax, and re­strictions upon alienation. The result was a smart constitution for the corpo­rate colony, which gave the BSAC administration far-reaching powers over the �?conquered’ amaNdebele?1}

This is not the whole picture. Quite separately, the company had already been preparing a programme of legal reform specifically for amaNdebele, an approach that was blunt, ad hoc, and authoritarian. Routinely overlooked by historians are the terms dictated by Jameson to a meeting of izinDuna some weeks before the Order in Council had even been read in the Castle of Wind­sor. �?The King being dead, the white Government had taken his place', he be­gan, making a keen modification to a proclamatory formula of succession used in contemplation of European monarchies but to which his African audience was likely unwitting (Le roi est mort, vive le roi!). Thus were the curtains felled on the Ndebele dynasty. For �?no other King would be elected', Jameson confirmed. Representing more than a clumsy interference with African sovereignty - the rule rather than the exception across the whole continent during high imperialism - the termination of Ndebele succession also entailed the termi­nation of payments to the king as promised by the concessions. Now that Lobengula was gone, Jameson continued, it was up to �?the Indunas [to] exer­cise authority [over] their people, but under the control of the white Govern­ment'. Whereas, before, Englishmen had to work within the limits of African government to get anywhere in Matabeleland, now Africans were subordinat­ed to the government of a company of Englishmen. There was more. A univer­sal legal regime was now to be installed, he told them, which was �?the same for whites and blacks' and, ostensibly, for women and men, but with some signifi­cant new introductions. Witchcraft was now abolished, and punishable by death; settlements were now subjected to regular police patrols; arms were now to be surrendered for reward, or otherwise later, for punishment; kraals were now and in the future to be removed from the vicinity of main roads and gold diggings; a comprehensive system of native reservations would soon be implemented.^[1297] And, finally, on the all-important question of communal Nde- bele cattle, the custodian of which had previously been Lobengula, a conven­tional conquest played out. �?The late King's cattle were forfeited and now be­longed to the white people', Jameson told the crowd, making the assurance, however, that private cattle, insofar as the company was able to tell the differ­ence, �?would not be interfered with'.

AmaNdebele were powerfully coerced into subjectivity by the company. In the mind of Frederick Selous, this was a right, just, and necessary result. �?I will say that the political effect of the conquest of Matabeliland will tend to secure the eventual supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon in South Africa', he declared at the beginning of 1894.^{[1298] [1299] For, �?when a black man's country has been conquered by Europeans', he would write later from Bulawayo in August of 1896, and with fresh experience on the matter, �?the laws by which that country will be subse­quently governed will be made in the interests of the whites, and some of them will be very unpalatable to the conquered race, however just and equitable they may seem to their rulers'. Selous was writing this passage just months after war had broken out again in Rhodesia, during which time he was, once again, an active combatant for the company. �?The savages will discover the useless­ness of rebelling against the white man', Selous continued, �?and as time goes on will become more reconciled to the ways of the conquerors'.44}

Selous's descriptions of the unrest in Matabeleland between 1894 and 1896 are unsympathetic towards the indigenous perspective, and in that sense were mostly characteristic of the views of the settler population, but not everyone saw matters the same way. When the Irish lawyer and Rhodesian cattle farmer John Barklie came to learn that the company's solicitors were �?claiming to have conquered the country as its own private domain', he considered that claim �?so utterly reckless as to surprise us at the desperate straits to which the support­ers of the Company's claims are reduced'. For �?what, pray', Barklie asked,

is the Chartered Company that it should claim the authority to acquire territorial rights by war and conquest? The British South Africa Company is not an independent sovereign state, but merely a British corporation as the name signifies. As a corporate person it is a British subject and the supplemental Charter reminds it of that fact by retraining it from estab­lishing a force of military police?^[1300]

For Barklie, the charter, and subsequent amendments to it, rendered free from scrutiny �?anything lawfully done thereunder', rightly or wrongly; but it was about to become another question entirely how �?lawful' all of the company's conduct had been in this period^[1301]

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