Ius Naturale Secundarium
One wonders, did this natural law �by extension’ constitute a ius per se, as natural law strictly speaking, or rather ex alio, as volitional law? Throughout his works Grotius is very explicit regarding the special character of natural law.
All law might be the product of an act of will, the law of nature had a status very much of its own. It had taken its origin from the will of God, but was no longer affected by an external agent, man or God.u6 It was absolute and a necessity; eternal, autonÂomous, and unchangeable; and it was the perfect expression of right reason. As we have seen, in ibp it is presented as commanding the moral status of an act with an appeal to its concordance with right reason and, as a consequence, with the will of the creator of nature. In 1627 reason is held to guide man to follow God’s demands in moral issues.u7 Man and animal shared the aspiration for selfÂpreservation and self-procreation. Precisely the moral rod of his conscience set man apart from the instinct that guided the animal world.u8Then, what about this second type of natural law?n9 In as much as its conÂtent was in principle changeable, even though not without problems (if of a pragmatic nature), it would rather seem to qualify as volitional law. Still, in ibp the ambiguity from 1605 is conspicuously upheld. Whereas lacking the moral cogency of natural law, volitional law in Grotius’s perception around 1625 parÂticipated in natural law â€?by reduction’ (Grotius here refers to the scholastic term) in the sense of not conflicting with the latter?20 Grotius’s proposition is the more interesting in that he, very intentionally, reduces the traditional province of natural law stricto sensu by transferring from this domain to the â€?improper' category precepts such as on concubinage, divorce, and polygamy that traditionally had been reserved for natural law, indeed on the authority of Scripture.[586] [587] [588] [589] [590] [591] The issue is a pertinent one as, much to, for example, Haggenmacher's concern, precisely this category of â€?improper' natural law formed the piece de resistance of Grotius's treatise of 1625. The move must therefore have been very intentional and the reason may be close at hand. 9