Forgiveness
Similar to questions regarding healing, considerations of forgiveness represent a recent development in the study and practice of transitional justice. Forgiveness is an even more controversial and more rarely disĀcussed issue in this context because it is so readily connected with reliĀgious perspectives to which many people do not subscribe.
some critics argue that any discussion of forgiveness will inevitably require forfeitĀing retributive or deterrent justice; that is, perpetrators will not receive the punishment they deserve or that may be necessary to discourage future criminality. some critics also argue that forgiveness will entail the enforced forgetting of crimes and an unjust demand for survivors to ā?move on' from their pain and loss.[95] For all of these reasons, it is often considered too emotionally costly or coercive to advocate forgiveness after mass violence.Most political thought on post-conflict forgiveness has occurred within the past decade. However, Hannah Arendt explored the approĀpriateness of forgiveness in the aftermath of the Second World War and provided an important analysis of the relevance of this term after atroĀcity mass conflict. Arendt argues that ā?forgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, which acts in the form of re-acting against an original tresĀpassing, whereby far from putting an end to the consequences of the first misdeed, everybody remains bound to the process'.[96] Direct retribution, Arendt argues, fuels the cycle of violence. Therefore, forgiveness, which entails forgoing feelings of resentment and a desire for personal, direct retribution, is necessary to start afresh and to allow people to deal with memories of the past in a more constructive manner. ā?Forgiveness does not imply forgetting... āgiving upā, āturning the other cheekā or āletting the other off the hookā', argues Wendy Lambourne, but rather should be seen as a ā?complex act of consciousness' that overcomes injury in order to restore lost relationships.[97] Forgiveness therefore requires active, someĀtimes public, acknowledgement of crimes committed, and leaves open the possibility that victims will seek redress from perpetrators and perĀhaps insist on punishing them.
On this basis, forgiveness does not inherently oppose all forms of punĀishment, provided it does not involve personal, direct retribution, or ongoing calls for retribution even after perpetrators have been punished. Because forgiveness suggests some form of renewed relationship between perpetrator and victim, it is often confused with reconciliation. The two concepts, however, are distinct. While forgiveness may, in practice, lead to parties' resolving their differences to the extent that a renewed form of relationship is possible, nothing in the concept of forgiveness requires parties to reconcile. A victim may justifiably forgive his or her transgressor and still refuse to engage with him or her again, perhaps for fear of repeat offences. Forgiveness requires only that a victim forgo feelings of resentĀment and a desire for direct revenge against the perpetrator.