Footnotes

Bamford (1973), pp. 10–30.

Boyer (1969), p.

An introduction to Mediterannean slavery, both from the viewpoint of the Barbary States and France, can be found in Fontenay (2010), pp. 500–502. Unfortunately, there is no single book solely devoted to the issue of Muslims enslaved by the French during this era. When mention is being made of these slaves, this is usually done as chapters in books that are concerned with the French galleys themselves (some of the scholars who have written most extensively on French galleys being Paul Masson, Michel Fontenay, Paul Bamford and André Zysberg).

Various authors, both contemporary and recent, tend to confound these categories. Things are made worse because of the fact that the term forçat or benevoglie is not commonly used in the English language, and the three categories tend to be simply translated as galley slaves. Next to that, it is difficult to determine whether the forçats were “true slaves” or not, making the issue of translation only more difficult. For an author who notes this difficulty, see Stanziani (2014), p. 34.

Zysberg (1987), pp. 62–63.

Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., pp. 59–116.

Weiss (2011), p.

Boyer (1969), pp. 59–60; Weiss (2011), p. 400.

Boyer (1969), pp. 61–63.

Ibid., p. 60. This in itself clearly shows the distinction between forçats and Turks.

Ibid., p. 55. It does not appear in the Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises. The distinction between forçats and Turks is also made clear in several other ordonnances (do note that the term “esclave” is not used in any of them). In book 19 and book 20 of the recueil général, which cover the period of 1672 until 1715 (this coincides with the time when the French galleys were at the zenith of their importance), there are several acts that mention a distinction between Turks and forçats. To name but a few: Ordonnance portant défenses aux gardiens conduisant des turcs ou des forçats, d’entrer dans aucun cabaret ou autre lieu public, ni de sortir la ville of 9 December 1682; Ordonnance portant que les forçats et Turcs trouvés saisis de choses volées seront punis du fouet of 21 October 1695; Ordonnance portant que les forçats qui frapperont et blesseront avec ferremens les pertuisaniers, seront condamnés a mort of 20 December 1713 (p. 614, Tome 20). See Recueil général des anciennes lois Françaises Vol. XIX, 409; Recueil général des anciennes lois Françaises Vol. XX, 259, 614.

Masson (1938), p. 281; Weiss (2011), pp. 403–405; Boyer (1969), pp. 63–66.

Zysberg (1987), pp.

Weiss (2011), pp. 398–399.

The only determined attempt to explain this anomaly between the freedom principle and slavery has been made by Gillian Weiss. She only discusses the works of several eighteenth century writers. When it comes to the seventeenth century, she notes that ”only after colonial slaves began claiming liberty in the metropole did questions about the lawfulness of keeping esclaves turcs arise”. It would be interesting to see whether this is truly the case, if one were to systematically check whether the great jurists from the time of Louis XIV really did not write anything about this issue. It seems little surprising that many scholars refer to eighteenth century encyclopaedia, as they would often include separate articles on “galères” or “galériens”. Besides Weiss (2011)., the only articles which I have found giving examples of the views of some jurists on this issue are Vigie (1985); Stanziani (2014). Weiss refers to the eighteenth century historian Jean-Baptiste Durival and the jurist François Bourjon. Vigie mentions the jurists Joseph-Nicolas Guyot, Claude-Joseph de Ferrière and Boucher d’Argis. Stanziani likewise refers to Ferrière and Boucher d’Argis. All of them, besides Durival le Jeune, can be found in Arabeyre (2007), pp. 113–115, 126–127, 326–327, 394. I have mostly limited myself to giving an overview (and commenting) on the views of the authors mentioned by those sources. Additionally, I have found the issue of Turkish slaves in France discussed by the author known as Chambron. He was a citizen of Marseille who wrote a Traité général du commerce de l’Amérique, a popular eighteenth century book on the commerce of the Americas. Given he was from Marseille, where the Turkish presence was most visible, and given his interesting views on this issue, I have taken note of his remarks as well.

The secrétaires d’état were important actors in the central government of France during the Ancien Régime. The institution already had predecessors in the fourteenth century, but was created in its then current form by Henri II in the middle of the sixteenth century. They were the highest administrative officials, but the king could always remove them from office. There were four secrétaires d’état, one being responsible for interior matters, another for foreign matters, one for the marine and one for war. Rigaudière (2010), pp. 553–554.

The Maurepas letter is mentioned by Zysberg (1987), p. 59.

Weiss (2011), pp. 402–403.

Loisel (1607), Livre I, Tit I, III.

At this time, references to the Sorbonne either denoted the collège universitaire or the faculty of theology of Paris. The reference here is to the latter. Compère (2010), pp. 1172–1173.

Fromageau and de Bussy de Lamet (1745), 1080–1084. Weiss also believes that, in this one sentence, we find an implicit referral to Louis XIII’s authorisation of enslavement as an effective means of evangelising pagans. As noted before, it is highly unlikely that Louis XIII made this pronouncement. Whether this myth had already become part of the mind-set of lawyers and theologians at this point is unknown to me. Weiss (2011), pp. 403–405.

Guyot (1779), pp. 486–490; Boucher d’Argis (1782), pp.

de Ferrière (1769), pp. 558–559.

Durival (1757), “Galérien”. The encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert was first published between 1751 and 1766 and can be found online at http://​xn--encyclopdie-ibb.​eu/​index.​php/​morale/​2009024668-jurisprudence-marine/​858967454-GAL%C3%89RIEN. de Bourjon (1770), Livre I, Ch. I. Weiss’ reading of Bourjon can also be interpreted differently. Bourjon confirms that all persons in France are free, but then gives two exceptions to this rule. According to Weiss, these two exceptions are (1) black persons taken to France from the colonies by their masters and (2) the right of reprisal against nations who enslave Frenchman. This is a possible reading of Bourjon’s text, but another reading is equally possible. It could also be said that the exceptions are (1) the still-existing gens de main-morte in certain parts of France and (2) the black persons taken to France from the colonies. The right of reprisal is then linked to black slavery, not to Mediterranean slavery.

Chambron (1783), 208.

Weiss (2011).

Verlinden (1955), pp. 762–765.

McCloy (1961), pp. 11–13.

More precisely, the declaration of 1777 asked for the registration of “aucun noir, mulâtre ou autres gens de couleur”.

The great majority of these arrivals were slaves, and Koufinkana only counted 13 free blacks in these registers.

Saugera (1995), pp. 290–291.

Boulle (2009).

See Noël (2011), (2013), (2017).

Boulle (2007), pp. 170–171.

Ibid., p. 170.

Ibid., pp. 181–182.

Ibid., pp. 196–197.

Sibalis (2003), pp. 95–106.

Koufinkana (2008), pp. 46–49.

Table des requêtes présentées à l’amirauté de France, 1730–1790 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 73.

Ibid., pp. 73–85; Corvisier (1968), pp. 367–413. The most famous example during Napoléon’s time was obviously Thomas-Alexandre Dumas (1762–1802), a general in Napoléon’s revolutionary army, who was of African descent.

Boulle (2006b), pp. 38–40.

In Ancien Régime France, we find quite some variety in the forms of royal legislation. Lettres patentes were the most important form. Depending whether the act was meant to be general and perpetual, or whether it was meant to deal with a particular and temporary issue, these could be divided in grandes lettres patentes and petites lettres patentes. The former could be divided in three categories (although the distinction only became truly settled in the eighteenth century): ordonnances, édits and déclarations. The term ordonnance was used when dealing with legislation of a rather general nature, wheras édit was used for measures which were limited to a certain subject (e.g. black slaves in France). The déclaration, finally, was meant to explain, complete or restrain one of the aforementioned legislative acts. The petites lettres patentes dealt with a particular situation, and could be obtained on request of an individual, a city, a region or a community or persons. Arrêts du conseil had become a separate form of royal legislation by the end of the Middle Ages. In essence, they were the decisions that the king took while he was in his council, although his actual presence was more often than not a fiction. Next to those two forms, there were also the ordonnances sans adresse ni sceau, which were legislative acts in the domains where the king’s powers were the most unconstrained, and the lettres closes, which was a general term used to signify many kinds of royal decisions that did not fall under any of the other categories. Whereas the arrêts du conseil were usually immediately sent to the persons that had to execute them, lettres patentes were first sent to the chancellor and then to the Parlements. The chancellor analysed whether the act was in conformity with the customs and laws of the kingdom, after which he would seal the document. The next step would be to send the act to the sovereign Parlements. If the Parlement believed that the act was not legally sound, it could send formal objections or remonstrances to the king. The king might then agree to change the law, or he could come to the Parlement himself and force it to register the law by the lit de justice procedure. The effectiveness of these remonstrances heavily depended on the balance of power between the Parlements and the King, as various French kings (most notably Louis XIV) tried to curtail the possibilities of the Parlements to refuse to register acts. What the exact consequences of non-registration were, was also a matter of debate. The extreme parliamentarian position held that acts which were not registered could not be executed, whereas the extreme royalist position professed that registration added nothing to the validity of a law. Rigaudière (2010), pp. 657–678; Olivier-Martin (2010), pp. 389–400; Shennan (1968), pp. 50–86.

The jurisdiction of the admiralty courts is complex, but well explained in Mousnier (1974), pp. 293–295. As regards jurisdiction, this was quite different for the main “slave cities” of France (Paris, Nantes and Bordeaux). Many northern cities would have their own admiralty seat (e.g. Calais and La Rochelle), from where recourse lay to the Admiralty of France and from there on to the Parlement of Paris, although for Dunkerque, for example, appeals from its admiralty were to be sent to the Parlement of Paris immediately. For Nantes, cases from its admiralty court could be appealed to the Parlement of Bretagne. The Parlement of Bordeaux had jurisdiction for appeals emanating from three admiralty courts in Guyenne. I have not checked all the judgments made by these courts myself, but have focused on the cases for which written mémoires were published (the cases of Jean Boucaux, Francisque, Roc, Pampy and Julienne v. Isaac Mèndes France and Furcy). All of the cases that came before the Admiralty of France have been analysed by Sue Peabody in her landmark study There Are No Slaves in France (154 cases in which the slave was freed every single time). Given that all of those published mémoires are related to proceedings at Parisian courts, this method bears the risk of neglecting the fact that the king himself might still intervene in these cases; and minimising the importance of decisions made by admiralty courts in other cities besides Paris. This is also pointed out by Dwain C. Pruitt, whose PhD thesis dealt with the situation in Nantes, see Pruitt (2005). However, Peabody seems to be the only one who engaged in exhaustive analysis of court records. For areas outside of Paris, there will thus primarily be reference to secondary literature. The reader will note that many of the references in this chapter refer to Peabody’s landmark study, which has significanty improved upon much earlier work (primarily by Lucien Peytraud, Jules Mathorez, Léon Vignols and Shelby McCloy).

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In general, see Peabody (1996), pp. 13–15.

As for England, I will sometimes use the words “nègre”, “noir”, “mulâtre” or “gens de couleur”, but only when the primary materials themselves used this term.

Le roi punit un officier de marine pour avoir introduit des esclaves en France in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 29.

Ordonnance de Sa Majesté, rendue au sujet des nègres venant des îles de l’Amérique, 28 avril 1694 in Ibid., p. 30.

Les esclaves venus en France seront affranchi, même s’ils retournent aux colonies, 1698 in Ibid., p. 31. The correspondence of 1696 is quoted verbatim in Koufinkana (2008), p. 33. The ministerial order of 1710 can be found in Boulle (2014), p. 22. This correspondence also proves the sophistry of the Count of Maurepas in relation to Turkish slaves. Just like Turks, nègres were acquired from countries in which slavery was allowed, yet black slaves could make use of the French freedom principle whereas Muslim slaves apparently could not.

Le principe du sol libre n’empêche pas les anciens propriétaires de bénéficier du service de leurs esclaves avant leur affranchissement, 1699 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 31.

Peabody (1996), pp. 14–15; Lettre du ministre de la marine, Jérôme de Pontchartrain, sur les nègres amenés en France, 10 juin 1707 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 39.

Pruitt (2007), p. 152; Peabody (1996), pp. 15–16.

[Gérard Mellier], Réponses au Mémoire présenté à Nosseigneurs du Conseil Royal de la Marine concernant les nègres esclaves que les officiers et habitants des colonies françaises de l’Amérique amènent en France pour leur service in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 40–43.

Pruitt (2007), p. 155.

See Abanime (1979), p. 22; Pruitt (2005), pp. 62–63.

Art. 2, Edict of 1716.

Art. 2–3, Edict of 1716.

Art. 5 and 7, Edict of 1716.

Art. 11 and 14, Edict of 1716.

Art. 15, Edict of 1716.

The discussion concerning the registration of the Edict is summarized in Peabody (1996), p. 18. Peabody has found primary material confirming registration by the Parlements of Dijon and Bretagne. The registration by the Parlement of Bretagne is also confirmed by Pruitt, “The Opposition of the Law to the Law: Race, Slavery, and the Law in Nantes, 1715–1778,” 156. In a more recent article, Erick Noël also held that the edict was registered in the Parlements of Bordeaux and Normandy, Érick Noël, “L’esclavage dans la france moderne,” Dix-huitième siècle 39, no. 1 (2007): 367. Various scholars have claimed registration in several other Parlements, but they have not provided primary references to ascertain this. Whilst I have not been in the position to verify any registrations myself, I could point out one extra Parlement which most probably did registered the Edict of 1716. As is clear from George de Ghewiet’s 1736 Institutions du droit belgique, the Parlement de Flandres was amongst those registering it. It was Alan Watson who noted this reference, although he believed it was an exception to the freedom principle of Belgium. It has to be borne in mind though that, ever since the 1668 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the areas under the ressort of the Parlement of Flanders, merely a very small part of territory that formerly belonged to the Spanish Netherlands, had been French territory, de Ghewiet (1736), pp. 78–79; Bély (2007), p. 230; Watson (1989), p. 107.

Peabody (1996), pp. 19–22. Although it was up to the Parlement itself to decide whether or not to register a royal law, the parquet would also make its own report indicating whether it was in favour of registration or not. This would be reported to the Parlement. Mousnier (1974), pp. 375–378.

Excerpts of the case before the Admiralty of France can be found in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 51–54. I have made use of the full report, which can be found in de Pitaval (1750), pp. 333–416.

Peabody (1996), pp. 23–24.

de Pitaval (1750), pp. 333–336.

Ibid., pp. 336–345.

Ibid., pp. 345–363.

Ibid., pp. 363–391.

French Ancien Régime courts (especially the Parlements) would normally not motivate their judgments. For the Parlements, this was partially related to the fact that they wanted to stress their sovereign status and felt they did not need to explain themselves. It also had to do with the formal lack of precedential value of judgments, and the fear of many courts that motivating their judgments would encourage appeals. Courts were only obliged to motivate their judgment after the French Revolution. Rigaudière (2010), p. 685.

As the King was the highest and ultimate source of law, the Conseil du Roi could make arrets d’évocation and arrêts de cassation, revoking sentences of any other French court. Evocation could happen on the initiative of the council itself, but a party could always ask the council whether it would consider its case. Ibid., pp. 624–625.

La Couronne intervient dans l’Affaire Boucaux, 1738–1739 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 55. Peabody opines that the council’s decision not to allow Boucaux to return to the colonies might show that Tribard’s public order rationale did touch a nerve. Peabody (1996), p. 40.

Peabody (1996), p. 37; Boulle (2014), p. 25; Déclaration du roi, concernant les nègres esclaves des colonies, 15 décembre 1738 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 64–67.

Art. 3, Declaration of 1738.

Art. 4, Declaration of 1738.

Art. 9, Declaration of 1738.

Art. 6, Declaration of 1738.

Art. 8, Declaration of 1738.

Art. 10 and 11, Declaration of 1738.

See, for example, the Rapport de Sartine au Conseil des dépêches, proposant la nouvelle loi sur les noirs, [9 août 1777] in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 95–99.

Again, there is some divergence amongst scholars. Peabody has found a printed copy of the Declaration of 1738 which specifically refers to its registration by all the Parlements, the sovereign councils and conseils supérieurs of the colonies, except for Paris. Boulle and Pruitt concur in this opinion. Erick Noël agrees that it was not registered by the Parlement of Paris, but adds Toulouse, Pau, Aix, Nancy, Metz, Arras and Douai to this list. He makes use of the Rapport de Sartine au Conseil des dépêches, proposant la nouvelle loi sur les noirs, [9 août 1777]. This report, however, just mentions Dijon, Grenoble, Besançon and Metz as having registered “Ces lois”, meaning both the Edict of 1716 and the Declaration of 1738 (Noël asserts they only registered the Declaration of 1738), but does not seem to exclude registration by other Parlements (given the report mentions “tels que”). Koufinkana believes it was not registered by Paris and Toulouse, but does not mention a primary source for Toulouse’s apparent refusal. Peabody (1996), p. 38; Boulle (2014), p. 26; Pruitt (2007), p. 159; Koufinkana (2008), p. 106; Noël (2007), p. 369.

According to Peabody, this can be explained by the fact that the admiralty clerk could charge a fee for registering these declarations, and because a refusal would be seen as a political statement of a lower administrative clerk. Peabody (1996), p. 39.

Boulle (2014), p. 28.

Tableau des requêtes présentées à l’amirauté de France, 1730–1790 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 73.

Peabody (1996), p. 55.

Ibid., pp. 51–52.

Again, this is a very interesting argument that still needs to be further explored. The fact that so many blacks appealed for their liberty in Paris, could mean that there was a network systematically informing black slaves of the possibility of freedom. Clearly, some lawyers were involved in this network. Professor Pierre Boulle hints that some lawyers were motivated to take slavery cases because of grievances against the absolutist tendencies of the crown. I wish to thank Professor Boulle for sharing some of his thoughts regarding the reasons Parisian lawyers took on these cases with me. Private correspondence with Professor Pierre Boulle, 13/05/2017.

Peabody (1996), pp. 92–94. There is no exact data on the number of slaves who asked and received back wages from the Admiralty of France. It is Professor Sue Peabody’s understanding that many petitioners asked for them, but that few of these requests were probably granted. Private correspondence with Professor Sue Peabody, 27/04/2017.

Ibid., p. 56.

Koufinkana (2008), pp. 102–104. In Professor Peabody’s understanding, this did not happen in the majority of the cases, though the issue is still subject to further research. Private correspondence with Professor Sue Peabody, 27/04/2017.

Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 81.

One reason for the relative neglect of the Declaration of 1738 is obviously that the slave would be confiscated instead of declared free if the formalities were not met. Peabody (1996), p. 59.

Mémoire signifié pour le nommé Francisque, Indien de nation, 1759 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 75–78.

Peabody (1996), pp. 69–70. Erick Noël has also noted the existence of a similar case in Southern France, where an enslaved Indian woman named Ketna was declared free by the Parlement of Aix, see Noël (2019).

Peabody (1996), p. 68.

Between 1730 and 1790, Peabody discovered 154 cases in which the Admiralty of France gave freedom to the slave, next to 93 acts of enfranchisement registered by the court. This means we have a total of 247 freed slaves in Paris. The fact that we also know that more than 600 slaves were registered in Nantes, more than 600 in La Rochelle and more than 1000 in Bordeaux, gives reason to put the number of 247 liberated slaves into perspective. Koufinkana (2008), pp. 47–48.

The black presence in Nantes is discussed in de Wismes (1992), pp. 147–173; Pruitt (2005). de Wismes’ work is of more limited use as concerns the legal position of slaves in Nantes, and contains some legal errors (e.g. asserting that the Edict of 1685 stipulated that every slave coming to France became free, which it did not). Pétré-Grenouilleau likewise discusses the impact of the slave trade in Nantes, but only mentions the issue of black slaves in the city in passing, Pétré-Grenouilleau (1998), pp. 132–133.

Pruitt (2007), p. 156.

Peabody (1996), pp. 41–48; Boulle (2014), p. 27.

Pruitt (2005), p. 51.

One chapter in André Saugera’s work is concerned with “Les Noirs en Guyenne”, but he does not discuss any judgments of the Admiralty of Bordeaux. Dominique Rogers surveys much of the previous historical research on the black presence in Bordeaux, does not discuss court cases, but points to the many flagrant breaches of the Declaration of 1738 in Aquitaine. Saugera (1995), pp. 287–310; Rogers (2001), pp. 103–121.

Boulle (2006b), pp. 23–25.

For a short overview of Poncet de la Grave’s views on the black presence in France, see Rachel Tolin Schultz (2017).

Guillaume Poncet de la Grave dénonce les abus causes par la presence de noirs à Paris. Réquisitoire à l’Amirauté de France, 1762 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 79–80. This was clearly exaggerated, given the very limited presence of blacks in France. Peabody (1996), p. 87.

Peabody (1996), pp. 73–85.

Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 63.

Peabody (1996), p. 91.

Pierre Paul Nicolas Henrion de Pensey [i.e. Pensey], Mémoire pour le nommé Roc, nègre, contre le sieur Poupet négociant, 1770 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 88–90.

Shennan (1968), pp. 316–320; Peabody (1996), p. 105.

Boulle (2006b), p. 20.

Whereas Boulle puts most stress on this conflict between the Admiralty of France and the contrary ordres du roi, Peabody, Abanime and Pruitt focus on the case of Pampy and Julienne v. Mèndes France as the trigger for new royal legislation. Erick Noël gives attention to the governmental connections of the Count of Choisseul-Gouffier. Boulle (2006a), pp. 19–21; Peabody (1996), pp. 107–111; Pruitt (2005), p. 82; Abanime (1979), p. 24; Noël (2007), p. 374.

The lieutenant général was the most important subordinate of the Admiral of France. One of Poncet de la Grave’s proposals was to create a special court with competence for questions of the personal status of blacks in France. Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 83–84.

The lettres patentes are partially reprinted in Koufinkana (2008), p. 89.

Rapport de Sartine au Conseil des dépêches, proposant la nouvelle loi sur les noirs [9 août 1777] in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 95–99.

Déclaration du Roi pour la Police des noirs, donnée à Versailles le 9 août 1777, enregistrée en parlement [de Paris] le 27 desdits mois et an in Peabody and Boulle (2014), pp. 99–102.

Art. 1 declaration of 1777. For the sake of consistency, I will still refer to slaves when dealing with this category.

Art. 2, Declaration of 1777.

Art. 4, 5 and 13, declaration of 1777.

Art. 9 and 10, declaration of 1777.

Art. 9, declaration of 1777.

Abanime (1979), pp. 26–27.

Arrêt du Conseil d’État du Roi, concernant le retour des noirs, mulâtres [etc.] aux colonies, du 7 septembre 1777 and Arrêt du Conseil d’État du Roi, du 5 avril 1778, concernant les mariages des noirs, mulâtres, ou autres gens de couleur in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 102–103, 121.

Boulle (2006a), pp. 27–30.

Peabody (1996), p. 123.

Arrêt du Conseil d’État pour la Police des noirs, mulâtres [etc.] qui sont dans la ville de Paris, du 11 janvier 1778 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 116–117.

Tableau des requêtes présentées à l’amirauté de France, 1730–1790 in Ibid., p. 73.

Ibid., p. 113.

McCloy (1961), pp. 50–51.

Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 87–88.

Peytraud (1897), p. 392.

Rogers (2001), pp. 104–110.

Pruitt (2007), pp. 164–165; Abanime (1979), pp. 26–27.

Ibid., pp. 164–174.

Boulle (2006b), pp. 33–37.

Ibid.

Arrêt du Conseil d’État du Roi, Pour le renouvellement des cartouches des noirs qui sont à Paris, du 23 mars 1783 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), pp. 129–130.

Le ministre de la Marine declare un embargo sur les voyages des gens de couleur entre les colonies et la metropole, automne 1789 in Ibid., 130.

In general, the somewhat lukewarm attitude of the Continent towards the abolitionist movement has often been contrasted with the vigorousness of this movement in the United Kingdom at the end of the eighteenth century. Drescher (1994), p. 65.

Koufinkana (2008), pp. 121–125.

Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 133.

Ibid, pp. 134–136.

Décret du 28 September 1791 (loi du 16 oct. 1791) in Ibid., 149. Boulle believes that the fact that the two decisions were made so close to one another, might prove that the colonists won the major battle, whilst the codification of the French freedom principle could serve as a sweetener for the interests of the libres hommes du couleur and the Société des Amis des Noirs. Boulle (2014), p. 37.

Bénot (1993), pp. 349–361.

I am only offering a “coup d’oeil” on the status of slavery in France after the first abolition of slavery. This is due to several reasons. First, a thorough review of the nineteenth century freedom principle goes beyond the scope of this work. Second, much work remains to be done on this issue by scholars in comparison with the eighteenth century. Third, in contrast to England, the institutional setup of France changed drastically vis-à-vis the Ancien Régime, as Admiralty Courts and Parlements were amongst the first victims of the Revolution. Many primary materials for the nineteenth century are collected in Peabody and Boulle, Le droit des noirs en France au temps de l’esclavage, 131–243, to which I would refer the reader for a more ample treatment. Pruitt also discusses the situation in Nantes after the Revolution, which shows much continuity until the black presence in the city had almost completely disappeared in the 1840s. Pruitt (2005), pp. 103–148.

Arrêté du 13 messidor an X (2 juil. 1802) portant défense aux noirs [etc.] d’entrer sans authorisation sur le territoire continental de la République in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 178.

Arrêté ministériel de juillet 1807, extrait de la lettre du préfet de Loire-Inférieure au maire de Nantes, 3 aôut 1807 in Ibid., 179.

Ibid., 184.

Circulaire ministérielle confidentiele aux administrateurs des colonies “sur le passage en France des personnes de couleur”, 5 août 1818 in Ibid., 199

Ibid., 212.

Circulaire du ministre de la Marine aux administrateurs des colonies, 3 mars 1824, et des ports, 6 mars 1824 in Ibid., 205.

Ibid., pp. 211–216.

On the affaire Furcy, see Peabody (2009), (2015), (2017).

Ordonnance du Roi relative aux esclaves des colonies amenés ou envoyés en France par leurs maîtres, 29 April 1836 in Boulle and Peabody (2014), p. 226.

Arrêt de la Cour royale de Paris dans l’affaire Furcy, 23 décembre 1843 in Ibid., pp. 232–233.