Federal Hearing
At a shorter sentencing hearing in April 1974 in the federal District Court across the street from the Dane County Courthouse in Madison, Karlton Armstrong faced the court concerning the attempted aerial bombing of the Badger Army Ammunition Plant near Baraboo as well as the AMRC bombing.
He had the opportunity in his second hearing to answer the arguments, first, that his actions led to anarchy and, second, that he felt no remorse. The former, he maintained, “is just another variation of the �red herring’ used to destroy or repress opposition to government policy in the past. The anarchy the prosecution speaks of was already being perpetrated by his client in Indo-China.” His actions threatened a governmental policy in the interest of a very few, while it is “the duty of every person in this country to try to decide if the government’s acts are �intelligent’ and �moral’ and to change or stop the government’s acts if they are not so.” When all democratic and legal means have been exhausted, “then that person must decide whether the use of violence is justified to end the government’s crimes.” The Watergate events and the Pentagon Papers case reveal how the government acted illegally, abused and manipulated the processes of democracy, and suppressed opposition to the war. “This same government is now asking for more blood, mine, to try to cover its own crimes by trying to make those who resisted them criminals.”44As for remorse, Armstrong maintained that the prosecutor must not have listened at the mitigation hearing. He did bear full responsibility for the death and injuries as a result of the AMRC bombing. “What I am not remorseful about is the remorse which the prosecutor really speaks of—remorse for trying to destroy war facilities. My acts did not intend that anyone die; they were intended to save untold lives and stop the suffering of Third World people.” That remorse “will never be forthcoming; no matter how severely the prosecutor would have me punished.” He concluded by saying that he would not be rehabilitated in prison.
“No sentence is going to deter anyone who acts from their conscience and love for life.” He signed his statement to the court, “Karl Armstrong, P.O.W., Waupun Prison.”45Recognizing that he was dealing with the “bitter fruit of a bitter season in the history of our country,” Federal Judge James E. Doyle considered that the American people had made the judgment that both the military action in Southeast Asia and Armstrong’s actions were wrong. Judge Doyle rejected punishment for vengeance or for retribution, but gave consideration to questions of what sentence would deter others, how the community could be protected from Armstrong, and the type of sentence needed, if any, for his rehabilitation. Avowing that his best practical judgment led him to believe in general deterrence, Judge Doyle suggested that fringe sympathizers with militant groups might be deterred by the knowledge that they would be punished if they attempted, as Armstrong did, to use violence in imposing their will on others. Likewise, he pointed out, given a similar set of circumstances, perhaps United States military action in Palestine or South Africa, Armstrong might be deterred from attempting to use violence to win his point. Discounting the bravado of Armstrong’s statement as understandable in light of seeing “his 1970 moment on center stage drown in the relentless torrent of 1974’s new crimes in the United States and in the world, it would be natural to assert rather stridently one’s political immortality.” It would be reasonable to expect that further violence from Armstrong is unlikely.46
As for Armstrong’s rehabilitation, Judge Doyle admitted that if it meant conditioning him to a proestablishment philosophy, the government had no right to do it, and if it meant developing a perspective skeptical of slogans and movement, although he was in need of it, prison was not the place. Judge Doyle concluded by recognizing general deterrence as the primary consideration, but, with due respect to the state court, twenty-five years seemed an extravagant response to the need for general deterrence. Consequently, he made the federal sentence a term of ten years, made it concurrent with the state sentence, and gave the federal parole board complete discretion over the sentence.47