Conclusion

Mark Walters asserts that the �challenge for judges is identifying for the legal system a theory of fundamental law that somehow fits within the matrix of doctrinal, institutional, and traditional assumptions that together define the character of the legal system.’^[1139] Our courts have declared that judicial review on constitutional grounds, a semblance of separation of powers and judicial independence rest at the core of our constitutions, and that these concepts can be located within our constitutional texts but do not depend on textual expression.

Not surprisingly, the rule of law is emerging as part of our inherent constitution. It is the foundation of separation of powers, judicial independence and judicial review. Given its overarching concern with constraining the arbitrary exercise of state power, it can provide some guidance on the proper limits of the other implied norms. The rule of law, for example, demands an appropriate distribution of state power to ensure accountability and limit abuse of state power. A very strict separation of powers is not necessary to meet those goals, and indeed might undermine them if it generates independence without accountability. Likewise, Suratt’s extension and containment of the principle of judicial independence could be explained using the overarching principle of the rule of law. It could be argued that the doctrine promotes the expansion of access to justice through the establishment of new judicial bodies while, at the same time, insisting that new tribunals enjoy the appropriate protection for their independence. The rule of law as an implied constitutional norm and part of our fundamental law fits in with traditional understandings of constitutional law in the Commonwealth Caribbean. It could clarify the meaning of already accepted implied constitutional norms and it can also help to make our constitutions our own and attentive to our needs.