Lawyers’ Self-image as Professionals

Self-image is a term, originating in psychology and later developed by psychoanaly­sis, referring to the representations that individuals have of themselves (Meffre, 2005: 1571-72).

In so doing, the study offers an attempt at an embryonic explanatory framework revolving around self-image that is intended to open a dialogue and initiate debate. This usage is not to suggest that alternative theoretical positions lack validity as, for example, Hoyle's (1998) research on the use of language by police wherein dispar­aging statements are made as something of a stress reliever, without any necessary underlying feeling. As such, she sees no reason to search for pervasive or long-term influences. However, Shiner's (2010) more recent study on police activity uses self­image as a means by which move beyond Hoyle's (1998) work. Delving deeper into the psychological processes underlying what the police say allows their exploits to be conceptualised as organisational defence mechanisms, deeds privy to change as they are exposed to particular stimuli. This highlights the value of Freudian theory; it allows the prospect of a more multifaceted, profound analysis with which to aug­ment existing knowledge.

When considering self-image, Freud represents the most notable authority (Carveth, 1996: 25-29). Indeed, it was Freud's work that really legitimised the seek­ing of the impact that subconscious processes exert on personality (Brym and Lie: 2007: 96-99). Freudian theory long ago permeated day-to-day life and popular cul­ture, from common conversational recourse to concepts such as the Freudian slip, to attempts at looking for the meaning behind apparently irrational acts. However, Bocock (1981: 346-47) highlights the extent to which Freud's work has been much maligned in the British social sciences - in stark contrast to the engagement of scholars in France, Germany and the United States. Freud's work is highly theoreti­cal, and makes claims to scientific validation, so presenting itself as a particularly dense grand narrative. As the twentieth century progressed, all-encompassing, positivistic, theories became increasingly unpopular, and Freud did not make the inroads that Marx's equally comprehensive oeuvre had previously. This has been attributed to a fundamental failure of sociologists to approach Freud as a social theorist, rather ghettoising him to the realm of ‘the therapist' (Bocock, 1981: 357-58).

Freud focused largely on the unconscious; however, it would be a mistake to consider his work as shut off from the social (Craib, 1989: 2-7). Indeed, Freud (1989d: 794) saw sociology as a type of applied psychology - a means to watch his theories play out. In this manner, Golding (1982: 556-57) depicts Freudian theory as occupying a crossroads between society and individual, exploring the ways in which the social entered the individual and the effect that what happened within subsequently had on the social. So it is that Parsons (1964: 78-79) posits social theory lacking if it does not give due attention to such psychic mechanisms.

Any attempt to fulfil this, though, should be premised upon an acknowledgment of Freud's flaws. In particular, Freud was misplaced in positioning his psychoanaly­sis as a science. Popper (2006: 43-51) debunks such claims as failing to satisfy the ‘falsifiability criterion' that separates ‘genuine' from ‘pseudo' science. Indeed, even an advocate like Craib (1998: 69-70) is duly alert to the manner in which Freudian theory has long been expressed in dogmatic, exclusive and bigoted terms by some of its advocates. This is an unpleasant - possibly dangerous - element, which does not allow criticism or deviation. However, this usage should not blind one to the insights held within, which even Popper (2005: 17) was want to recognise. Perhaps the most fruitful way to do this would be to pay heed to the bricolage style taken by Butler (1999) in her Gender Trouble. Despite initial feminist opposition to Freud, Butler (1999: 73-84) follows a host of post-structuralist scholars in engaging with Freud and, in so doing, she makes selective use of particular Freudian concepts.

Though Freud (1995b: 171) has shown himself appalled by such ‘eclecticism', this approach allows insight to be drawn without chapter and verse adherence to the cannon. Being open to the possibility of alternative accounts allows many of the pitfalls of Freudian theory to be avoided. Freud's greatest legacy to social theory is the set of conceptual tools which can be drawn upon to reveal the otherwise hidden processes which might influence social actors (Young, 1940: 869).

For Freud (1989c: 630-31), self-image is tied into the ego. Ego sits alongside id and super-ego as the three parts of Freud's (1989c: 631-40) vision of the human mind. The id represents the base level of the mind. Entirely unconscious, the id is that uncoordinated and instinctual part of the mind constituting the basic drives which seek to follow the ‘pleasure principle' of avoiding pain or discomfort (Freud, 1989a: 301-02). On the other hand, the super-ego works in contradiction to the id, at the top layer of the mind. Mainly unconscious, it strives for social acceptability, fulfilling the critical and moralising element of the mind as it seeks perfection. Mediating these can be found the ego, striking a balance between the primitive drives of the former and the idealistic assessments of the latter. It is this part of the mind which contains the consciousness.

The term ego derives from a Latin translation of Freud and it is, perhaps, more accurate to use direct translation of the original German, whence das ich can be understood as ‘the I' (Bettelheim, 1983: 53). With this handle, the concept of ego seems rather more self-explanatory; though Freud later refined his conception, the ego can be understood to correspond with a ‘sense of self - the understanding most beneficial for this lay application (Levine, 2000: 107-08). As such, the ego is the part of the mind that allows individuals to deal with reality and go about their everyday lives, enabling the individual to satisfy their desires in socially appropriate ways. In this manner, the ego plays a central role in self-image. Self-image is constituted by various interrelations between the three parts of Freud's structural model of the psyche - ego, id and super-ego - notably involving the ‘ego-ideal', a model of perfection that the ego attempts to achieve (Freud, 1989b: 556-60).

This ego-ideal begins in the super-ego, which Freud (1995a: 81) suggests pro­vides ‘the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emu­lates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfil'. The ego-ideal replaces childhood narcissism; as belief in one's own perfection is lost, the ego-ideal offers the possibility of its realisation in the future. To achieve this, the individual sets rules and standards of good behaviour. When these are achieved, feelings of pride, value and accomplishment are duly experienced.

Select insights from Freudian theory can be adapted and applied when consider­ing the lawyers in this research and their self-image. The interview data revealed the satisfaction with which they self-identified as professionals. The lawyers expressed those feelings of pride, value and accomplishment in this designation; it seemed to offer a sense of perfection for which they had strived. In occupying this role, lawyers were imbued with an awareness of their own importance, revelling in the responsi­bility placed in their hands. As such, 31 out of the 35 lawyers - from all firms - pre­sented this position, as characterised by the following examples:

I am proud to be in criminal defence. It's an ego thing, I suppose; I think it's hugely important. You have a member of the public who knows nothing and they have the might of the state against them and we are the knights in shining armour standing between the individual and the dragon of the state.

(Mike, senior partner, Radison and Muddle, INT)

Criminal defence work is important and I think societies are often judged on how they treat the sick, the mentally ill and their own criminal population. There is part of me that feels incredibly privileged to be a part of all of this, to have a perception of this and a knowledge and an understanding of our society that means, one, I am not scared of it, and, two, I'm trying in some small way to do something that contributes perhaps to improving it.

(Eileen, solicitor, Radcliffe and Musk, INT)

It is understandable that the lawyers should revel in such a title. To be considered a professional in the United Kingdom is a rank permeated with the trappings of high social status: an association with the aristocracy and nobility that stretches back to the establishment of the three learned professions - law, medicine and the clergy - in Medieval England (Freidson, 1994: 16-19). Recognition as a professional was seen to confer ‘gentlemanly’ or ‘gentry’ status, and so was highly sought after (Freidson, 1994: 17-18). Accordingly, the legal profession is well characterised by Elliot (1972: 14) terming it a ‘status profession’, existing in some contrast to the lesser ‘occupational professions’ of more recent times.

The deference that so elevates the status of these professions in the United Kingdom has been characterised as ‘the British disease’ (Fores and Glover, 1978) and is well evinced in a cross-national study of first-year law students (Asimow et al, 2005). That research features students drawn from institutions in Argentina, Australia, Germany and the United States, but it was those in English and Scottish universities who provided the greatest conviction as to the exalted status that law­yers held. Over 80 per cent of British respondents believed that lawyers hold ‘a lot of prestige’, contrasting sharply with the 44 per cent in Buenos Aires (Asimow et al, 2005: 421). So it is that Francis and Sommerlad (2009: 73-78) are able to document some of the ways in which the legal profession has striven to maintain social closure for those hailing from backgrounds rich in social and cultural capital. This repre­sents a profession at pains to preserve itself as a class apart. As such, it seems clear that, in seeing themselves as professionals, the self-satisfaction of the lawyers I interviewed was essentially founded upon the high status they felt it conferred.

However, such a claim was problematic in that such high status was not reflected when it came to the matter of how they were valued financially. This presented a challenge to the lawyers’ self-image.