Sociological institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism, much like historical institutionalism, had its beginnings in the late 1970s, mainly in the sociological sub-field of organizational theory. Sociological institutionalists also rejected the older methodological approaches, including behaviourism, systems approaches, as well as rational choice analyses.

Rationality for sociological institutionalists is socially constructed and culturally and historically contingent. It is defined by cultural institutions which set the limits of the imagination, establishing basic preferences and identity and setting the context within which purposive, goal-oriented action is deemed acceptable according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (see DiMaggio and Powell 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March and Olsen 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977; see also the discussions in Campbell 2004; Campbell and Pederson 2001: 7-8; Hall and Taylor 1996: 947-8). Sociological institutionalism is thus in direct contradiction to rationalists’ views of human behaviour as following a ‘logic of interest’ which is prior to institutions, by which individuals may be affected but not defined.

Sociological institutionalist analyses that are particularly significant for political scientists include Frank Dobbin’s (1994) study of nineteenth­century railways policy, where reasonably similar policies were ‘concealed’ as state actions in the United States but ‘revealed’ as state actions in France; Neil Fligstein’s (1990) account of the transformation of corporate control as resulting from change not just in economic environments but also in corporate leaders’ perceptual lenses; and Yasemin Soysal’s (1994) contrast of immigration policy in Europe and America, which showed the import­ance of distinctive ‘incorporation regimes’ for absorbing immigrants based on differing models of citizenship. In political science itself, the seminal work is by James March and Johan Olsen (1989), who argued that cultural as well as historical structures matter, and who therefore have been claimed as one of their own by historical institutionalists as much as by sociological institutionalists. More recently, a number of political scientists have moved to sociological institutionalism (see Finnemore 1996a), in particular in international relations, where they often call themselves ‘constructivists.’ Most notable has been Peter Katzenstein’s edited volume (1996a) that focuses on how interests develop from state identities, with norms acting as collective expectations about the proper behaviour for a given identity, and with state identities structuring national perceptions of defence and security issues.

Sociological institutionalism works best at delineating the shared under­standings and norms that frame action, shape identities, influence interests, and affect what are perceived as problems and what are conceived as solu­tions. It stands in direct opposition to rational choice institutionalism in its assumption that norms, identities, and culture constitute interests, and are therefore endogenous because embedded in culture, as opposed to seeing interests as exogenous and culture, norms, and identity epiphenomena that follow from interests rather than preceding them (see Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1987).

But as a result, rather than being too general, it is sometimes accused of being too specific, and the ‘cultural knowledge’ it provides useful mainly as preliminary to rational choice universalization. However, when the objects of sociological institutionalism are subsumed under rational choice expla­nation, often the very essence of sociological institutionalism - the norms, rules, and reasons which are culturally unique or anomalous because they do not fit generally expected interest-motivations - get lost. Because such explanations are arrived at inductively rather than deductively, they can lend insight into individuals’ reasons for action in ways that rational choice institutionalism cannot, whether they fit the norm or depart from it. Moreover, because such explanations account contextually for individuals’ reasons for action, sociological institutionalism is better able to explain the events out of which historical institutional explanations are constructed. And because sociological institutional explanations emphasize the role that collective processes of interpretation and legitimacy play in the creation and development of institutions, they can account for the inefficiencies in institutions that rational choice institutionalism cannot (Meyer and Rowan 1977; see discussion in Hall and Taylor 1996: 953).

However, because sociological institutionalism makes no universalistic claims about rationality and is generally focused on explanation within rather than across cultures, it risks an implicit relativism which leads one to question whether sociological institutionalism allows for any cross­national generalizations at all. In fact, generalizations are possible here too, by invoking similarities as well as differences in cultural norms and identities, much in the way of historical institutionalism with country­specific institutional structures and processes. The resulting explanation, however, involves a lower level of generality and less parsimonious, ‘thicker description’ than in historical institutionalism, let alone rational choice institutionalism.

Finally, rather than appearing either economically or historically deterministic, sociological institutionalism can appear culturally determin­istic where it emphasizes the cultural routines and rituals to the exclusion of individual action which breaks out of the cultural norm, i.e., rule-creating action as opposed to rule-following action. Moreover, its emphasis on macro-patterns may make it appear like ‘action without agents’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 954) or, worse, structures without agents (see the critique by Checkel 1998: 335). And like the rational choice approach, it too can be too static or equilibrium-focused, and unable to account for change over time - although where it adds a historical perspective, it can also show how norms are institutionalized, as in the case of the police and military in post­war Japan and Germany (Katzenstein l996b) or how state identities can change and pull interests along with them, as in the case of anti-militarism in Germany and Japan (Berger 1998).