The foregoing discussion in Part A of moral scepticism and several of its ramifications will form the backdrop of my consideration of aspects of legal theory.
By that I mean that the picture of law soon to be presented rests veiy much on the view of reason, human interaction and morality that I have already presented in the first part of this book.
Even the questions I will ask about law, no less than the answers 1 will suggest, have been shaped by the conclusions of the first six chapters. Quite simply, my moral scepticism will permeate my conception of law, my legal theory.Nevertheless a familiarity with the detailed argument of Part A will be unnecessary in order to follow the thrust of my views about legal theory. Those who wish will be able to read this part of the book, if not as a stand alone whole then at most with a concomitant understanding that the author follows in the tradition of Hobbes and Hume in believing values and value judgements to be radically subjective. Questions of justice, of right, of fairness will be disputed and no answer to such disagreements about values can ever rise above the relative and the contingent. That the author believes there are no mind-independent or non-contingent resolutions to such disputes, therefore, is the only pre-requisite to comprehending this latter portion of the book. So I would not discourage anyone whose interest or inclination to read extended no further than legal theory. Besides, some few of such readers might, if I manage to stimulate or provoke, be spurred to go back and study the sceptical conception of morality just offered.
A discussion of what underpins, validates and legitimizes judicial interpretation, including the issue of what constraints there are on those with the final authority to resolve disputes, begins this second part.
a)
More on the topic The foregoing discussion in Part A of moral scepticism and several of its ramifications will form the backdrop of my consideration of aspects of legal theory.:
- The discussion about principles in contemporary legal theory: How it all started
- Moral Scepticism and the Meaning of Moral Statements
- PART B: LEGAL THEORY FROM THE SCEPTIC’S VANTAG
- PART 1 Revisiting the Idea of Autonomy in Federalism: Theoretical Consideration
- In building my case for moral scepticism I begin with reason, by deciding what can be considered its ambit and abilities.
- Acceptance that there simply are no transcendent, objective, mind-independent moral values would seem to bear on how one comprehends rights, more particularly moral or non-legal rights.
- PART A: A CASE FOR MORAL SCEPTICIS
- B. Legal and Moral Validity
- A LEGAL AND MORAL DIVERGENCE
- Atienza Manuel, Manero Juan Ruiz. A Theory of Legal Sentences. Springer Netherlands,1998. — 205 p., 1998
- What moral ‘facts’ could lie behind the variety of moral notions — and what is often their bedrock, religious notions — which have manifested themselves in myriad institutions and norms of behaviour and which appear to be relative to time, place and circumstances?
- 1. Permission in contemporary legal theory
- The question of whether there is such a thing as permissive norms is one of the most hotly debated issues in legal theory.
- Besides these internal distinctions, principles must also be distinguished, so to speak, externally, from other standards of behaviour that can be part of a legal system.
- Chapter Six Ramifications and Reckonings