Excursus 1. Terminology
The older books, if they gave any place to advocates at all, usually made some remarks about the Latin words for �advocate’ in relation to the history of the �profession’.[428] The standard conclusion was to infer from the word patronus that Roman advocacy arose from the aid given by the early Roman patronus to his cliens.
None of those writers discussed the Greek terminology or considered it relevant, nor, consequently, the epigraphy, let alone the papyrology.In 1958 appeared a monograph by W. Neuhauser,[429] which examined the history of the terms patronus and orator, arguing for their original separateness and eventual coalescence in the Ciceronian age. For present purposes that canvas is obviously too restricted; but the monograph also exhibited certain weaknesses that tend to plague the subject, and so cannot be left unexamined. Neuhauser seems to have supposed that every term in every context has a single, unequivocal sense, and that all statements, in whatever source, are seeking to be assertions
IV. Advocacy in the traditional material 147 of fact: he makes insufficient allowance for the subtlety, elusiveness and multivalence of language, for the different levels of discourse, or for the existence of normative statements, such as Cicero makes when talking about the ideal orator.
Neuhauser argued that the catalyst that resulted in his chosen terms, originally of different origins, coalescing by the late Republic was the arrival of Greek rhetoric on the Roman scene. He continued - though he did not discuss it in detail - that as a result of the loss of importance allegedly suffered by forensic rhetoric under the Principate the words went their separate ways again and the normal word for an advocate came to be aduocatus.172 To start with, he gave the word patronus a bizarre etymology, which presupposed that in early Rome the patronus 'Nas a pater over the gens and �ruler over everything that belonged to the gens’: the clientes were not merely vassals,173 they were not even sui iuris, and the patronus had ius uitae et necis over them.174 But although there was indeed a formal clientela, the alleged potestas is a figment.175 And when Neuhauser turned to study patronus in the literature he exerted himself to down-date the cases in Plautus where patronus means an advocate,176 claiming that it �really’ meant something else, and omitting altogether to note that people are already being offered patroni (clearly advocates) in the lex repetunda- rum.1'' As for orator in the literature, Neuhauser evidently supposed that there was no eloquence at all at Rome until Greek theory provided it, so that Naeuius’ �oratores noui, stulti adulescentuli’ cannot have meant what Cicero178 thought they meant but must have been �statesmen’ or �ambassadors’.
For he contends that, originally, Roman oratores were nothing to do with the courts but were political speakers. But the notion of that separation is another figment; and Neuhauser seems incapable of allowing that a word might have different meanings. He correctly states that in Plautus and other authors orator often means an ambassador or go-between; but in Stichus172 This is based on Dial. 1.
173 As in 104 Grellet-Dumazeau, 39, n. 3.
174 Neuhauser projects this back from a supposed �Herrschaft’ of patron over freedman; but that potestas is a figment, see 269 Treggiari, 71-3.
175 See the previous note.
176 Plaut. Vidul. 60-2 (which he tries, contra metrum, to emend); Men. 585.
177 FIRA I 7, lines 9-11. See p. 125 and n. 32, above; also Ch. II, p. 47 and n. 72.
178 Cic. Cat. 20.
495 it plainly and squarely means an advocate:
�equidem hercle orator sum, sed procedit parum.’ Neuhauser is intent on persuading us that only from Cicero on (and because of Cicero) did orator become a word of rhetorical terminology - only Livy being old-fashioned - and that that is to be laid at the door of Greek rhetoric.[430]
When he comes to discuss aduocatus in the literature, Neuhauser insists that originally that word had nothing to do with patronus because the aduocatus did not plead but only advised.[431] He is relying on a much-quoted passage of the pseudo-Asconius:[432] �qui defendit alterum in iudicio aut patronus dicitur si orator est aut aduocatus si aut ius suggerit aut praesentiam suam commodat amico’ �he who defends another in court is either called patronus if he is a speaker or aduocatus if he is prompting him in law or lending his presence to a friend’. That is seductive; but it is a classic case of the �normative’ definition - the professor pointing out what the word �really means’. Terence and Plautus already have aduocati who are pleaders,[433] while Quintilian still has aduocati who just advise.[434] Aduocati, explains Neuhauser, being men who knew the law, took over the pleading function from the old patroni because there was an escalation of the amount of law to know; but he thereby commits himself to a gross paradox, for he believes, as much as everyone else seems to, that the advocates of the Ciceronian age were not learned in the law: what he would have to explain, and cannot, is why the aduocatus ceased to be someone learned in the law.
The truth is subtler and less striking than all those hard-edged dogmatisms. The terms certainly had different origins and original contexts, and they never at any period overlapped in all contexts; but they all overlapped a good deal quite early on, and continued to do so. That is not to deny or doubt that patronus shows that advocacy grew out of the help of
IV. Advocacy in the traditional material 149 patron to client[435] and that aduocatus shifted from being an adviser to being a pleader and became synonymous with patronus. The question left unexplained is what happened to cause orator to cease to be an ordinary word for â€?advocate’[436] - not that it very often had been - and come to be used only normatively: de oratore, institutiones oratoriae. Maybe that was the real Ciceronianism.[437] But it is not made any less odd by the fact that the standard word in the papyri is, precisely, rhetor. Against that background the striking phenomenon is the survival of patronus, and with the old nuance of advocate for the defence.[438] For notwithstanding the pseudo-Asconius, aduocaÂtus and patronus went on being synonyms,[439] and were joined by causidicus. '
Minor terminology need not occupy us for more than a moment. The fact that there were plenty of slang - even abusive - names for advocates is not surprising or interesting; but one word must just be mentioned lest its omission seem odd, Greek parakletos, the closest verbal analogy to aduocatus. Through �If any man sin, we have a parakleton pros ton patera’ (I John 2,1) it became the great word of Christian metaphor, and even got back into the Latin form paracletus·, but it was not a regular synonym in legal literature or the epigraphy or papyrology for a practising advocate, and scholars suppose that it signified something more like the assumed original meaning of aduocatus, someone who is brought in to �put in a word’.[440]
One other role also demands brief inspection here, for reasons that should gradually become more apparent: that of the �back-room boy’ who assists the advocate, partly with technical legal help but probably in other practical matters as well, the pragmatikos I pragmaticus.[441] He appears in a well-known line of Juvenal.[442] �The Greeks have them’, says Cicero,[443] �infimi homines’, who �mercedula adducti ministros se praebent in iudiciis oratoribus’ �for a fee offer themselves as legal assistants to orators’.
They may be advocates themselves, though minor ones, according to Quintilian;[444] [445] but that sounds a different role from that of the �pure’ pragmaticus who �tela agentibus subministrat’, and perhaps there was seen to be a difference between both those and the failed advocates who fell back on giving legal advice, formularii and legulei^ - or perhaps there was very little difference. The only important aspect of the matter is the existence of minores aduocati who were periti iuris. Quintilian says it is humiliating for an advocate (i.e. a �real’ one) to be stuck for his law and have to turn to such a person; and, anyway, �quid si peritus iuris file non aderit’ �what if the said legal expert isn’t available’?[446] But those sound like the men drawn attention to by Kunkel,[447] who were capable of �riding on either saddle’, at a level, to be sure, below the grand metropolitan practitioners.That is our cue to turn to the epigraphy, for some fresher material to consider alongside the by now rather outworn literary references. Included with it is a little papyrological evidence that belongs here rather than in Chapter III. The analysis will not be formalistic but flexible, in order to stay close to the untidy reality. Most of the inscriptions are funerary or otherwise honorific; a high proportion of them are Greek, and from the Greek-speaking part of the Roman world, and all of them belong to the period of the Principate and later. Those features are blessings, for they extend the range of consideration of advocates in the legal order in the way the present study demands, and furnish links across the terminology which offer a better view of the diversity of professional involvement in the law in the time of the Roman empire.197 The material is organised, in what follows, in three large, rough groups.
1. Aduocatus / synegoros
There are plenty of quite high-status aduocati·.
several are equites Romani or of high curial rank. Particularly interesting is a group from Africa of early to mid-third century AD,198 in which advocates honour the governor, e.g. CIL VIII 2734, �To M. Aurelius Cominius Cassianus [titles of governor], their patron, T. Fl. Siluanus eq(ues) R(omanus), aduocat(us) [and others], who have so long admired the judgments of his forum and his justice’. In CIL VIII 2775, from Lambaesis, one M. Valerius Valerianus is described as aduocatus Karthag. It seems natural to conclude from this evidence that there are already in Africa, in Severan times, advocates attached to a particular �Bar’;199 that would be no surprise in the light of the Egyptian material, and it does not prove that those men were confined to the one Bar.For equally plain synegoros by itself the inscriptional harvest, for the Roman period, is almost non-existent - save for a verse epitaph from Syria too long to quote,200 a second-century set of accounts on papyrus recording payments for various purposes, including one to a synegoros 201 and a papyrus letter of Augustan date (which is nice) containing the remark that �Apis the synegoros has not yet reviewed the documents, but has put them off day by day’.202 But the relative absence of �pure’ synegoros is misleading, as will emerge.
As appendix to the aduocatus-group may be cited a little crop of other titles. There is causarum orator·203 there are two
197 Some important inscriptions have already been adduced in Ch. Ill, section 3, above. A good start was made by 117 Hitzig and by 64 de Ruggiero. Subsequently, see 30 Broughton IV, 585; 152 Kunkel, 264-70; 229 Robert on nomikoi; 245 Seidl; 196 Norr on pragmatikoi·, 169 and 170 Liebs.
198 AE 1911, 99; AE 1917/8, 73; CIL VIII2734; 2393; 2743.
199 Coinciding with the conclusions drawn from the papyrological evidence in Ch. Ill, above.
200 Kaibel, Epigr.
Gr. 442 (=Peek, no. 1974), dated to the fourth century ad by Robert, REG 1961, 252. The appearance of the term in the �Edict of Ti. Julius Alexander’, OGIS 669 (= SB 8444), AD 69, see Chalon, L’edit de Tiberius Julius Alexander, Lausanne, 1964, 198-201, is not really a propos.201 P.Tebt. 1091; cf. payment to a rhetor, P.Amh. 128 (=P.Sarap. 67). But not all rhetores were advocates, see below.
202 P.Oxy. 1479.
203 ILS 4152; 7746 (both late); and see n. 205, below. causarum patroni, one an eques Romanus204 and one very grand indeed, though late;205 one man �causas egit annis 38’,206 one �causas orauit’ and lived to 43, another to 75.207 And causidicus provides a small but satisfactory haul. First there are two �straight’ ones from Rome and Mainz, with dates;208 next there is a Wunderkind from Milan, who died at the age of 23, having been five times on delegations to Rome and elsewhere, whose figured monument illustrates the job of a busy pleader;209 next again a iuuenis eruditus, causidicus bis who only lived to 19;210 but finally, and unforgettably, the first-century tomb, from the city of Rome, of the man who was the emperor Tiberius’ imitator, �qui primus inuenit causidicos imitari’ �who invented how to mimic advocates’!211
But the matter of first importance about this group is what, for want of a more elegant term, may be called its â€?shadings-off - and in three directions. The first is soon dealt with: one man (he died at 36) on a Roman inscription is called both aduocatus and iuris peritus.[448] The second takes us to aduocatus (patronus) fisci (eighteen inscriptions) / synegoros (rhetor) tameiou (sic) (six inscriptions). To be noticed is the evidence afforded that besides the aduocatus fisci at Rome there were aduocati fisci in individual provinces[449] and departments of the administraÂtion.[450] They were quite often equites Romani or local bigwigs; but they were also sometimes quite young. The third direction in which aduocatus points is the complex aduocatus rei publicae, aduoc. populi, aduoc. publicus, actor rei publicae I synegoros or pragmatikos tes poleos or patridos. It is a big historical area, and can only be dealt with here in so far as demanded by the present subject; it picks up again the requirement in the third section of Chapter II above to set the boundaries of advocacy wide. The
204 ILS 6744.
208 CIL X 4560, probably Ragonius Celsus, ILS 1272. See PLRE I, s.v. Ragonius Vincentius Celsus, where the reading is causarum [oratori],
206 ILS 7445.
207 AE 1953, 200, Rome; ILS 7747, Lambaesis.
208 CIL VI9240; XIII 7063.
209 ILS 6732; see 60 David.
210 Wilmanns 2472 (=Mommsen, Inscr. Helv. 117).
IV. Advocacy in the traditional material 153 municipalities employed advocates for many purposes in legal relations with their own citizens, with other municipalities, and with central government. Not all the uses were strictly forensic, nor all the persons so used regular advocates, and pragmatikos is not only - perhaps not even usually - an advocate:[451] he may just be a business manager looking after the affairs of a city (and somebody hated the fellows: â€?let them not be recommended to the divinity!’).[452] [453] But pragmatikos tes poleos I aduocatus rei publicae211 tends to be of equestrian status and to have held all the local magistracies; the only one of whom we know his further career, C. Caluisius Statianus from Verona,[454] a friend of Fronto, went on to be ab epistulis and, in 174, Prefect of Egypt. The people already looked at in Chapter II were doing that kind of job, which itself shades off into â€?embassies’ or delegations.[455] 2. Orator / rhetor As regards the second of these words care must be taken not to misinterpret the record, because a rhetor may not be a forensic speaker but a rhetoric-teacher, a schoolmaster, or a practising rhetorician but of a wholly epideictic kind;[456] and some of the contexts in which rhetores occur are just lists of people owning property or, in one papyrus, a kind of town directory.[457] One rhetor witnesses a document,[458] one writes a document for an illiterate.[459] On the other hand, P. Hordeonios Lollianos, the sophist, who was amphoteron rhetera dikon meletesi t’ariston[460] â€?advocate of both laws and supreme at exercises’, was surely a forensic as well as an epideictic practitioner, and returns us to the domain of the Second Sophistic, of which it will be necessary to say more.225 And M. Oulpios Isodemos, â€?the most celebrated of rhetors’, honoured for his eunoia eis ten eparcheian â€?good will towards the province’226 had surely been advocate on its behalf, like Diotrephes, the rhetor of Antioch-on-the-Maeander.227 And for an overlap we can cite L. Annianos, rhetor kai nomikos, of Thyatira.228 As for orator, it is not on all fours with rhetor, even in the forensic use of the latter. Oratores seem to be men of social distinction: they include some men of senatorial rank (indeed, the epigraphically attested ones nearly all are), and they â€?run late’. One was patron of Sorrento;229 one is described as â€?oratori praestantissimo’ and â€?defensori clientium fidelissimo’,230 and was probably C. lulius Asper, consul for the second time in AD 212; one, M. Postumius Festus, another friend of Fronto, was â€?oratorem utraque facundia maximum’ â€?a very great orator in both eloquences’231 like Lollianos above; one, mentioned by Philostratus, C. Sallius Aristaenetus, â€?orator maximus’, had a career in legal administration - decemuir stlitibus iudicandis, praetor tutelaris, iuridicus;232 one was â€?orator et poeta illustris’, which might take him out of the forensic domain, except that he rose to be iuridicus of Spain and governor of Moesia;233 — and one was Symmachus. Evidently in the heyday of the Roman empire, and on into the Late Empire, people of note liked to have themselves recorded as oratores - and that in an age when we are asked to believe that rhetoric was dead! 3. luris peritus, iuris studiosus, iuris prudens I nomikos Those terms sound as if they were hardly the business of the present study: â€?nihil ad Ciceronem: ad ius’ is irresistible; but there are some overlaps that need exploring. The Latin terms are rare in inscriptions. They can be found in tandem with the Greek term, as in the case of the Bithynian who is 225 In Ch. V, at pp. 186-7, below. 226 Arch. Anz. 57 (1942), 24 (=Robert, Hellenica V 34). And see p. 156, below. 227 SEG XXXI (1981) 899, first century bc. 228IGRRIV1226. 229 CILX 862. 230 CIL XIV 2516. 231 ILS 2929. 232 ILS 2934. 233 ILS 2939. IV. Advocacy in the traditional material 155 commemorated as[461] â€?A. Servilius Maximus iuris prudens: A. Serbeilios Maximos nomikos’, and in the Edict on Maximum Prices of Diocletian, where fees are fixed for â€?aduocato siue iuris perito’ and, correspondingly, for dikologoi etoi nomikoi (dative), for petitions, i.e. preliminary statements of case, and for the â€?day in court’.[462] The Price Edict is probably also a case of the link between aduocatus and iuris peritus, because the phrase in each case looks like a hendiadys: either man would perform either task. In any event, links with aduocatus are provided by the man at Rome already quoted who was aduocatus and iuris peritus and another man in an African inscription, â€?father of three equites Romani', who was â€?in foro iuris peritus’.[463] There are a clutch of iuris studiosi and a couple of magistri iuris, one of them an eques Romanus.[464] Nomikoi, by contrast, are the biggest epigraphical group of all.[465] They are found in the papyri as well as the inscriptions, and in the former they have always received a certain amount of attention (and have been noticed already where they occur in the papyri discussed in Chapter III above). Some of them â€?run very late’, showing that the terminology was extremely stable. They were, certainly, the people called in to advise judges (i.e. magistrates), and perhaps also litigants, about the law in the â€?conflict of laws’ situations that Rome had to cope with in the east. We have seen some such experts in the papyri already, advising on Greco-Egyptian law,[466] and one early third-century inscription records P. Pinnios loustos, senator of Amastris, nomikon, synkathedron of the Proconsul of Africa (where he would hardly have been advising on Greek local law, and the inscription comes from the Jewish cemetery at Sicca).[467] An important â€?overlap’ is Likinios Roupheinos, consularis, â€?syne- goros for the province in the matter of the union of the Thessalians’.[468] (The inscription is from Beroea, thus recalling the already quoted orator Ulpius Isodemos from that city who was honoured for his â€?good will towards the province’.)[469] For M. Cn. Licinius Rufinus was a jurist, called, in an inscription from Salonica, enpeirotatos nomon â€?most experienced in the laws’.[470] Thus the nomikos honoured at Philadelphia in Asia for â€?great services to the district of Pergamum’[471] may constitute another â€?overlap’;[472] and M. Aristonikos Timokrates, whom we met earlier,[473] â€?chosen advocate before the tribunals of the governors (or (?) emperors) on behalf of his ethnos', was, epi ton nomon empeiriai â€?by virtue of his experience in the laws’, head of a mouseion at Smyrna, which sounds more like a school of law than of rhetoric, though maybe both. L. Annianos, rhetor and nomikos, we have also encountered earlier:[474] he was high priest at Thyatira. (It must be admitted that there are disconcerting features about some of this epigraphical evidence. One nomikos died at 19, one at 20, one at 21.[475] One â€?very good’ nomikos was also a â€?writer of epic and new comedy and iamboi and composer of encomiastic speeches’,[476] sounding like one of those rhetors whose main business was festal.) Kunkel,[477] who took some inscriptional evidence into account, argued that a reunion of advocacy and legal learning began â€?especially in the second half of the second century’. Some of the â€?overlaps’ we have observed might be grist to his mill, for none of the nomi^os-material is likely to be earlier than the second century, and perhaps, in the man who ran that mouseion at Smyrna,[478] we might catch a glimpse of law-school training in the pre-Berytus age. But caution is called for, because there may always have been such â€?overlaps’ in the eastern half of the empire and at the less exalted levels of society; and the real IV. Advocacy in the traditional material 157 lesson may be not that there was a reuniting of the disciplines but that there was a tendency for people to exploit more than one skill and make a living at more than one job. The nomikoi in the papyri, some of whom we have met already, also do not occur much before the second century. Like the rhetores, they sometimes simply appear in lists of proprietors and the like: if you lived in a bourgeois street in an eastern town you were quite likely to have a rhetor or a nomikos as your neighbour.[479] They also simply turn up in private letters. We find them, however, drafting letters and docuÂments,[480] and translating: the best-known will on papyrus, that of C. Longinus Castor,[481] was translated by Gaios Loukeios (for Lucceius) Geminianus, nomikos Rhomaikos, and a new papyrus which is a more complete version than formerly available of another well-known text related to testation,[482] [483] [484] dated AD 249, ends with a similar formal declaration by the translator, nomikos Rhomaikos, i.e. a specialist in Roman legal drafting. Precisely another such specialist is loulios also called Sarapion, nomikos, who advises on the Roman practice about tabellae.266 We find the judge Lupus consulting his nomikoi (elsewhere in the papyrus it is called consultation meta ton philon)·251 we find nomikoi sometimes consulted by letter;[485] and we hear of payments to nomikoi for services unspecified.[486] Finally, in one papyrus, of Hadrianic date, there is a complaint of misbehaviour by hoi apo tes Aigyptou nomikoi:[487] they are failing, says the Prefect, to deposit asphaleiai ( = cautiones, securities) in the new Library of Hadrian as they have been told to. In that context they sound like what we might call â€?attorneys’. We do not find in the papyri nomikoi acting as pleaders. Nevertheless, taking all the material of this excursus as a whole, and adding it to the other epigraphical and papyrological evidence furnished in earlier pages, what stands out is the untidiness of the picture, the way in which the different roles within the law were carried out in many combinations. We may well find one important reason for that in the fact that cognitio extraordinaria did much to unify the branches and tasks of the law. But we must not forget that we have been what Cicero and Gallus would have regarded as â€?slumming’, for this excursus has been a â€?tale of ordinary folk’. Cicero would have regarded the standards of advocacy as low, and Gallus would have regarded those of jurisprudence as equally so. If, in this milieu and at this level, advocacy and legal knowledge tended to be the province of the same people, that cannot properly be regarded as a victory of jurisprudence over advocacy, of law over rhetoric.
More on the topic Excursus 1. Terminology:
- Questions of terminology
- Excursus 4. Quintilian
- Status, pay, the “decline of oratory”, and terminology
- Excursus 3. The controuersiae
- Excursus 2. The advocate as �representative’
- Excursus: Petitions and the �Narratio’ Documents
- Introduction
- CHAPTER V
- Contents
- The Ideas behind the Quasi Categories
- The criteria for direct effect
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- Humanitas and clementia: Augustus and Tiberius
- Libraries and learning resource centres
- C. The Empirical Basic Norm (Hart)