Clientelae and the claque

The extent to which the institution of patronage still existed in Roman soci­ety in the first and second century, after the emergence of the emperor as the supreme patron of all Romans, is an ongoing topic of debate within ancient studies.¹⁰³ During the formative period of the institution of patronage in the early Republic, one of the main arenas in which both patron and client had to fulfill their obligations was the courtroom.

ipse dies pulchro distinguitur ordine rerum: sportula, deinde forum iurisque peritus Apollo atque triumphales, inter quas ausus habere nescio quis titulos Aegyptius atque Arabarches, cuius ad effigiem non tantum meiiere fas est. vestibulis abeunt veteres lassique clientes votaque deponunt, quamquam longissima cenae spes homini; caulis miseris atque ignis emendus.

The day itself is divided by the most admirable order of things: the handout, then the forum and Apollo learned in law and the triumphators, among which the upstart

Egyptian, I know not whom, dares to have an inscription, the statue of which is only just worth pissing on.

Experienced weary clients depart from the entrance-courts and they abandon the prayer, although the most long-desired prayer of men, for a dinner; it is made up for with cabbage and coals for the wretches.¹⁰⁶

While lacking in direct information, Quintilian and Pliny use language when describing the claque that suggests their attendance and payment possibly were not entirely free enterprise, but rather the pursuit of one of the funda­mental tenets of clientship — supporting one's patron in the courts.

Martial describes a scene in which it is certain that an individual was pre­sent in the court and participated in the very same way as the hired claque because a patron/client relationship existed between him and the advocate. This relationship clearly was not formed on the floor of the courtroom. It would appear that Martial himself is the client:

Exigis a nobis operam sine fine togatam:

non eo, libertum sed tibi mitto meum.

“Non est” inquis “idem.” multo plus esse probabo.

vix ego lecticam subsequar, ille feret.

in turbam incideris, cunctos umbone repellet: invalidum est nobis ingenuumque latus.

quidlibet in causa narraveris, ipse tacebo: at tibi tergeminum mugiet ille sophos. lis erit, ingesti faciet convicia voce: esse pudor vetuit fortia verba mihi.

“Ergo nihil nobis” inquis “praestabis amicus?” quidquid libertus, Candide, non poterit.

You demand from me togaed work without end:

I do not go, but I send my freedman to you.

You say, “That is not the same.” I will prove that it is much better.

I can scarcely follow a litter, he can carry it.

If you enter a crowd, he drives them all back with his elbow:

I have a weak and tender side.

No matter what you argue in your speech, I myself will be quiet: but that man will bellow “Bravo!” three times for you.

If you have a legal suit, he will pour out insults in a monstrous voice: decency prevents me from such strong language.

“So, you, a friend, will perform no service for me?”

Yes, Candidus, whatever my freedman cannot.¹¹²

The inclusion of the reference to the courts, within the larger context of the epigram, strongly suggests that this freedman’s attendance at the hearing was predetermined by the patronage relationship, and not solely by a desire on the part of the freedman to receive pay.¹¹³

Earlier, in the context of the logistics and methods by which audience members could earn pay, it was proposed that the advocate who indicated to his clerk that payment (sportula) be made to someone in the audience had no connection to the audience member, rather his attention was drawn to the stranger because of his active partipication.¹¹⁴ However, in light of Martial’s comments above, perhaps there in fact was a connection between these two. Possibly the reason the advocate noticed the individual and made a note was not because of the individual’s aggressive participation, but because he was one of his clientes. This reading would explain how the advocate or his clerk knew the audience member; the advocate saw one of his own clients in the audience and realised that he was indebted for the client’s participation. Martial’s patron likely would have made a similar note of his attendance.

Is it then possible to go one step further and conclude that, since the lan­guage describing the claque and the patronage institution is identical, all references to paid audience participation testify to a patron/client relation­ship between those audience members and the litigants or advocates? Re-examination of the sources with this question in mind reveals that, in fact, the only specific reference to individuals being hired to provide support for an advocate is found in Pliny's letter discussed above.¹¹⁵ In all the other references we cannot exclude the possibility that a patronage relationship existed between the advocate or litigant and those individuals in the audi­ence who seem to have been present only for pay.

It is therefore illogical to argue that the advocate had to buy his own praise, and that all references to people providing praise are evidence of a paid claque. Perhaps previous scholars, in an overzealous effort to equate the court­room claque described so vividly by Pliny with that found in the theaters, have unfairly underestimated the role of patronage. Since so many people had to be organized, were the manceps and mesochorus merely go-betweens for the advocate or litigant and their clients? This notion may be too extreme. A compromise would identify two groups of paid audience in the courtroom: those professionals with no ties to the participants in the case, the hired claque; and those people who were present out of patronage duties, either expecting some reward for their support or repaying a “debt” for previous support.¹¹⁸ If this description accurately describes the social links between some participants in the courtroom, the dynamic within changes drastically from pure capitalism to an additional arena for the public display of patron­age — continuing this institution's central role in the development of auctoritas and the conservation of the existing social hierarchy.

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Unquestionably the audience participated actively in the Roman courtroom and thereby played a role in the justice system. In an illuminating passage, Quintilian compares how a person reaches a conclusion from reading versus listening to a speech:

In lectione certius iudicium, quod audienti frequenter aut suus cuique favor aut ille laudantium clamor extorquet. Pudet enim dissentire, et velut tacita quadam verecundia inhibemur plus nobis credere, cum interim et vitiosa pluribus placent, et a conrogatis laudantur etiam quae non placent.

In reading, judgment is more reliable, because a listener frequently is swept away either by his own preference for a certain speaker or by the din of an enthusiastic audience. To disagree feels shameful, and a certain silent modesty stops us from believing our own opinion to be better; meanwhile defective speeches are pleasing to many and a claque praises even those speeches that are not pleasing.¹¹⁹

In today's courts, by contrast, the audience is only to observe, and outbursts are not tolerated. The public has participating representation — the judge, the advocates, and of course, the jury. This does not, however, stop the modern public from feeling the need to participate; in particularly disturbing cases, throngs outside the courtroom fulfil the role that the ancient audience could play within the courtroom itself. If we imagine the transfer of such displays into the courtroom, we can appreciate the powerful influence that such an audience could have on the procedure and, very likely, on the outcome.